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3PREFACE
Opiates originating in Afghanistan threaten the health 
and well-being of people in many regions of the world. 
Their illicit trade also adversely impacts governance, 
security, stability and development—in Afghanistan, in 
its neighbours, in the broader region and beyond.
The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, the 
second such report of the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime research project on the topic, covers 
worldwide flows of Afghan opiates, as well as trafficking 
in precursor chemicals used to turn opium into heroin. 
By providing a better understanding of the global impact 
of Afghan opiates, this report can help the international 
community identify vulnerabilities and possible counter-
measures.
Heroin is the most dangerous drug worldwide. This 
report presents data on the distribution of trafficking 
flows for Afghan opiates and their health impact through-
out the world. Trafficking in Afghan opiates is also very 
lucrative, generating some US$ 61 billion in illicit funds 
in 2009 (out of US$68 billion for the global illicit opiate 
trade, including other production sources). Most of this 
money went into the pockets of traffickers all along the 
transnational heroin distribution routes, and some went 
to insurgents. 
A worrying development that requires international 
attention is the increasing use of Africa as a way station 
for Afghan heroin shipments to Europe, North America 
and Oceania. This is fuelling heroin consumption in 
Africa, a region generally ill-equipped to provide treat-
ment to drug users and to fight off the corrupting effects 
of drug money.
Another new trend is the growing use of sea and air 
transport to move Afghan heroin around the world, as 
well as to smuggle chemicals used in heroin production 
into Afghanistan. Traffickers in Afghan heroin have tra-
ditionally relied on overland routes, and law enforce-
ment services will need to respond to this new threat. 
The response to the global threat from Afghan opiates 
requires increased international cooperation within the 
context of an integrated, comprehensive and cost-effec-
tive strategy that is based on the principles of shared 
responsibility, a balanced approach between demand and 
supply reduction, and respect for national sovereignty 
and human rights. 
The Paris Pact unites more than 50 States and interna-
tional organizations in the fight against Afghan opiates. 
At the regional level, this translates into counternarcotics 
information-sharing and joint cooperation initiatives 
like the Triangular Initiative (involving Afghanistan, Iran 
and Pakistan), the Central Asian Regional Information 
and Coordination Centre (CARICC) and Operation 
TARCET. With the support of these multi-lateral initia-
tives, national authorities have intercepted and seized 
tons of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals. 
The findings of this report identify areas that need more 
attention. Strengthening border controls at the most 
vulnerable points, such as along Afghanistan’s border 
with Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, could help stem the 
largest flows of heroin, opium and precursor chemicals. 
Increasing the capacity to monitor and search shipping 
containers in airports, seaports and dry ports at key tran-
sit points and in destination countries could improve 
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interdiction rates. Building capacity and fostering intel-
ligence sharing between ports and law enforcement 
authorities in key countries and regions would help step 
up interdiction of both opiates and precursor chemicals. 
Addressing Afghan opium and insecurity will help the 
entire region, with ripple effects that spread much far-
ther. Enhancing security, the rule of law and rural devel-
opment are all necessary to achieve sustainable results in 
reducing poppy cultivation and poverty in Afghanistan. 
This will benefit the Afghan people, the wider region 
and the international community as a whole.
But addressing the supply side and trafficking is not 
enough. We need a balanced approach that gives equal 
weight to counteracting demand for opiates. This is also 
part of the international community’s shared responsibil-
ity for the global drug problem; heroin-consuming 
countries need to do more to provide treatment, care and 
support for drug users to help them kick the habit, and 
also to prevent drug use.
Reports like this make an important contribution to 
understanding the global opiate problem and identifying 
where interventions are most likely to be successful. The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime will con-
tinue to contribute to the research effort by collecting 
and analyzing data, and helping to build the research 
capacity in national institutions and Governments, 
including in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In closing, I would like to thank our dedicated team of 
skilled field research staff in Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Central Asia who collect data on the Afghan opiate trade 
in often challenging and even dangerous circumstances. 
Thanks to them, this report is a unique and reliable 
source of information about the global Afghan opiate 
trade. 
Yury Fedotov
Executive Director
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
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• Globally, around 16.5 million people use illicit opiates 
annually (opium, heroin and morphine), generating a 
US$68 billion global opiate market in 2009.
• In Afghanistan and elsewhere, transnational organ-
ized crime groups were the main beneficiaries of this 
extremely profitable trade. UNODC estimates that 
the Afghan Taliban earned around US$155 million 
in 2009, Afghan drug traffickers US$2.2 billion, and 
Afghan farmers US$440 million. 
• Heroin is the most abused opiate worldwide, with 12-
13 million users consuming an estimated 375 tons of 
pure heroin per year (equal to 2,800 tons of opium). 
Opium abuse is also significant with users consum-
ing an estimated 1,300 tons of raw opium in 2009. 
In total, over 4,000 tons of opium production were 
needed to meet global heroin and opium consump-
tion in 2009. 
• Afghan production has largely exceeded estimated 
global demand for the past several years, resulting in 
the creation of large stocks (including 2,600 tons in 
2009). Stocks, in opium or morphine form (and to a 
lesser extent, pure brown heroin), accumulated in Af-
ghanistan and along major trafficking routes over the 
period 2005-2009, would amount to 10,000-12,000 
(opium equivalent) tons. 
• Although Afghan heroin is only directly trafficked to 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Central 
Asia, it flows from there to the rest of the world; in 
2009, UNODC estimates that 150 tons of Afghan 
heroin reached Europe, 120 tons Asia and 45 tons 
Africa. 
• Africa has received increasing Afghan heroin flows, 
re-emerging as a heroin trafficking route to Europe, 
and to a lesser extent, North America and Oceania in 
2009. Increasing flows of heroin to Africa are also ap-
parently generating some increase in heroin abuse in 
parts of the continent.
• In 2009, law enforcement bodies continued to stem 
the flow of heroin, seizing almost 76 tons of heroin 
worldwide. Depending on the purity of the heroin 
seized, the interdiction rate would amount to between 
2 and 16 per cent of the global heroin flow that year.
• Traditional emphasis on land border control to stem 
the flow of opiates into destination markets needs to 
be complemented with increased attention to traf-
ficking by sea and through seaports, which appears to 
play a growing but still insufficiently noticed role.
• Opiates have continued to cause severe health prob-
lems for drug abusers in 2009. More than 60 per cent 
of the drug treatment demand in Asia and Europe was 
related to heroin. 
• In Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries, the 
level of opiate consumption has risen sharply in the 
last decade. 
• Afghanistan, the centre of global heroin manufacture, 
has approximately 300-500 laboratories in operation 
with an output of approximately 380-400 tons of 
heroin per year. Heroin labs are mainly located where 
there is limited law enforcement capacity. 
• Acetic anhydride is the main chemical precursor used 
for manufacturing heroin. A tiny fraction (0.02 per 
cent, or some 475 tons) of the legitimate global trade 
(2 million tons a year) needs to be diverted to satisfy 
the needs of Afghanistan’s heroin processors. Europe 
and East Asia are the main regions of origin of the 
acetic anhydride trafficked into Afghanistan. 
• The patterns of acetic anhydride seizures that have 
developed around Afghanistan in recent years also 
strongly suggest that a focus on seaports is warranted.
• Despite a sharp decrease in opium production in Af-
ghanistan in 2010, and scattered reports of shortages 
of good quality heroin from some European countries, 
there were no major heroin shortages reported from 
consumer markets.
• Stopping the operations of the global Afghan opi-
ate market will require further efforts to eliminate 
production of, demand for and trafficking in Afghan 
opium and heroin. Increasing the effectiveness of 
interventions in these three interrelated areas also re-
quires guidance from threat monitoring and analysis 
efforts.
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Over the last decade, the global trade in illicit Afghan opi-
ates has been one of the world’s greatest transnational drug 
and crime threats – with severe consequences for health, 
governance and security at national, regional and interna-
tional levels. 
UNODC has undertaken numerous surveys and studies on 
aspects of the trade with a view to supporting countermea-
sures and initiatives at the national and international levels. 
These include the Paris Pact Initiative and its Rainbow 
Strategy. To complement these efforts and to help monitor 
and better understand the global impact of Afghan opiates, 
UNODC launched a research project dedicated to the 
threat of Afghan opiates in September 2008. The Project 
released its first report, Addiction, crime and insurgency: the 
transnational threat of Afghan opium in November 2009. 
The report mapped and measured global heroin and opium 
flows to main opiate markets, analysing market values and 
beneficiaries. The report also discussed the links security 
and the opium economy in Afghanistan and some of the 
neighbouring areas.
This report is the second from the Afghan Opiate Threat 
Assessment Project. In this report, the analysis is both 
deeper and broader in scope. Opiate market estimates and 
flows have been updated. The report also pays particular 
attention to the reverse flows of acetic anhydride trafficked 
into Afghanistan. 
Opiate trafficking
Globally, some 16.5 million people use opiates annually, 
generating a US$68 billion global opiate market in 2009. 
Heroin is the most abused opiate, with 12-13 million users 
globally consuming an estimated 375 tons of pure heroin 
per year. Opium abuse is also significant, with 3-4 million 
users consuming some 1,300 tons of raw opium. In addi-
tion to global consumption, an additional 2,600 tons of 
opium (or an equivalent amount of heroin or morphine) 
are estimated to have been stocked in Afghanistan and 
along trafficking routes in 2009. UNODC currently esti-
mates that there are between 10,000 and 12,000 tons of 
opium held in stockpiles – which may be sufficient for at 
least three years of heroin and opium abuse worldwide. 
In 2009, Afghan heroin was trafficked to numerous desti-
nations worldwide, with the exception of South and Cen-
tral America. Europe is the largest market for Afghan 
heroin. In 2009, 150 tons of pure Afghan heroin were esti-
mated to have been consumed in Europe. According to the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addic-
tion, heroin is present in the majority of drug-induced 
deaths reported in Europe, making heroin a significant 
public health threat. 
East and South-East Asia have also become significant des-
tinations for Afghan heroin due to the decrease in opium 
production in Myanmar during the last decade. Almost 50 
per cent of the Chinese market and most of the East Asian 
market may have been supplied by Afghan heroin in 2009.
Africa has also received increasing Afghan heroin flows, 
emerging as a cost-effective heroin trafficking route to 
Europe, North America and Oceania in 2009. Trafficking 
through this new route is likely facilitated by relatively high 
levels of corruption, widespread poverty and limited law 
enforcement capacity in many countries.  Increased pres-
sure on traditional heroin trafficking routes may be provid-
ing an incentive to traffickers to diversify itineraries and 
reopen the African route to Europe that had been very 
8THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE: A THREAT ASSESSMENT
Map 1: Heroin trafﬁcking ﬂows from Asia, 2009
Source: UNODC.
active in the 1980s and early 1990s. Increasing flows of 
heroin to Africa are also apparently leading to increases in 
drug abuse in parts of the continent.
The multiple threats engendered by Afghan opiates are not 
limited to distant destination markets. In Afghanistan and 
its neighbouring countries, the level of opiate consumption 
has risen sharply in the last decade. Some 35,000 hectares 
of opium poppy cultivation (out of a total of 123,000 ha in 
2009) are currently needed to produce the opiates con-
sumed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Afghan 
opium now presents significant public health and internal 
security challenges for the population of Afghanistan and 
its immediate neighbours; however, unlike in downstream 
markets, treatment facilities are very limited in these coun-
tries. 
In Afghanistan and elsewhere, transnational organized 
crime groups were the main beneficiaries of the US$68 bil-
lion trade in 2009, which they supplemented with other 
forms of crime such as arms trafficking and human smug-
gling. In 2009, the Afghan Taliban was estimated to have 
earned around $150 million from the opiate trade, Afghan 
drug traffickers $2.2 billion, and Afghan farmers $440 mil-
lion. While the findings suggest that most insurgent ele-
ments content themselves with taxing the trade rather than 
attempting to become active participants, it now appears 
that some insurgents involve themselves directly in the 
heroin supply chain, including in the procurement of acetic 
anhydride. Anti-government elements based in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan may gain access to only a fraction of the value 
of Afghan opiate exports, but this is nonetheless enough to 
support logistics, operations and recruitment. 
Areas under insurgent influence, such as the border between 
Iraq and Turkey and the border between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, also provide a key competitive advantage for 
organized crime groups as those areas lie beyond the reach 
of law enforcement. If global organized crime groups man-
aging the opiate trade pocketed only 10 per cent of the 
profit, they would have earned at least $7 billion in 2009. 
All these illicit profits are laundered in one way or another, 
a process that undermines the vulnerable economies of 
areas such as the Balkans and Central Asia. 
In 2009, law enforcement bodies continued to stem the 
flow of heroin, seizing almost 76 tons of heroin worldwide. 
The interdiction rate was between 2 and 16 per cent, 
depending on the purity of the heroin seized. Dropping of 
trade barriers across many parts of the globe has not only 
facilitated the movement of illicit goods, but also closer 
interaction between organized criminal groups from differ-
ent locations and cultures. Drug traffickers will almost 
certainly exploit this situation and make connections with 
other criminal networks to facilitate the smooth movement 
of heroin.
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Traffickers tend to shift routes and change their modus 
operandi as law enforcement pressure increases. Traditional 
methods of land border control may not be sufficient to 
stem the flow of opiates into destination markets. With 
traditional emphasis on land border and airport control, the 
use of maritime transportation and seaports by opiate traf-
fickers appears to have received too little attention. In 
2009, just 6 per cent of global heroin seizures made by 
customs departments occurred at seaports, although there 
are indications that heroin traffickers are utilizing maritime 
transportation much more than currently estimated. 
Acetic anhydride trafficking
Acetic anhydride is a precursor chemical essential to the 
production of heroin. Global manufacture of acetic anhy-
dride reaches 2 million tons annually, but only a fraction 
– some 475 tons (or 0.02 per cent) – is needed to satisfy the 
demand of Afghanistan’s heroin processors. The European 
market was heavily targeted by traffickers in 2008-2009 
and remains an area vulnerable to diversion. Afghan organ-
ized crime groups have also penetrated several regions in 
Asia and cooperate with indigenous groups to traffic heroin 
processing chemicals into Afghanistan. In Afghanistan 
itself, traffickers managed a domestic acetic anhydride 
market estimated at $130-$ million in 2009. In the 
same year, some 38 tons of acetic anhydride were seized in 
Afghanistan, most of which was seized at heroin production 
sites in the south, with the help of coalition forces. 
Acetic anhydride trafficking for Afghan heroin production 
is multi-directional, but Central and South-Eastern Europe 
appear to straddle a major artery, which mostly pumps 
diverted acetic anhydride out of the trade within the Euro-
pean Union. In 2008, Slovenia and Hungary alone seized 
156 tons, equivalent to nearly two thirds of global seizures 
and more than a third of the illicit requirements of Afghan-
istan that year. On the other side of the globe, diversion 
from domestic trade is also important; diversions from the 
Republic of Korea and other South-East Asian countries 
appear to supply a significant proportion of the acetic anhy-
dride transiting Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
In diverting from domestic trade, traffickers still face a low 
level of risk with the potential for rich rewards. 
With Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran positioned 
between acetic anhydride-producing regions and an acetic 
anhydride-consuming country (Afghanistan), the transit of 
acetic anhydride through their borders is inevitable. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran receives heroin chemicals across its 
border with Turkey, but also from northern Iraq and 
through its southern seaports. Pakistan receives smuggled 
acetic anhydride from multiple directions and accounted 
for 70 per cent of acetic anhydride seizures in countries 
bordering Afghanistan (excluding China). Afghanistan’s 
southern frontier with Pakistan appears to receive the lion’s 
share of acetic anhydride due to porous borders and limited 
capacity for detection and enforcement.
Central Asia witnessed seizures of 260 tons of acetic anhy-
dride from 1995-2000, but from 2001-2010 it seized less 
than half a ton. The role of the so-called ‘Northern route’ 
through Central Asia appears secondary. However, there 
remains a question as to whether trafficking routes have 
quickly shifted or modus operandi has changed through 
Central Asia to avoid detection. 
Afghanistan, the centre of global heroin manufacture, has 
approximately 300-500 laboratories in operation with an 
output of approximately 380 tons of heroin per year. At the 
‘centre of the centre’, southern Afghanistan was responsible 
for 50 per cent of national manufacture in 2009 and 2010. 
The patterns of acetic anhydride seizures that have devel-
oped around Afghanistan in recent years strongly suggest 
that a focus on seaports is warranted. In the high-seizure 
countries of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, 80 
per cent of the acetic anhydride seized in 2008-2010 was 
interdicted in seaports.
Based on arrests resulting from seizures, it appears that 
networks of Afghan and Pakistani nationals play an impor-
tant role in diverting acetic anhydride, even in distant 
producing countries where respective diasporas are rela-
tively small, namely the Republic of Korea and Japan. By 
contrast, most groups involved in trafficking acetic anhy-
dride through Europe and the Balkan route seem to be 
loose multi-national networks usually composed of local 
nationalities working jointly with Turkish citizens. Heroin 
is often used as a barter currency to purchase acetic anhy-
dride on the Balkan route, notably in Turkey.
Policy implications 
Stopping the operations of the deadly and globalizing 
Afghan opiate market that has exploded over the last 20 
years will require further efforts to gradually eliminate pro-
duction of, demand for and trafficking in Afghan opium 
and heroin. Increasing the effectiveness of interventions in 
these three inter-related areas requires guidance from accu-
rate information and assessments of the problem and of the 
ways in which the performance of counter-measures can be 
increased.
There is a strong link between insecurity and opium poppy 
cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan. Anti-govern-
ment elements are partly funding their operations from the 
opiate trade. In most of the Afghan provinces where secu-
rity is better, there is either no or very limited opium poppy 
cultivation. Conversely, the main poppy cultivation areas of 
the country are found in the insecure southern provinces. 
Further improving security in Afghanistan appears there-
fore as a critical precondition for controlling opium poppy 
cultivation in the country. 
Heroin trafficking occurs mainly through Afghan border 
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provinces with weak law enforcement and border control. 
Although considerable improvements have been brought to 
a number of border control points, there are still many areas 
along Afghanistan’s borders that are not well protected or 
monitored, such as the borders between the southern prov-
inces of Afghanistan (Hilmand, Kandahar and Nimroz) 
and the Baluchistan province of Pakistan. Drug traffickers 
take advantage of this situation and heavily use these bor-
ders for trafficking opium, heroin and acetic anhydride 
from one country to the other. The capacity to control 
these border crossings should be further increased. 
In addition to land borders, the sea- and airports of Afghan-
istan’s immediate neighbors have become increasingly used 
for heroin and acetic anhydride trafficking. Maritime trans-
portation, in particular, appears to have gained in impor-
tance for traffickers, be it for exporting heroin to the 
re-emerging African route, or for importing acetic anhy-
dride destined to heroin processing labs in Afghanistan. 
Consequently, interdiction capacity at vulnerable seaports, 
including dry ports, should be improved, notably in Paki-
stan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, but also in other 
transit and destination countries. 
Only some 2 per cent of the millions of containers shipped 
every year across the globe can be physically searched. More 
generally, the further drugs move away from their source, 
the more fragmented, diverse and widespread drug ship-
ments become, making it extremely difficult for law 
enforcement agencies to detect and intercept them in the 
legitimate and ever growing flows of goods and people. 
Particular attention needs to be paid, therefore, to stepping 
up interdiction efforts and capacity as close as possible to 
the Afghan opiate source, as well as to increasing intelli-
gence sharing among concerned law enforcement agencies.
In addition to increased law enforcement capacity, social 
and economic conditions need to be improved in Afghani-
stan and the poorest areas in the region. Although there is 
no direct causal link between poverty and drug production 
and trafficking, where security and the rule of law is weak, 
drug traffickers and anti-government elements find in dis-
advantaged areas more fertile ground to promote illicit drug 
production and to recruit young males in the ranks of 
armed and drug trafficking groups. 
The vast majority of heroin produced in Afghanistan is 
consumed outside of Afghanistan and its immediate region. 
Although heroin demand has stabilized worldwide, there 
are no signs of a decrease at present. Afghanistan and its 
neighbours cannot bear alone the burden of stopping the 
operation of the global opiate market.  In line with the 
principles of shared responsibility and a balanced approach 
to reducing supply and demand, consuming countries, 
particularly in the regions that create the strongest demand 
Seizures (in liters)
> 150,000
> 80,000 <= 150,000
> 30,000 <= 80,000 
> 10,000 <= 30,000
> 3,000 <= 10,000
<= 3,0000
No data provided
Map 2: Global acetic anhydride seizures by country, 
1999-2010 (100 litres or more)
Source: UNODC country reports; United States of America Drug Enforcement Agency; reports of the International Narcotics Control Board on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-2009). Note: 
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted 
line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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pull, need to strengthen their own efforts to reduce opiate 
consumption within their borders and the outflow of drug 
money it generates. Strategic considerations, public health 
needs and humanitarian concerns all point to the need to 
increase, in line with international standards and guide-
lines, treatment efforts directed at core opiate users, who are 
both consuming the bulk of illicit opiates and suffering the 
most severe health and social consequences as a result of 
their use.
Increases in Afghanistan’s opiate production and trafficking 
in recent years have also caused an increase in opiate addic-
tion in Afghanistan and its neighbors. Sadly, facilities to 
provide treatment for drug addicts in the region are far 
from sufficient. As drug abuse, and its associated health 
impact (such as HIV/AIDS among injecting drug users) 
worsens in the region, the development of local treatment 
capacities needs to be given greater priority. 
UNODC research project on the  
Afghan Opiate Trade
The Afghan opiate trade continues to represent a severe 
global threat to public health, governance and security. 
Timely and accurate threat and risk analysis is essential to 
help shape the international response to this evolving prob-
lem and, with the support of the Member States, UNODC 
will continue to play its role in this research effort. The 
Afghan Opiate Trade Project will strive to continue provid-
ing timely and accurate analysis to UNODC and the 
Member States in 2012. However, timely analysis requires 
timely data. In that view, the project now relies on a net-
work of 16 dedicated staff located in 11 countries and has 
established strong links with key international organiza-
tions, Member States and other UNODC programmes and 
field offices. The project is also helping to build research 
capacity in national institutions and local governments, 
including in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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1. AFGHAN OPIATE TRAFFICKING
1.1 CURRENT STATE OF THE GLOBAL 
OPIATE MARKET
Developments in the global  
opiate market
Emergence of Africa
In 2009, Africa emerged as a cost-effective heroin traffick-
ing route to Europe, North America and Oceania. Drug 
seizures and the arrest of traffickers indicated that African 
drug traffickers – particularly West African networks – are 
increasingly transporting Afghan heroin from Pakistan into 
East Africa for onward shipment to Europe and elsewhere. 
During the first quarter of 2011, there were two major 
heroin seizures (each was above 100 kg) reported by Kenya 
and the United Republic of Tanzania. The emergence of 
Africa as a heroin trafficking hub is almost certainly due to 
ongoing corruption, widespread poverty and limited law 
enforcement capacity – as well as increased pressure on 
traditional drug trafficking routes. 
The most fragile African states are particularly vulnerable, 
as drug trafficking organizations are able to exploit the low 
capacity at seaports and airports. Indeed, East Africa’s min-
imal law enforcement at ports of entry has encouraged drug 
traffickers to transit heroin from Pakistan or Gulf countries 
through East Africa. Once in East Africa, Afghan heroin 
flows to Europe, North America, South-East Asia and 
Oceania – either directly or via other African countries. 
Increasing flows of heroin to Africa have also led to increases 
in drug abuse across the continent. Indeed, African author-
ities have reported increases in both drug trafficking and 
heroin abuse. However, drug abuse estimates are likely to 
be unrealistically low due to a lack of comprehensive data. 
Removal of trade barriers
Removal of trade barriers in many parts of the globe has not 
only facilitated the movement of illicit goods, but also 
closer interaction between organized criminal groups from 
different locations and cultures. In 2009, international 
trade agreements – both regional and bilateral – had a sig-
nificant impact on opiate trafficking routes and criminal 
networks, especially in Europe. Recently, several countries 
lifted visa requirements bilaterally or at the regional level. 
Drug traffickers may exploit this situation and make con-
nections with other criminal networks to facilitate the 
smooth movement of heroin. For example, Afghan opiate 
traffickers may take advantage of the recently signed trade 
agreement between the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus. Heroin trafficking is likely to increase through 
Central Asia in the coming years, further fuelling health, 
economic and security problems in the region.1 Therefore, 
information and intelligence sharing between the countries 
will become increasingly important to stop heroin traffick-
ing. 
Use of maritime transport 
Given the ongoing removal of trade barriers globally, tradi-
tional methods of border control may become increasingly 
unable to stem the flow of opiates into destination markets. 
In particular, traffickers’ use of maritime transportation and 
seaports has been identified as a key emerging threat – one 
which is largely overlooked by international law enforce-
ment. Traffickers are already capitalising on increased global 
trade along sea routes. In 2009, more than 400 million 
containers were shipped worldwide, yet only 2 per cent of 
these containers were inspected. It is impossible to control 
1 Balkan Info Report 2010, Zollkriminalant.
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every container transiting sea ports. In addition, narcotics 
control capacity is often lacking. Therefore, it is necessary 
to increase the law enforcement capacity at sea ports and 
information or intelligence exchange between countries to 
stop heroin trafficking via maritime transportation. 
In 2009, just 6 per cent of global heroin seizures made by 
customs departments occurred at seaports. Such limited 
seizures are likely the result of high levels of global con-
tainer transportation, limited law enforcement capacity at 
most seaports and a general lack of awareness. Yet indica-
tions suggest that drug traffickers are utilizing maritime 
transportation much more intensively than currently esti-
mated. For example, in 2009, all heroin seized in South 
Asian seaports originated in Pakistan, yet no heroin seizures 
were made at Pakistani seaports. Drug trafficking through 
international seaports must be further studied and moni-
toring mechanisms enacted.
Decline in Myanmar’s heroin production 
affecting South-East Asia
Although opium production in Myanmar has been in 
decline since the 1990s – when Afghanistan emerged as the 
key global opium producer – production had been suffi-
cient to fill local and even some regional demand. However, 
current seizure data and drug abuse estimates suggest that 
Myanmar’s heroin production has further declined and was 
insufficient to meet regional demand in 2009. Larger quan-
tities of Afghan heroin are now trafficked into the region to 
fill the void – there are even unconfirmed reports that 
Afghan heroin might be available in Myanmar itself. 
Given Myanmar’s decline, it is not surprising that Afghan 
heroin is increasingly trafficked into China and other 
South-East Asian countries to meet domestic consumption 
needs. Although small amounts are trafficked overland into 
China, it is likely that the majority of Afghan heroin reaches 
China via maritime transport from Pakistan, or via other 
South-East Asian countries. The level of Afghan heroin 
trafficking into China is dependent on the level of opium 
production in Myanmar. For example, in 2010, opium 
production in Myanmar increased by 76 per cent, resulting 
in less Afghan heroin reaching China compared to 2009.  
Emergence of opiate production  
in new locations
While Afghanistan and Myanmar have been the traditional 
producers of opiates, the extent of opiate production in 
other regions of the world is now emerging. 
India has been the leading licit producer of opium for dec-
ades, although the estimated quantity converted from licit 
to illicit form is very limited, or possibly non-existent. 
However, seizures, drug consumption estimates and the 
Annual Report Questionnaire provided by the Indian Gov-
ernment may suggest that some 15 tons of heroin – or 3 per 
cent of global supply – are illicitly produced in India. 
According to Indian Government estimates,2 half of India’s 
heroin consumption and all of India’s opium consumption 
(70 tons) was met by domestic supply. In order to produce 
these amounts of heroin and opium in 2009, India was 
estimated to have at least 7,500 hectares of illegal opium 
cultivation. Although an estimated 6 tons of Indian heroin 
is exported regionally, Indian drug traffickers prefer to 
export Afghan heroin due to its higher purity and greater 
profits when trafficking to other destinations. For further 
clarity on local production, the Indian Government is plan-
ning to launch an opium poppy survey in 2011, in coop-
eration with UNODC.
The Americas are also increasing heroin production areas. In 
2009, Mexico produced 426 tons of opium3 which could 
yield 40 tons of ‘black tar’ heroin – a type of heroin con-
sumed exclusively in the Americas. Despite being better 
known for its cocaine, Colombia also produced 10 tons of 
opium in 2009 – which could yield 1 ton of heroin. Sur-
prisingly, in 2009 the Guatemalan Government also 
reported producing 15 per cent of the country’s total opium 
consumption. Given that only 13 out of 42 countries in the 
Americas provided drug consumption data in 2009, it is 
likely that opium production and consumption are higher 
than currently estimated.
Although few countries actually process opium into heroin, 
many countries that consume raw opium have a limited 
local production. In 2009, Egypt was the only country in 
Africa that reported opium abuse; with a local demand esti-
mated at 44 tons, it is likely that the country hosts between 
1,500-2,500 hectares of illegal opium poppy cultivation. 
Eastern European countries commonly use a form of opium 
called kompot or cherniashka – a mixture of opium poppy 
straw and other chemicals. Given the difficulty of trafficking 
poppy straws (due to its strong odour) and negligible sei-
zures into Eastern Europe, it is likely that demand is met by 
local production. Further research is needed to determine 
the extent of Eastern European opium cultivation.  
Trends of opium production  
in Afghanistan
Opium cultivation remained consistent in 2009 and 2010; 
however opium production decreased by 48% in 2010 – 
from 6,900 tons to 3,600 tons – due to a disease in the 
opium plants. Disease often plagues opium plants in 
Afghanistan, last affecting production in 2004.
Due to the decrease in opium production, fresh opium 
prices (per kg) increased from US$48 in 2009 to US$128 
in 2010 at the opium poppy harvest time (May – June). By 
December 2010, opium prices had reached US$240 per kg. 
However, since farmers sold most of their opium produc-
tion right after harvest time, only traders benefited from the 
increased prices. Opium traders are the main beneficiaries 
and manipulators of the opium market in Afghanistan. 
2 Annual Report Questionnaire, India.
3 World Drug Report 2011, UNODC.
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In 2010, 53 per cent of Afghanistan’s total opium poppy 
cultivation was in Hilmand province – enough to satisfy 
global opiate consumption, if disease did not reduce out-
puts. 
According to UNODC’s Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid 
Assessment 2011,4 a further slight decrease in opium poppy 
cultivation is expected in 2011. However, even if cultiva-
tion remains stable or decreases slightly, opium production 
may increase in Afghanistan in 2011 due to the increase in 
opium production yield per hectare – assuming no further 
disease occurs. Moreover, opium cultivation is likely to 
slightly increase in eastern and northern Afghanistan due to 
the increasing opium prices. 
Exposed scale of drug abuse in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Islamic Republic 
of Iran and Central Asia
Although Afghanistan is well known as the dominant global 
producer of opium, and its neighbours as key drug traffick-
ing transit countries, drug addiction within these countries 
is much less known. Indeed, drug abuse surveys have been 
historically difficult to conduct in these countries, with the 
extent of drug abuse only recently emerging.
The results of Afghanistan’s Drug Abuse Survey, conducted 
in 2009, identified a major problem. From 2005-2009 the 
number of regular opium users had jumped 53 per cent to 
230,000 people, while the number of heroin users had 
increased to 120,000, a leap of 140 per cent.5 Indeed, at 
2.65 per cent, Afghanistan’s opiate prevalence rate is cur-
rently the highest worldwide. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
also has one of the highest global opiate prevalence rates, 
estimated at 2.26 per cent,6 or 1.2 million users in 2009. 
Pakistan is also affected, with an opiate prevalence rate 
estimated at 0.7% or 727,500 people. As a key transit route 
from Afghanistan to the Russian Federation, it is not sur-
prising that Central Asia has a significant opiate abuse 
problem, with an estimated 358,000 opiate users. 
In 2009, at least 35,000 hectares of opium poppy cultiva-
tion was necessary to produce enough opium to satisfy 
demand in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of 
4 UNODC, January 2011, Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment 2011 
(Phase I).
5 UNODC, 2009, Drug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey.
6 World Drug Report, 2011.
Iran and Central Asia. Increasing domestic and regional 
demand is making it difficult for Afghanistan and its neigh-
bours to eliminate opium poppy crops. Given the high 
levels of estimated opiate abuse, both the Islamic Republic 
of Iran and Pakistan have planned to undertake new drug 
abuse surveys, with results due in 2011. 
Lack of global drug consumption  
information
Global statistics on the number of opiate users and per 
capita consumption are only estimates, as UNODC figures 
are limited by the availability of information. In 2009, only 
one third of the countries in the Americas provided drug 
consumption data; Oceania data was limited to Australia 
and New Zealand; and from Asia – a continent that is esti-
mated to contain 48 per cent of global heroin users – just 
16 out of 47 countries provided drug consumption data. 
However, some regions responded well in 2009, including 
Europe with 16 out of 21 countries providing data. As 
more holistic regional data is provided, UNODC can make 
more accurate estimates and those countries involved can 
design better and more effective measures to cope with drug 
abuse in their region.
Drug consumption data is critical not only for developing 
social interventions, but also for estimating the volume of 
flows, organized crime profits and even amounts of global 
poppy fields. Significant information gaps remain for many 
countries. In addition, very limited data is available on the 
purity of heroin processed in Afghanistan, the purity of 
heroin seized by each country or the purity of heroin used 
by consumers. Purity levels are also critical in predicting 
volumes of heroin trafficked, dilution points and criminal 
profits. Despite a decade of considerable international 
funding to fight opium cultivation in Afghanistan, there is 
no reliable scientific data on the morphine content of Afghan 
opium. Morphine content is fundamental for estimating 
the amount of opium used to manufacture 1 kg of heroin 
– enabling estimates of poppy fields and annual opium 
yields. 
Global market volume 
In 2009, 460-480 tons of pure heroin and 1,300 tons of 
opium were trafficked to consumers worldwide. Afghani-
stan remains dominant as global supplier, with Afghan 
Opiate users Heroin consumption Opium consumption
Afghanistan 350,000 5 230
Pakistan 727,500 20 132
Islamic Republic of Iran 1,200,000 16 476
Central Asia 358,000 11 36
Total (rounded) 2,635,000 53 874
Source: UNODC, 2009, Drug Use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey and World Drug Report, 2010.
Table 1: Opiate consumption in Afghanistan and the region, (tons) 2009
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heroin trafficked all over the world. Demand and consump-
tion of other opiates, however, is concentrated in specific 
countries or regions.
Opiate supply
Although heroin was produced in six countries in 2009 – 
Afghanistan, Myanmar, Mexico, India, Colombia and the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic – Afghanistan domi-
nated the market, supplying 84% of the world’s consumed 
heroin. The remaining countries produced much smaller 
quantities that mainly served local or regional markets. 
Indeed, Afghanistan has developed a monopoly over the 
opiate market since the 1990s, when South-East Asian 
production – especially in Myanmar – began steadily declin-
ing. In 2009, global opium supplies were also dominated by 
Afghanistan; although opium was also produced in Myan-
mar, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mexico, India, 
Egypt and in some Eastern European countries for local 
and regional consumption. Afghan heroin is trafficked glo-
bally – with the exception of Central and South America.
Heroin produced in Afghanistan is estimated to have a 
purity of 70 per cent and is known as ‘pure heroin.’7 How-
ever, purity levels decline rapidly along trafficking routes, as 
criminal networks dilute heroin with other chemicals to 
increase profits. By the time heroin reaches the consump-
tion market it is usually between 5-15 per cent purity. The 
other supplying countries produce much smaller quantities 
of heroin. Although Colombian heroin is of very high 
purity – sometimes reaching the upper 90th percentile 
range – it is insufficient to meet demand in the Americas 
and has a very limited reach. Mexican heroin mainly takes 
the form of black tar heroin and is used almost exclusively 
within the Americas.
With significant amounts of heroin and opium  
produced every year – where does it go and who  
consumes it?
Opiate demand
Opiate consumption and drug abuse are global problems, 
with consumers in every country, regardless of race, religion, 
politics or economics. Globally, some 16.5 million people 
are considered opiate abusers. Heroin is the most com-
monly abused opiate, chosen by 75-85% of global users. 
However a range of opiates are consumed worldwide – not 
just heroin – including raw opium, morphine and local 
types of opiates, such as kompot or cherniashka.8 Although 
heroin has a global consumer base, raw opium consumption 
is largely restricted to areas of Asia, kompot or cherniashka 
are consumed almost exclusively in Eastern Europe, and 
morphine has an extremely limited consumer base. 
7 Further research needs to be done on purity levels of heroin in Afghanistan, 
especially morphine content.
8 Produced by mixing locally grown poppy with acetic anhydride. 
Heroin 
In 2009, an estimated 12-13 million global heroin users 
consumed 375 tons of pure heroin.9 Table 2 contains num-
bers of heroin users and consumption figures broken down 
by region and subregion.
The global distribution of heroin users and consumption 
levels become even starker when displayed graphically. 
Importantly, countries with high numbers of users do not 
necessarily consume corresponding high levels of heroin; 
consumption per capita varies significantly between coun-
tries. For example, although Europe has fewer heroin users 
than Asia, its consumption per capita is higher.
Certain regions or countries stand out as key heroin con-
sumption markets within each continent. In Europe, West, 
Central and East Europe contained significant numbers of 
users, while in Africa, the belt across East, Central and West 
Africa dominated the continent. North America accounted 
for 83 per cent of consumption in the Americas; Australia 
dominated Oceania with 80 per cent of the region’s con-
sumption; and China accounted for one third of Asian 
consumption. 
At the country-level, the top five heroin consuming nations 
in 200910 were the Russian Federation, China, the United 
States of America, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. Also, 
Afghanistan – the world’s largest opiate producer – and 
many of its immediate neighbours were among the top 15 
heroin consuming countries.   
Opium
As mentioned previously, raw opium consumption is much 
more limited than heroin consumption – both in terms of 
number of users and geographic reach. In 2009, there were 
an estimated 3-4 million opium abusers worldwide con-
suming 1.3 tons of opium. Of the total number of global 
9 Pure heroin refers to heroin of 70 per cent purity, which is roughly equivalent 
to 2,600 tons of heroin of 10 per cent purity. 
10  Based on the current data available to UNODC.
Fig. 1: Global heroin producers (tons and per cent 
share), 2009
Source: UNODC.
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users, 2.1 million users – accounting for 84 per cent of 
consumption – were in Asia. Cultural practices and tradi-
tion are the main underlying reasons for the concentration 
of opium abuse in Asia. Smoking of opium is a traditional 
practice in South-West Asian and South Asian countries, 
especially in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Afghan-
istan and India. 
Having understood global opiate supply and demand 
trends, how do the opiates get from the supplier to the 
consumer? And who benefits?
Global market shape 
Opiate trafficking from production countries to consumer 
markets requires a global network of routes and facilitation 
by domestic and international criminal groups. Although 
exact routes are constantly changing, the global movement 
of opiates from Afghanistan to consumers follows well-
established geopolitical paths. Although farmers in Afghan-
istan supply much of the world’s opiates, it is the international 
criminal networks along trafficking routes that earn billions 
of dollars every year.
Key opiate trafﬁcking routes
As the key global producer, almost all international opiate 
flows originate in Afghanistan. From Afghanistan, exact 
heroin trafficking routes to consumer markets are not fixed 
and can change depending on the risk perception of drug 
traffickers.
Global routes
Heroin flows from Afghanistan in three main directions – 
to Pakistan, to the Islamic Republic of Iran and to Central 
Asia. From these border countries, Afghan heroin is 
Table 2: Estimated number of heroin users and consumption (tons) worldwide, 2009
Region/ 
Subregion
Heroin users Heroin consumption
Number of  
users
Percentage of  
total users
Quantity 
(tons)
Percentage of total 
consumption
AFRICA
Eastern Africa 533,000 4.3% 13 4%
Northern Africa 168,000 1.4% 5 1%
Southern Africa 242,000 2.0% 3 1%
Western and Central Africa 793,000 6.4% 13 4%
AFRICA Total 1,736,000 14.0% 34 9%
AMERICAS
Central America 20,000 0.2% 0 0%
North America 1,380,000 11.2% 22 6%
South America 208,000 1.7% 2 1%
The Caribbean 64,000 0.5% 1 0%
AMERICAS Total 1,672,000 13.5% 25 7%
ASIA
Central Asia and Transcaucasia 322,000 2.6% 13 3%
East and South-East Asia 3,243,000 26.2% 82 22%
South Asia 1,156,000 9.3% 23 6%
Near and Middle East Asia 484,000 3.9% 18 5%
South-West Asia 712,000 5.8% 25 7%
ASIA Total 5,917,000 47.8% 160 43%
EUROPE
Eastern Europe 1,581,000 12.8% 73 20%
Northern Europe 57,000 0.5% 3 1%
South-Eastern Europe 150,000 1.2% 5 1%
Western and Central Europe 1,194,000 9.6% 70 19%
EUROPE Total 2,982,000 24.1% 151 40%
OCEANIA 69,000 0.6% 4 1%
OCEANIA Total 69,000 0.6% 4 1%
Total (rounded) 12,376,000  375
Source: UNODC.
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Heroin users
> 1,000,000
500,000 − 1,000,000
250,000 − 500,000 
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No data
Map 3: Geographic distribution of heroin users, by country, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
Heroin consumption (kg)
> 50,000
20,000 − 50,000
10,000 − 20,000 
2,000 − 10,000
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No data
Map 4: Global heroin consumption, by country, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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trafficked to every region in the world, with the only excep-
tion of South and Central America. Despite the complexity 
of heroin trafficking routes, some global movements can be 
generalized. 
From Pakistan, heroin is trafficked to the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, China, South-East Asia, North America and Africa. 
Once in Asia, Afghan heroin combines with locally pro-
duced heroin to meet regional demand, as well as being 
trafficked onward to Oceania, particularly Australia. 
From the Islamic Republic of Iran, heroin is trafficked to 
Europe, North America, the Middle East and Africa. How-
ever, the majority of heroin trafficked from the Islamic 
Republic of Iran enters Turkey and travels along the ‘Balkan 
Route’ into Western and Central Europe.
From Central Asia, heroin is trafficked into China and the 
Russian Federation before moving along the ‘Northern 
Route’ across Eastern Europe, Northern Europe and into 
Western and Central Europe. 
As mentioned previously, heroin trafficked to Africa is not 
just for use on the continent. Africa is emerging as a new 
transit point for heroin destined for Europe and to a lesser 
extent, North America and Oceania.
Calculating volumes and routes
Heroin trafficking routes are extremely complex. Estimat-
ing the scope of the global flow of Afghan opiates requires 
data on global opium/heroin demand as discussed in the 
previous section. Global heroin and opium seizures were 
used to identify heroin/opium trafficking routes, and to 
help estimate the size of the heroin/opium flows in each 
country. In addition to the seizure data, information was 
drawn from official country reports such as ARQ (Annual 
Report Questionnaire) responses provided to UNODC. 
Available demand data was used as the key variable to esti-
mate the size of the heroin/opium flows in the world. The 
robustness of demand data varies from region to region and 
country to country and is subject to revisions and changes. 
Most countries still lack structured or organized data collec-
tion systems capable of producing scientifically sound 
demand, supply and seizure statistics. 
Accordingly, the statistics and estimates provided on heroin/
opium demand and opiate flows should be viewed as work 
in progress and the best current approximations, given the 
available data. These figures are calculated to assist Member 
States and international organizations in preparing global 
policies to combat heroin trafficking worldwide. A more 
detailed explanation of this methodology is contained in 
Annex 1.
Map 4 indicates the volume of heroin trafficked interna-
tionally during 2009 – which combined gives an overview 
of the global drug trafficking ‘pattern’. Although Afghan 
heroin is only directly trafficked to the Islamic Republic of 
Opium consumption (kg)
> 250,000
100,000 − 250,000
50,000 − 100,000 
< 50,000
Negligible
Map 5: Global opium consumption, by country, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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World heroin market
> USD 5 billion
USD 3 − 5 billion
USD 1 − 3 billion 
USD 100 million − 1 billion
< USD 100 million
No data
Map 7: The value of the heroin market in 2009, by country
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia, it flows from these coun-
tries all over the world; 77 tons of Afghan heroin reached 
Western and Central Europe, 40 tons entered China, 44 
tons made it to Africa and 25 tons entered South-East Asia.
In 2010, there were reports that heroin trafficking had 
increased along certain routes, especially via Africa to 
Europe. In addition, various international organizations 
reported changes along well-known routes, such as the 
Balkan and Northern routes to Europe. For instance, Turkey 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran reported that traffickers 
were smuggling small quantities of heroin rather than large 
hauls via the Balkan route11 - an indication that law enforce-
ment efforts may be making an impact.
Using the figures and routes shown in Map 4, the remain-
der of this report will seek to explain the mechanisms, 
finances, criminal networks and social and political factors 
that surround each of these flows.  
Global value and beneﬁciaries
In 2009, the global opiate market was worth US$68 bil-
lion, with heroin consumers paying $61 billion and opium 
consumers paying $7 billion. Heroin and opium prices are 
dependent on a number of factors, including purity, supply 
and demand, distance from the source and risk of intercep-
tion.  
Given the global spread of heroin users and consumption 
outlined in the previous section, it is not surprising that the 
financial value of the world heroin market follows a similar 
geographic pattern. This global pattern can be deceiving 
however, as heroin prices vary significantly across countries 
and regions. 
Figure 2 illustrates the global financial breakdown of the 
opiate market. Given that the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
estimated to have 1.2 million opiate users, yet contributes 
just 4 per cent of the value of the global market, it is clear 
that prices fluctuate significantly across the globe. Australia 
is the starkest example of global price variation – although 
Australian users represent just 0.85 per cent of total global 
heroin consumption, they contribute 4 per cent of global 
market value. Indeed, Australia is the most lucrative heroin 
market in the world, with a heroin street price of $230-370 
per gram. By comparison, one gram of heroin was worth 
around $170-200 in the United States of America and in 
Northern Europe, while consumers in Western and Central 
Europe paid $40-100 per gram. Overall, the Russian Fed-
eration and Western and Central Europe contributed 
almost half of the total global market value – with users 
paying $31 billion combined in 2009.
11 Meetings with Turkish Narcotics Police and Drug Control Headquarter of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2010.
Beneficiaries
Given the geographic spread of heroin users and the fact 
that heroin prices increase roughly with distance from the 
source, it is not surprising that criminal networks in Europe, 
Russia and South-East Asia pocketed most of the profits in 
2009. Indeed, beneficiaries in Afghanistan – including 
poppy farmers, the Taliban and other anti-government ele-
ments – earned significantly less than international criminal 
networks.
Although international organised crime groups dominate 
transnational trafficking, local sales in each country are 
conducted almost entirely by indigenous groups – includ-
ing domestic insurgent and separatist movements. A more 
specific, geographic break-down of beneficiaries and values 
highlights the most prominent global organised crime 
groups along the key heroin trafficking routes. 
Profits from heroin trafficking increase rapidly as heroin is 
moved along the trafficking route. Criminal networks ben-
efit by diluting heroin purity, enabling maximum benefit 
from increasing street prices. Indeed, the total farm-gate 
value of Afghan opium was just US$440 million in 2009, 
with elements of the Afghan insurgency likely to have made 
US$155 million. By comparison, in 2009 international 
(non-Afghan) organized crime groups made at least US$7 
billion in profits.12 
Indigenous groups – facilitating street-level heroin dealing 
– probably earned even more than international drug traf-
ficking networks. Indeed, with numerous individual domes-
tic markets worth billions of dollars each in 2009, criminal 
groups are highly unlikely to cease their activities – on the 
contrary, other groups will be enticed. If Afghanistan were 
to cease manufacturing heroin, these groups would 
 
12  Assuming a 10 per cent profit margin.
Fig. 2: Global opiate market value (amount in 
US$billion and share in per cent) in 2009 
($68 billion) 
Source: UNODC.
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undoubtedly ensure that manufacturing simply shifted 
elsewhere in order to satisfy global demand and secure their 
profits. Indeed, with operating budgets larger than many 
national governments, international organized crime 
groups pose a serious global threat. Moreover, exceptionally 
high profits from the heroin trade fuel corruption; as long 
as corruption exists, traffickers will always find a way to 
smuggle heroin to consumer markets.
Global opiate interdiction
Although much is known about drug trafficking suppliers, 
consumers, traffickers and even routes, interdiction remains 
difficult. Law enforcement efforts are frustrated by the fact 
that international traffickers constantly change their meth-
ods and routes, high profits fuel high-level corruption, and 
international cooperation initiatives take time to become 
effective. In 2009, 650 tons of opium, 76 tons of heroin 
and 24 tons of morphine were seized worldwide. These 
seizures were the highest annual seizures in the last decade, 
with a combined total equivalent to 1,500 tons of opium. 
Over the past 10 years there has been a 100 per cent 
increase in heroin seizures and a 171 per cent increase in 
opium seizures. To a certain extent, increasing seizures can 
be attributed to continual improvements in global law 
enforcement capacity. However, since 2005 opium produc-
tion reported in Afghanistan has also increased. 
Heroin seizures
In 2009, 460-480 tons of pure heroin was trafficked world-
wide. Of this amount, 76 tons were seized. Unfortunately 
it is not possible to estimate the exact interdiction rate, as 
there is no data available on the purity of the seizures. The 
Fig. 4: Global opiate seizures, 1999-2009
Source: UNODC.
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Fig. 3: Overview of the beneﬁciaries of Afghan opiate trafﬁcking, 2009
Source: UNODC.
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global interdiction rate could, therefore, be anywhere 
between 2 and 16 per cent.13 In 2009, 13 countries made 
seizures above 1 ton, jointly accounting for 83 per cent of 
all heroin seizures (see table). 
Heroin seizures are not just dependent on law enforcement 
capability. National seizure levels can change significantly 
13 Assuming that all seizures were of high-purity Afghan heroin (70%) the 
interception rate would be 16 per cent. However, as street-level heroin purity 
is significantly lower (10% average); the interdiction rate could be as little as 
2 per cent worldwide. 
over time due to changes in global production, domestic 
demand and transit volume, trafficking routes, corruption 
or political will. Indeed, in 2009 the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Turkey together made 53 per cent of all global 
heroin seizures. As both countries are key heroin transit 
countries, increased seizures are possibly due to the increase 
in law enforcement in those countries. On the other hand, 
the producing countries Afghanistan and Myanmar seized 
just 0.5 per cent and 4 per cent respectively of their esti-
mated domestic production in 2009.
Fig. 5: Organized crime groups beneﬁting from the Afghan opiate trade, 2009
Source: UNODC.
Country Heroin seizures (kg) Cumulative percentage
Islamic Republic of Iran 24,926 32%
Turkey 16,059 53%
China 5,838 61%
Russian Federation 3,152 66%
Afghanistan 2,188 69%
United States of America 2,100 71%
Pakistan 2,061 74%
Bulgaria 1,183 76%
Italy 1,149 77%
Tajikistan 1,133 79%
United Kingdom 1,100 80%
Myanmar 1,076 82%
India 1,045 83%
Rest of the world 12,389 100%
Source: UNODC, WCO.
Table 3: Distribution of heroin seizures in the world, 2009
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Table 4: Global heroin seizures by region/subregion (Kg), 1999-2009
Region/
Subregion
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Change 
(1999-
2009) %
Variation 
(kg)
AFRICA
East Africa 55 59 63 95 62 88 78 121 35 19 22 -60% -33
North Africa 29 49 55 66 36 57 57 77 90 217 896 2937% 866
Southern Africa 9 17 30 15 35 20 49 30 35 55 204 2187% 195
Western and  
Central Africa
138 79 77 115 106 238 140 108 167 20 105 -24% -33
Africa Total 231 204 226 291 240 402 325 335 328 311 1,227 431% 995
AMERICAS
Caribbean 27 136 220 181 123 137 210 294 54 155 39 43% 12
Central Amer-
ica 104 65 150 229 452 231 169 237 293 185 5 -95% -99
North America 1,548 2,013 2,327 3,052 2,675 2,222 2,172 2,153 2,754 2,268 2,596 68% 1,048
South America 714 942 1,406 1,818 1,633 1,794 1,484 1,154 865 994 893 25% 178
Americas Total 2,393 3,157 4,103 5,280 4,883 4,385 4,036 3,838 3,965 3,602 3,533 48% 1,139
ASIA
Central Asia and 
Transcaucasian  
countries
1,361 3,251 5,154 4,708 6,828 6,311 3,883 3,688 3,337 5,341 3,382 148% 2,021
East and  
South-East Asia
6,793 7,716 14,557 11,505 11,473 13,699 11,619 6,830 5,603 5,375 7,966 17% 1,173
Near and Middle 
East/South-West 
Asia
11,381 16,242 11,308 11,450 10,760 10,948 15,292 18,632 24,491 28,642 28,706 152% 17,325
South Asia 951 1,389 1,101 1,007 1,106 1,254 1,056 1,291 1,266 1,109 1,079 13% 128
Asia Total 20,486 28,598 32,120 28,670 30,166 32,211 31,849 30,442 34,696 40,468 41,133 101% 20,647
EUROPE
East Europe 719 1,010 1,299 1,055 3,256 3,908 4,706 2,494 3,453 3,957 3,152 339% 2,433
Southeast Europe 4,227 8,603 5,791 3,513 6,349 10,739 9,537 12,102 15,286 17,602 17,737 320% 13,510
West & Central 
Europe 7,920 11,619 10,571 9,477 8,419 9,198 7,922 7,575 7,656 7,647 6,913 -13% -1,007
Europe Total 12,866 21,233 17,661 14,045 18,024 23,845 22,165 22,171 26,394 29,206 27,802 116% 14,936
OCEANIA 361 941 88 460 530 73 152 67 65 80 170 -53% -191
Oceania Total 361 941 88 460 530 73 152 67 65 80 170 -53% -191
Grand Total 36,337 54,133 54,199 48,746 53,843 60,916 58,527 56,854 65,448 73,667 75,995 109% 39,658
Source: UNODC.
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Fig. 6: Global opium seizures, 1999-2009
Source: UNODC.
Table 6: Global morphine seizures (kg), 1999-2009
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Afghanistan 85 85 1,967 938 5,019 479 5,167
Islamic Republic 
of Iran 22,764 20,764 8,668 9,521 13,063 12,878 6,939 10,607 9,681 8,977 16,139
Pakistan 3,061 1,825 6,839 27,778 21,256 22,197 32,658 10,989 7,325 1,961
Turkey 441 2,500 797 7,890 1,010 4,730 529 529 169 87 16
Subtotal 23,205 26,325 11,290 24,250 41,935 38,949 31,631 44,732 25,858 16,868 23,283
Total morphine 
seizures  
(worldwide)
23,623 26,791 11,416 24,702 43,723 39,177 32,009 46,392 27,439 17,265 23,687
Source: UNODC.
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
O
p
iu
m
 s
ei
zu
re
s 
(k
g
)
I.R of Iran Total
Opium seizures
In 2009, roughly 650 tons of opium were seized globally 
– 89% of which was seized by the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Interestingly, although Afghanistan is a key producer of 
opium, only 5% of seizures occurred in the country. Given 
that only minimal quantities of opium were reportedly 
abused or seized in countries bordering the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, it is highly likely that most of the opium smug-
gled into the country was for domestic consumption and 
not onward trafficking. Opium seizures in Myanmar and 
India were from illicit domestic crops.
Over the last decade, the Islamic Republic of Iran has made 
the majority of global opium seizures. Between 1999 and 
2009, there was a 162 per cent increase in the quantity of 
opium seized worldwide. Although opium seizures increased 
by 52 per cent in Pakistan and 9 per cent in India during 
this period, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s 183 per cent 
increase in opium seizures was the primary driver behind 
this global increase. 
Morphine seizures
In 2009, 24 tons of morphine were seized globally – almost 
all of which was intercepted in just four countries: the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. 
With an almost negligible global consumer base, seizures of 
morphine have remained consistent over the last decade, 
both in terms of quantity and seizure location.
Although morphine consumption is limited, it is also used 
to process opium into heroin. Interestingly, while seizures 
declined in both Turkey and Pakistan in 2009, they 
increased sharply in the Islamic Republic of Iran – account-
ing for almost 70 per cent of all global morphine seizures. 
Given the small number of morphine users in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the reasons for trafficking large shipments 
of morphine into the country remain unclear.
Country
Opium 
seizures 
(kg)
Percent of 
total
Islamic Republic of Iran 579,400 89%
Pakistan 24,820 4%
Afghanistan 35,687 5%
Central Asia 3,474 1%
Myanmar 752 0%
India 1,732 0%
Rest of the world 3,833 1%
Total 653,172 100%
Source: UNODC.
Table 5: Global opium seizures, 2009
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1.2 AFGHANISTAN: THE ORIGIN OF  
OPIATES
Afghanistan continues to dominate global opiate supply. In 
2009, an estimated 6,900 tons of opium was cultivated 
across Afghanistan – some of this was consumed locally, 
some was stockpiled, some was seized, but most was proc-
essed into heroin. An estimated 365 tons of Afghan heroin 
was trafficked into the international market.   
Opiate production
Almost 95 per cent of the opium produced in Afghanistan 
is grown in the provinces of southern Afghanistan, includ-
ing Hilmand, Kandahar, Farah, Nimroz and Uruzgan. 
Heroin processing laboratories are also concentrated in 
these southern provinces. 
Opium cultivation in Afghanistan varies from year to year 
due to weather conditions, crop yield, law enforcement 
efforts and farmer re-training programmes.14 Yet, despite 
opium production decreasing sharply in 2010 – to just 
3,600 tons – due to a disease affecting the opium poppy 
plants, there was no major shortage of heroin or opium on 
the consumer markets. In addition, although opium prices 
14 For more information on opium cultivation trends see the UNODC annual 
Afghan Opium Survey.
more than doubled in Afghanistan between January and 
November 2010, recalling a similar occurrence in 2004, the 
increase in heroin prices in Afghanistan was minimal. This 
is possibly due to the presence of heroin stocks. Opium 
prices should correct in 2011, however, if opium prices 
continue to rise in Afghanistan and if heroin prices increase 
in the main consumer markets, it will be necessary to re-
assess the level of heroin demand in those markets, opium 
production estimates and the estimated size of opiate stocks. 
In 2009, the majority of global heroin processing also 
occurred in Afghanistan; an estimated 2,700 of the 6,900 
tons of raw opium produced in Afghanistan was used to 
manufacture heroin. Indeed, according to the head of 
Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) in 
Hilmand province, dozens of laboratories are concentrated 
in that province alone and, to a lesser extent, in Kandahar. 
Yet, the high volume of morphine seizures in neighbouring 
countries strongly suggests that heroin processing also 
occurs outside of Afghanistan. Drug traffickers and lab 
owners interviewed in Afghanistan reported that heroin of 
very high purity is manufactured outside of Afghanistan; 
however, no solid evidence has been found to prove the 
existence of large-scale heroin processing suspected to occur 
outside of Afghanistan. 
Map 8: Involvement of A.G.E in the opiate trade in Afghanistan, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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Opiate stocks
After heroin processing, the majority of the remaining 
4,200 tons of raw opium – an estimated 2,600 tons – was 
stocked by traders and to some extent, by farmers. How-
ever, the identity of those involved remains unclear, as does 
the exact locations of Afghanistan’s opium stocks. In any 
case, insurgents will benefit from the future sale of existing 
stocks. 
Traditionally, Afghan opium poppy farmers stock around 
10-20 per cent of their harvest to sell at a later date, with the 
majority being sold right after harvest time. Opium traders 
also stockpile their opium in case poppy cultivation declines 
or law enforcement pressures affect their supply. There are 
several hundred traders across Afghanistan. However, the 
size of the stocks depends on the traders’ importance. For 
example, some traders in Hilmand have up to 3 tons of 
stock, whereas small-scale traders have at most around 500 
kg in opium stocks. Some farmers in Nangarhar province 
reportedly still have stocks from the opium harvested 
between 2005 and 2009.15 As mentioned above, opium 
production in Afghanistan decreased in 2010, yet there were 
15 Interviews with farmers in Nangarhar (Afghanistan), 2010.
no major opium or heroin shortages in markets in or outside 
Afghanistan. This also occurred in 2001, where despite the 
sharp decrease in opium production in Afghanistan,16 there 
was no shortage of heroin in the main consumer markets. 
These events, coupled with anecdotal evidence, confirm the 
existence of opium stockpiles in Afghanistan. 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that heroin lab 
owners keep stocks. Since anti-government elements like 
the Afghan Taliban are not usually directly involved in the 
opium trade, it is generally believed that they do not keep 
any stocks either. This makes large opium farmers and 
opiate traders the main actors involved in stockpiling 
opium in Afghanistan. 
Given that heroin processing labs are mainly located in 
southern Afghanistan, opiate stocks are likely kept in the 
same region – as it is difficult to carry thousands of tons of 
opium. Opium is usually stocked in remote villages or 
poorer areas within the main towns. Opium traders and 
traffickers do not generally stock opium in their own houses 
or in houses of relatives, but rather, pay poor households a 
rental fee to hide opium on their property, often these 
16 The total opium popy cultivation in 2001 was only 8,000 hectares,
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2001, UNODC. 
Fig. 7: Dry opium prices in Afghanistan, 2004-2010
Source: UNODC.
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Table 7: Heroin prices in Afghanistan (US$), September 2009-September 2010
Afghanistan Sep-2009
Oct-
2009
Nov-
2009
Dec-
2009
Jan-
2010
Feb-
2010
Mar-
2010
Apr-
2010
May-
2010
Jun-
2010
Jul-
2010
Aug-
2010
Sep-
2010
Badakhstan 2,526 2,536 2,539 2,539 2,633 2,610 2,595 2,664 2,736 2,743 2,715 2,816 2,813
Balkh 2,650 2,700 2,750 2,800 3,000 3,100 3,150 3,300 3,900 4,000 4,169 4,322 4,540
Hirat 1,509 1,505 1,508 1,509 1,514 1,539 1,535 1,505 1,602 1,650 1,905 2,115 2,184
Nangarhar 1,866 1,857 1,853 1,769 1,847 2,510 2,541 2,186 2,517 2,955 3,194 3,278 3,456
Kandahar 2,270 2,275 2,280 2,320 2,640 3,200 2,990 2,280 2,310 2,350 3,023 3,020 3,700
Takhar 2,223 2,232 2,234 2,234 2,317 2,296 2,226 2,326 2,586 2,592 2,602 2,707 2,658
Average 2,174 2,184 2,194 2,195 2,325 2,543 2,506 2,377 2,609 2,715 2,935 3,043 3,225
Source: UNODC.
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stocks are buried. It is estimated that a considerable amount 
of opium is stocked in the Nimroz province of Afghanistan,17 
one of the most isolated and poorly controlled areas of the 
country.  
Opium can be stocked in plastic bags for a long time, 
whereas pure brown heroin‘s shelf life is limited to around 
2 years. It is important to note that the size of stocks, esti-
mated at 2,600 tons in 2009, depends on demand estimates 
worldwide; if actual demand is higher than currently esti-
mated by UNODC, it is likely that the size of opium stocks 
is much lower. However, it is more likely that there are high 
levels of opium stocks in Afghanistan, as there is no evi-
dence of a sharp increase in opiate consumption worldwide. 
The pictures above show some of the labels used by heroin 
manufacturers in Afghanistan in 2010. On some heroin 
and morphine bags, the production year is 2009, indicating 
that pure brown heroin and morphine can also be stocked, 
at least for 1-2 years. Therefore, in addition to opium, 
heroin and morphine are likely also stocked in Afghanistan 
and/or along the trafficking routes exiting the country, 
especially close to the main heroin markets. 
Trafficking routes 
All opiates trafficked from Afghanistan enter the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Pakistan or Central Asia. In 2009, some 
365 tons of heroin was exported from Afghanistan. Of this 
amount, 160 tons was trafficked to Pakistan, 115 tons to 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and 90 tons to Central Asian 
countries (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). In 
addition to heroin, 1,200-1,400 tons of opium was traf-
ficked from Afghanistan, the majority of which – 1,050 
tons – was smuggled to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Opium 
trafficking routes, traffickers and methods are almost 
exactly the same as those used for heroin trafficking to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia.
As the majority of opium produced in Afghanistan is grown 
17 Interview with CNPA Nimroz, March 2010.
and processed in southern Afghanistan, heroin trafficking 
also begins here. Heroin is trafficked in three main direc-
tions from Hilmand and other southern provinces:
i) To Nimroz, Farah and Hirat provinces (Afghanistan) 
along the border with the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Drug traffickers transport heroin overland to Farah and 
Hirat provinces, where it is stored for a defined time (usu-
ally no longer then a few days) in small villages close to 
unprotected areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran border. 
Villagers living along the border are then recruited as couri-
ers and carry approximately 20 kg of heroin each into the 
Islamic Republic of Iran for a reported US$400 per trip. 
These couriers travel only at night and the journey usually 
takes two nights. Traffickers pay US$2,000-2,500 for armed 
groups to protect each heroin or opium convoy; generally, 
these consist of 8-10 heavily armed guards.
Traffickers also use the Islam Qala official border crossing 
(Hirat province) with the Islamic Republic of Iran, as it is 
very busy and difficult to police with at least 300-400 vehi-
cles and hundreds of people crossing the border each day. 
Fig. 8: Distribution of opium production in  
Afghanistan, 2009 (6,900 tons)
Source: UNODC.
Opium demand, 
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Heroin demand 
(in opium 
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Selected logos/labels used on heroin and  
morphine bags in Afghanistan, 2010
Heroin seizure, Hirat province, Afghanistan, 2010 
(with 2009 stamp)
Morphine seizure (with 2010 stamp), Hirat province,
Afghanistan, 2011
Source: Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) in Hirat.
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Map 9: Heroin trafﬁcking ﬂows from Afghanistan, 
2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designa-
tions used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by 
the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Con-
trol in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final 
status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
ii) To eastern and northern Afghanistan.
Due to the limited opium production in eastern and north-
ern Afghanistan in 2009, both opium and heroin were 
trafficked to those areas from Hilmand and Kandahar prov-
inces –mainly into Nangarhar, Badakhshan and Takhar 
provinces– for processing and/or onward trafficking. Drugs 
were transported to eastern and northern Afghanistan along 
the main highway using transporters, at a cost of US$35-40 
per kg of heroin. Transporters and traffickers are well linked 
to corrupt government officials, who facilitate illicit flows 
as drug shipments go through multiple checkpoints along 
this route to the northern provinces. Indeed, the highway 
from southern to northern and eastern Afghanistan could 
be called the ‘corruption corridor’. 
Once heroin reaches the Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz 
provinces (Afghanistan), it is almost impossible to stop it 
from being trafficked into Tajikistan partly because these 
provinces are populated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks with 
trade, tribal, familial and linguistic connections across the 
border. Difficult geographic conditions also hinder law 
enforcement and favour traffickers. 
Exact data on heroin volumes smuggled from Nangarhar 
into the FATA region of Pakistan are not available, but 
given the lack of law enforcement capacity on both sides of 
the border this amount is likely to be large. Hundreds of 
unofficial border crossings are spread across the area and are 
heavily used on a daily basis for both vehicles and persons. 
Moreover, the same tribal groups are settled on both sides 
of the border (such as the Shinwaris, Khogiani and Mohm-
and tribes) and most cross the border without any docu-
mentation. Criminal elements within these tribes control 
heroin trafficking from eastern Afghanistan into FATA, 
many maintaining permanent residences on both sides of 
the border. 
The Nangarhar province district boundaries with FATA are 
heavily used by drug traffickers, especially the Lalpura, 
Gostha, Door Baba and Mohmand Dara districts. Drug 
traffickers use trucks, camels and mules to traffic heroin 
through both official and unofficial borders, sometimes 
paying couriers US$20-25 per kg of heroin carried into 
Pakistan. Since the drug trafficking tribes straddle the 
border, heroin is not handed over at the border areas, but 
rather stocked in FATA until it is sold onward to other 
Pakistani groups. 
iii) To the Baluchistan borders (Nimroz, Hilmand, 
Zabul). 
The Taliban and other anti-government elements active in 
southern Afghanistan (including Hilmand, Kandahar, 
Nimroz, Farah, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces) provide 
protection and oversee heroin trafficking into Pakistan. 
Traffickers use both the official border crossing at Chaman 
and hundreds of unofficial crossings. As in eastern Afghan-
istan, ethnic, tribal and familial links facilitate heroin smug-
gling into the Baluchistan province of Pakistan. In southern 
Afghanistan two main ethnic groups organize heroin traf-
ficking across the border: the Baluch and the Pashtoons. 
Although relations between the two groups are not always 
cordial, they are pragmatic and cooperate for financial ben-
efit. Heroin is smuggled under heavily armed Taliban escort 
to the Hilmand, Nimroz and Kandahar borders. Afghan 
traffickers generally deliver or store heroin at border towns 
of Pakistan, although there are a few towns on the border 
itself that are also used, such as Baramcha in Hilmand prov-
ince. Key drug traffickers never physically deliver the 
heroin, but rather their couriers finalize the deal and arrange 
the delivery.
Traffickers take advantage of the open borders Afghanistan 
has with neighbouring countries. For instance, between 
Baluchistan province in Pakistan and Afghanistan there is 
only one official border crossing point at Chaman (Kanda-
har province), but there is no official crossing along the 
border of the Hilmand (the main opium and heroin pro-
ducing region) and Nimruz provinces of Afghanistan with 
Pakistan. Thus, huge amounts of opiates are being traf-
ficked through these borders with very little resistance. 
Many heroin labs are active in these two provinces and it is 
estimated that significant opium stocks are kept in the area. 
Although the Governments of both Afghanistan and Paki-
stan have considered opening a border crossing point in the 
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area,18 the strong presence of the Taliban and criminal 
groups mean that this would be almost impossible to secure. 
Ultimately, unless this border is jointly controlled, it will 
continue to facilitate heroin trafficking from Afghanistan 
into Pakistan.
The situation is very similar along the border with neigh-
bouring countries like the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Therefore, unless 
the country’s borders are better controlled, it is almost 
impossible to stop any form of trafficking to and from 
Afghanistan. It is important to mention that both the Gov-
ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan have 
strengthened their police forces in the fight against drug 
traffickers and extremist groups; as a result, many drug traf-
fickers were either arrested or killed. 
Value and beneficiaries 
There is a strong link between insecurity and the opiate 
trade in Afghanistan, as opiate constitutes the main income 
source for anti-government elements like the Afghan Tali-
ban. Indeed, almost all of the opium produced in Afghani-
stan was grown in the provinces of southern Afghanistan 
where anti-government elements are active and able to 
project force into other areas of the country.
Afghan Taliban
Although the Afghan Taliban’s role in drug trafficking is not 
clear, drug traffickers paid the group up to 10 per cent of 
the value of their opiate shipments as tax or protection fees. 
As mentioned previously, 160 out of the 365 tons of heroin 
exported from Afghanistan were trafficked to Pakistan and 
115 tons to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Most of the heroin 
trafficked to both Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
passed through Taliban strongholds; perhaps as much as 
275 tons of heroin were trafficked under the protection and 
involvement of the Taliban in 2009. 
The Taliban’s 10 per cent tax was paid either directly as 
cash, or indirectly through the requisition of food, guns, 
vehicles or other items. The total market value of the 275 
tons of heroin trafficked to Pakistan and the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran was US$700 million, of which approximately 
$70 million was paid to the Taliban as tax and protection 
fees. Although there was no evidence to suggest that the 
Taliban levied taxes on drug traffickers in Nangarhar or 
other eastern Afghan provinces (as drug traffickers in Nan-
garhar are heavily armed and provide their own protection) 
some drug traffickers reportedly provided guns, food, shel-
ter and vehicles to the Taliban when these items were 
requested. As such, heroin finances indirectly supported 
insurgent groups. 
In addition to drug traffickers, heroin laboratory owners 
paid an estimated US$600-1,200 per month to the Taliban. 
18 Interviews with Afghan and Pakistani officials in 2008-2010.
Although the exact number of heroin laboratories in 
Hilmand, Nimroz and Kandahar is not very clear, there are 
likely to be some 150-250 main processing laboratories 
spread across these provinces. Indeed, based on production 
estimates19 Afghanistan is estimated to have between 300-
500 heroin laboratories in total, with the Taliban collecting 
$2-7 million20 from these laboratories in 2009. In total, the 
combined direct and indirect benefit of the Taliban from 
the heroin trade was estimated at $72-77 million in 2009. 
In addition to heroin traffickers, the Taliban also collected 
taxes from opium farmers and traders. Indeed, 95 per cent 
of the 6,900 tons of opium produced in Afghanistan in 
2009 was produced in the southern provinces. In 2009, the 
farm-gate income of farmers was around US$438 million; 
of this, the Taliban and other anti-government elements col-
lected 5-10 per cent, or $22-44 million, as ushr tax, at times 
withholding the entire amount and other times sharing it 
equally with the local mullah. The total value of the 1,200 
tons of raw opium trafficked from Afghanistan to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Pakistan was $450 million in 2009; 
Afghan opium traffickers likely paid the Taliban and other 
anti-government elements $45 million for protection.  
In total, the Taliban’s total income from the opiate trade in 
2009 was around US$155 million (ranging from $140 to 
$170 million). These calculations are just estimations; in 
fact, the Taliban may have benefited even more from the 
Afghan opiate trade, given that the total value was $2.2 
billion. Moreover, Taliban commanders are often directly 
involved in heroin or opium wholesale, in which case they 
would have earned much more than the 10 per cent tax. 
The Taliban are also increasingly taxing the non-opium 
economy, collecting taxes from almost every truck transit-
ing through areas under their control. 
Other beneﬁciaries
In 2009, 395 drug cases were recorded in Afghanistan and 
499 people were arrested; among these, 23 were Afghan 
public servants and 21 were foreigners – with 16 Africans, 
six Iranians, one Canadian, and one Pakistani arrested.21 
The high number of African nationals arrested in Afghani-
stan might be an indication of the increasing level of Afghan 
heroin trafficking to Africa. Overall, the limited number of 
international arrests in Afghanistan suggests that Afghan 
traffickers likely deliver the drugs to other traffickers at the 
border areas. For example, drug traffickers commonly use 
couriers to smuggle heroin into Tajikistan at US$150-200 
per kg of heroin. In 2009, the average price of high-purity 
heroin at the Afghanistan-Tajikistan and the Afghanistan-
19 On average, each heroin laboratory is estimated to manufacture 1,000-1,500 
kg of heroin per year in southern and eastern Afghanistan, 1,000 kg in north-
ern Afghanistan and 300 kg in western Afghanistan.
20 $600 per month, over 12 months, per 300 heroin labs equals to a minimum 
of $2 million per year.
21 CNPA, Afghanistan.
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Uzbekistan borders was $4,500 per kg. However, Afghan 
traffickers only paid $2,500 for 1 kg of heroin. After selling 
90 tons of heroin to Tajik and Uzbek groups at the border, 
Afghan traffickers likely made a $220 million net profit in 
2009.  
The arrest of Afghan public servants is indicative of broader 
corruption in the Afghan opiate trade. According to the 
traffickers and couriers interviewed, in Afghanistan it is 
common practice to bribe government officials; it appears 
that traffickers usually pay officials around 5 per cent22 of 
the value of heroin or opium trafficked. Thus, considerable 
amount of money in bribes might have been paid to gov-
ernment officials, including local commanders. 
Aside from the Afghan Taliban, elements of other militants 
groups, such as Hezb-i-Islam, are known to have had both 
a direct and indirect role in opiate trafficking for many years 
and this may still be the case in north-eastern Afghanistan. 
Thus high levels of income appear to have been made by 
these groups from the heroin trade in northern Afghanistan. 
Law enforcement and seizures
As the place of origin for much of the world’s opiates, sei-
zures in Afghanistan occur not only along drug trafficking 
routes and ports of entry and exit, but also in production 
and processing areas, or where stocks are held. However, 
Afghanistan’s opiate seizure data is only available from 2002 
onwards. 
Between 2002 and 2009 heroin seizures increased by almost 
70 per cent, yet this was still less than 1 per cent of the total 
estimated amount manufactured in Afghanistan during this 
period. By comparison, Myanmar – another heroin produc-
ing country – seized the equivalent of 4 per cent of its 
estimated heroin production in 2009. In 2006-2007, 
heroin seizures peaked in Afghanistan, but since then they 
have decreased – by more than half in 2009. 
Considering that Afghanistan is a major heroin manufac-
turer, the amount of heroin seized in the country should be 
higher than levels currently reported. Most of the heroin 
was seized along the exit routes used to transport heroin out 
of Afghanistan, such as Hilmand, Kandahar and Nimroz 
provinces in the south, Nangarhar in the east, Hirat in the 
west and Badakhshan and Takhar in the north. 
22  Interview with drug traffickers in Afghanistan, 2009.
Some key observations can be made from the map showing 
heroin seizures by province:
i. In 2009 the amount of opium produced in eastern 
and northern Afghanistan was very limited; however, 
heroin was still manufactured and trafficked from 
these regions. This indicates that opiates were traf-
ficked from the main producing areas in southern 
Afghanistan to eastern and northern Afghanistan 
through central Afghanistan. Yet, despite the large 
number of checkpoints, seizures in central Afghani-
stan were very limited – almost non-existent – with 
the exception of Kabul and Baghlan.
ii. In 2009, the largest volumes of heroin and opium 
were seized in Hirat province; this might indicate 
that traffickers prefer to use the Islam Qala official 
border crossing point between Afghanistan and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. According to customs offi-
cials at this border, the capacity of customs is limited 
on both sides of the border. Moreover, the volume of 
cross border trade here is very high, making it more 
vulnerable to smuggling, as drug traffickers may pre-
fer to use busy border crossings. 
iii. No heroin or opium seizures were reported from 
Paktika, Khost, Paktya or Logar provinces, which 
are situated along the heroin trafficking route from 
southern to eastern Afghanistan. Given the strong 
presence of anti-government elements in these prov-
inces (and on the other side of the border) and the 
limited law enforcement control, it is not surprising 
that no seizures were made. Indeed, drug trafficking 
activities are almost certainly taking place in these 
provinces. 
In 2009, almost 65 per cent of Afghanistan’s total opium 
seizures were made in Hilmand province. Surprisingly, 
opium and heroin seizures were low in Kandahar province, 
despite the area’s high level of opium production in 2009; 
the province did, however, have the highest level of canna-
bis seizures in the country. 
A total of 48 heroin23 laboratories were destroyed in 
Afghanistan in 2009; of this, 11 were situated in Hilmand 
province, 6 were seized in central provinces and 4 in Bada-
khshan province; the location of the remaining laboratories 
was not made known to UNODC. No reports were made 
of heroin laboratories being dismantled in Nangarhar or in 
any other eastern province bordering Pakistan, despite the 
23 CNPA, Afghanistan.
Table 8: Opiate seizures in Afghanistan (kg), 2002-2009
Seizures 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Heroin 1292 815 2388 7112 4053 5038 2782 2,188
Opium 5,582 8,412 21,446 90,990 40,959 52,457 42,807 35,687
Morphine 85 85 1,967 938 5,019 479 5,167
Source: UNODC.
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presence of heroin manufacturing in these provinces, espe-
cially in Nangarhar. Currently, between 300 and 500 heroin 
laboratories are estimated to be active in Afghanistan. 
As anti-government elements in Afghanistan are directly 
linked with the production of and trafficking in drugs, the 
fight against drug trafficking in the country is becoming 
increasingly violent. In 2007-2008, a total of 1,412 national 
police were killed by anti-government elements; this 
number was 639 in 2009 and around 300 as of June 2010. 
These incidents were not always drug-related.24 This 
amount of casualties is very high by Afghan National Police 
standards. As repeatedly mentioned in various interviews 
with senior Afghan officials, the Afghan police do not have 
the necessary resources to combat drug trafficking. 
International Security Assistance Force 
and Afghan National Army seizures 
In addition to the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan 
(CNPA), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
and Afghan National Army (ANA) also carried out drug 
trafficking operations in 2009. During these operations, a 
total of 102 tons of opium, 10 tons of morphine, 1.3 tons 
of heroin, and 33,000 litres of acetic anhydride were seized. 
In 2009, most of the opium, heroin and acetic anhydride 
24 Afghanistan Causalities: Military Forces and Civilians, Susan G. Chesser, 
Congressional Research Service, USA
seizures were made in Hilmand province. Indeed, on aver-
age the ISAF/ANA seized 1.8 tons of opium per case and 
3,000 litres of acetic anhydride per case in Hilmand prov-
ince. Although Balkh is not an opium-producing province, 
10,000 litres of acetic anhydride were reported seized there 
in a single case in 2009; it remains unclear whether the 
chemical was intended to be used in the province or dis-
patched to another location. 
The large quantities seized per case on average might be an 
indication of possible opiate and acetic anhydride stocks in 
the country. In 2009, counting both ISAF, ANA and CNPA 
seizures, a total of 138 tons of opium, 3.5 tons of heroin 
and 15 tons of morphine were seized in Afghanistan. The 
total opium equivalent of all these opiate seizures was 
around 270 tons, that is, 4 per cent of the total opium 
production in 2009. 
In July 2010, the ANA and ISAF together seized a total of 
17 tons of opium (together with acetic anhydride and other 
chemicals) in just two operations in southern Hilmand. 
During the first operation, 11.6 tons of opium was seized 
in the Dishu district of Hilmand. In the same month, an 
additional 5.5 tons of heroin was seized. These two seizures 
support the assumed presence of opium stocks and heroin 
labs in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, bearing in 
mind that the largest networks are likely able to protect 
their stocks even from coalition forces.  
Map 10: Heroin seizures in Afghanistan, by province, 2009 
Source: Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official 
endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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By September 2010, ISAF and ANA forces had seized 43 
tons of opium, 7 tons of heroin, 300 kg of morphine and 
580 litres of acetic anhydride in Afghanistan. In several 
instances, the amount of opium and heroin seized exceeded 
1,000 kg, which clearly indicates the stockpiling of opium 
and heroin. 
Health and socio-economic impact
In addition to the multiple security threats it engenders, 
opium poppy cultivation has become a health hazard for 
Afghanistan. In 2009, Afghanistan had 230,000 opium 
abusers25 − a 53 per cent increase from 2005. In particular, 
the heroin-abusing population in Afghanistan almost tri-
pled, reaching 120,000 in 2009 and consuming an esti-
mated 5 tons of pure heroin. Overall, nearly 8 per cent of 
the adult population are estimated to be drug users. Further 
research is needed to better understand the heroin abuse 
situation in Afghanistan, including total consumption per 
capita and related heroin purity levels.  
Despite significant increases in domestic drug abuse, just 
3-4 per cent of the opium produced in Afghanistan is 
abused in Afghanistan. This is an indication of the threat 
posed by Afghan opiates worldwide. 
Corruption
As highlighted by a report issued by UNODC in 2010,26 
one of the major issues facing Afghanistan is corruption 
among government officials or the police. At least 30 per 
cent of heroin laboratory owners interviewed in Afghani-
stan in 2009 reported bribing Government security forces, 
25 Drug use in Afghanistan: 2009 Survey, UNODC.
26 Corruption in Afghanistan, January 2010, UNODC.
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Table 9: Seizures made by ISAF and ANA, 2009
Province Opium (kg)
Heroin 
(kg) 
AA 
(litres)
Morphine 
(kg)
Badakshan
Balkh 3 10,000
Farah 2,333
Hilmand 82,845 1,016 20,369 522
Hirat 361
Kandahar 6,443 950
Nangarhar 3,512 225 2,326 9,502
Nimroz 6,000 80
No data 202
Uruzgan 731
Total 102,427 1,324 33,645 10,024
Source: International Security Assistance Force.
Map 11: Opium seizures in Afghanistan, by province, 2009
Source: Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official 
endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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to protect their heroin production. In addition to labora-
tory owners, traffickers smuggling acetic anhydride and 
opiates also reported bribing Government officials.
However, corruption is not seen only in Afghanistan but 
observed all along the drug trafficking routes from Afghan-
istan to the final destination; without corruption, it would 
be almost impossible to transport hundreds of tons of 
heroin across thousands of miles to international markets. 
Therefore, given that drug traffickers are international crim-
inal networks and that corruption is a global concern, these 
issues should be handled at the regional or global level. 
1.3 MAJOR TRANSNATIONAL FLOWS  
 OF AFGHAN OPIATES
The flow of Afghan opiates 
to Pakistan
In 2009, an estimated 160 tons of heroin were trafficked 
from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Of this, 20 tons were con-
sumed in Pakistan and 2 tons were reportedly seized. The 
remaining 138 tons were trafficked internationally. In pre-
vious years, UNODC had estimated that 104 tons were 
trafficked via Pakistan. However, declining opium produc-
tion in Myanmar has increased heroin trafficking via Paki-
stan to South-East Asia in 2009. 
In addition to heroin, some 350-400 tons of opium were 
trafficked from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Out of this 
amount, some 200 tons were trafficked further to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 132 tons were consumed in the 
country and 25 tons were seized. 
Opiate supply from Afghanistan
It is estimated that the majority of heroin reaching Pakistan 
is trafficked through the Hilmand and Kandahar provincial 
borders in Afghanistan to Baluchistan Province due to lim-
ited law enforcement capacity on both sides of the border 
and the strong presence of the Taliban and other anti-gov-
ernment elements (AGE). The borders of Afghanistan’s 
Nangarhar and Kunar provinces with Pakistan’s FATA 
region also figure as prominent heroin crossing areas, 
although to a lesser extent. In 2009, very few Afghans were 
arrested on drug trafficking charges in Pakistan. This might 
suggest that Afghan drug traffickers hand heroin over to 
Pakistani groups at the border. 
Despite being the main entry point and transit route, there 
is no strong evidence that heroin processing occurs in Balu-
chistan. Heroin labs have been identified on the border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, it has not been 
confirmed whether any of the laboratories are located on 
Pakistani territory, as the exact border between the two 
countries is not always clear. For example, the border 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan divides the Baramcha 
town (famous for its drug bazaars and production) into two.
It is also likely that opium stockpiling occurs in Baluchistan 
Map 12: Reported opiate trafﬁcking routes in Pakistan, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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and FATA, as there are strong family and tribal links 
between the people living in the provinces along the border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, drug trafficking 
networks in FATA maintain a number of opiate stockpiles, 
primarily in Khyber Agency. 
An in-depth analysis about the drug trafficking routes, 
beneficiaries and operations within Baluchistan and FATA 
has been included in this report. Please see Case study: opiate 
trafficking through Baluchistan and FATA.
Value and beneﬁciaries
Pakistani criminal groups paid an estimated US$400 mil-
lion to Afghan drug traffickers for the 160 tons of heroin 
that entered the country; they then sold 138 tons onward 
to international drug traffickers for $700 million, making a 
$300 million profit. In addition to international traffick-
ing, Pakistani heroin abusers consumed 20 tons of heroin 
at a street price of $400 million.27 Additionally, for con-
sumption of some 132 tons of raw opium, users paid some 
$95 million to drug traffickers. In total, Pakistan’s opiate 
market was worth $1.2 billion in 2009 – counting both 
transnational trafficking and domestic consumption – with 
Pakistani drug traffickers making a net profit of $650 mil-
lion. The exact beneficiaries of the opiate trade through 
Pakistan are difficult to specify, although it appears that 
extremist groups in FATA and criminal groups in Balu-
chistan are key recipients.
Extremist groups
Numerous extremist groups, such as the Pakistan Taliban 
(Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, TTP), Al-Qaida and the 
27 Although the wholesale price was a more modest $50 million.
Haqqani network, are located in FATA along one of the 
main trafficking routes from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Being 
outside the full reach of the Government of Pakistan, the 
Anti Narcotics Force (ANF) does not have a presence in the 
region and almost no heroin seizures were made between 
2000 and 2009. Indeed, the Government’s primary pres-
ence in FATA is the Pakistani Armed Forces, which con-
ducts ongoing military operations in the region. Although 
exact amounts are difficult, if not impossible, to determine, 
extremist groups in FATA are likely to have benefited, at 
least indirectly, from the $1.2 billion opiate trade in 2009. 
Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, for example, has few income 
options, namely illegal trade and taxation, donations from 
the public and state sponsorship. Given the local poverty 
situation, public donations are likely to be small and there 
is no evidence that the Pakistan Taliban is supported by any 
particular state worldwide. The only remaining sources of 
income are illegal trade, criminal activities (such as kidnap-
ping for ransom) and taxation. A similar conclusion was 
reached by the United Nations Al-Qaida/Taliban Analytical 
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which noted that 
the effect of the global financial crisis may lead to a reduc-
tion in donations and an increase in crime as a means for 
Al-Qaida and the Taliban to raise money.28 However, 
according to the Government of Pakistan, no connection 
can be identified between terrorist groups and the heroin 
trade (or wider drug trade) in Pakistan.29
Many of the drug trafficking networks may have close links 
with key militant commanders of the Haqqani network, 
28 Ninth report of the Monitoring Team, May 2009, www.un.org/sc/commit-
tees/1267/monitoringteam.shtml.
29 Interview with ANF and Ministry of Narcotics, May 2009.
Drug addiction among the Afghan refugees in Pakistan
According to a drug treatment centre in Quetta, at least 20 per cent of their clients were Afghan refugees likely travelling 
from refugee settlements for treatment. In fact, a study by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) found that Afghans were travelling from Afghanistan to Quetta and Peshawar for drug treatment, 
particularly antiretroviral treatment. Drug treatment centres reported treating Afghan refugee drug abusers, although 
UNHCR noted that there were no reported cases of HIV within the refugee camps, as drugs were taken orally. Injecting 
drug abuse – and consequently the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS – is much more prevalent in refugee settlements than 
in organized refugee camps. 
Moreover, treatment services are not evenly distributed across Baluchistan. In addition, there are no treatment centres 
servicing street children, women, adolescents, probationers and parolees, nor clients with dual diagnosis in the case of 
co-infections or mental and emotional problems.
The DOST Foundation Drug Treatment Centre in Peshawar estimates that approximately 20 per cent of its clients are 
Afghan refugees.  In 2007, drug abuse within Afghan refugee settlements was estimated at 2.6 per cent and rising. Several 
drug trade sources in FATA acknowledged that drugs are used on a large scale within refugee camps, especially in the main 
camps of Kacha Garhi and Jalozai (near Peshawar).
There are currently no drug treatment facilities in FATA. In 2009 there were only 32 registered hospitals with a total bed 
capacity of 1,660 across the entire territory of FATA. The closest drug treatment facilities are located in Peshawar (KP) 
and Quetta (Baluchistan). Drug related problems within FATA are likely to be significant, including drug abuse among 
vulnerable groups and the spread of HIV/AIDS.  Unfortunately, due to a lack of drug treatment facilities, data specific to 
drug abuse in FATA is unavailable.
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either through business dealings or as a result of tribal 
affiliations with the Tanai tribe of Khost, which is the 
Haqqanis’ hometown.30 The Haqqani network has strong 
cross-border ties and is not only involved in drug traffick-
ing, but particularly deeply dependent on smuggling hero-
in.31 The Haqqani network, focused on the conflict in 
Afghanistan rather than domestically, are more heavily 
involved in drug trafficking. Other terrorist groups in Pak-
istan are driven ideologically and are not systematically 
involved in the drug trafficking business. Dependent on 
revenue from drug trafficking, the Haqqani network gains 
these funds through taxation, coercion or facilitation rather 
than through direct operational involvement.
According to interviews in FATA, another militant group, 
Lashkar-e-Islam, gains significant revenue from the major-
ity of drug trafficking routes passing through territory 
under its control. In fact, drug traffickers pay significant 
amounts to Lashkar-e-Islam for freedom of movement and 
the ability to operate in the area.32 The deteriorating secu-
rity situation in North and South Waziristan Agencies has 
meant that drug trafficking routes have become increas-
ingly concentrated in Khyber Agency. Subsequently, this 
has boosted the taxation and revenue of militant groups in 
the area. Although other militant groups operate in Khyber, 
Lashkar-e-Islam is by far the most prominent.33 
Al-Qaida and allied groups are reportedly active in FATA, 
particularly in North Waziristan, and have established ties 
to both the Haqqani network and the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-
Pakistan. Al-Qaida uses FATA as a training ground and safe 
haven, while actively assisting other militant groups in the 
area, for instance by providing suicide bombers to the 
Haqqani network. Al-Qaida has reportedly avoided estab-
lishing new structures and supports local extremist net-
works instead. Al-Qaida is unlikely to be directly taxing 
drug trafficking flows or actively involved in the drug trade 
in FATA. Moreover, Al-Qaida’s base in North and South 
Waziristan indicates that it is not well established along the 
drug trafficking routes in FATA.
In Baluchistan, however, given that the Baluch control the 
majority of Baluchistan’s drug trafficking routes and are 
more organized and professional than their Pashtun coun-
terparts, the Taliban’s involvement in and revenue from 
drug trafficking is likely to be minimal.
There are four main illegal armed groups in Baluchistan: 
Baluch Republic Army, Baluch Liberation Army, Baluch-
istan Liberation Front and the Baluch Liberation United 
Front. There is little or no evidence to suggest a connection 
between these resistance groups and drug trafficking, except 
30 Interviews in Peshawer, 2010.
31 Peters, Gretchen, 2009, Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban 
and al Qaeda, Thomas Dunne Books, p. 37.
32 Interviews in Peshawar, August 2010.
33 5,36,37 Fishman, Brian, April 2010, The battle for Pakistan: Militancy and 
Conflict across the FATA and NWFP, New American Foundation
that many drug trafficking routes pass through their strong-
hold areas. Indeed, locals reported that these groups in the 
areas of Mand and Turbat have continuously issued warn-
ing notices to drugs traffickers to abandon their activities, 
going as far as attacking the shops of alleged traffickers in 
these areas.34  
Another extremist group with a presence in the region is 
Jund Ullah. Jund Ullah is an extremist Sunni Baluch minor-
ity group based in the Sistan-Baluchistan province of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Jund Ullah’s founder, Abdul Malik 
Reeki, belonged to the Sunni Baluch tribe Reeki, which is 
settled on both sides of the border between the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Pakistan. There is no strong evidence 
that Jund Ullah is directly involved in drug trafficking.  
Opiate demand and social issues  
in Pakistan
In 2009, Pakistan was estimated to have 727,500 opiate 
abusers – or 0.7 per cent of the adult population.35 Of 
these, 571,600 were heroin abusers. In 2009, Pakistan’s 
heroin abusers (the third largest community of heroin abus-
ers in Asia) abused 20 tons of pure heroin. Pakistan’s opium 
abusers, on average, consume 850 grams each per year; this 
translates into 132 tons of opium estimated to have been 
consumed in Pakistan in 2009.
The rising number of opiate abusers, especially heroin 
abusers, is facilitating the spread of HIV in Pakistan owing 
to the practice of needle sharing.36 Nearly 23 per cent of 
injecting drug abusers in urban settings are HIV-positive.37 
Moreover, two thirds of injecting drug abusers in Pakistan 
reported having shared needles during the week before they 
were surveyed. However, Pakistan’s drug abuse estimates are 
unclear, as the latest survey was carried out in 2005 in col-
laboration with UNODC. Pakistan’s Ministry of Narcotics 
Control is scheduled to repeat a drug abuse survey in 
2011.38
Onward trafﬁcking routes 
In 2009, 138 tons of heroin was trafficked internationally 
from Pakistan. At least 30 tons of heroin was trafficked 
from Baluchistan to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The 
remaining 108 tons was moved internally to Pakistan’s 
industrial capitals, namely Karachi and Lahore and other 
locations like Gwadar for onward trafficking to Europe, 
South-East Asia, South Asia and Africa by sea and air trans-
portation. Despite the fact that no seizures were made at 
seaports in Pakistan in 2009, large heroin seizures (1.4 
tons39) made in China were traced back to Pakistan sea 
34 Interview with law enforcement official, October 2010.
35 World Drug Report 2010, UNODC.
36 ARQ of Pakistan, 2009.
37 UNAIDS epidemic update 2009, Bokhari et al., 2007). 
38 Interview with Pakistan Government officials April 2010
39 Meetings with National Narcotics Control Commissions of China, March 
2011.
37
1. Afghan opiate trafficking
routes – indeed, heroin trafficking via maritime transport is 
likely to be much higher than currently estimated. 
Although the Pakistan-India border is well controlled, sei-
zures on both sides indicate that drug traffickers are still 
using this route. Aside from some arrests in India, very few 
Pakistani drug traffickers were arrested outside of Pakistan 
between 2000 and 2008,40 indicating that Pakistani groups 
are likely to distribute heroin to international drug traffick-
ers in Pakistan, mainly West Africans.   
Near and Middle East Asia
Heroin trafficked from Pakistan met the majority of 
demand in Near and Middle East Asia. In 2009, 17-18 tons 
of heroin was consumed in Near and Middle East Asia. The 
majority – 16 tons (91 per cent) – was consumed in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the remaining 1-2 tons in 
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Kuwait. Heroin 
was brought into these countries mainly across the coastline 
of Pakistan – especially via the United Arab Emirates – 
using speedboats and other marine transport.41 To a lesser 
extent, heroin is also trafficked from the Islamic Republic 
of Iran using other means of transportation.
40 According to the statistics provided from World Customs Office.
41 Interview with sea border guards, Karachi, Pakistan, May 2009. 
Apart from the Islamic Republic of Iran, onward heroin 
trafficking from Near and Middle East Asia was limited, 
with only small amounts of heroin trafficked to China (0.5 
tons) and Europe (3 tons) from the United Arab Emirates. 
No heroin seizures were reported in Africa from countries 
in Near and Middle East Asia in 2009. 
Map 13: Heroin trafﬁcking ﬂows from Pakistan, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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Map 14: Heroin seizures in Pakistan, 2000-2009
Source: UNODC and World Customs Office seizure database. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply 
official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by 
India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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As a global finance and trade hub, the United Arab Emir-
ates has very busy airports and seaports. Such busy locations 
are preferred by drug traffickers due to the reduced risk of 
detection. In addition, there are large Afghan, Iranian and 
Pakistani expatriate populations living in the United Arab 
Emirates. These ethnic and familial links are likely to be 
used for heroin trafficking, as is common along other 
routes.
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, law enforcement agencies in Pakistan seized 2 tons 
of heroin, 2 tons of morphine and 25 tons of opium. The 
majority of Pakistan’s seizures were at entry and exit points, 
including near the border to Afghanistan and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, as well as at ports – especially inland dry 
ports.
Heroin seizures
Over the last decade, law enforcement agencies have made 
significant seizures close to Afghanistan’s Hilmand province 
border, despite the fact that there is no official border cross-
ing from Hilmand. Although drug traffickers do use 
Chaman, the official crossing, to traffic heroin (favoured by 
the high volume of vehicles crossing everyday) the entire 
border can be crossed freely and many are unsure of the 
exact location of the border. Afghanistan’s Nimroz province 
border area is also used, especially to traffic heroin to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran via Pakistan. Recently, Pakistani 
drug traffickers have increased usage of the country’s south-
western border with the Islamic Republic of Iran, according 
to the Anti Narcotic Forces (ANF).42 
Opium seizures
In 2009, 25 tons of Afghan opium was seized in Pakistan. 
Given that a total of 350-400 tons of opium was estimated 
to have been trafficked from Afghanistan to Pakistan in 
2009, the interdiction ratio for opium was higher than 
heroin interdiction. Opium trafficking appears to be gener-
ally organized by the same Afghan and Pakistani groups, 
who use the same routes as those used for heroin traffick-
ing. Aside from domestic consumption, opium is almost 
exclusively trafficked to the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
although small quantities of opium are also trafficked by sea 
to Gulf countries, where they are abused locally. 
Between 1999 and 2006, Pakistan’s opium seizures 
decreased by 50 per cent.  Later in 2006, this number began 
to rise again – in parallel with the increase in opium poppy 
cultivation in Afghanistan – and amounted to almost 
25,000 kg in 2009. As previously indicated, in recent years 
more seizures were reported close to the Islamic Republic of 
Iran-Pakistan border, as drug trafficking has increased via 
Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
There is an urgent need for improved law enforcement and 
border control capacity in Pakistan, including at all the sea 
42 Interview with ANF, 2009.
ports, dry ports, air ports and land borders. Currently, law 
enforcement capacity at sea ports (including the dry sea 
ports) is extremely low. Technical equipment and trained 
personnel remain insufficient, especially at dry sea ports 
and sea borders. Therefore, any container arriving or depart-
ing from dry ports of Pakistan are vulnerable to drug and 
acetic anhydride trafficking. 
Control of the Afghan-Pakistan land border is very difficult 
given that it is not clearly delineated and people move freely 
between the two countries. In addition, there is still a seri-
ous lack of equipment at border control points. The vast 
majority of opium produced in Afghanistan is located in 
the provinces bordering Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province. 
However, there is only one official border control point 
between Baluchistan and Southern Afghanistan. Unless this 
border area is controlled better, it is almost impossible to 
stop opiate trafficking from Afghanistan to Pakistan. In 
addition to border control, it is also essential to enhance the 
intelligence and information exchange between the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The flow of Afghan opiates to  
the Islamic Republic of Iran
In 2009, an estimated 145 tons of heroin was trafficked 
into the Islamic Republic of Iran. Of this amount, 16 tons 
was consumed and 23 tons was seized. The majority of 
heroin that enters the Islamic Republic of Iran is trafficked 
onwards along the ‘Balkan Route’ to Western and Central 
Europe.
Opiate supply 
According to the ARQ provided by the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 80 per cent (the equivalent of 115 tons, according to 
UNODC estimates) of heroin trafficked to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran entered via its borders with Afghanistan 
and 20 per cent (30 tons) via Pakistan. However, increased 
security along the Afghan border is likely to cause an 
Fig. 10: Opium seizures in Pakistan, 1999-2009
Source: UNODC.
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Map 16: Reported drug trafﬁcking routes in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations.
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increase in heroin flows through Pakistan, according to 
Pakistan’s ANF in 2010. In addition, 1,000-1,100 tons of 
Afghan opium was estimated to have entered the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in 2009 along the same routes used to 
traffic heroin.
Pakistani heroin trafficking groups are likely to deliver 
drugs to Iranian groups within the vicinity of the border, as 
not many Pakistanis are arrested in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran or vice versa. Strong tribal, ethic and familial links 
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan facilitate 
heroin trafficking between the two countries, especially 
with Baluch people living on both sides of the border. Fur-
thermore, according to a bilateral agreement, persons living 
in the border areas are entitled to cross the borders without 
any visa requirement, a system known as the rahdari. 
Details of heroin trafficking from the Baluchistan province 
in Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Iran are available in 
the Case Study: Opiate trafficking from Baluchistan and 
FATA. 
Based on heroin seizures, it is apparent that once heroin 
enters the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is transported in four 
directions: i) through Central Iran to the Turkish border ii) 
to the seaports and coastline, iii) to the border with Iraq, or 
iv) to the Azerbaijan border.
Value and beneﬁciaries
In 2009, Iranian drug traffickers paid US$725 million to 
Pakistani and Afghan drug traffickers for 145 tons of high-
purity heroin. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the same 
amount of heroin at wholesale price was $1.3 billion. Of 
the 145 tons, 82 tons were sold to Turkish and Kurdish 
drug traffickers for $750 million. With 1 kg of pure heroin 
sold for $5,000 at the Islamic Republic of Iran-Afghanistan 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran-Pakistan borders and 
$9,000 at the Turkish border, the Iranian drug trafficking 
groups pocketed some $330 million for facilitating heroin 
trafficking into Turkey in 2009. 
In addition, US$1.2 billion was paid by Iranian heroin 
users for the 16 tons of heroin consumed. Priced at $3 per 
gram, Iranian opium smokers paid $1.5 billion to opium 
dealers in 2009. In total, the opiate consumer market of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran was estimated at $2.7 billion in 
2009. The majority of this profit went to Iranian criminal 
groups and, to a lesser extent, foreign drug traffickers based 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is clear that opiate traf-
ficking is extremely profitable in that country, even that 
which caters strictly to the domestic market. 
Although a few African citizens and other foreigners were 
arrested on drug trafficking charges in 2009, the majority 
41
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of drug traffickers arrested were Iranian. Iranian organized 
crime groups are likely to monopolize heroin trafficking 
within the Islamic Republic of Iran; however, given the 
limited number of Iranians arrested in Turkey, heroin is 
probably handed over to Turkish criminal groups at the 
border. In 2009, more than 1,900 drug trafficking groups 
were dismantled and more than 170,000 persons arrested 
in Iran.43 This suggests that either heroin is trafficked by a 
few small groups or individuals rather than cartels, or that 
traffickers prefer to use several persons as couriers rather 
than large shipments– a practice known as ‘ant trafficking’. 
Opiate demand and social issues 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has the highest prevalence rate 
of opiate abuse in the world, at 2.26 per cent of the adult 
population (1.2 million users).44 However, according to the 
2009 ARQ provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran, there 
are 430,000 are heroin users in the country.45 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the annual average heroin 
consumption per capita is 384 grams;46 this figure does not 
pertain to pure heroin. Average purity at street level is esti-
mated to be around 7 per cent according to the price infor-
mation available and interviews with drug users in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Hence, at 7 per cent purity, 384 
grams would be equivalent to an annual consumption of 38 
grams of pure heroin per user. Based on this data, 16 tons 
of heroin was consumed in 2009. 
In addition to heroin, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s esti-
mated 560,000 opium abusers consumed an average of 850 
grams per user in 2009.47 Total annual opium abuse in the 
country was estimated at 476 tons, which is 48 per cent of 
global consumption. 
Opiate abuse causes serious public health problems in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. According to the Iranian National 
Centre for Addiction Studies, injecting drug abuse accounts 
for more than two thirds of reported HIV cases. In 2010, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran launched a new drug abuse 
survey to try and gain a better understanding of domestic 
drug abuse and consumption patterns. 
Onward trafﬁcking routes 
Of the 145 tons of heroin trafficked into the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, 16 tons were consumed domestically and the 
majority was trafficked internationally: 82 tons to Turkey, 
6 tons to African countries, 3 tons to Caucasus countries 
and small quantities to Europe. 
Turkey receives the vast majority of heroin trafficked 
through the Islamic Republic of Iran, facilitated by the 
43 According to the Annual Drug Control report of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.
44 2011 World Drug Report by UNODC.
45 Drug Control in 2008, the Islamic Republic of Iran.
46 Ibid.
47 Drug Control in 2008, the Islamic Republic of Iran
presence of criminal elements among the cross-border 
ethnic Kurdish population and the abundance of official 
and unofficial borders crossings (see The Flow of Afghan 
Opiates to Eastern Europe).
Iraq has also emerged as a transit country for heroin des-
tined for Turkey. Iranian authorities have confirmed that 
heroin trafficking occurs through the border between the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq;48 however, no data on 
this could be obtained from Iraqi authorities. Given that 
the population of northern Iraq is mainly Kurdish and 
given the large number of heroin seizures along the border 
between Turkey and Iraq, it is highly likely that heroin traf-
ficking occurs via Iraq to Turkey. In addition, the nation’s 
situation of instability has made it easier for criminal organ-
izations, such as the PKK in northern Iraq, to develop and 
use Iraq as a transhipment point for Afghan heroin. In 
addition, the PKK – which is based in northern Iraq – is 
well known for its direct and indirect involvement in the 
heroin trade. Heroin trafficking through Iraq will be stud-
ied in further detail in upcoming reports. 
Although Pakistan supplies many of the Gulf countries, 
heroin seizures on the coast of the United Arab Emirates 
and Kuwait indicate small amounts of heroin trafficking 
from the Islamic Republic of Iran’s seaports and coastal 
areas. Similarly, Africa has emerged as a recipient of heroin 
trafficked from the Islamic Republic of Iran, although Paki-
stan also remains dominant as the African supplier.
48 Meetings with officials at Drug Control Headquarters, Tehran, 2009.
Map 17: Heroin trafﬁcking ﬂows from the Islamic  
Republic of Iran, 2009
 
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designa-
tions used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by 
the United Nations. 
Islamic Republic
of Iran
75-85
1-5
(in metric tons)
Flows of heroin 
(not actual trafﬁcking routes)
42
THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE: A Threat Assessment
In 2009, drug traffickers utilized the border between the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Azerbaijan to traffic heroin to 
the Russian Federation and Caucasus countries. Cross-
border ethnic and language connections and weak law 
enforcement almost certainly helped to facilitate this traf-
ficking activity. According to information provided by the 
Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination 
Centre (CARICC), the number of Iranians arrested on 
drug charges in Azerbaijan has more than doubled in 2009 
(14 persons in 2008 and 32 in 2009), which may be an 
A section of the Islamic Republic of Iran- 
Afghanistan border
 
Source: Drug Control Headquarter of Islamic Republic of Iran.
indication of increased trafficking from the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran.49
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, Iranian law enforcement officials seized 580 tons 
of opium, 23 tons of heroin and 16 tons of morphine. The 
580 tons of opium seized was more than the estimated 
domestic consumption of 476 tons, making it the only 
country where seizures have exceeded the estimated con-
sumption. Given that it is severely punished by law and that 
on average 55 per cent of drugs are seized, drug trafficking 
appears to be an extremely risky venture to undertake in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. This may suggest that either the 
number of opium users in the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
higher than currently estimated, or that traffickers are will-
ing to absorb significant losses. 
Law enforcement initiatives
In recent years the Islamic Republic of Iran has undertaken 
several infrastructure projects along its border with Afghan-
istan, including constructing a 688 km canal, building 477 
km of embankments, erecting an 85 km concrete wall and 
setting 120 km of barbed wire. These projects were mainly 
undertaken between the Islam Qala border (Hirat province 
of Afghanistan) and the Zaranj border (Nimroz province of 
49  CARICC Distribution Message N° 68, March 2010.
Map 18: Heroin seizures in and around the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000-2009
 
Source: UNODC and World Customs Office seizure database. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply 
official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
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Afghanistan). The number of heroin seizures has decreased 
following the implementation of these security measures, 
suggesting that traffickers have either shifted their routes 
through Pakistan, or are utilizing parts of the border with 
Nimroz province that are not closely monitored by author-
ities. Heroin can also be trafficked from Pakistan to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran using speedboats. 
Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has made significant 
enhancements at its borders in recent years to prevent drug 
trafficking, there is still room for further development. For 
example, the number of scanners, sniff dogs and drug and 
precursor test kits should be increased at the borders and 
especially sea ports. Bandar Abbas is one of the biggest sea 
ports in the region and with high volumes of containers 
arriving daily, is vulnerable to heroin trafficking. The 
Afghan Opiate Trade Project and Iranian officials organized 
a visit to Iran/Afghanistan customs at Dogharoon and 
Bandar Abbas sea port in February 2011. During this visit, 
Iranian officials underlined the need for both regional and 
global cooperation, including technical support and infor-
mation sharing.
Heroin seizures
In 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran seized almost 25 tons 
of heroin – almost 16 per cent of heroin that entered the 
country. Between 2000 and 2009, the majority of seizures 
occurred in the south and east – along the trafficking routes 
from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Interestingly, almost no 
seizures were made in the north of the country near Turkey; 
however, Turkey made significant seizures on the other side 
of the border.
Morphine seizures
In 2009, 23 tons of morphine were seized worldwide, of 
which 16 tons (70 per cent) were seized in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. That said, according to the latest Drug 
Users Survey issued by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
morphine addict population in the country is insignificant. 
In addition, although Iranian morphine seizures were made 
close to its borders with Turkey, its neighbours have made 
only negligible seizures. While morphine is usually used to 
manufacture heroin, there is currently no solid evidence 
that heroin is manufactured anywhere in the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, including at its border with Turkey; therefore, 
the intended use and trajectory of these morphine ship-
ments remain unknown.
Opium seizures
In 2009, 580 tons of opium were seized in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, making it the only country in which the 
quantity of drugs seized exceeded consumption. With neg-
ligible amounts of onward trafficking, the majority of 
opium trafficked to the Islamic Republic of Iran is intended 
for domestic abuse.
Map 19: Morphine seizures in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000-2009 
Source: UNODC seizure database. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations. 
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Opium trafficking routes were the same used to traffic 
heroin to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The most common 
crossings used by opium traffickers are: the Iranian border 
with Nimroz province (Afghanistan), the Baluchistan prov-
ince (Pakistan), less monitored areas of Farah province 
(Afghanistan) and, to a lesser extent, the Islam–Qala official 
border crossing with Afghanistan. Opium was sold to Ira-
nian drug traffickers at these border areas. 
However, opium seizures were made across the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, indicating that opium is likely to be 
abused throughout the country. Although the Iranian Gov-
ernment strengthened its borders with Afghanistan and 
drug trafficking is punishable by death in the country, 
demand has ensured the continued smuggling of drugs. 
The flow of Afghan opiates  
to Central Asia
In 2009, approximately 90 tons of Afghan heroin were traf-
ficked into Central Asia – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turk-
menistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Of these 90 tons, 
the majority – between 75-80 tons – was trafficked onwards 
to the Russian Federation, 11 tons were consumed domesti-
cally, and 3.4 tons were seized. Central Asia forms the 
gateway for heroin destined for the Russian Federation and 
onwards to Eastern Europe, a route known as the ‘Northern 
Route’.
Opiate supply from Afghanistan
Afghan heroin enters Central Asia mainly via the porous 
Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, delineated by the Pianj 
River.50 Despite the presence of several customs controls 
and border guards, opiate trafficking from Afghanistan to 
Tajikistan is relatively uninterrupted due to favourable 
geography. In addition, the rise of corruption and criminal 
organizations in Tajikistan has led to an increase in drug 
trafficking activity through this country.
Afghan heroin also enters via Uzbekistan, although in 
smaller quantities than enter Tajikistan. Indeed, Uzbekistan’s 
border with Afghanistan, consisting of a river, is quite 
small. The single border crossing point at Hayraton is rela-
tively well controlled and only light vehicles are allowed to 
cross. There is, however, a rail link at this border and traf-
fickers would likely prefer the train transportation, as it is 
difficult to check each of the approximately 1,000 contain-
ers that cross the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border every 
day.51 During the hours of darkness, drug traffickers are also 
likely to cross the river. 
Turkmenistan is not a preferred transit country within Cen-
tral Asia due to the flat terrain of the Turkmenistan-Afghan-
50 Drug Control Agency (DCA) of Tajikistan.
51 http://uzbekistan.usembassy.gov/incsr_2009.html.
Map 20: Opium seizures in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000-2008
Source: UNODC seizure database. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations. 
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istan border areas, which makes it easy for the police to 
monitor trafficking activities. Preference is given to the 
Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, which is mountainous. 
Moreover, as few as 20 vehicles per day cross at the two 
official crossings along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan 
border (Sherhetabad and Imam-Nazar) and the Sherhetabad 
rail connection is largely inactive. While the green borders 
between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan are more vulnerable 
to trafficking than the official border crossings, regular 
patrolling on the Turkmenistan side and a strong govern-
ment intelligence network increase the risk of detection.  
Internal trafﬁcking
Once in Tajikistan, opiates generally move through 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan before transiting Kazakhstan 
into the Russian Federation. Some opiates are transferred 
directly from the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border to 
Tajikistan’s northern Sugd region by car, horse or mule; the 
Sugd region is one of the most developed regions of 
Tajikistan with better road, rail and air connections to 
export opiates. Indeed, from the capital Dushanbe there are 
direct flights to five cities in the Russian Federation, as well 
as Kazakhstan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dubai, China 
and Turkey. 
From Tajikistan heroin is also trafficked into Uzbekistan as 
the green border between these two countries is extremely 
vulnerable to drug trafficking. Moreover, vehicle traffic at 
the border crossings between the two countries is also very 
busy. It is possible that traffickers prefer to move heroin 
from Tajikistan into Uzbekistan rather than directly from 
Afghanistan, due to geography and law enforcement. 
Heroin enters Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyzstan through both 
official and unofficial border crossings. However, Kyr-
gyzstan is probably the preferred route given the current 
instability situation and ease of operation for drug traffick-
ers. As Kyrgyzstan does not have a land border with Afghan-
istan, heroin reaches Kyrgyzstan via Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. According to 2008 estimates by the Drug Con-
trol Agency (DCA) of Kyrgyzstan, most opiates are trans-
ported by car or railway to neighbouring Kazakhstan. It is 
also believed that smaller quantities of opiates are trans-
ported to Uzbekistan or directly to the Russian Federation 
by air. Given the increasing demand for Afghan heroin in 
China, Central Asian borders with China will likely be 
increasingly targeted.
In 2009, an estimated between 70-75 tons of heroin reached 
Kazakhstan, mainly from Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent 
from Uzbekistan, while very limited amounts of heroin 
were likely trafficked from Turkmenistan.  
Map 21: Heroin trafﬁcking routes through Central Asia
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan.  
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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Opium flows to Central Asia
In 2009, the estimated quantity of opium abused in Cen-
tral Asia was 35-40 tons and an additional 3.5 tons were 
seized. Since the level of raw opium abuse in the Russian 
Federation is unknown, it remains unclear how much 
opium was trafficked via Central Asia to the Russian Fed-
eration. Therefore, at least 40 tons of opium is thought to 
have been trafficked from Afghanistan through the borders 
of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
Value and beneﬁciaries
Although each Central Asian country has domestic crimi-
nal groups, it is possible that Tajik and Russian criminal 
groups organize heroin trafficking all the way from Afghan-
istan to the Russian Federation. Indeed, Russian is the 
common language along this route. Currently, there is no 
strong evidence that any terrorist group is benefiting from 
the heroin trade in Central Asia. 
Within a drug trafficking network there are three types of 
roles, namely organizers, implementers, and supporters or 
partners.52 Most of the members are drawn from Central 
Asia, enabling control of the whole opiate trafficking route 
from Afghanistan to the Russian Federation. Clan or fam-
ily-based associations are the most important organizational 
feature, even more relevant than ethnicity or citizenship; 
the Central Asia region is characterized by a large number 
of small groups as opposed to a few large cartels. According 
the Anti-Drug Smuggling Department of the Ministry of 
Interior, organized groups make use of ethnic connections 
through diaspora communities. Accordingly, ethnic Afghans 
and Chinese living in Tajikistan form their own mafia-like 
networks, as they are often recruited as acquaintances of 
family members. 
Heroin trafficking is often organized through couriers; 
however, opiates do not usually leave the hands of the traf-
fickers, who prefer to control the drugs all the way from 
Afghanistan to the Russian Federation. Indeed, an esti-
mated 80 per cent of opiate trafficking is controlled by 
organized groups using established channels.53 Most groups 
only export to one country and generally specialize in traf-
ficking opiates to the Russian Federation.
Tajikistan
In 2009, there were 20 known drug trafficking groups 
operating in Tajikistan.54 Drug trafficking is mainly con-
ducted by small groups of 3-15 persons along the Afghan 
borders; these groups might hold opiate stockpiles just 
inside the Tajikistan border according to the DCA. Many 
of the villages along both the Tajik and Afghan sides of the 
52 Information provided by the Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan.
53 Interview with Tajik DCA, 2008.
54 Interview with the head of the Tajik DCA, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, November 
2009. This figure only includes groups known to the DCA. Each law enforce-
ment agency maintains its own files on organized groups. 
border – especially near Kalai Khumb and Moskovvskiy – 
are closely interconnected through familial relations. More-
over, Tajiks and Afghans speak a variant of the same 
language, facilitating the flow of heroin supply from 
Afghanistan to Tajikistan. 
The Tajik DCA believes that each of these groups has one 
leader, a clearly defined hierarchy and a strong disciplinary 
system in place. These groups are believed to be closely 
affiliated with the persons involved in the transportation, 
packaging, repackaging, storing, selling to other traffickers 
and street retailing, as well as working with traffickers 
exporting to various areas including Central Asia, the Rus-
sian Federation and other Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) countries. However, opium and heroin are 
believed to be trafficked by different individuals and groups. 
Given the limited number of Afghan citizens arrested, 
Afghan drug traffickers are likely selling heroin to Tajik 
organized crime groups in the border area.
Kyrgyzstan
In 2008, 8-12 large organized crime groups were identified 
in Kyrgyzstan, according to the Ministry of Interior. These 
groups were located in Chuy Oblast, Osh city (south of 
Kyrgyzstan, close to the border with Uzbekistan), in the 
Osh region and in the Djhalalabad region (both south of 
Kyrgyzstan). While in the 1990s drug traffickers were 
mostly individuals or associations of 2-3 people acting 
together, opiate trafficking is now almost exclusively con-
trolled by organized groups.55 Indeed, according to the 
DCA, criminal groups are well organized and well con-
nected, hindering the ability of law enforcement agencies to 
investigate and prosecute members. 
Competition between groups is not tolerated and police are 
engaged in stopping these groups from fighting. Conspir-
acy and secrecy are paramount and the groups are based on 
a hierarchical system, which may include ‘cell structures’ at 
the lower levels. These groups use mules to carry drugs, 
often recruiting the unemployed youth or mothers with 
several children. Ethnicity is an important feature for group 
inclusion, as are relational ties, such as being from the same 
area – in particular Chui Oblast. Some groups are particu-
larly hard to infiltrate on account of their strong family-
based structure. This is the case for ethnic Dungans,56 a 
minority ethnic group with strong linguistic and cultural 
affinity with China. Kyrgyz networks also include other 
minority groups such as ethnic Chechens and Uyghurs.57 
Although groups are highly distrustful of outsiders, various 
ethnical groups will work closely together by reselling and 
handing over drugs to one another or by forming a single 
group. In 2009 for example, officers of the DCA of Kyr-
55 Information provided by the Kyrgyz DCA, 2008.
56 Interview with CARICC analysts, Almaty, April 2010.
57 Saltanat Berdikeeva, Kyrgyzstan’s world of organised crime, Jane’s Intelligence 
Digest, March 23, 2007.
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gyzstan dismantled one such group organizing opiate smug-
gling from Afghanistan via Kyrgyzstan to Russia and 
Western Europe. The criminal group consisted of Kyrgyz, 
Chechen and Tajik nationals.58
According to Interpol, drug trafficking operations in Kyr-
gyzstan are carried out primarily by Kyrgyz citizens of vari-
ous ethnic groups (mainly Uzbek, Tajik and Russian), 
although more than 80 per cent of the drugs transiting the 
Osh region are trafficked through connections within the 
same ethnic groups. Most Kyrgyz citizens arrested abroad 
on drug trafficking charges were apprehended in Kaza-
khstan and the Russian Federation and were primarily from 
the poorer areas in the southern part of the country. 
Uzbekistan
According to the ARQ provided by Uzbekistan, Uzbek 
nationals dominate heroin trafficking in Uzbekistan, fol-
lowed by Tajik citizens. Interestingly, the number of Afghans 
arrested on heroin charges was very small. These statistics 
indicate that Afghans do not travel into Uzbekistan, but 
rather sell the heroin to Uzbek criminal groups at the 
border; moreover, this indicates that a considerable amount 
of heroin is trafficked from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan. 
Turkmenistan
Predictably, very little information - official or otherwise - 
exists on organized crime groups in Turkmenistan. Availa-
ble data indicates that heroin is mainly trafficked from 
Afghanistan to Turkmenistan for local abuse. Opiates are 
usually smuggled in quantities between 5 and 20 kg mostly 
by foot across illegal border crossing points with Afghani-
stan, Uzbekistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Small 
Turkmen networks with organizational links to both 
Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran handle the 
bulk of the traffic through the country,59 but few citizens of 
Turkmenistan are ever arrested on opiate trafficking charges 
outside Turkmenistan. The Turkmen route is facilitated by 
the presence of approximately one million ethnic Turkmens 
in the Hirat, Badghis and Faryab provinces of Afghanistan, 
and an equal number in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
mainly in the Mazanderan and Khorassan provinces, close 
to the Turkmen border. While the green border is of con-
cern, Turkmenistan also has a blue border and Afghan 
analysts have reported extensive smuggling along the Amu 
Darya River.
Kazakhstan
Although almost all heroin destined for the Russian Fed-
eration transits Kazakhstan, drug trafficking groups operat-
ing in the country are largely from other parts of the region 
or international. Law enforcement officials often mention 
58 CARICC Information Bulletin No 58, October 2009.
59 Interview DCA Turkmenistan, October 22 2009.
Caucasian ethnicities60 such as Chechens as active in heroin 
trafficking through Kazakhstan.61 West Africans, particu-
larly ethnic Nigerians are also frequently reported including 
in organized trafficking of Afghan heroin to China from 
Kazakhstan. Nigerians can also act as simple couriers, as 
demonstrated by the attempt of a Nigerian group to have 
one of their own smuggling heroin across the Kazakhstan 
border with China.62 
Value
In 2009, criminal groups that purchased the heroin at the 
Afghan borders (mainly Tajik and Russians and to a lesser 
extent Kyrgyz and Uzbeks) and transported it to the Rus-
sian Federation for onward wholesale made a potential net 
profit of US$19,000 per kg. In 2009, the trafficking of 
75-80 tons of heroin to the Russian Federation would have 
earned these groups some $1.4 billion. In addition to 
heroin, Central Asian drug traffickers smuggled opium into 
the Russian Federation. Opium trafficked from the Afghan 
border to the Russian Federation made a profit of approxi-
mately $12,750 per kg. 
With a net profit of US$1.4 billion only from heroin trade, 
drug traffickers earned almost 31 per cent of the GDP of 
Tajikistan ($4.58 billion63), 33 per cent of the GDP of 
Kyrgyzstan, 5 per cent of that of Uzbekistan ($28 billion), 
and 1 per cent in the case of Kazakhstan. The economies of 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan appear to be the most vulnerable 
in Central Asia.
In addition to these wholesale drug traffickers, small groups 
sell heroin at the street level in Central Asia. The region’s 
estimated 290,000 heroin consumers paid some $1.4 bil-
lion to these dealers and an additional $160-170 million 
was paid for an estimated 37 tons of opium. Such high 
amounts of illicit income can create economic instability 
and fuel high levels of corruption. 
Opiate demand and social issues  
in Central Asia
As part of the main opiate trafficking route from Afghani-
stan to the Russian Federation, Central Asian heroin abuse 
has significantly increased over the last decade. In Uzbekistan 
there are an estimated 120,000 heroin users, 85,000 in 
Kazakhstan, 31,000 in Turkmenistan, 26,000 in Kyrgyzstan 
and 20,000 in Tajikistan. Combined, these users are esti-
mated to consume 11-12 tons of pure heroin annually. In 
addition, an estimated 62,500 opium abusers in Central 
Asia abused 36 tons of opium in 2009; the highest volume 
was in Kazakhstan (18 tons).
60 UNODC, An assessment of transnational organized crime in Central Asia, 
New York,  2007, p. 32.
61 Interview with CARICC analysts, Almaty, November 2009; CARICC
Information Bulletin No 14, March 3, 2008.
62 CARICC Information Bulletin No 45, May 2009.
63 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5775.htm.
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In 2009, an estimated 44 per cent of Uzbekistan’s drug 
users were injecting heroin abusers. In Kazakhstan, drug 
abuse is becoming an increasing public health threat, with 
an estimated 50,000 injecting drug abusers and 1,244 
drug-related deaths in 2009.64 The number of new HIV 
cases registered in the Central Asian countries has risen 
sharply, from 514 in 2000 to 7,200 in 2009.65 Among the 
HIV-positive population in those countries, around 55 per 
cent are injecting drug abusers. 
Aside from drug abuse problems, the prominence of organ-
ized crime – both financially and politically – in Central 
Asia is becoming an increasing problem. 
According to the DCA of Tajikistan, drug trafficking groups 
may also be involved in other criminal activities, most com-
monly money-laundering, but also arms smuggling or ter-
rorism. Investment in property is the easiest way to launder 
money, although traffickers also invest in the licit economy, 
especially in industries that facilitate their operations, such 
as transportation. Moreover, Tajikistan’s Anti-Drug Smug-
gling Department noted that over the past few years these 
organized groups have become more sophisticated and 
technically equipped, making increasing use of pressuring 
techniques, such as hostage-taking. In addition, traffickers 
use informants in law enforcement and border services to 
avoid detection. These groups have very good means of 
communication and transportation; they use modified cars 
and may even attempt to use shipping companies for their 
operations. These groups are also believed to be well-armed, 
especially those crossing the border. Several instances of 
shootings at the borders have been recorded, particularly 
aimed at border guards.
Kyrgyzstan in particular is facing serious domestic problem. 
Domestic political instability in Kyrgyzstan is likely being 
exploited by traffickers and perhaps even extremist groups. 
The leadership of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU) may still be based in the border areas of Pakistan, 
but the number of operatives in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
seems to be increasing. This is undoubtedly partly linked to 
violence in the Kunduz province of Afghanistan (bordering 
Tajikistan) in late 2009. IMU operatives from Chechnya, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were using the town of Ghowr-
Teppa66 as a short-term sanctuary to infiltrate into southern 
Tajikistan. The instability in northern Afghanistan is also 
beneficial to drug trafficking, as law enforcement on both 
sides of the border focus their attention on fighting insur-
gents. This is a cause for concern, given evidence that mili-
tary operations in the south may be shifting trafficking 
patterns northward. This is likely to put an additional 
burden on law the enforcement authorities of Central Asia 
in their efforts to prevent the trafficking of Afghan opiates 
to and through their countries.
64 ARQ Kazakhstan, 2009.
65 Compendium of Statistics, UNODC Regional office for Central Asia, 2009.
66 Afghanistan: kunduz may become launching pad for international attacks, 
Eurasianet, January 25, 2010. 
As in neighbouring Tajikistan, drugs in Kyrgyzstan are 
inseparably entangled with corruption and insecurity. Cur-
rently, the efforts by Kyrgyzstan to fight the trafficking in 
Afghan opiates are constrained by major political and 
ethnic instability and the threat of violent extremism, which 
has monopolized the attention of law enforcement agen-
cies. An example of this is the anti-Uzbek riots that engulfed 
the restive Osh region, bordering the Fergana valley. This 
instability also serves to delegitimize the state and makes it 
more vulnerable to penetration by criminal elements. 
Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies are also noting some dis-
turbing convergences between terrorist groups and the drug 
trade.67 
In fact, rather than trying to work against the State, mem-
bers of criminal groups try to enter the State structure via 
legitimate means to gain power and leverage. State power 
allows persons involved in criminal activities to protect 
themselves and their associates while also extending their 
influence and eliminating competitors. As an example, 
during the 1995-2005 period, known drug barons occupied 
seats in Parliament, making them immune to prosecution. 
Onward trafﬁcking routes 
In 2009, an estimated 75-80 tons of heroin was trafficked 
through Central Asia to the Russian Federation. Based on 
seizure data, almost 89 per cent of heroin trafficked to the 
Russian Federation was transported by land, 7 per cent by 
train and almost 4 per cent by air.68 Extrapolation of these 
figures suggests that around 69 tons of heroin moved by 
land transportation (both by vehicles and train) and 3 tons 
was dispatched by air transportation. Of the 3 tons of 
heroin trafficked by air, 80 per cent (2.4 tons) was dis-
patched from Tajikistan, 11 per cent (330 kg) from 
Uzbekistan and 9 per cent (270 kg) from Kyrgyzstan.69  
Given that the only land border between the Russian Fed-
eration and Central Asia is Kazakhstan, nearly the entire 
amount of heroin trafficked by land to the Russian Federa-
tion passed through it. The recently signed trade agreement 
between the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and the 
Republic of Belarus might unfortunately further facilitate 
the trafficking of Afghan opiates. According to this agree-
ment, customs between the countries were removed much 
like in countries of the Schengen Area in Europe. There-
fore, once heroin enters Kazakhstan it is very difficult to 
seize it, unless regional intelligence networks boost their 
cooperation. Indeed, a 2008 report from the Central Asian 
Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARIIC) 
starkly concluded that if drugs reached the territory of 
Kazakhstan then the probability of safe shipping to the 
Russian Federation can be around 95 per cent.70 Although 
historically heroin trafficking via the Kazakhstan-Russian 
67 CARICC Information Bulletin No 47, June 2009.
68 ARQ, Russian Federation,  2009.
69 ARQ, Russian Federation,  2009.
70 CARICC Information Bulletin No 14, March 3, 2008.
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Federation-Eastern Europe route to Western and Central 
Europe was limited due to high transportation costs, the 
signing of the trade agreement is likely to make this route 
more viable.
Interestingly, virtually no heroin trafficking was reported 
from Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan, and very limited heroin 
trafficking was recorded from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan 
in 2009. According to the Tajik DCA, there is also low-level 
heroin trafficking from Tajikistan to China across land 
borders – although there have been limited seizures made 
along these borders in the last decade. 
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, just 3.4 tons of heroin was seized in all of Central 
Asia – less than 4 per cent of the 90 tons that entered the 
region. Law enforcement efforts are exacerbated in Central 
Asia due to the mountainous terrain, lack of road infra-
structure and inhospitable climate. Tajikistan made the 
majority of regional seizures over the last decade. Interest-
ingly, between 1999 and 2004, Tajikistan’s seizures increased 
from 700 kg to 5,600 kg; however they have since decreased 
to just 1,132 kg in 2009.
Kyrgyzstan in particular faces an extremely difficult climate. 
Border stations located on mountain passes on the Chinese 
and Tajik borders are covered in snow and remain unused 
for up to four months each year. Government outposts and 
interdiction forces rarely have electricity, running water or 
modern amenities to support their counter-narcotics efforts. 
These isolated passes are some of the most heavily used 
routes for opiate trafficking. The Government estimates 
that smugglers use over 100 different paths to move opiates 
and contraband across the border.71 Green border areas are 
even more vulnerable and likely witness a higher volume of 
illegal crossings during the summer, especially involving 
carriers travelling by horse or on foot to avoid checkpoints. 
The Kyrgyzstan Border Services expect help from citizens; 
71 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2007.
Table 10: Heroin seizures in Central Asia (kg), 1999-2009
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Tajikistan 709 1,883 4,239 3,958 5,600 4,794 2,345 2,097 1,550 1,636 1,132.7
Uzbekistan 325 675 467 256 336 592 467 537 480 1,472 754.7
Kazakhstan 54 262 137 168 707 458 626 555 522 1,639 731.6
Turkmenistan 240 200 131 54 76 258 173 201 326 245 419.7
Kyrgyzstan 27 217 171 271 105 207 260 261 431 299 341.2
Total 1,355 3,237 5,144 4,707 6,825 6,309 3,870 3,651 3,309 5,291 3,380
Source: UNODC.
Map 22: Opium seizures in Central Asia, 2002-2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan.  
The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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as a result, locals form volunteer teams largely comprised of 
nomads and provide information to law enforcement agen-
cies. Compounding matters, in 2009, the Kyrgyz DCA was 
closed, a decision that will almost certainly have a negative 
impact on the fight against drug trafficking in Kyrgyzstan.
Border control in Central Asia is further complicated by 
ongoing disputes on the demarcation of regional borders. 
Kyrgyzstan has unresolved border disputes with Tajikistan 
(in the Isfara Valley to the south-west) and with Uzbekistan 
(on the status of Uzbek enclaves in Kyrgyzstan and else-
where along the common border). Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan 
has yet to ratify the 2001 border delimitation with Kaza-
khstan. Due to the ongoing negotiation process with neigh-
bouring states, as much as 30 per cent of the border line in 
Kyrgyzstan has not been delimited and remains almost 
uncontrolled.72
Opium seizures have generally decreased across Central 
Asia over the last decade. As the map above depicts, certain 
border areas between countries are preferred – likely due to 
accessibility, however, successful seizures will encourage 
traffickers to alter their routes. Some limited opium seizures 
were made around the Caspian Sea, which might indicate 
that opium is trafficked from Turkmenistan to its Caspian 
neighbour Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation.
Although the number of opium seizures made in the last 
decade has decreased by 63 per cent across Central Asian 
countries, there is no indication of a decrease in demand for 
opium; rather an increase has been observed. A major 
decrease in the amount of opium seizures was observed in 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and, to a lesser extent, 
Tajikistan. 
72 Organized crime threat assessment survey, 2007. Interviews with 
DCA officials Kyrgyzstan, 2007
Fig. 11: Opium seizures in Central Asia, 1999-2009
Source: UNODC.
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The flow of Afghan opiates  
to Eastern Europe 
In 2009, an estimated 75-80 tons of heroin was trafficked 
into the Russian Federation, some of which travelled 
onward as part of the 2-3 tons that entered Eastern Europe. 
The route through Central Asia, the Russian Federation 
and into Eastern Europe is known as the ‘Northern Route’. 
Opiate supply
The majority of the 75-80 tons of heroin trafficked to the 
Russian Federation came from Central Asia, and to a lesser 
extent Azerbaijan.73 Eastern Europe received an estimated 
2-3 tons of heroin, the majority onward from the Russian 
Federation, as well as from Turkey and the Caucuses.
Indeed, the 2000-2009 seizure data from the World Cus-
toms Organization shows that nearly 97 per cent of the 
heroin seized in the Russian Federation was trafficked from 
Central Asia. The remainder, approximately 2 tons, was 
estimated to have been trafficked from Azerbaijan. Almost 
90 percent of heroin trafficked to the Russian Federation 
appears to enter in private and commercial vehicles from 
Central Asian highways. The remainder is trafficked via air 
and rail; see Afghan Opiate Flows to Central Asia.  
Opium ﬂows to the Russian Federation
In 2009, it is unclear how much raw opium was trafficked 
to the Russian Federation, as it is difficult to estimate the 
number of opium abusers in the country. Most of the coun-
try’s opium is shipped from Afghanistan through Central 
Asia. Opium is usually mixed with acetic anhydride to pro-
duce a local injectable drug called cherniashka. In order to 
find the estimated amount of raw opium flows to Russian 
Federation, it is essential to find the number of cherniashka 
users and identify average consumption per capita. 
In 2009, an estimated 2-3 tons of heroin was trafficked into 
Eastern Europe. Between 1-2 tons was estimated to have 
come from the Russian Federation, with less than one ton 
each coming from Turkey and the Caucuses. Ukraine and 
Belarus appear to be important heroin consumption mar-
kets in Eastern Europe. Although data for 2009 is insuffi-
cient to accurately estimate routes and volumes trafficked 
into Ukraine, between 2000 and 2008 heroin was mainly 
trafficked to Ukraine via the Black Sea route (Iran-Azerba-
ijan-Georgia) from the Russian Federation and Turkey. In 
2009, it is estimated these three routes were used to traffic 
between 1-2 tons of heroin to Ukraine.
Value and beneﬁciaries
In 2009, Russian heroin users consumed 70 tons of pure 
heroin, with these Russian criminal networks making an 
estimated US$18 billion. Based on drug related arrests, the 
Russian drug market is dominated by Russian citizens, fol-
73  According to the ARQ provided by the Russian Federation.
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lowed by Tajiks as the most active foreign nationals. It is 
possible that Tajik and Russian criminal groups organize 
heroin trafficking all the way from Afghanistan to the Rus-
sian Federation. At the street-level in the Russian Federa-
tion, heroin purity is about 5 per cent and sells for an 
average of $24 per gram.74 
Drug trafficking in Eastern Europe is most likely conducted 
by indigenous groups, however UNODC does not have a 
clear picture criminal activity in this region. Further 
research is required to determine the exact beneficiaries and 
value of opiate trafficking in Eastern Europe.
Opiate demand and social issues 
in Eastern Europe
In 2009, an estimated 1.6 million heroin users in the Rus-
sian Federation and Eastern Europe consumed 73 tons of 
pure heroin – 70 tons and 3 tons respectively – making up 
almost half of total European consumption. Within Eastern 
Europe, Ukraine consumed 1.5 tons, Belarus almost 1 ton, 
and the Republic of Moldova less than 100 kg. European 
opium abuse is also confined mostly to Eastern Europe, 
particularly the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
The 2008 World Drug Report estimates that there are 17,000 
opiate users in Georgia. This contradicts the Health Depart-
ment of Georgia estimate that there are 200,000 drug abus-
ers nationwide, of which 70,000 are heroin abusers. As 
heroin trafficking has reportedly increased through the 
Caucasus, Georgia would benefit from an updated drug 
addiction survey to understand current consumption levels. 
74 ARQ, Russian Federation, 2009.
Russian Federation
According to the 2011 World Drug Report, the opiate prev-
alence rate for the adult population in the Russian Federa-
tion was 1.64 per cent. This translates to a total of 1.7 
million opiate abusers in the country. The vast majority are 
estimated to be heroin users. Indeed, the Annual Report 
Questionnaire provided by the Russian Federation in 2009 
showed that opiate prevalence is rather high (0.9 per cent) 
in Arkhangelsk, Ivanov and Samara regions. 
Map 23: Heroin ﬂows to the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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In 2009, UNODC estimated that these 1.7 million opiate 
abusers consumed 70 tons of pure heroin.75 Although 
annual pure heroin consumption per user is 55-60 grams in 
Western and Central European countries, it is estimated to 
be 45-50 grams in the Russian Federation. However, in 
order to gain a better understanding of the level of heroin 
consumption in the Russian Federation, more in-depth 
research is required.
In 2009, treatment was administered to 358,120 drug 
abusers in the Russian Federation, almost all of who were 
opiate abusers. A further 7,464 drug-related deaths were 
reported in the same year. According to the 2009 AIDS 
Epidemic Update report, an estimated 37 per cent of inject-
ing drug abusers in the Russian Federation are HIV-posi-
tive. A survey of street youth (aged 15-19) in St. Petersburg 
found that 37.4 per cent of those surveyed were HIV-posi-
tive; positive HIV status was found to be closely linked to 
drug abuse by injection and the sharing of needles76. 
In the Russian Federation, heroin purity levels are around 
5-10 per cent at street level. However, it remains unclear 
whether heroin is diluted at the manufacturing level (in 
Afghanistan), in Central Asian countries en route to the 
Russian Federation, or once it reaches that destination. 
75 UNODC Russian Federation office and National Research Centre on Drug 
Addiction (NRC, Russian Federation) study in 2009.
76 UNAIDS, AIDS epidemic update, 2009.
Unfortunately, no heroin purity information (on the heroin 
either seized or consumed) could be obtained from Afghan-
istan or Central Asia, which greatly limits the scope of this 
analysis. 
Opium
European opium abuse is confined mostly to Eastern 
Europe, particularly the Russian Federation and Ukraine. 
Unlike drug users in Central Asia or Afghanistan, those in 
Eastern Europe do not smoke opium, but rather mix opium 
and acetic anhydride to make a local concoction called 
kompot or cherniashka, which is usually then injected. 
Although not proven, the majority of opium abusers in 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation most likely abuse 
kompot and/or cherniashka. 
The opium used to produce poppy straw concoctions is 
most likely produced locally, as poppy straw seizures 
reported along drug trafficking routes to Ukraine are negli-
gible; furthermore, it is difficult to traffic poppy straw due 
to its distinct odour that can be easily detected by drug and 
border control officials. As for the Russian Federation, the 
opium volumes required to produce cherniashka are most 
likely trafficked from Afghanistan. A detailed study is 
needed to understand the level of kompot (cherniashka) 
abuse and the extent of illegal opium poppy cultivation in 
Eastern European countries. 
Map 24: Heroin seizures in the Russian Federation and Central Asia between 2000-2009 
Source: UNODC, Annual Report Questionnaire (ARQ) database. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not 
imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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Given the high levels of heroin and kompot abuse in 
Ukraine, it is not surprising that the country is experiencing 
a severe and growing national HIV/AIDS epidemic. With 
adult HIV prevalence higher than 1.6 per cent, the country 
has the highest infection level reported in Europe.77 Between 
38.5 and 50.3 per cent of injecting drug abusers in Ukraine 
are believed to be living with HIV. 
Onward trafﬁcking routes
In 2009, an estimated some 4 tons of heroin was trafficked 
from the Russian Federation. As discussed above, 1-2 tons 
entered into Eastern Europe. The remaining 2-3 tons was 
trafficked directly from the Russian Federation to Northern 
Europe. 
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, 3 tons of heroin was seized in Eastern Europe, 
opium seizures also occurred, however these were small 
compared to global seizure levels. Seizures in the Russian 
Federation accounted for the majority of Eastern Europe’s 
seizures.
The majority of heroin seizures in the Russian Federation 
are made along – or in the vicinity of – the border with 
Kazakhstan. This is not surprising given that the majority 
of heroin trafficked to the Russian Federation comes 
through Central Asia. Traffickers make use of nearly the 
entire length of Kazakhstan-Russian Federation border 
(6,846 km). This indicates that there is no fixed route for 
the traffickers, who choose the least risky route at the time 
of trafficking.
Between 2000 and 2009, around 2 per cent of heroin seized 
in the Russian Federation was intercepted at the border 
between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation. While 
heroin seizures were made around the Caspian Sea (see 
map) in the Russian Federation, it is unclear whether these 
were linked to seaborne trafficking. No heroin seizures were 
reported from any Caspian seaports in 2009. Interestingly, 
in 2009 Russian customs also seized 95 kg coming from 
Ukraine. This might indicate that traffickers also use the 
Black Sea-Ukraine-Russian Federation route as the Geor-
gia-Russian Federation border was closed due to the con-
flict situation. 
Opium seizures are also recorded in the Russian Federation, 
although the level of seizures has decreased sharply in recent 
years.
77 UNAIDS, AIDS epidemic update 2009, Kruglov et al., 2008.
The flow of Afghan opiates  
to Northern Europe
In 2009, an estimated 3 tons of pure heroin was trafficked 
to Northern Europe, purely for domestic consumption – 
there is no evidence of onward trafficking. Of this amount, 
just 126 kg was seized.
Opiate supply
Almost 75 per cent of heroin reaching Northern Europe is 
estimated to be trafficked from the Russian Federation – 2-3 
tons – through Latvia, Lithuania, Finland and Estonia. 
The remaining limited amounts of heroin come from the 
Balkan route, an estimated 800kg. Indeed, in 2009 reports 
indicated that the Balkan route was used to traffic heroin to 
Norway and Sweden78. The country report for Norway 
issued by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction (EMCCDA) indicated that heroin traf-
ficking via the Balkan route is still a key threat for Norway. 
Value and beneﬁciaries
In 2009, heroin users in Northern Europe paid around 
US$1.7 billion to heroin distributors.
According to the 2008 Europol Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment, Nigerian organizations purchased large quanti-
ties of heroin from Turkish ringleaders and arranged for the 
78 According to the EMCCDA country report for Norway.
Map 25: Heroin ﬂows to Northern Europe, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designa-
tions used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by 
the United Nations. 
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heroin to be transported from Turkey to other European 
countries, including Nordic countries. These groups have 
arrangements with Nigerian networks established across 
Europe and in the Nordic countries, creating an effective 
system for the distribution of heroin. Transport is often 
carried out using female couriers. 
However, in Norway, the heroin trade appears to be organ-
ized by ethnic Turkish groups living in Norway.79 In Fin-
land, Finnish citizens dominated drug trafficking activities,80 
although Estonians, Nigerians and Russians were also 
active. Further south, according to the ARQ provided by 
Estonia, most drug traffickers arrested were Estonian citi-
zens, followed closely by Russian citizens. 
Opiate demand and social issues in 
Northern Europe
In 2009, an estimated 60,000 heroin users in Northern 
Europe consumed 3 tons of pure heroin. Northern Euro-
pean countries,81 each with 10,000-15,000 heroin abusers, 
have an annual heroin consumption of between 500-800 
kg. Indeed, heroin abuse is not widespread in Northern 
Europe and the region has traditionally been characterized 
by limited organized criminal activity. There is little data 
indicating onward trafficking from Northern Europe.
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, although 3 tons of heroin was trafficked into 
Northern Europe, just 126 kg of heroin was seized in the 
entire region.
The flow of Afghan opiates  
to South-East Europe
In 2009, 80-85 tons of heroin was trafficked to South-
Eastern Europe. As heroin consumption in the region was 
just 5 tons, the vast majority of this heroin was then traf-
ficked onward. Indeed, heroin trafficking through South-
Eastern Europe – a route known as the ‘Balkan Route’ is 
still considered to be the most important supply route to 
Western and Central Europe. In 2009, an estimated 65 
tons of heroin reached the Balkans, and some 60 tons was 
trafficked onwards from South-Eastern Europe.
Opiate supply
The Balkan route originates in Afghanistan, passes through 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, then Turkey and reaches the 
Balkans via Bulgaria, with a smaller flow through Greece. 
In 2009, an estimated 80-85 tons of heroin was trafficked 
into Turkey via its border with the Islamic Republic of Iran 
at both official border crossings and green borders. Interest-
ingly, a 20% decrease in heroin trafficking from the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to Turkey was observed in 2009 compared 
79 EMCCDA country report for Norway, 2009.
80 ARQ Finland, 2009. 
81 Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Norway and Sweden – excluding Lithuania.
to previous years. This might be due to the increase in law 
enforcement in both Turkey and Islamic Republic of Iran; 
traffickers may now prefer air cargo and maritime transpor-
tation. 
Almost no heroin seizures were reported at Turkey’s borders 
with Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic or Georgia, although 
this does not necessarily indicate an absence of heroin traf-
ficking activity. Ongoing military operations along the 
borders between Iraq and Turkey are most likely the reason 
that traffickers currently use the Islamic Republic of Iranian 
border. Although visas are not required to travel from 
Turkey to Georgia, encouraging high vehicle traffic, heroin 
seizures along the border are very limited; Georgian cus-
toms officials argue that most drug consignments are small, 
consisting mainly of Georgian heroin users bringing heroin 
from Turkey for personal abuse. 
Once heroin enters Turkey, most of it is trafficked to Istan-
bul and then onwards to the borders with Bulgaria and 
Greece. Trade across these borders is high, with an average 
of 2,500-3,500 vehicle crossings per day at the Bulgarian 
border and 500 at the Greek border. In addition, most of 
these vehicles carry food items that must be transported 
quickly, making it virtually impossible to scan every vehicle. 
Moreover, the scanning capacity of Bulgarian customs is 
limited,82 taking more than 10 hours to scan one truck or 
container.83
Traffickers are able to take advantage of the lack of visa 
requirements between Balkan countries. For example, while 
Turkish citizens require a visa in most of the Balkan coun-
tries (except the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Kosovo84, Albania and Bosnia), Bulgarian citizens do not 
need a visa for Serbia or for countries of the Schengen Area. 
Therefore, traffickers can import heroin to Bulgaria, unload 
it onto a different vehicle and carry it onwards to Serbia or 
Romania. In 2009, at least 25 per cent of the heroin seized 
at Bulgarian customs was concealed in Turkish imports. 
Kosovo appears to act as a storage site for heroin smuggled 
from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or Alba-
nia.85 Heroin is often stretched and cut with adulterants 
and then re-packaged and sent westward through Serbia or 
Montenegro. 
Value and beneﬁciaries
In 2009, the domestic heroin market in South-Eastern 
Europe was worth about $500 million, most of which went 
to local criminal groups. However, this figure is very small 
compared to the heroin trade transiting the region. One kg 
82 Interview with customs officials in Bulgaria.
83 Interview with customs officials at Bulgarian borders.
84 All references to Kosovo in this report should be understood to be in the 
context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
85 Kosovo shares borders with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. The border with Serbia is known as the 
Administrative Boundary Line by the UN, OSCE, EU and nations that do 
not recognize Kosovo’s independence.
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of heroin at the border between Turkey and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is worth US$9,000, yet in the Balkans the 
price increases to $25,000 per kg. Given that 65 tons of 
heroin was transported along this route in 2009, Turkish 
and Kurdish drug trafficking groups could have made 
upwards of $1 billion net profit and Balkan based organized 
crime groups were likely to have made some $2 billion.
However, it should be noted that above mentioned groups 
also partially organize drug trafficking operations to the 
Netherlands, translating into potentially much higher prof-
its, as the wholesale price of high-purity heroin is around 
$45,000 in Germany and the Netherlands. Indeed, ethnic 
Turkish groups organize the wholesale of heroin to groups 
in Germany and the Netherlands, but are not involved in 
street level selling; this explains why in Western and Central 
Europe the number of Turks on heroin trafficking charges 
is always smaller than the number of locals. 
Clan and familial networks facilitate heroin trafficking 
through Turkey. Indeed, heroin seizure patterns from the 
year 2000 onwards show that the majority of heroin is 
smuggled through Kurdish populated areas in south-east 
Turkey to seaports in southern Turkey (for example, Mersin 
and Antalya) and Istanbul through Central Anatolia. 
Although no heroin seizures were reported from Turkish 
seaports in 2009, this is not conclusive particularly given 
that the Turkish Narcotics Police made seizures in towns 
close to the seaports. Of the 16 tons of heroin seized in 
Turkey, 35 per cent (5.6 tons) was seized in south-east and 
eastern cities, 2.7 per cent in Central Anatolia, almost 10 
per cent (1.6 tons) in southern Turkey and 48 per cent (7.7 
tons) in Istanbul.86 In order to reach Bulgaria or Greece, 
traffickers must transport heroin from eastern and south-
eastern Turkey to these borders via Central Anatolia, yet 
seizures in Central Anatolia were much lower than at entry 
and exit points. It is possible that Turkish police track ship-
ments until they reach their final destination, in order to 
seize the key traffickers rather than the carriers; it is also 
possible that traffickers use different routes from south-east 
or east Turkey to Istanbul. 
According to the Turkish Trafficking and Organized Crime 
Police, the PKK is involved in heroin trafficking from the 
Turkey-Islamic Republic of Iran border to Western and 
Central Europe, either directly or indirectly by taxing traf-
fickers. The Turkish Addiction Monitoring Centre has also 
confirmed that most drug trafficking routes overlap with 
areas where PKK has intensified its activities in Turkey.87 
The PKK is also reported to collect taxes per kilogram of 
heroin trafficked to Turkey from the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Iraq borders,88 with potential profits reaching 
86 KOM, Annual Report 2010, The Department of Anti-Smuggling and 
Organized Crime, Ankara/Turkey, 2011.
87 Turkey`s gangs branch out, Jane`s Intelligence and Insight, August 2008.
88 KOM, Annual Report 2010, The Department of Anti-Smuggling and 
Organized Crime, Ankara/Turkey, 2011.
US$200 million annually. More direct involvement in 
heroin trafficking operations has been reported, such as a 
2007 case involving 4 tons of seized heroin that were 
directly linked to PKK elements. Both Turkish organized 
crime groups and the PKK benefited from the $1 billion 
heroin trade profit in 2009.
Although heroin trafficking from Turkey is mainly organ-
ized by Turks, the number of foreigners arrested in 2008 
and 2009 exceeded the number of Turks apprehended; 311 
Turkish citizens were arrested in 2009, compared to 409 
foreign citizens.89 Interestingly, the average amount of 
heroin seized from citizens of Albania, Bulgaria, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran was more than 10 kg per case, while it was only 10 
grams or less in the case of other nationals. Indeed, in 2009, 
25 Georgian citizens were arrested with a total of 100 grams 
of heroin, while in the same year 19 Albanian citizens were 
arrested with 1,000 kg of heroin smuggled during eight 
operations. Seizure amounts are similar in operations 
involving citizens of Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. These seizure volumes suggest that 
ethnic Albanians and Bulgarian organized crime groups 
have started collaborating with Turkish drug trafficking 
networks, especially in Istanbul.  
Heroin is shipped to the Balkans mainly via Bulgaria and 
to a lesser extent Greece. As mentioned previously, at least 
25 per cent of the heroin seized in Bulgaria was concealed 
in Turkish imports. This indicates that heroin is first smug-
gled into Bulgaria as imported goods and then trafficked 
onwards. Moreover, heroin is commonly altered in the Bal-
kans, as most of the heroin trafficked from Turkey is of high 
purity (55-65 per cent); this indicates the involvement of 
local organized crime groups. Heroin is also reportedly 
stocked by drug trafficking networks in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,90 especially around Sarajevo,91 which is situ-
ated along the heroin trafficking route to Italy and Ger-
many (via Croatia-Slovenia-Austria). 
Ethnic Albanian criminal groups purchase heroin in the 
Balkans for $25,000 and reportedly sell it for $55,000 
(wholesale price) in Italy, profiting at least $500 million 
from the heroin trade alone. Albanian criminal groups are 
also well connected with Turkish and Italian criminal 
groups. Other Balkan-based criminal groups trafficking 
heroin to Germany or the Netherlands earn at least $20,000 
per kg, making an estimated $900 million for trafficking 45 
tons of pure heroin to Western and Central Europe in 
2009. Thus, altogether, Balkan based organized crime 
groups made some $2 billion from the heroin trade in 
2009. 
89 KOM, Annual Report 2010, The Department of Anti-Smuggling and 
Organized Crime, Ankara/Turkey, 2011.
90 Statement by the Head of the Narcotics Division of the Federation of Bos-
nian Police.
91 Criminal groups expands across the Balkans, Jane`s Intelligence and Insight, 
December 2009. 
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In many cases, profit from the heroin trade from the Bal-
kans to Western and Central Europe exceeded the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of transit countries such as Alba-
nia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, posing 
a serious threat to the licit economy. Given the low GDP 
per capita across most of the Balkan countries, the heroin 
trade can significantly exacerbate corruption. Kosovo92 is 
especially threatened, due to its location along the main 
heroin trafficking route from Bulgaria to Italy. Albanian 
criminal groups use family or clan links in Kosovo to facil-
itate heroin trafficking to Albania. In most Balkan coun-
tries, the limited capacity of customs is a serious problem, 
with insufficient scanners, sniffer dogs and precursor test 
kits. In 2009, heroin seizures across all Balkan countries 
combined were equivalent to only a tenth of the quantity 
seized in Turkey. 
While heroin is smuggled from Turkey to Europe, heroin 
precursors such as acetic anhydride and synthetic drugs 
(like ecstasy) are transported in the opposite direction, 
towards Turkey. Human trafficking and arms trafficking 
rings are also active throughout the Balkan. Indeed, organ-
ized crime is a serious threat to both the economic develop-
ment and security of the region. However, strong ethnic, 
familial and clan ties across the region make organized 
crime networks difficult to target and disband. 
Opiate demand and social issues  
in South East Europe
In 2009, the estimated 150,000 heroin abusers in South-
Eastern Europe consumed 5 tons of pure heroin. Bulgaria, 
Greece, Romania and Turkey, each with 20,000-30,000 
heroin abusers, consume 600-800 kg annually. 
Onward trafﬁcking routes
In 2009, 65 tons of heroin reached the Balkans. Of this 
amount 59 tons was trafficked onwards – 14 tons towards 
Italy and the remaining 45 tons to Western and Central 
Europe, mainly to the United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
France and Belgium by:
iv. Air 
v. Sea 
vi. Road via 
a. Bulgaria-Serbia or Romania-Slovenia or  
Hungary-Czech Republic
b. Bulgaria-Serbia-Bosnia-Croatia-Slovenia-Austria
c. Bulgaria- Romania-Hungary-Austria
Limited heroin trafficking also occurred via air from Turkey 
directly to Western and Central European countries.
According to drug control experts in Bulgaria, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia, most of the 
heroin trafficked to the Balkans was of high purity on entry 
92 All references to Kosovo in this report should be understood to be in the 
context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
into the region, but was then adulterated, reducing its 
purity to 20-30 per cent before being trafficked to Western 
and Central Europe.
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, Turkish law enforcement seized 16 tons of heroin 
and Balkan countries seized a further 2 tons. Almost all 
seizures in South-Eastern Europe were made at land bor-
ders.
In the past decade two critical countries along the Balkan 
route – Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran – both 
increased their capacity to combat drug trafficking. In 
2003, Turkey began to install scanners at its border cross-
ings; by the end of 2008, almost all land border customs in 
Turkey had scanners. In addition, each land border custom 
office now has a sniffer dog available for their operations. 
As a result, the total amount of heroin seized by these two 
countries has increased from 9.8 tons in 1999 to 39.3 tons 
in 2009 – a 300 per cent increase. However, the increase in 
heroin seizures does not necessarily indicate the increased 
use of the Balkan route on the part of drug traffickers. Turk-
ish and Iranian law enforcement bodies seized a total of 130 
tons of heroin between 2006 and 2009, which would have 
cost the traffickers at least US$1 billion in lost profits.
The Balkan countries have also increased their law enforce-
ment capacity in recent years. This raises the question as to 
whether traffickers will continue to use the Balkan route or 
attempt to find alternative routes so as to minimize their 
risks and losses. Traffickers might have started to use more 
maritime and air transportation for heroin trafficking. This 
needs to be further monitored. 
Given that heroin is trafficked from Turkey to the Balkan 
countries mainly through land borders, the number of 
heroin seizures in Balkan countries is very low compared to 
Batumi seaport, Georgia, 2010
Container 
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57
1. Afghan opiate trafficking
that reported by Turkey. Bulgaria saw the most significant 
increase in heroin seizures between 1999 and 2009 at 316 
per cent. However, the former Yugoslav Republic of Mac-
edonia reported the highest increase in heroin seizures from 
2008 to 2009, at 788 per cent.
In 2009, 32 kg of heroin was seized in seaports of the Greek 
islands (mainly in Rhodes), suggesting possible heroin traf-
ficking by sea from Turkey to these islands. However, despite 
small seizures in towns close to Turkish seaports, no heroin 
seizures were actually made at any Turkish seaport in 2009. 
In 2007 and 2008, several major heroin seizures were made 
by Ukraine and Bulgaria coming from Georgia via the 
Black Sea; however, in 2009 no heroin seizures were 
reported by any countries bordering the Black Sea. Indeed, 
sea transportation from Georgia to Eastern European and 
Balkan countries was limited. Heroin trafficking from 
Georgia to the Balkans and Eastern Europe was estimated 
to be very low in 2009, due to the good inspection capacity 
of Georgian customs at its seaports,93 as well as the fact that 
all trucks coming from Georgia (by ship) to Ukraine are 
now checked very carefully.94
93 UNODC mission to Georgia in 2010.
94 In an interview with Ukrainian customs authorities in 2009.
The flow of Afghan opiates  
to Western and Central Europe 
In 2009, 75-80 tons of heroin were trafficked to Western 
and Central Europe. Of this amount, some 70 tons were 
consumed and 7.5 tons were seized. Western and Central 
Europe remains one of the most lucrative drug markets, 
worth an estimated US$13 billion in 2009.
Opiate supply
Of the 75-80 tons of heroin trafficked to Western and Cen-
tral Europe in 2009, some 60 tons were estimated to have 
been trafficked from countries of South-Eastern Europe 
(via the Balkan route), 7 tons from Africa, 4 tons from 
Pakistan, 3 tons from the Middle East and the Gulf area 
(mainly the Islamic Republic of Iran, Qatar and Jordan) 
and 1 ton from South Asia (mainly India, Bangladesh and 
Nepal); the source and route of the remaining 3 tons are 
undetermined. 
Heroin is trafficked into Western and Central Europe by 
land, sea and air. The Balkan route dominates land and sea 
shipments, while Africa is emerging as the leading origin of 
air shipments.
Balkan Route
The majority of Afghan heroin trafficked into Western and 
Central Europe comes through the Balkan route. Once 
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Map 26: Heroin seizures in Southern Europe and neighbouring countries, 2000-2009
Source: UNODC and World Customs Office seizure database. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply 
official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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Map 27: Heroin ﬂows to Western and Central Europe, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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moved through the Balkan countries, heroin is brought to 
Western and Central Europe via border countries such as 
Italy, Hungary, Slovakia and Austria and is transported 
through Germany, the Netherlands and France, concluding 
its journey in the United Kingdom. 
In 2009, heroin was trafficked to Italy from Albania and 
Greece via sea routes and to a lesser extent through the land 
border with Slovenia. With just 10 per cent of seizures 
made at airports (on flights departing from Turkey, Pakistan 
and African countries), almost 90 per cent of the heroin 
abused in Italy entered the country via:
i. Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of  
Macedonia, Kosovo95 or the Albania route;
ii. Greece route;
iii. Greece- Albania route; and
iv. Bulgaria-Serbia-Bosnia-Croatia-Slovenia route 
(less used).
In 2009, an estimated 4 tons of heroin were trafficked by 
sea to Western and Central Europe, the key departure loca-
tions being Balkan countries. One exception was the United 
Kingdom, where the majority of drugs seized at ports in 
2009 were dispatched from the Netherlands. No seaport 
heroin seizures were reported in Western and Central 
Europe from any other regions. Additionally, no data was 
found on heroin being transported from Western and Cen-
tral Europe onwards by sea. 
95 All references to Kosovo in this report should be understood to be in the 
context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
Considering that in 2009 more than 400 million containers 
were transported worldwide using sea routes, the lack of 
seizures at seaports does not necessarily entail a lack of drug 
trafficking activity via sea. Indeed, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and Belgium are 
home to some of the busiest seaports in the world,96 where 
it is not unusual for a full inspection of one container to 
96 World Development indicators database.
Place of origin Tons of heroin trafﬁcked 
Africa 7
Central Asia Negligible
Eastern Europe Negligible
Middle East and Gulf area 3
Pakistan 4
South-East Asia Negligible
South-East Europe 59
South America Negligible
South Asia 1
Unknown 3
Total 77
Source : UNODC.
Table 11: Estimated heroin ﬂows to Western and 
Central Europe, 2009
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take hours.97 As a result, heroin traffickers might be using 
seaports more and more for their activities. This topic will 
be studied in more detail in a separate report. 
Netherlands hub
Interestingly, a significant proportion of heroin trafficked 
to the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Belgium 
was dispatched from the Netherlands. In 2009, an esti-
mated 30 tons of heroin was first trafficked into, or through, 
the Netherlands. According to the WCO seizure database, 
almost 30 per cent of the heroin seized in Germany in 2009 
was trafficked from the Netherlands. According to ARQ 
provided by the United Kingdom, 15 per cent of heroin 
was trafficked by sea (mainly from the Netherlands) to the 
United Kingdom and 70 per cent overland (across the 
channel between the United Kingdom and France). 
The Netherlands is also reported to have heroin stockpiles, 
which are destined for France and the United Kingdom.98 
Undoubtedly, the Netherlands constitutes an important 
heroin hub for Europe;99 however, this is in stark contrast 
with the country’s seizures in 2009, totalling less than 1 ton 
of heroin. It remains unclear how heroin reached the Neth-
erlands in the first place. In 2009, no heroin seizures were 
made at seaports in the Netherlands nor was heroin des-
tined for the Netherlands seized at any seaport worldwide. 
According to the 2009 Netherlands country report by the 
EMCCDA, heroin is trafficked to the Netherlands via 
Southern Europe (Balkan route), via the Islamic Republic 
of Iran and Caucasus (the Black Sea route) and via the 
Northern route. Therefore, current data still suggests that 
heroin is transported to the Netherlands overland mainly 
through the Balkan route (via Turkey-Balkans-Austria-
Germany). However, it remains unclear why a portion of 
the heroin trafficked through Germany to the Netherlands 
is then transported back to Germany. 
The Netherlands has one of the busiest seaports in the 
world, handling at least 30,000 containers every day. As it 
is almost impossible to control every single container, cus-
toms use risk-profiling methods to assist them in identify-
ing potential drug trafficking activities. However, it should 
be noted that most of these containers are not transported 
directly from risk areas and, as such, they do not necessarily 
fit the risk profile. The routes and dynamics of heroin traf-
ficked to Western Europe by sea, especially to the Nether-
lands, will be analysed in more detail in a separate report. 
African hub
Beyond the traditional Balkan route, a new trafficking hub 
appears to be emerging in Africa. One reason for this devel-
opment is that law enforcement capacity in Eastern Africa 
is scarce and trafficking heroin by sea from Pakistan poses 
97 Interview with the customs officials in Odessa seaport in Ukraine, 2009.
98 The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organized Crime, 2009.  
99 EMCCDA, country report for the Netherlands, 2009.
few challenges to experienced traffickers. Several countries, 
like Italy, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands also 
reported to UNODC increases in heroin trafficking via 
Africa in 2009.
Due to the high value of even very small quantities of 
heroin, traffickers use couriers to carry small shipments on 
their person inter alia through intra-cavity concealment. Of 
the 450 kg of heroin seized at airports in Western and Cen-
tral Europe in 2009, 34 per cent (171 kg) originated from 
African countries. The main countries of origin were 
Zambia, Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana and the primary desti-
nation countries were the United Kingdom and the Neth-
erlands. 
The second largest point of departure for heroin trafficked 
by air was Pakistan, accounting for 103 kg of heroin sei-
zures (23 per cent of airport seizures). Destination countries 
included the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and Italy. 
In 2009, an estimated 4-5 tons of heroin was air trafficked 
from Pakistan to the above-mentioned countries, primarily 
the United Kingdom.
Other important departure points for Afghan heroin export 
were Turkey, South-East Europe (mainly Bulgaria), the 
Middle East and Gulf area (Qatar, Jordan and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran) and South Asia (mainly India, Bangladesh 
and Nepal). In 2009, 1-2 tons of heroin were trafficked by 
air to Western and Central Europe from each of these 
regions. 
Heroin dilution
Europe abuses both brown and white heroin. Brown heroin 
purity in Europe is 15-30 per cent and white heroin 30-50 
per cent.100 Given that white heroin purity in Turkey is 
around 65 per cent,101 it is likely that heroin is diluted by 
drug traffickers en route to the final destination. In Italy, 
for example, heroin purity is between 17-21 per cent.102 
Data suggest that two thirds of the heroin entering the 
United Kingdom is unadulterated, but that almost all of it 
is adulterated prior to reaching users103. Interestingly, in 
2008 German wholesale heroin purity was 51 per cent and 
heroin sold at street level was 18 per cent. By contrast, in 
1999, wholesale purity was 29 per cent, while street-level 
purity was 9 per cent.104 
As heroin manufacturing has become concentrated in 
Afghanistan, heroin purity levels appear to have concomi-
tantly increased across Europe. In 2003, heroin purity in 
the United Kingdom was at 32 per cent, but reached 49.8 
per cent in 2008; some seizure cases even reported heroin 
100 Annual Report 2009, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA).
101 Annual Report Questionnaire 2009. 
102 2009 National Report to the EMCCDA, Dipartimento Politiche Antidroga.
103 United Kingdom Drug Situation, 2010. 
104 2009 National Report to the EMCCDA, DBDD (Deutch Beobachtungs-
stelle fur Drogen und Drogensucht).
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purity higher than 60 per cent.105 However, street-level 
brown heroin purity is more uniformed and remains con-
sistently around 15-25 per cent in other European coun-
tries. Brown heroin is probably manufactured at lower 
purity levels in Afghanistan or diluted before it reaches the 
main markets in Europe. Data on the purity levels of heroin 
seizures (for both brown and white heroin) should be 
obtained from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran for further clarity on this crucial indicator. 
Value and beneﬁciaries
In 2009, the total heroin market of Western and Central 
Europe was estimated at US$13 billion. However this value 
is distributed differently among member countries.
The heroin market in the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland was estimated at $3 billion in 2009. 
British organized crime groups based in the Spain and the 
Netherlands dominate the supply of heroin jointly with 
Dutch and ethnic Turkish criminal groups that are also 
based in the Netherlands. London-based ethnic Turkish 
criminal groups control much of the heroin trade in the 
United Kingdom, working closely with criminal elements 
from Pakistan and other South Asian countries.106 Some of 
the ethnic Turkish criminal groups have links with the 
PKK,107 which has a vast network in Europe.108 This was the 
case of an ethnic Turkish drug lord who was convicted of 
drug-related charges in the United Kingdom in 2006. At 
his trial, he admitted controlling up to 90 per cent of the 
105 Annual Report 2010, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA).
106 The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organized Crime, 2009.  
107 An armed group based in south-eastern Turkey, fighting against the Turkish 
Government. It is defined as a terrorist group according to Turkey, the United 
States of America and some European countries. 
108 PKK criminal networks and Fronts in Europe, Policy Watch #134, 2008.
heroin trade in the United Kingdom, thanks to his close ties 
with the PKK network of followers in Turkey and Europe.109 
In 2009, the heroin market in Italy was worth US$3 billion, 
which mainly went to Italian and Albanian organized crime. 
Although Albanian drug traffickers remain very active in 
the Italy, many North Africans from the Tunisia, Algeria, 
Morocco and to a lesser extent Egypt were arrested on 
heroin trafficking charges in 2009.110 According to the 
ARQ released by Italy, there is a possible heroin trafficking 
route from East Africa to Italy via Northern Africa. How-
ever, in 2009 no heroin seizures were made at Italian sea-
ports. In addition to the foreign groups, domestic groups 
such as Camorra, Cosa Nostra and Apulian criminal groups 
were also identified as active in heroin trafficking in Italy.111 
These local syndicates engage in a broad array of crimes 
including trafficking in cocaine and cannabis. Italian groups 
also have well-established international links, including 
with Albanian, Colombian, Turkish, Balkan, Asian and 
Russian criminal groups. Italian criminal organizations have 
traditionally procured heroin from Turkish and Albanian 
traffickers; however, the large number of African citizens 
arrested in Italy in 2009 may suggest that these groups have 
extended their presence into Africa as well. The average 
purity of heroin consumed in Italy in 2009 was around 20 
per cent, due to heavy cutting in Balkan countries before 
reaching Italy. 
In 2009, the value of the French heroin market was esti-
mated at US$2 billion, which was pocketed almost entirely 
by France-based distributors. According to the Annual 
Reports Questionnaire (ARQ) provided from France to 
109 PKK Survives EU Arrests, The Jamestown Foundation, 2007.
110 Moroccan and Tunisian drug traffickers were also active in cannabis and 
cocaine trafficking to Italy.
111 ARQ 2009, Italy.
Departure-region Airport (kg)
Land 
boundary 
(kg)
Mail 
center 
(kg)
Seaport 
(kg)
Total  
(kg)
Percentage 
of total
Africa 171 1 0  172 9%
Central Asia 1 0   1 0%
Eastern Europe  0   0 0%
Middle East and Gulf area 31 31   62 3%
Pakistan 103 0 1  104 5%
South-East Asia 1 0   1 0%
South-East Europe 70 1,283 4 95 1,452 76%
South America 3 0   3 0%
South Asia 34 0 2  36 2%
Unknown 37  39  76 4%
Total 450 1,315 47 95 1,907 100%
Source: World Customs Office.
Table 12: Heroin seizure distribution in Western and Central Europe in 2009
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UNODC in 2009, 93 per cent of heroin-related trafficking 
arrests in France involved French citizens; the rest were 
French-speaking Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian citizens. 
This may suggest that French criminal groups organize 
heroin trafficking operations from the Netherlands to 
France. In France, brown heroin is the most commonly 
abused form of heroin. 
The heroin market in Germany yielded approximately 
US$1.3 billion for criminal groups in 2009. Including 
consumption (7 tons), at least 30 tons of heroin was likely 
trafficked via Germany in 2009. This figure is in stark con-
trast with the total quantity of heroin seized in Germany, 
which reached only 700 kg in 2009. 86 per cent of the 
persons arrested in Germany on drug-related charges in 
2009 were German citizens; the rest were ethnic Turkish, 
Map 28: Heroin market value in Europe, by country, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations.
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Fig. 13: Country of origin of heroin trafﬁckers 
arrested in Italy, 2009
Source: UNODC, Annual Report Questionnaire (ARQ) database.
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Fig. 14: Country of origin of heroin trafﬁckers  
arrested in Germany in 2009
Source: UNODC, Annual Report Questionnaire (ARQ) database.
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Fig. 15: Distribution of heroin seizures in Western 
and Central Europe, by country, 2009
Source: UNODC.
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Lebanese and Italian citizens, among other nationalities. 
However, heroin was mainly trafficked by ethnic Turkish 
and Balkan groups, whose ethnic and familial links to Ger-
many facilitate heroin trafficking from South-East Europe 
to Germany.  
Opiate demand and social issues in  
Western and Central Europe
In Western and Central Europe there are an estimated 1.2 
million heroin abusers, consuming 69 tons of pure heroin 
– almost half of total European consumption.
The United Kingdom and Italy each have between 200,000 
and 300,000 heroin users, consuming 16-17 tons of pure 
heroin in each country in 2009. In 2008, the United King-
dom reported 400,469 problematic drug abusers and 3,356 
drug-related deaths.112 Of the 128,208 drug abusers that 
received treatment in the United Kingdom in 2008, 53 per 
cent were heroin abusers. Italy reported 385,000 problem-
atic drug abusers in 2008;113 of these, 102,914 received 
treatment, 67 per cent of which were heroin abusers. 
In 2009, France’s estimated 130,000–160,000 heroin abus-
ers consumed 10-12 tons of pure heroin. Overall, problem-
112 ARQ United Kingdom, 2008. At the time of preparation of this report, 
ARQ for 2009 was not available. 
113 ARQ Italy, 2008. At the time of preparation of this report, ARQ for 2009 
was not available.
atic drug abusers were estimated to number 230,000 in 
2008. In 2009, 5,542 drug abusers received treatment, 37 
per cent of which were heroin abusers.114 
UNODC estimates that 115,000 German heroin abusers 
consumed 6-7 tons of pure heroin in 2009. Of the 43,058 
drug abusers that received treatment, 47 per cent were 
heroin abusers. In 2009, 949 heroin-related deaths were 
reported. 
Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands have an 
estimated 20,000-40,000 heroin abusers each, with around 
2 tons of pure heroin abused in each of these countries in 
2009. In Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark 
and Poland, the number of heroin abusers ranged between 
20,000 and 30,000, with 1.5 tons of pure heroin consumed 
in each of these countries in 2009. 
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, 32 countries in Western and Central Europe 
seized a total of just 7.5 tons of heroin. The elimination of 
most border controls and internal borders within the Euro-
pean Union means that heroin trafficking is difficult to stop 
once the heroin reaches Western and Central European 
borders. 
The main European markets, namely the United Kingdom, 
Italy and France, seized 1-1.5 tons, while other countries 
seized much smaller amounts, including 14 kg in Slovakia, 
190 kg in Austria, 31 kg in the Czech Republic, 42 kg in 
Slovenia and 124 kg in Hungary. Generally, the highest 
seizures occur in the main consumption countries such as 
in Italy, UK, France and Germany.
Undoubtedly, the Netherlands constitutes an important 
heroin hub for Europe;115 however, this is in stark contrast 
with the country’s seizures in 2009, totalling less than 1 ton 
of heroin.
Of the 7.5 tons of heroin seized in the region, only 1.9 tons 
(25 per cent) were seized by customs. Land border seizures 
accounted for 69 per cent, followed by 24 per cent at air-
ports, 5 per cent at seaports and 2 per cent at mail cen-
tres.116 Although there is no direct correlation between 
114 ARQ France, 2009.
115 EMCCDA, country report for the Netherlands, 2009.
116 These statistics are in line with the figures provided in Annual Report 
Questionnaires (ARQ) by the Western and Central European countries to 
UNODC in 2009.
Location Estimated amount of heroin trafﬁcked to Western and Central Europe (tons) 
Airports 18
Land borders 53
Mail centres 2
Seaports 4
Total 77
Source: World Customs Office.
Table 13: Estimated heroin ﬂows to Western Central Europe by mode of importation, 2009
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seizures and trafficking routes, extrapolating from the sei-
zure data may suggest that an estimated 53 tons reached 
Western and Central Europe via land borders, 18 tons of 
heroin via airports, 4 tons via seaports and 2 tons via mail. 
Constant shifts in smuggling routes and the varying degrees 
of law enforcement capacity at each entry point mean that 
these estimates can serve only as a guide. This said, they 
clearly illustrate that the majority of heroin is likely to be 
transported overland. Seizures of heroin originating from 
South-Eastern Europe and travelling through the Balkan 
route accounted for 97 per cent of all land seizures into 
Western and Central Europe.
Heroin trafficking across Europe is likely to become more 
difficult to police. Recently, the EU lifted visa requirements 
with some countries of South-Eastern Europe like Bulgaria 
and is planning to do the same with other countries in 
2011. In addition, bilateral border crossing agreements are 
in place between some South-East European countries such 
as Bulgaria, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, as well as Serbia and Hungary. For example, 
Bulgarian citizens do not require a visa to enter Serbia, 
Serbians do not need one to enter Hungary, nor do Hun-
garians for Austria. Drug traffickers will most likely attempt 
to exploit this situation. Information and intelligence shar-
ing will become increasingly important to stop heroin traf-
ficking in the region, especially with Turkey situated at the 
external border of the EU and being the first gateway of 
heroin to South-Eastern Europe. 
Over the last decade, heroin seizures decreased in most of 
Northern and Western and Central Europe – especially in 
Switzerland (by 37 per cent), the United Kingdom (53 per 
cent) and Spain (74 per cent). Only France, Austria, Bel-
gium, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Luxem-
burg, Estonia and Latvia saw an increase in the number of 
seizures, although in most of those countries the quantity 
seized was less than 100 kg. 
The flow of Afghan opiates  
to South Asia
In 2009, an estimated 25 tons of heroin was trafficked from 
Afghanistan to South Asia, and a further 15 tons was man-
ufactured domestically. Of this total of 40 tons, 15 tons was 
trafficked onwards from South Asia.
Opiate supply
Of the estimated 23 tons of heroin consumed in South 
Asia, 14-15 tons (65 per cent) was likely Indian heroin and 
8-9 tons (35 per cent) was Afghan heroin. 
In order for Indian producers to manufacture 15 tons of 
heroin domestically, and meet the local raw opium demand 
Map 29: Heroin seizure locations in Western and Central Europe, 2002- 2009
Source: UNODC and World Customs Office seizure database. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply 
official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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of approximately 70 tons, a total of 220 tons of opium 
would be required. Therefore, is likely that at least 7,500 
hectares of illegal opium poppy was cultivated in India in 
2009.117 Indian heroin is also used to supply regional mar-
kets. In 2009, almost all heroin seized in Bangladesh had 
originated from India.118 India-sourced heroin also 
accounted for the vast majority of supply to Nepal.119 
Sri Lanka, however, reported both Indian and Afghan heroin. 
As did India itself – of the 17 tons of heroin consumed in 
India, 8 tons was Afghan heroin and the remaining 9 tons 
was local heroin.120 Nonetheless, it is possible that Indian 
opium production and heroin manufacturing levels are still 
underestimated and that less Afghan heroin is required to fill 
the gap. In order to clarify this, an in-depth heroin abuse and 
trafficking study should be carried out in India.
Value and beneﬁciaries
In 2009, the total value of the South Asia heroin economy 
– estimated at US$1.9 billion – mostly went to Indian 
indigenous criminal groups. With a value of $1.4 billion, 
the biggest market was in India. The remaining $500 mil-
lion was contributed by users in Bangladesh, Nepal, Mal-
dives and Sri Lanka. Although the majority of users in India 
abuse Indian heroin, drug traffickers prefer to export 
Afghan heroin due to its higher purity. 
Most drug traffickers arrested in India in 2009 were Indian 
citizens. Foreigners arrested were primarily Nepalese, West 
African and Afghan nationals. Most seizures made in largely 
117 With average yield 30kg / hectares.
118 Interviews with officials of Bangladesh in March 2009.
119 Interviews with Nepalese officials in March 2009. 
120 According to the ARQ provided by India.
populated areas, like Mumbai and New Delhi, involved 
West African traffickers.121 A large number of Sri Lankan 
citizens were also arrested in India for trafficking heroin 
into Sri Lanka. Despite the reported high level of heroin 
trafficking across the India-Bangladesh border, the number 
of Bangladeshi citizens arrested in India between 2000 and 
2009 was minimal. 
Much of the heroin trafficked in South Asia transits areas 
where Maoist separatist groups are active. The same areas 
are reportedly also opium producing. However, no clear 
evidence has emerged on these groups’ direct or indirect 
involvement in the opiate trade. 
Family and tribal links across the India-Pakistan border are 
likely to facilitate heroin trafficking from Pakistan into 
India. South Asian trafficking groups that purchased heroin 
from Pakistan paid almost US$125 million to Pakistani 
drug traffickers and then managed to sell the same heroin 
wholesale at $600 million to international drug traffickers 
in South Asia. 
Opiate demand and social issues  
in South Asia
In 2009, an estimated 23 tons of pure heroin were con-
sumed in South Asia. The vast majority, 17 tons, was con-
sumed in India, 4.5 tons in Bangladesh, 0.8 tons in Nepal 
and less than 1 ton in Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives 
combined. 
In 2009, the opiate prevalence in India was 0.43 per cent122 
– or 3.1 million people – of which at least half are estimated 
121 According to the 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
(INCSR) issued by the United States Department of State.
122 World Drug Report 2009, UNODC.
Map 30: Heroin trafﬁcking ﬂows from South Asia, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of 
Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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to be synthetic opiate abusers (for example abusing 
buprenorphine). India’s 2003 drug abuse survey put the 
number of heroin users at 900,000, however there are plans 
to carry out a new drug abuse survey in 2010 or 2011.123 
Indian users abuse both Afghan and locally produced 
heroin, known as ‘brown sugar’. Moreover, in 2009, an 
estimated 70 tons of opium was abused in India; as opium 
is not imported to India, this entire amount was produced 
illegally in the country. As illegal opium is likely cultivated 
in remote, often infertile areas, the yield is likely to be very 
low. The increasing use of synthetic opiates like burprenor-
phine is an emerging threat for South Asian countries 
(mainly India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka). 
Nepal has between 30,000 and 50,000 heroin abusers who 
abuse an estimated 0.5-1 ton of pure heroin per year. In 
Bangladesh, HIV prevalence is increasing and has transi-
tioned from a low-level epidemic to a concentrated epi-
demic, with particularly elevated rates among injecting 
drug users.124 
Onward trafﬁcking routes
In 2009, an estimated 15 tons of heroin was trafficked 
onward from South Asia, mainly via India. Of these 15 
tons, 6 tons went to South-East Asia, 6 tons went to Africa, 
123 Interview with Indian Government officials, March 2010.
124 UNAIDS, AIDS epidemic update, 2009.
1-2 tons went to North America, and 1 ton went each to 
China and Europe. As mentioned above, drug traffickers 
prefer to export Afghan heroin, rather than local heroin, 
due to its higher purity. Indian heroin is used purely for 
local abuse in South Asia.
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, just 1.2 tons of heroin was seized across South 
Asia. India made the vast majority of these seizures. 90 per 
cent of seizures made in South Asia occurred inland – many 
in the vicinity of the India-Pakistan border. Seizures at sea-
ports accounted for 6 per cent and airports just 4 per cent. 
Bangladesh law enforcement seized just 20 kg of the esti-
Table 14: Heroin seizures in South Asia, 2009
Map 31: Heroin seizures in and around India, 2000-2009
Source: UNODC and World Customs Office seizure database. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply 
official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by 
India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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mated 4.5 tons of heroin trafficked to Bangladesh, virtually 
all of which was manufactured in India.125 Airport seizures 
in the region occurred mainly in the Maldives and Sri 
Lanka on flights originating from India and Pakistan. 
Heroin is undoubtedly being trafficked overland from Paki-
stan into India, but the volume of heroin flows remains 
unknown. Further study of both the India-Pakistan border 
and global seaports is necessary to better understand these 
dynamics.
In 2009, 10 per cent of the seizures made at customs in 
Pakistan were destined for India. Interesting, all heroin 
seized in South Asian seaports originated from Pakistan, yet 
in 2009 no heroin seizures were made at seaports in Paki-
stan. Heroin trafficking through seaports in Pakistan is 
likely to be much higher than currently estimated. Indeed, 
law enforcement capacity at South Asian seaports is limited; 
as a result, the vast majority of containers arriving in Bang-
ladesh are not checked.126 China reported several heroin 
seizures cases which were trafficked via Bangladesh sea ports. 
Over the last decade, India has experienced only a 9 per 
cent increase in seizures. According to the Indian Govern-
ment, opium is not trafficked into India, thus indicating 
that the country’s entire raw opium consumption was met 
by domestic illicit opium poppy cultivation. India has been 
the leading licit producer of opium for decades, although 
the estimated quantity converted from licit to illicit form is 
very limited, or possibly non-existent. The Indian Govern-
ment is planning to launch an opium poppy survey in 
2011, in cooperation with UNODC to better understand 
domestic supply and demand. 
The flow of Afghan opiates  
to East and South-East Asia
In 2009, opiate demand in East and South-East Asia was 
met by both local production and Afghan supply. Myanmar 
and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic are the main 
producing countries, exporting an estimated 25 tons of 
heroin in 2009. An additional 65 tons of Afghan heroin 
was trafficked to fill the gap in East and South-East Asia.
Opiate supply
Regional supply
In 2009, local opium production totalled 330 tons in 
Myanmar and 11 tons in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic. After domestic consumption and seizures, 240 
tons of opium were available for export from Myanmar and 
4 tons from the Lao People’s Democratic Republic – once 
converted to heroin, this is equivalent to 25 tons and 400 
kg respectively. In 2009, a total of 81 tons of heroin were 
abused and 8 tons were seized in South-East Asia; a maxi-
125 Interviews with officials of Bangladesh in March 2009.
126 Interviews with officials of Bangladesh in March 2009.
mum of 24 tons likely came from Myanmar and the 
remaining 65 tons127 were likely trafficked from Afghani-
stan to meet the demands of this market. Despite declining 
opium production in Myanmar over the last decade, an 
estimated 580 tons were produced in 2010 – a 76 per cent 
increase. In addition, a 58 per cent increase in production 
was seen in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in 2010. 
Since 2010 seizure and abuse figures were not provided to 
UNODC, estimated amounts of heroin flows from Afghan-
istan to China for 2010 will be studied in the next report 
issued by the Afghan Opiate Trade Project.
Data from Viet Nam challenges these regional estimates. 
Total heroin abuse in Viet Nam is estimated at 4 tons, with 
seizure data indicating that the majority is trafficked from 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. However, the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic was only capable of export-
ing 4 tons of opium in 2009 (yielding 400 kg of heroin) – 
so either more Myanmar heroin and/or more Afghan heroin 
are flowing into Viet Nam. However, if Myanmar heroin is 
flowing into Viet Nam, then less Myanmar heroin is avail-
able for the market in China. The source of heroin con-
sumed in Viet Nam – and also consumption levels – remain 
unclear and require further study.
Therefore, either abuse figures for Viet Nam are over-esti-
mated, or more Afghan heroin was trafficked to Viet Nam 
(some 3.5 tons). Alternatively, it is possible that regional 
opium production is higher than predicted, especially in 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
From Afghanistan
In 2009, an estimated 65 tons of pure Afghan heroin were 
trafficked to the region – 25 tons to South-East Asia and 40 
tons to China. Given that the majority of heroin from 
Myanmar is trafficked to China, most of the heroin reach-
ing South-East Asia was likely transported from Afghani-
stan via Pakistan. However, exact drug trafficking routes 
and sources are difficult to determine due to a lack of sei-
zures in 2009; of the 1 ton of total regional seizures a mere 
72 kg were seized at customs posts. 
In 2009, an estimated 63-64 tons of heroin were trafficked 
into China. The vast majority of the 25 tons of heroin 
manufactured in Myanmar was trafficked to China.128 
Unless the opium production of Myanmar is underesti-
mated or additional heroin comes from another source, 
some 40 tons of Afghan heroin was trafficked from Afghan-
istan to China in 2009. It should be noted that Chinese 
heroin abuse statistics remain vague and current estimates 
are based on information available to UNODC. 
Thailand also appears to be an important heroin trafficking 
hub, linking Pakistan to other countries in South-East Asia 
such as Indonesia and Viet Nam. Indeed, based on seizure 
127 Including seizures. 
128 1 ton of heroin was trafficked to Thailand for local abuse.
67
1. Afghan opiate trafficking
data, 18 tons of heroin reached South-East Asia directly 
from Pakistan, while the remaining 6 tons came from Paki-
stan through South Asia (mainly India, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh).
Value and beneﬁciaries
In 2009, China’s heroin market was alone worth US$7.3 
billion and other South-East Asian countries were worth 
$2.4 billion. Chinese and other local organized crime 
groups control the South-East Asian heroin market at both 
retail and wholesale levels and therefore benefit entirely 
from this trade. Interestingly, the heroin trade in Indonesia 
is predominantly controlled and directed by West Africans, 
particularly Nigerians.129
In 2009, 1,559 drug traffickers from 50 different countries 
were arrested in China.130 Of the foreign drug traffickers 
arrested in 2008, people from Myanmar, Pakistan, Nigeria, 
China’s Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and 
Malaysia were among the most active.131 Yet, that same year 
very few Chinese drug traffickers were arrested outside of 
China, with the exception of neighbouring Myanmar. This 
indicates that Chinese drug traffickers probably do not 
become involved in the heroin trade until the heroin reaches 
China.  
In 2009, the wholesale price of 1 kg of high-purity heroin 
in Myanmar and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic was 
$12,000. Therefore, for 20-25 tons of heroin, Chinese traf-
fickers paid at least $300 million to Myanmar drug traffick-
ers based in the Shan State region - not including 
cross-border transport fees, which can be as much as $5,000 
per kg.132 With an average government official salary of 
$10-20 per month, corruption temptations are very likely 
in Myanmar. Moreover, the country’s entire heroin export 
is reportedly processed domestically in the Shan State 
region, necessitating dozens of heroin laboratories close to 
the Myanmar-China border. The same heroin is sold whole-
sale for $90,000 per kg once it reaches the Chinese market, 
indicating that Chinese drug traffickers would make $2.2 
billion for the heroin trafficked from Myanmar. 
Afghan heroin is also available at the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border for a wholesale price of $3,500 and for just $5,000 
in Karachi, Pakistan. At this price, it may be cheaper for 
drug trafficking networks to transport Afghan heroin to 
China and South-East Asia rather than use heroin from 
Myanmar. 
Opiate demand and social issues  
in East and South-East Asia
In 2009, there were an estimated 3.2 million heroin users 
in East and South-East Asia. Although just 16 Asian coun-
129 International Narcotics Control Strategy report of INL (USA), 2009.
130 Annual Report on Drug Control in China, 2009.
131 2008 World Customs data.
132 Re-engineering the Drug Business, Matthew Brzezinski. 
tries provided drug consumption data in 2009, this data 
suggests that heroin users individually abuse between 20 
and 40 grams of pure heroin annually, although further 
research is required. Thus, a total of 80-85 tons of heroin 
were estimated to have been consumed in East and South-
East Asia in 2009. 
South-East Asia
In 2009, Myanmar’s estimated 230,000-300,000133 opiate 
users consumed 2 tons of pure heroin. Only 9 per cent of 
Myanmar’s opium production was consumed in the coun-
try, the rest was exported to neighbouring countries, mainly 
China. Myanmar’s opium users are mostly located in the 
Shan State region – the main opium poppy cultivation area. 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam have a large number of 
heroin abusers, who abused 15 tons of pure heroin in 2009, 
worth an estimated $1.5 billion. Indonesia and Malaysia 
are estimated to each have between 150,000 and 250,000 
heroin abusers, with abusers in each country consuming 
4-6 tons of pure heroin in 2009. Indonesia has reported 1.4 
million problematic drug abusers and 52,000 HIV infected 
persons;134 however, in 2009 just 2,350 drug abusers 
received treatment. In Malaysia, 7,135 drug abusers received 
treatment in 2009. Indeed, injecting drug abuse is one of 
the greatest threats to public health in South-East Asia. In 
Indonesia, for example, more than half of injecting drug 
abusers are HIV-positive.135
In 2009, Viet Nam’s estimated some150,000 heroin abus-
ers136 – of which 66,000 are considered to be drug injectors 
– consumed 3 tons of heroin. In the same year 2,184 people 
died of drug-related deaths137 in Viet Nam. 
Thailand, Taiwan, Province of China and Japan each have 
between 30,000 and 50,000 heroin abusers who consume 
0.5-1 ton of pure heroin per year. In 2009, 84,190 drug 
abusers received treatment in Thailand, of which only 1 per 
cent were heroin abusers. Of the heroin consumed in Thai-
land in 2009, 90 per cent was from Myanmar and the 
remainder from Afghanistan via Pakistan.138
China
In 2009, UNODC estimated that China had between 1.8 
and 3 million opiate users, who consumed 55-60 tons of 
heroin. However, the 2009 ARQ provided by the Chinese 
Government indicated the presence of 1.33 million regis-
tered drug abusers, of which 74 per cent were heroin abus-
ers. The actual number of heroin abusers normally greatly 
exceeds the number of registered users. According to the 
133 World Drug Report, 2011, UNODC.
134  ARQ Indonesia, 2009.
135 National AIDS commission, 2008.
136 WDR 2010, UNODC.
137 ARQ Vietnam, 2009.
138 According to ARQ provided by the Government of Thailand.
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2009 epidemic update report issued by the Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), China 
hosts the world’s largest population of injecting drug abus-
ers, at 2.4 million. Surveys carried out in China have found 
high rates of risk behaviour among injecting drug abusers, 
including the sharing of needles by an estimated 40 per cent 
of those abusers.139 
Each Chinese heroin user abuses, on average, 25 grams of 
pure heroin annually – this would be 850-900 kg of heroin 
daily. Deeper insight into Chinese drug consumption 
would require a national drug abuse survey. 
Onward trafﬁcking routes
Heroin trafficking from East and South-East Asia is lim-
ited. In 2009, 3-4 tons of heroin was trafficked from South-
East Asia to Australia and to a lesser extent New Zealand. 
There are no reports of onward heroin trafficking from 
China.
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, 2 tons of heroin was seized in South-East Asia, 
and 5.8 tons was seized in China. Overall, compared to 
consumption levels, the quantity of heroin seized in South-
East Asia is very low.
South-East Asia
In 2009, heroin seizures were particularly low in Indonesia, 
Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Sin-
gapore. Indeed, Indonesian, Malaysian and Vietnamese 
heroin users abused 15 tons of pure heroin in 2009, yet law 
enforcement seized just 600 kg. Malaysia receives a greater 
number of direct shipments due to the presence of busy 
seaports yet only 28 kg of heroin were seized along this 
route in 2009. Although Vietnamese customs did not seize 
any heroin travelling from Pakistan, Pakistani authorities 
seized 11 kg destined for Viet Nam in 2009. Despite high 
consumption, heroin seizure levels in Indonesia are low. 
The majority of Afghan heroin destined for Indonesia first 
transits Pakistan, then India or Thailand.140 Indonesia has 
significant amounts of sea traffic with 5-6 million contain-
ers transiting annually (180,000 daily); however, no sei-
zures were made at seaports in 2009. 
As a production country, heroin seizures in Myanmar vary 
significantly from year to year. For example, in 2008 a total 
of 88 kg were reportedly seized, whereas in 2009 police 
confiscated 1,076 kg. Opium seizures in Myanmar remained 
generally stable between 1999 and 2003. However, since 
2004 seizures have decreased sharply, with the exception of 
2006 and 2008 – which coincided with the decrease in 
opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar. In 2009, Myanmar 
recorded its lowest opium seizures in the last decade – just 
752 kg. 
139 UNAIDS, AIDS epidemic update 2009, Wang et at al., 2009. 
140 International Narcotics Control Strategy report of INL (USA), 2009.  
China
Heroin seizures in China have varied significantly over the 
last decade. In 2001, the country seized 13,200 kg of 
heroin; since then, heroin seizures have steadily decreased 
in conjunction with the decline in opium production in 
Myanmar. However, heroin abuse in China has not 
decreased since 2001. Therefore, Afghan heroin is likely to 
be increasingly trafficked into the Chinese market, yet is 
not seized as effectively as Myanmar’s heroin has been in the 
past. Opium seizures are also recorded in China, with sei-
zures consistently ranging between 1,000 kg and 1,500 kg 
every year. 
Of the 5.8 tons of heroin seized in China in 2009, 81 per 
cent was seized at seaports and originated entirely from 
Pakistan. Therefore, it is likely that 33 of the 40 tons of 
Afghan heroin trafficked to China came via Pakistan by sea, 
even though in 2009 no heroin seizures were made in sea-
ports in Pakistan. China has the busiest seaports in the 
world, handling at least twice as many containers as the 
Fig. 16: Heroin seizures in China, 1999-2009
Source: UNODC.
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
China
Rest of the countries in South-East -Asia
Fig. 17: Opium seizures in Myanmar, 1999-2009
Source: UNODC.
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United States of America and six times more than Ger-
many; an estimated 250,000 containers transit Chinese 
seaports every day.141 
A further 11 per cent of seizures were made at airports, 4 
per cent at land borders and 2 per cent at mail centres. 
According to Chinese customs, 70 per cent of heroin seized 
at airports originated from other South-East Asian coun-
tries, including Malaysia, Viet Nam, Thailand and the 
Philippines. The remaining heroin seized at airports origi-
nated from Africa (15 per cent), Gulf countries (9 per cent) 
and Turkey (6 per cent). The 0.5 tons seized from Africa 
came from East Africa and Nigeria, while the 0.5 tons from 
141  World development indicators database, World Bank.
Gulf countries came mainly from the United Arab Emir-
ates. Seizures of heroin originating from Pakistan via air 
were almost negligible in 2009.  
Most heroin seizures made on land in China occurred close 
to the Myanmar border; however, the country’s 2,000 km 
border with Myanmar is generally very difficult to police 
due to geography, the abundance of crossings and a lack of 
law enforcement capacity. Despite several heroin seizures 
reported from both Pakistan and India close to their borders 
with China, very few seizures were reported from Chinese 
customs between 2000 and 2009. Few seizures were made 
near the borders between China and Central Asia and little 
Seizure location Amount (kg) Percentage of total
Estimated amount of heroin  
trafﬁcked to China (tons)
Airport 156.7 11% 4
Land border 59.8 4% 2
Mail centre 34.7 2% 1
River 2.0 0% 0
Seaport 1,197.1 83% 33
Total 1,450.3 100% 40
Source: World Customs Office and UNODC. 
Table 15: Chinese heroin seizures based on location, 2009
Map 32: Heroin seizures in China, 2000-2009
Source: UNODC and World Customs Office seizure database. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply 
official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by 
India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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is known about trafficking along this route. Finally, signifi-
cant information gaps remain as regards trafficking between 
the Russian Federation and China, although several heroin 
seizures were made at the border in 2009. 
Seizures alone are unlikely to uncover all possible trafficking 
routes. For example, no heroin seizures were reported at the 
border between China and Nepal, although the open border 
between India and Nepal, limited law enforcement capacity 
in Nepal and weak controls at the border with China all 
create conditions conducive to trafficking. In addition, 
opium poppy cultivation has recently started to increase in 
Nepal while India has both opium poppy cultivation and 
heroin manufacturing sites. Although the Chinese border 
with Nepal and India is mostly very mountainous, making 
heroin trafficking difficult, the number of Nepalese arrested 
in Pakistan on drug trafficking charges has increased since 
2008, possibly indicating Afghan heroin trafficking to 
Nepal. Nepalese officials argue that Afghan heroin is traf-
ficked through Nepal to China, but that it is not abused 
locally. Interestingly, almost all heroin seized at Chinese mail 
centres (estimated at 1 ton) in 2009 originated in India.
The flow of Afghan opiates  
to Oceania
In 2009, almost 4 tons of heroin were trafficked to Oce-
ania, mainly to Australia. Oceania is comprised of 24 coun-
tries, encompassing an estimated 7,500 to 10,000 islands, 
including Australia, New Zealand and the numerous Pacific 
Island Countries and Territories (PICT) of Polynesia, 
Micronesia and Melanesia. The region seized just 171 kg of 
heroin in 2009.
Opiate supply
Of the 4 tons of heroin trafficked to Oceania in 2009, 3.2 
tons were abused in Australia and 0.6 tons in New Zealand. 
Heroin abuse was almost negligible in other countries of 
the region. Afghan heroin formed the overwhelming major-
ity of heroin abused in Australia and New Zealand, likely 
trafficked via Pakistan and South-East Asian countries, 
mainly Thailand, Viet Nam, Cambodia and Malaysia.142 
According to the World Customs Office seizure statistics, 
more than 90 per cent of heroin seizures made at Australian 
customs were trafficked from South-East Asian countries. 
Although heroin trafficking from South and East Africa to 
Australia was limited in 2009, shipments from Africa are 
emerging as a new trend, according to the Australian Gov-
ernment.
Value and beneﬁciaries
In 2009, Oceania’s heroin market was worth an estimated 
US$3.5 billion. Indeed, Australia and New Zealand had the 
highest heroin prices in the world; heroin of just 30 per 
cent purity cost $380 per gram. The almost 4 tons of heroin 
consumed in the region cost Australian users $3 billion and 
users from New Zealand $500 million.
In 2009, both South-East Asian and African – mainly Nige-
rian – drug traffickers were involved in shipping heroin to 
Australia. Although information is limited, domestic sales 
were likely conducted by indigenous groups. 
Opiate demand and social issues  
in Oceania
In 2009, 3.8 tons of heroin was consumed by 69,000 
heroin abusers. Australia dominated with an estimated 
142  ARQ Australia, 2009.
Map 33:  Heroin trafﬁcking ﬂows to Australia, 2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. 
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55,000 heroin abusers, followed by New Zealand with an 
estimated 12,000 abusers. The remaining countries in Oce-
ania are small islands with no drug abuse data available. 
Law enforcement and seizures
Heroin seizures in Oceania are mainly limited to Australia. 
In 2009, Australia seized 170 kg of heroin and New Zealand 
seized 1 kg. Between 1999 and 2009, heroin seizures in 
Australia decreased by 53 per cent despite stable heroin con-
sumption in the country. In New Zealand, heroin seizures 
have remained at around 1 kg between 1999 and 2009. 
The flow of Afghan opiates  
to Africa
In 2009, an estimated 40-45 tons of Afghan heroin were 
trafficked to Africa. The majority of this amount was con-
sumed in Africa; however Africa is now emerging as a 
heroin trafficking hub for onward movement to Europe, 
China and Australia. Across Africa, 1.2 tons of heroin were 
seized in 2009.
Opiate supply
Of the 40-45 tons trafficked to Africa, some 25-30 tons 
were likely trafficked from Pakistan, 5 tons from the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 5-6 tons from the United Arab Emirates 
and 5-6 tons from India. Indeed, the majority of heroin is 
still smuggled into South Africa mainly from South-West 
Asia and, to a lesser extent, South-East Asia. Major hubs in 
Africa include Nigeria and South Africa.
Based on seizure data, it appears that the majority of heroin 
trafficked from Pakistan to Africa is conducted by African 
couriers rather than Pakistanis. Heroin is most likely 
exchanged in industrial cities such as Karachi or Lahore, 
before being shipped by air. Trafficking from Pakistan to 
East Africa also occurs by sea, given the limited capacity of 
law enforcement at seaports across East Africa. 
Most heroin enters Africa through its eastern countries. 
Heroin reaches Nigeria via East African countries (Ethio-
pia, Somalia, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania and 
Mozambique) by air or overland; however, it is also trans-
ported by couriers on direct flights or shipped directly to 
Nigeria from the countries of origin. Heroin is smuggled 
into South Africa mainly using couriers and parcel post. 
Other routes involve entry through Kenya, the United 
Republic of Tanzania and Mozambique and the use of road 
networks. Exact volumes and routes are difficult to deter-
mine given that East African countries provided UNODC 
with very limited drug trafficking data in 2009. 
Value and beneﬁciaries
In 2009, Africa’s drug trafficking market was worth an 
estimated US$3.2 billion – most of which went to Nigerian 
criminal groups. Nigerian organized criminal groups likely 
dominate the African drug trade and are active in many 
countries around the world, including destination countries 
in Europe. However, drug trafficking in Africa involves 
both African networks, including Nigerians and Tanza-
nians, as well as foreign networks, including Chinese and 
Pakistanis. Indeed, the Pakistan-Africa route appears criti-
cal; in 2009, the overwhelming majority of foreigners 
arrested on drug charges in Pakistan were Nigerians.143 
Although African drug traffickers are clearly very active in 
Pakistan, few Pakistanis are likely to be active in Africa.
West African and Chinese criminal organizations are 
reported to be major players in hubs like South Africa, 
busying themselves in the local distribution and developing 
the heroin and methamphetamine markets.144
Opiate demand and social issues in Africa
In 2009, an estimated 34 tons of heroin were consumed in 
Africa. However numbers and distribution of drug users are 
difficult to determine as official drug consumption figures 
were provided by just 9 per cent of African countries in 
2009. African data collection capacity must be developed as 
a matter of urgency, since the absence of data makes it 
almost impossible to accurately estimate the number of 
opiate abusers in Africa.
Available data suggests that there are more heroin users in 
East, West and Central Africa than in Northern and South-
ern Africa.145 This is not surprising given that East Africa is 
the main entry point for Afghan heroin and West Africa is 
an important exit point. Estimated number of African users 
may also be skewed by heroin purity levels. Given the eco-
nomic profile of consumers, heroin purity at street level 
may be even lower than 10 per cent. Low quality heroin is 
often mixed with cannabis; intravenous abuse of heroin is 
not very common, as most heroin abusers smoke the 
drug.146
143 ARQ 2009, Pakistan. 
144 HONLAF September 2009.
145 National estimates or regional averages were used to analyse distribution of 
users.
146 HONLAF September 2009.
Fig. 18: Heroin seizures in Australia, 1999-2009
Source: UNODC.
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Fig. 19: Distribution of drug trafﬁcking arrests in Pakistan, by country of nationality, 2000-2008
Source: World Customs Office. 
Africa’s high level of HIV/AIDS, coupled with current 
trends of increased heroin trafficking to the continent may 
result in increased heroin abuse and further HIV/AIDS 
infection in the coming years. The spread of HIV/AIDS by 
injecting drug abuse has already been reported in East 
Africa. A study of 336 heroin abusers in Nairobi found that 
44.9 per cent used, or had previously used, heroin by injec-
tion; of the 101 persons who abused heroin by injection at 
the time of the study, 52 per cent were HIV-positive.147 
Heroin abuse by injection is also reported to be spreading 
at an alarming rate in the United Republic of Tanzania. 
Injecting drug users are particularly vulnerable to HIV 
infection, since many share syringes and engage in unpro-
tected sex, thus contributing to the spread of HIV to the 
general population. Indeed, Africa has 22.4 million of the 
estimated 33.4 million HIV-positive persons identified 
worldwide in 2010 – an alarming 67 per cent. 148 The level 
of HIV infection is higher in Nigeria and South Africa than 
in other African countries. 
In 2009, Egypt was the only African country to report 
opium abuse. An estimated 207,000 people are opiate abus-
ers, of which 126,000 are opium abusers. Consuming 44 
tons of opium in 2009, Egypt would require 1,500-2,500 
hectares of illegal opium poppy cultivation. More data is 
needed to better estimate consumption and opium poppy 
cultivation in Egypt.   
Onward trafﬁcking routes
Although the majority of heroin trafficked to Africa is con-
sumed on the continent, Africa is also emerging as a key 
147 The rise of injecting drug use in East Africa: a case study from Kenya. Susan 
Beckerleg et al., 2005.
148 UNAIDS outlook report, 2010.
trans-shipment point for heroin destined for other markets. 
In 2009, an estimated 7 tons of heroin was trafficked from 
Africa to Europe, almost 1 ton to China and a small amount 
to Australia. 
The high number of Nigerian arrests for heroin trafficking 
internationally suggests that Nigeria is a hub for heroin 
distribution from Africa to Europe. Like other West African 
groups, Nigerian networks abroad are not highly structured 
and they often overlap with other networks. From Nigeria, 
heroin is shipped to Europe by sea and air. Nigerian crimi-
nal groups have already established a large cocaine network 
in Europe and most likely use the same network for heroin 
trafficking. According to the ARQ provided by the Italian 
Government, heroin is also trafficked from Pakistan via 
East and North Africa to Italy. Detailed routes of heroin 
trafficking to and from Africa will be covered in a separate 
report, as more data is needed.  
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, African law enforcement seized 1.2 tons of heroin; 
just 70 kg of this was seized by customs. As mentioned 
above, heroin trafficking via East Africa through North 
Africa has increased sharply in recent years, although the 
number of heroin seizures made in East African countries 
was very limited in 2009 – less than 10 kg in each country.
North Africa, however, reported a significant increase in 
seizures. Between 1999 and 2008, the amount of heroin 
seized in Africa was between 200 kg and 350 kg; in 2009, 
the total amount of heroin seized in the region nearly quad-
rupled to 1,227 kg. Increased seizures were mainly reported 
in North Africa, particularly Algeria. Given the emergence 
of Africa as a heroin trafficking hub, in-depth research is 
required as a matter of urgency. 
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The flow of Afghan opiates  
to the Americas
In 2009, an estimated some 40 tons of heroin was available 
in the Americas – of this 25 tons were consumed and 3.5 
tons were seized. This heroin supply was met by both 
regional and, to a limited extent, Afghan supply. It is not 
clear why heroin supply was higher than demand – either 
consumption statistics are incorrect, production is lower, or 
stockpiles exist in the region.
Opiate supply
There are three primary sources for the heroin abused in the 
Americas: South America (mainly Colombia), Mexico and 
Afghanistan. 
In 2009, Colombia produced 9 tons of opium, with the 
potential to yield 900-1,000 kg of heroin. Columbian 
heroin is of very high purity, sometimes reaching the upper 
90th percentile range. This amount was, however, insuffi-
cient to meet South American consumption demand (2 
tons) and seizures (1 tons) in 2009. In addition, 58 per cent 
of the heroin seized in the United States of America is 
reportedly Colombian heroin149 - this would mean that 12 
tons of Colombian heroin was trafficked to the United 
States of America in 2009. In total, Colombia would have 
had to manufacture 15 tons of heroin in order to meet the 
heroin demand in both South America and the United 
States of America; 150 tons of opium would have been 
necessary to manufacture that much heroin, resulting in an 
obvious discrepancy between the supply and demand for 
Colombian opium. Further research on this topic is needed. 
In 2009, 426 tons of opium was produced in Mexico, with 
the potential to manufacture some 40 tons of heroin – 
mostly black tar heroin. As 39 per cent of heroin seizures in 
the United States of America were Mexican black tar 
149 According to the DEA (USA) heroin signature programme.
heroin,150 it is likely that 9 tons of black tar heroin was traf-
ficked to the United States of America from Mexico in 
2009. The long Mexico-United States of America land 
border appears to be the main entry point. Mexican heroin 
is smuggled in cars, trucks and buses and may also be 
hidden on or in the body of the smuggler.  
The Canadian heroin market however, is dominated by 
Afghan heroin,151 with only a limited amount of heroin 
coming from Mexico. Based on previous seizure patterns, it 
is likely that around 78 per cent of the heroin abused in 
Canada is Afghan heroin trafficked from India, Pakistan 
and to a lesser extent from Africa.  
If the total demand for Mexican heroin in 2009 was at most 
10 tons, it remains unclear where the remaining 30 tons 
was abused. Although seizures indicate that some Afghan 
heroin was trafficked to the United States of America, the 
level of trafficking for 2009 remains unclear, firstly because 
heroin manufacture in Mexico was much higher than the 
demand in the United States of America, eliminating the 
need to import Afghan heroin into the United States of 
America; and secondly, seizure data from the United States 
of America in 2009 was insufficient to draw any solid con-
clusions.
The above analysis is based on limited available supply and 
demand statistics. Therefore, the manufacture of heroin 
specifically in South America and Mexico should be further 
analysed in future reports, in order to accurately estimate 
the amount of Afghan heroin trafficked to the United 
States of America and Canada. 
Opiate demand and social issues  
in the Americas
In 2009, an estimated 25 tons of pure heroin were abused 
by 1.67 million heroin users in the Americas. The majority, 
22 tons, was abused in North America, 2 tons are estimated 
to have been used in South America, 850-900 kg in the 
Caribbean and 500 kg in Central America. The United 
States of America dominated heroin abuse in the Americas, 
with users consuming 21 tons in 2009. Canadians con-
sumed 1.3 tons in 2009. Despite being a key production 
country, just 100-150 kg of heroin were abused in Mexico 
Exact numbers of heroin users are difficult to determine, as 
just 13 out of 42 countries in the Americas provided drug 
consumption data in 2009. Of a total estimated 1.67 mil-
lion heroin abusers in the Americas, 1.2 million were in the 
United States of America and 114,000 were in Canada. In 
2009, the number of heroin abusers in Mexico and Brazil 
was estimated to be between 50,000 and 60,000 in each 
country and between 30,000 and 40,000 each in Argen-
tina, Colombia, Peru and Puerto Rico. The highest preva-
150 According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Heroin Signature 
Programme (HSP).
151 Report on the Illicit Drug Situation in Canada – 2007, 2008. 
Fig. 20: Heroin seizures in North Africa, 1999-2009
Source: UNODC.
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lence rates among adults in the Americas were reported in 
Costa Rica (2.8 per cent), Puerto Rico (1.25 per cent) and 
the United States of America (0.58 per cent). 
In 2009, an estimated 2 tons of heroin were consumed in 
South America, yet only 1 ton was manufactured in the 
subregion that year. Given the absence of evidence to sug-
gest that Afghan or Mexican heroin was trafficked to South 
America, it can be inferred that either the level of heroin 
abuse was overestimated or the level of heroin manufacture 
in the subregion was actually significantly higher than 1 ton.
A large number of countries in the Americas have yet to 
provide data on opium consumption, posing significant 
data constraints. Costa Rica and Guatemala were among the 
very few countries to provide this data. According to the 
2009 ARQ from Costa Rica, 2.8 per cent of the country’s 
adult population are opium abusers. This would translate 
into some 80,000 persons potentially abusing around 28 
tons of opium. In addition, in the ARQ it provided in 2009, 
Guatemala reported producing 15 per cent of the country’s 
total opium consumption. This might suggest a high level 
of illicit opium poppy cultivation in Central America. 
In addition to heroin production in the Americas, some 
Afghan heroin was trafficked to Canada and the United 
States of America in 2009. Overall, the amount of heroin 
available in the Americas (almost 40 tons) is much higher 
than the amount consumed (25 tons); suggesting that 
either consumption is higher than estimated or opium pro-
duction is lower than estimated. However, if both demand 
and supply statistics are correct, there are likely to be heroin 
and opium stocks in the region.
Law enforcement and seizures
In 2009, an estimated 3.5 tons of heroin was seized in the 
Americas – the majority, around 2 tons, was seized in the 
United States of America.152
Over the last decade, heroin seizures have increased in 
North America, particularly in the United States of Amer-
ica. An increase was also seen in Canada, from 88 kg of 
heroin seized in 1999 to 213 kg in 2009 – the majority of 
152 At the time of publication official 2009 seizure data was unavailable for both 
the United States of America and Canada – 2008 estimates were used.
heroin seized in Canada originates from Afghanistan. In 
2009, 32 kg of heroin was seized en route to the United 
States of America: 21 kg in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 5.6 
kg in India, 5.6 kg in Turkey, 4.5 kg in Germany (in transit 
from India) and 0.16 kg in Pakistan. Although no heroin 
seizures were reported in African countries or South-East 
Asia to the United States of America in 2009, some seizures 
were reported between 2000 and 2008, especially from 
Nigeria and Thailand. 
Despite increases in both the United States of America and 
Canada over the last decade, Mexican seizures remained 
stable despite the significant increase in opium production 
in the country during this period. Indeed, although Mexico 
produced some 40 tons of heroin in 2008, only 174 kg 
were seized. 
In 2009, most countries in Central America seized less than 
100 kg of heroin – data indicates that heroin abuse levels 
were also low. Heroin abuse and seizures were also limited 
in most South American countries – Colombia seized the 
most heroin in 2009 at 650 kg. Given that Colombia 
manufactured around 1 ton of heroin, this represents a 
heroin interdiction rate of around 65 per cent. Such a rate 
has never been observed in any other country or region of 
the world. In addition, total heroin abuse in all of South 
America was around 2 tons (of pure heroin) in 2009, indi-
cating that South American abusers outside of Colombia 
were left with only 350 kg of heroin. The combined manu-
facture, seizure and consumption figures suggest that either 
the quantity abused is less than estimated or that produc-
tion is higher in Colombia and the rest of South America. 
The level of heroin seized was less than 5 per cent in Brazil, 
Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, com-
pared to reported abuse levels.
Region
Consumption 
(tons) - purity: 
70% (kg)
Percentage 
of total
Central America 494 2%
North America 21,985 88%
South America 2,076 8%
Caribbean 870 3%
Total (rounded) 25,000 100%
Source: UNODC.
Table 16: Heroin consumption in the Americas, 2009 Fig. 21: Heroin seizures in the USA, 1999-2009
Source: UNODC.
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1.4 CASE STUDY:  
 OPIATE TRAFFICKING THROUGH  
 BALUCHISTAN AND FATA
The majority of the 160 tons of heroin trafficked into 
Pakistan in 2009 transited Baluchistan province in Paki-
stan. Significant amounts also transited the FATA region. 
Prior to this report, very little was known about the drug 
trafficking routes, beneficiaries and operations within Balu-
chistan and FATA. This case study provides a comprehen-
sive study of these areas, including economic and social 
factors and law enforcement capability.
Baluchistan
Baluchistan has an extremely poor economic record, despite 
being the largest province in Pakistan and well endowed 
with natural resources. Baluchistan is the least developed 
province of Pakistan and also the largest, covering some 42 
per cent of the country’s total land area. Baluchistan’s popu-
lation is scattered across the province’s 26 districts and is 
dominated by four major ethnic groups: Baluch, Brahui, 
Pashtun and Hazara. At 45 per cent, the Baluch form the 
overwhelming majority of the population, followed by the 
Pashtuns with 38 per cent and the remaining 17 per cent 
including a range of minority groups belonging to other 
provinces of Pakistan.153 Baluchistan’s ethnic groups are 
regionally segregated across the province.
The Sunni Muslim Baluch ethnic group largely dominates 
the province, but is especially prevalent in areas bordering 
the Islamic Republic of Iran to the west and parts of the 
border with Afghanistan, as the tribe extends across both of 
these borders. Compared to other tribes, the Baluch are 
extremely hierarchical and have a very strong ethnic identity 
that permeates all aspects of society, including religion. Tra-
ditionally, a clan chief known as a Sardar or Nawab heads 
each clan. Among the Baluch and the Brahui tribes, these 
chiefs hold dominating and influential positions that per-
meate the social, economic and political realms.
Thanks to the strong tribal ties, cross-border smuggling and 
illicit activities between Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran are smooth and relatively easy to 
run. The Baluch tribes almost completely monopolize Bal-
uchistan’s drug trafficking networks, while drug flows 
between Afghanistan and the Pashtun areas of Baluchistan 
are much smaller and less systematic.
Pashtuns, although fewer in number than the Baluch, dom-
inate the areas bordering Afghanistan to the north, espe-
cially the Achakzai, Noor Zai, Kakar, Syeds and Tareen 
153 Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Baluchistan, November 2005, 
Report 7.
Map 34: Districts of Baluchistan
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. 
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tribes. Pashtun tribes are not as strictly hierarchical as their 
Baluch or Brahui counterparts, especially in northern Balu-
chistan where the role of chief is more symbolic and less 
influential.
Baluchistan’s Pashtuns have strong tribal connections across 
the border into southern Afghanistan and into neighboring 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In 2005 an 
estimated 600,000 Afghan Pashtuns lived in Baluchistan, 
most of which had settled in the northern areas.154 Smug-
gling and illicit activities between Afghanistan, Pashtun 
Baluchistan and FATA are widespread and tribal elders have 
little or no power to intervene. Some Pashtun areas in 
Baluchistan are also reported to host elements of the Tal-
iban, Al-Qaida and other powerful militant groups.
Brahuis are mainly concentrated in the centre of Baluch-
istan with a population estimated at just 100,000. Brahui 
speaking tribes include Raisani, Shahwani, Sumulani, Ban-
gulzai, Mohammad Shahi, Lehri, Bezenjo, Mohammad 
Hasni, Zarakzai (Zehri), Mengal and Lango, although most 
of these tribes are bilingual, in addition to being fluent in 
the Baluchi language.155 Although Brahui and Baluchi are 
distinct languages, the culture, social organization and his-
tory of the two groups are rather similar. In fact, many of 
the Brahui and Baluch feel a sense of belonging to a wider 
Baluch society and tradition. The 1998 national census, for 
example, did not differentiate between the two. Although 
Brahuis also have ethnic connections across the border in 
Afghanistan, they are rarely mentioned specifically in rela-
tion to drug trafficking.
Hazaras are a minority ethnic group in Baluchistan. Origi-
nally from Afghanistan, a large number of them migrated 
or fled to Baluchistan due to violence and ethnic persecu-
154 Gazdar, Haris. 2007, Balochistan Economic Report: Background Paper on Social 
Structures and Migration, Collective for Social Science Research, Karachi.
155 Baluchistan Government website, http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/, accessed 
October 2010.
tion. Many have since emigrated internationally although a 
significant number remain in Baluchistan, particularly in 
the city of Quetta.
The majority of the population of Quetta is Pashtun, Baluch 
and Hazara, followed by other ethnic groups, including 
Tajik refuges from Afghanistan. These ethnic groups are 
geographically segregated within the city. The Hazara popu-
lation is reportedly gaining power in Quetta due to financial 
support from relatives living abroad, mostly in Australia. As 
a result, religious and ethnic clashes between the Baluch and 
the Hazara have been increasing and represent a serious 
social and security problem that regularly occupies law 
enforcement agencies.
Baluchistan has consistently scored the lowest in education, 
literacy, health, water and sanitation development indica-
tors of any province in Pakistan. An estimated 700,000 of 
1,100,000 school-aged children do not attend school.156 
Where schools are available, students often need to travel 
prohibitively long distances to attend. As in the case of 
FATA, entrenched tribal and religious traditions have given 
rise to a clear gender disparity in education levels. The edu-
cation standard is very low and enrolments are equally low. 
This situation is worse in the border areas where young 
children are actively recruited for smuggling activities.
Law enforcement in Baluchistan
Baluchistan’s law and order situation is widely perceived to 
be deteriorating, with intermittent separatist and sectarian 
clashes and the provincial crime rate increasing. The prov-
ince’s borders with Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran are long and porous, making it extremely difficult to 
properly control the area. Despite the presence of many law 
enforcement agencies, including both federal and provin-
156 World Bank, May 2008, 
Pakistan, Balochistan Economic Report: From Periphery to Core, No. 40345-PK.
Administration Agency name Baluchistan provincial strength
Total national 
strength
Provincially 
administered
Police 35,870 362,778
Levies 5,000 12,000
Frontier Constabulary 10,500 33,500
Federally 
administered
Frontier Corp 43,000 116,000
Frontier Constabulary 5,200 33,500
Coast Guard 1,600 3,000
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) 45 3,000
Anti Narcotics Force 463 3,000
Customs 300 12,000
* Not all figures were officially available at the time of printing and, as a result, some figures are estimates.
Table 17: Law enforcement strength in Baluchistan*, number of staff, 2010
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cial agencies, information sharing between agencies is ad 
hoc and their relationships are often competitive rather 
than cooperative. Resources available to these agencies are 
insufficient and low personnel numbers make it impossible 
to properly secure the largest province in Pakistan.
Prevailing insecurity in Baluchistan has impacted the ability 
of law enforcement agencies to deal with local criminal 
justice issues. Criminal activity is on the rise in Baluchistan, 
with an overall 25 per cent increase in the number of crimes 
reported between 2006 and 2009. During the same period, 
murder, kidnapping and car theft all more than doubled. 
The most startling increase was the number of cases of 
kidnapping for ransom in Baluchistan, which rose by 867 
per cent between 2006 and 2009. 
Federal law enforcement agencies operating in Baluchistan 
include the Anti Narcotics Force, Customs, Frontier Corp, 
Federal Investigation Agency, Coast Guard and the Directo-
rate of Intelligence and Investigations (Customs and Excise).
The Anti Narcotics Force (ANF) is the premier law enforce-
ment agency of Pakistan in the area of drug control. The 
ANF has the primary responsibility of interdicting the pro-
duction, smuggling, trafficking and abuse of narcotics and 
illicit psychotropic substances. It collects intelligence and is 
responsible for arrests, drug seizures and the investigation 
and prosecution of offenders. The ANF has a presence in 
strategic areas across Baluchistan, including in and around 
Quetta, Chaman, Dalbandin, Panjgur, Turbat, Hub and 
Gwadar, although their staff shortage and limited drug and 
precursor detection equipment makes effective operations 
outside of these areas difficult. In 2009, almost half of all 
ANF seizures in Baluchistan occurred in and around Quet-
ta.157 
Pakistan Coast Guard (PCG) is headquartered in Karachi. 
The main responsibilities of the PCG are to counter narcot-
ics, prevent illegal immigration and enemy agents, saboteurs 
or terrorists from infiltrating into or out of the country 
within the area of responsibility of the PCG. They also 
monitor weapon smuggling, counter terrorism and carry out 
internal security and flood relief operations, in addition to 
supplementing coastal defence during war. The ANF dele-
gated powers to carry out seizures, arrests and investigations 
to various law enforcement agencies including the PCG.
Recruitment remains a significant problem across law 
enforcement agencies, particularly for customs, since their 
officers tend to maintain their position until old age. In 
fact, there have reportedly been no new recruits to the ser-
vice since 1994.158
In addition to the national law enforcement forces, there 
are provincial law enforcement agencies operating in Balu-
157 ANF, March 2010, Drug Situation in Pakistan and Counter Narcotics Achieve-
ments: 2009.
158 Interview with Customs Official, Quetta, August 2010.
chistan, which include the provincial police and Levies. 
Provincial police forces do not have a presence along the 
borders or in tribal areas where other law enforcement 
agencies have been delegated police mandates. For instance, 
Levies are responsible for policing in tribal areas and carry-
ing out other functions under their respective political 
agents. The tribal chiefs handpick the Levies and their loy-
alty is to the tribe. Hence, tribal chiefs prefer the levy struc-
ture and are pushing for the restriction of police control.
Border control in Baluchistan
Islamic Republic of Iran
The border between Baluchistan and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran is 730 km long, stretching from Jiwani in Gwadar 
district to Qilla Rabat in Chaghi district. Taftan is the main 
official border crossing between the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Baluchistan, although there are also numerous 
unofficial crossings in this hilly desert terrain. Baluchistan’s 
hostile border terrain makes movement and interdiction 
difficult for law enforcement, thus making the area favour-
able to drug traffickers.
Licit cross-border trade between Baluchistan and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran is significant and concentrated 
mainly in Taftan, although other official border crossing 
points are also used. In some cases, drug traffickers use 
official crossings for shipments, even though the largely 
unprotected border makes crossing easy in most locations.
Pakistani law enforcement present at the Taftan border 
includes ANF, FIA, Customs and the Frontier Corp. None 
of these agencies have technical equipment, aside from one 
mobile scanner. A Border Liaison Office is scheduled to 
open at Taftan in 2011, with the aim of improving com-
munication and interaction between Pakistani and Iranian 
law enforcement. Although the border is extremely difficult 
to patrol, the Iranian side of the border is perceived to be 
the more secure of the two.
Border with Afghanistan 
The 930 km long Baluchistan-Afghanistan border begins at 
Qilla Rabat (Chaghi district) and ends at GulKach (Zhob 
district). Manned by Customs, the ANF, the Frontier Corp 
and the FIA, Chaman is the only official crossing point 
along this long border. However, with a mountainous and 
hilly terrain along the rest of the border, there are numerous 
routes aside from the official crossing through which drug 
traffickers can easily pass undetected.
At the Chaman border, the equipment, manpower and 
training of law enforcement agencies are insufficient to 
properly execute their mandated task. One customs officer 
from Baluchistan noted that they do not even have scanners 
available at the border crossing and have to rely on infor-
mants and tip-offs.159 Another officer reported that scan-
ning machines have been installed at Chaman and Quetta, 
159 Interview with Customs Officer, Quetta, August 2010.
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but due to the high level of vehicle crossing it is not possible 
to use them regularly.160 Without even the basic drug and 
precursor detection equipment, drug traffickers pass 
through Chaman with a moderate risk of interdiction and 
those caught are often low-level drug mules rather than key 
members of the drug trafficking network. This said, only 
drug traffickers wanting to transport large volumes of drugs 
or precursors would risk transiting through Chaman. In 
most cases, these types of big shipments rely heavily on 
contacts and bribes to secure smooth passage.
In 2008, the Chaman border crossing was fitted with a 
biometrics capability, although this is not currently opera-
tional reportedly due to political issues with Afghanistan. 
Trucks are meant to be thoroughly searched, but in reality 
searching is ad hoc and it can range from checking one box 
to fully unloading a truck. Unlike at the border between 
Pakistan and China, trucks coming from Afghanistan are 
not required to fully unload onto trucks in Pakistan, making 
full searches difficult.  
Coastline
Baluchistan’s coastline with the Arabian Sea is 640 km long, 
stretching from Jiwani (Gwadar district) to Hub/Gaddani 
(Lasbella district). Along the coast there are five official 
ports, namely Gwadar, Gaddani, Ormara, Pasni and Jiwani, 
and numerous unofficial, natural small jetties commonly 
exploited by smugglers and drug traffickers. The Coast 
Guard of Pakistan is the prominent law enforcement agency 
operating along the Makran coast, with jurisdiction from 
30 km out to sea to 120 km inland. Although relatively 
small in number, the Coast Guard have secured a number 
160 Interview with Customs Officer, Quetta, August 2010.
of seizure successes including the 2009 seizure of the high-
est volume of heroin of any law enforcement agency in 
Pakistan.
Opiate trafﬁcking to/from Baluchistan
Although drugs enter Pakistan through numerous unoffi-
cial tracks across the Afghan border, once in Pakistan they 
are usually moved along established trade routes and enter 
key transport networks, with the notable exception of Balu-
chistan. In Baluchistan, drugs are mainly trafficked on 
smaller, unmonitored routes between the border and the 
Makran coast, making detection and interception difficult 
for law enforcement agencies. Moreover, coercive power in 
the drug trade is significant and frequently deployed, 
including the use of heavily armed convoys to transit across 
Baluchistan province. Drug trafficking networks in Baluch-
istan are considerably more organized than in FATA.
Baluchistan’s long and porous border with Afghanistan has 
one official crossing, located in Chaman, although it is 
punctured by hundreds of natural passes and unofficial 
crossings. Difficult terrain, inadequate equipment and lim-
ited training of law enforcement, as well as strong tribal 
connections, make the border extremely vulnerable to drug 
trafficking. Even with increased numbers of law enforce-
ment personnel, drug trafficking from southern Afghani-
stan into Baluchistan would be almost impossible to 
prevent. Heroin manufacturing labs in the Hilmand, 
Nimroz and Kandahar provinces of Afghanistan are con-
centrated close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border due to 
both favourable security conditions and ease of transporta-
tion into Pakistan. Drugs trafficked into Baluchistan most 
commonly cross at unofficial passes, although the Chaman 
border crossing is also used.
Taftan official crossing, Pakistan 
 – Islamic Republic of Iran border
Source: UNODC.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of containers 14,250 17,800 14,700 19,950 21,750 18,000
Source: Baluchistan Customs Department.
Chaman pedestrian crossing
Source: UNODC.
Table 18: Containers entering Baluchistan annually from the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005-2010
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A significant proportion of Afghan opiates are trafficked 
from Hilmand and Nimroz into Baluchistan utilizing unof-
ficial crossings. Drugs are trafficked via three main unoffi-
cial border points in Baluchistan’s Chaghi district: Girdi 
jungle, Baram Cha and Rabt. These routes are regarded as 
golden passages for drug traffickers, as they have minimal 
law enforcement presence and optimal transport distances 
to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Makran coast. Drugs 
are also reportedly stored in these border areas temporarily 
until they can be transported through Baluchistan.
Unofficial crossings and mountain passes require flexible 
transportation arrangements. Drugs trafficked through 
these crossings are usually transported on camels, horses 
and other livestock, or on foot. Whenever possible, cars are 
used to transport drugs, although these are limited to flat 
terrain and low altitude areas.
Drugs trafficked into the northern Pashtun areas of Balu-
chistan are most commonly concealed in fruit boxes, bags 
and in specially designed vehicle cavities. These drugs are 
then transported to Quetta, where they join other drug 
flows. Indeed, opiates trafficked across numerous routes 
from Afghanistan are often gathered in the cities of Quetta 
and Dalbandin before continuing along routes through 
Baluchistan, including to the ports along the coast of Paki-
stan, such as Karachi and Gwadar, or to the eastern part of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, by road or rail. Due to the 
porous nature of the border, Afghan drug traffickers usually 
deliver the drugs to their Pakistani counterparts in Balu-
chistan, particularly at Girdi Jungle, Quetta and Dalband-
in.161 Alternatively, Pakistani drug traffickers can travel to 
Afghanistan to collect the drugs, although this is less 
common. In practice, the dual nationality and cross-border 
ties of many tribes make this distinction difficult. Drug 
networks also maintain a number of safehouses containing 
drug stockpiles in northern Baluchistan, which serve as 
distribution points for drugs sold onward to networks in 
Pakistan. While some small shipments may be exchanged 
for cash on the spot, the majority of large deals are settled 
through hawala dealers in Quetta or Dalbandin.
Once across the border, the majority of drugs from Afghan-
istan are transported through Baluchistan to export points, 
namely the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Makran coast 
or they are shipped via air. Tribal groups manage the move-
ment of drugs in their area of jurisdiction and pass them 
onto other tribes in a drug trafficking chain (see ‘Opiate 
Trafficking Networks in Baluchistan’). While drugs are 
often trafficked into Baluchistan using livestock or con-
tainer trucks, they most commonly transit Baluchistan in 
convoys of cars or trucks. Drug trafficking groups in Balu-
chistan are highly organized, professional and well armed. 
These groups possess fleets of vehicles, an abundance of 
light weaponry such as AK-47s and grenades, as well as 
heavy weaponry including machine guns and even an anti-
161 Interviews in Quetta, September 2010.
aircraft capability. Drug convoys are fast, heavily armed and 
range in number from three to more than twenty vehicles 
per convoy. Larger convoys are mostly used in northern 
Baluchistan and smaller convoys are utilized to travel 
towards the Makran coast.162
It has been reported that smaller convoys’ perceptions of 
vulnerability to law enforcement interdiction has prompted 
them to be more heavily armed than larger convoys. Smaller 
convoys are more likely to engage law enforcement and thus 
more likely to inflict casualties. Large convoys of twenty or 
more trucks are intimidating, powerful and unlikely to be 
confronted by law enforcement if encountered on a routine 
patrol. The threat of violent interception is most pro-
nounced in Chagai district and the northern border areas 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Afghanistan. How-
ever, as the convoys move towards the coastline they become 
smaller and blend in with local trade and traffic flows. 
Baluchistan is the most direct gateway connecting Afghan-
istan with international markets via sea and, to a lesser 
extent, via air transport. As mentioned previously, opiates 
trafficked through Baluchistan are mainly gathered in the 
cities of Quetta and Dalbandin before being sent off on 
separate routes, including to Gwadar and Karachi ports. 
Proposed transport networks to link the expanding Gwadar 
port with the Afghan border may also facilitate the con-
solidation of Baluchistan’s trafficking routes and turn 
Gwadar into a major drug trafficking export hub. Heroin 
and opium seizures at Gwadar were very small compared to 
other entry and exit points in Pakistan in 2002-2008, but 
this may change as its share of cargo increases.
Although currently used only for bulk cargo, Gwadar port 
has a foreseeable role as one of the main entry points for 
Afghan transit goods, thanks to its proximity to the Afghan-
istan border. The area is currently lacking the necessary 
infrastructure links between Gwadar and the Afghanistan-
162 Interviews in Quetta, September 2010.
Girdi Jungle landscape
Source: UNODC.
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Map 35: Heroin seizures in Baluchistan province, 2000-2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations.
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Pakistan border, but the ongoing development of this route 
will likely see Gwadar becoming an increasing transit point 
for drugs and precursors entering and exiting Afghanistan. 
The location of Gwadar port also provides the opportunity 
to subvert trade sanctions placed on the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. The rapid increase in trade volume transiting the 
region, which is likely overwhelming Customs and law 
enforcement agencies, and the port’s vicinity to regional 
trade centres will most likely see Gwadar targeted by illicit 
traffickers. According to available data, Gwadar is already 
the most common port area used for illegal migration from 
Pakistan, including human trafficking.163
Karachi is currently the main port in Pakistan, handling the 
majority of cargo for imports, exports and the Afghan Tran-
sit Trade Agreement (ATTA). The high volume of goods 
transiting through Karachi means that law enforcement is 
focused heavily at the port, although it also limits the 
chances of detection. Karachi’s port control unit has suc-
cessfully seized a number of drugs and precursors, but these 
are likely to represent only a small portion of the total illicit 
trade transiting through Karachi.
Aside from official ports, a significant volume of drugs is 
also trafficked by sea from Baluchistan at various unofficial 
163 Baseline Study on Illegal Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in 
Pakistan, EBDM, 2009.
points along the Makran Coast. Key exit points along the 
coast include Ormara, Talar, Hingole, Sur Bander, Peshu-
kan and Jiwani, although Kund Malir in Lasbella district 
and Jirwani in Gwadar district are reportedly the most vital 
unofficial natural jetties used for drug trafficking.164
Drugs, including flows coming from both Baluchistan and 
FATA, are delivered to safehouses along the Makran coast, 
before being prepared for export. Drugs trafficked by sea 
from various parts of Baluchistan’s coastline are usually first 
loaded onto small boats before being taken out to interna-
tional waters, where the drugs are then unloaded onto 
larger cargo ships. The small boat transport system and 
broader drug trade along the coast are dominated by the 
powerful clans of Baluchistan’s Awaran and Lasbella dis-
tricts and particularly by the Baluch Bizanjo, Kalmati and 
Dashti tribes. These groups also work in conjunction with 
the Buledi tribes of Makran division.165 Although the cargo 
ships are operated by large international drug trafficking 
networks, some Pakistani networks reportedly operate their 
own drug trafficking boats along the smaller distances, 
especially between Pakistan, Oman and Yemen.166
164 Interviews in Quetta, October 2010.
165 Interviews in Quetta October 2010.
166 Interviews in Quetta October 2010.
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Given the presence of law enforcement agencies at airports 
and the increased risk of interdiction, compared to the total 
lack of law enforcement on the road network for example, 
drug traffickers tend not to use Baluchistan’s airports for 
trafficking. Indeed, the risk calculation for air trafficking is 
much higher than for land or sea routes throughout the 
province and the quantities that can be shipped are signifi-
cantly lower. The three international airports of Balu-
chistan, situated in Quetta, Gwadar and Turbat, have a 
number of international flights. There are currently two 
flights from Quetta to Dubai, two flights from Gwadar to 
Muscat and two flights from Turbat to Sharja per week. 
According to seizure data, Karachi airport is used much 
more frequently for drug trafficking than the airports in 
Baluchistan. However, this data might be misleading. Law 
enforcement capability at Karachi international airport is 
far more advanced than in Baluchistan and thus more likely 
to yield seizures. Overall, in 2009 airport seizures accounted 
for just 14.17 per cent of all heroin seizures.167
Drug trafficking from Baluchistan into the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran is streamlined in that, depending on the route, 
the same tribes control the entire area from the Afghan 
border to the Iranian border. The main tribes to have wide-
spread control are three Baluch tribes: the Notezai, Gorgage 
and Sanjrani. Unauthorized exit points at Talab, Mashkel 
and Chidgee are used along the north-western border, while 
Mand, Buleda and Kalato are most utilized along the south-
western border. The Iranian border in Chagai district is the 
trafficking route most commonly used, being the shortest 
distance from Afghanistan via Pakistan and also having a 
good road network. 
The traditional system, known as rahdari, allowing unre-
stricted cross-border movement of border tribes, is accepted 
by both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. This 
167 ANF, March 2010, Drug Situation in Pakistan and Counter Narcotics Achieve-
ments: 2009.
freedom of movement, intended to facilitate familial and 
economic ties, is exploited by drug traffickers belonging to 
border tribes. Despite the ease for both nationalities to 
travel across the border, it is reportedly much more common 
for Pakistanis to transport drugs into the Islamic Republic 
of Iran than for Iranians to enter Baluchistan to collect 
them.168
Drugs and precursor chemicals are transported across the 
Pakistan-Islamic Republic of Iran border on motorbikes, 
camels, donkeys and in small caravans consisting of two or 
three vehicles. Drugs and precursor chemicals are also con-
cealed in specially designed vehicle cavities or in bags and 
cartons of items meant for legal import. Exchange of drugs 
for payment is uncommon at the border itself and the 
majority of drug deliveries occur in safe houses in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Moreover, payments are mostly 
made via hawala dealers rather than in cash at the time of 
exchange. In most cases, the north-western border town of 
Zaidan in the Islamic Republic of Iran is used as a base from 
which drugs are delivered to Iranian groups.169
Opiate trafﬁcking networks in Baluchistan
Drug trafficking networks in Baluchistan are arranged 
according to geographic tribal areas of control. These tribal 
areas interlink with one another in a drug trafficking chain, 
moving the drugs through each tribal area until they reach 
the border of Baluchistan. Northern Baluch tribes operate 
far more organized and entrenched drug trafficking net-
works than their Pashtun counterparts. Opiate trafficking 
through the northern Pashtun areas is smaller and more ad 
hoc than through the Baluch dominated border areas. 
Although not consistent across the province, tribal leaders 
generally have knowledge of drug trafficking activities in 
their tribal area and derive financial benefits in return for 
protection and freedom of movement for the drug traffick-
ers. Unlike Afghanistan, drug trafficking networks in Balu-
chistan are almost entirely criminal in nature and have only 
minor links to militant groups. Powerful drug trafficking 
groups are well organized and well armed, reportedly pos-
sessing weaponry ranging from small arms to anti-aircraft 
weaponry.170
The large drug trafficking networks of Baluchistan do not 
fully monopolize the market. In fact, smaller drug traffick-
ing groups are emerging to capitalize on the perceived easy 
money. However, these small groups are not well connected 
and are more likely to be of a criminal nature; ultimately, 
these groups are more frequently intercepted by law enforce-
ment agencies. There are no reported links between drug 
trafficking networks and arms trafficking networks.
Three Baluch tribes – the Notezai, Gorgage and Sanjrani 
tribes – dominate the border area, where drugs are traf-
168 Customs officer, Islamabad, October 2010.
169 Interviews in Quetta, October 2010.
170 Interviews in Quetta, October 2010.
Saindak, near the border with the Islamic  
Republic of Iran, Chagai District
Source: UNODC. 
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ficked from Hilmand and Nimroz into Baluchistan. As a 
result of geography, economic opportunity and familial ties, 
these tribes are more heavily involved in the drug trade than 
tribes based further inland. In fact, influential members and 
families of these tribes are reportedly directly involved in 
drug trafficking, providing logistic support and recruits to 
the traffickers. Tribal chiefs utilize their influence and 
authority to protect and safe guard the traffickers passing 
through their respective jurisdictions.
These tribes also have close ties and working relationships 
with Afghan refugees based in Pakistan. Indeed, many of 
the Afghan refugees have both tribal and familial links to 
the Baluchistan border tribes. The long-standing presence 
of Afghan refugees in Baluchistan has contributed to devel-
oping cross-border smuggling ties and building the trust 
needed to facilitate drug trafficking networks between 
Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Pashtun tribes in the north-
ern parts of Baluchistan do not enjoy the same level of 
social cohesion as the Baluch, although they also have cross-
border tribal and familial ties. Among Pashtuns, the Achak-
zai and Noorzai tribes are mostly involved in the drug 
smuggling along the border from the south of Afghanistan 
to Baluchistan. Indeed, the majority of the population in 
Chaman forms part of the Achakzai and Noorzai tribes.  
Although the Baluch tribes of Notezai, Gorgage and San-
jrani control large swathes of land from the Afghan border 
up to the Iranian border, there are some exit points to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran that cross into other tribal areas. 
Specifically, at Mand, Dasht and Chedgee on the Iranian 
border the Baluch tribes Muhammad Hasni, Bezenjoo and 
Rinds and Beels are dominant. However, these tribes – all 
of them Baluch – have solid working relationships and 
cooperate on drug trafficking movements. 
Federally Administrated Tribal Areas 
(FATA)
The economy of FATA, and even that of neighbouring 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), is based almost solely on agri-
culture and livestock. Most of the population are farmers, 
earning a meagre income and remaining vulnerable to the 
economic allure of the illegal economy. Unemployment 
across FATA is estimated to exceed 50 per cent.171
The lack of employment opportunities and licit livelihood 
options in FATA has created a conducive environment for 
opportunistic militant groups whose economic incentives 
for potential recruits greatly outweigh any other available 
opportunity. Young men are particularly vulnerable to eco-
nomic incentives provided by militant groups. For instance, 
the Taliban stipend is reportedly more than double the 
amount of a well-paying unskilled job in FATA.172
171 World Bank, 2010, Pakistan Crisis Analysis Framework: KP and FATA.
172 World Bank, 2010, Pakistan Crisis Analysis Framework: KP and FATA.
Economic stress is boosting the participation in illicit liveli-
hoods, including drug smuggling, arms smuggling and 
other criminal activity, further degrading the security envi-
ronment. The illicit economy of FATA is a product of, and 
contributor to, its insecurity.
Education in FATA is heavily prioritized towards men and 
is generally of a low standard. One of the main constraints 
is the difficultly of attracting and retaining teachers, espe-
cially in areas tightly controlled by militant groups. Given 
the agriculture and livestock economy, many children are 
expected to help on the farms rather than attend school – 
this is especially true for girls. Moreover, schools are often 
located long distances from the areas where the population 
resides, discouraging attendance.
Adult literacy is a serious problem, with an illiteracy rate of 
82.6 per cent in FATA.173 Despite the number of schools, 
school buildings are often inadequate, have no teachers, or 
students are refused admission due to classroom overcrowd-
ing. In 2008, FATA had 1,000 vacant teaching positions. 
Schools also lack appropriate facilities, teaching materials 
and have high levels of absenteeism of both students and 
teachers. These challenges, coupled with distance and the 
cost of attending formal schooling, have meant that infor-
mal and religious education has become widespread in 
FATA, especially the use of madrasahs.
Most people living in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas are Pashtun (also called Paktun and Pathan). Across 
the seven FATA agencies (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, 
Kurram, Orakazai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan) 
reside at least seventeen major tribes, which then further 
break down into clans and sub-clans. Tribal identity is 
strong and fundamentally permeates all aspects of FATA 
society. Although each agency is largely dominated by one 
or two distinct tribal groups, clans often extend across bor-
ders, as do familial ties. With the exception of a few small 
minority groups, FATA is populated almost entirely by 
Sunni Muslims although there is a minority Shia popula-
tion in Kurram Agency, which represents approximately 40 
per cent of the 500,000 residents.
Bajaur Agency
Despite being the smallest FATA agency, Bajaur Agency 
hosts a population estimated at 942,140. The Tarkani and 
Uthman Khel tribes dominate Bajaur Agency, with the 
Tarkani sub-tribes in particular having close kin across the 
border in the Kunar province of Afghanistan. Due to its 
extremely mountainous and largely inaccessible territory, 
the economy of Bajaur Agency is dependent upon agricul-
ture and livestock rather than industry. Indeed, between 
2008 and 2009 Bajaur produced 27 per cent of the total 
vegetable produce and 33 per cent of the total maize supply 
173  Post Crisis Needs Assessment, September 2010.
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for all FATA agencies.174 The remote location of the Agency 
has contributed to its lack of development, with one of the 
lowest levels of literacy − at just 13 per cent − and the lowest 
number of educational institutions of any FATA agency.175 
Although not a key drug trafficking route, Bajaur Agency is 
Kunar’s main trade link with Pakistan and small amounts 
of trade pass through the mountainous Nawa Pass into 
174 Directorate of Agriculture (FATA), North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), 
Peshawar.
175 Directorate of Education (FATA), NWFP, Peshawar.
Fig. 22: Annual income comparisons for young 
men in FATA
Source: World Bank, 2010, Pakistan Crisis Analysis Framework: KP and FATA.
Bajaur. Drugs are also trafficked through the Nawa Pass, 
primarily carried on mules and generally only in small 
quantities, possibly for domestic consumption.
Mohmand Agency
Mohmand Agency is dominated by the Mohmand tribe 
and has a total population estimated at 526,638.176 Safi and 
Uthman Khel tribes are also present in Mohmand Agency, 
but the relatively unified cross-border tribal structure of the 
Mohmand tribe ensures that it actively controls a number 
of trade and smuggling routes throughout the agency. At 11 
per cent, Mohmand Agency has the second lowest level of 
literacy of any FATA agency.177 It should be noted that, 
despite the low level of school attendance and overall liter-
acy, Mohmand has the highest primary school completion 
rate at 55 per cent, among those that do attend school.178 
This agency also employs a third of all FATA industrial 
employees. Mohmand Agency borders Kunar and Nangar-
har provinces in Afghanistan. In these provinces, several 
districts along the border are dominated by the Mohmand 
tribe. Cross-border smuggling is facilitated by these tribal 
ties and bolstered by the heavy involvement of Mohmand 
tribesmen in Nangarhar’s transport industry. Drugs smug-
gled through Mohmand can easily be connected to the 
176 Bureau of Statistics, 2009, FATA Cell, Peshawar.
177 FATA Census Report, 1998.
178 Directorate of Education (FATA), NWFP, Peshawar.
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main drug trafficking routes along the national trade cor-
ridor to Karachi, Pakistan, or transported overland into 
China or India.
Khyber Agency
The population of Khyber Agency is estimated at 
829,210,179 comprising primarily Alfridis, followed by 
Shinwari and other smaller tribal groups. The economic 
development of Khyber Agency is comparatively higher 
than that of other FATA agencies, accounting for 55 per 
cent of the total industry of FATA. In addition, Khyber 
Agency has a 23 per cent adult literacy rate and the highest 
enrolment rate in educational institutions.180 The develop-
ment of Khyber Agency is largely due to its key geographic 
position between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The bulk of the 
transit trade of Afghanistan, as well as NATO supplies, 
passes through the agency’s border crossing at Torkham. In 
addition to the official crossing, there are hundreds of natu-
ral passages through which the cross-border Alfridi and 
Shinwari tribes traffic drugs and heroin precursor chemi-
cals. Both tribes are renowned smugglers of illicit goods. 
Given the high level of tribal involvement in drug traffick-
ing and the agency’s geographical proximity to Afghanistan, 
it is not surprising that Khyber is famous for its bazaars 
stocking smuggled and illicit goods, especially in Landi 
Kotal and Ali Masjeed, with Landi Kotal at only 6 km from 
the Torkham border crossing. Drug traffickers and abusers 
alike come to Khyber Agency from across FATA, or further, 
to purchase and collect drug supplies. Some sources also 
identified Landi Kotal as hosting an arms market.181
Kurram Agency
Kurram Agency is home to two major Pashtun tribes, the 
Turi and the Bangash, with a total population estimated at 
585,805.182 Unlike other FATA agencies, the Bangash and 
Mangal tribes of Kurram form a minority Shia population 
of approximately 40 per cent.  Sectarian clashes between the 
179 Bureau of Statistics, 2009, FATA Cell, Peshawar.
180 Directorate of Education (FATA), NWFP, Peshawar.
181 Drug trafficker interviews, Peshawar, August 2010.
182 Bureau of Statistics, 2009, FATA Cell, Peshawar.
Shia and Sunni groups are common and significantly con-
tribute to the situation of instability in the agency. The 
sectarian clashes are exacerbated by the role of the Sunni 
Taliban, which has historically been anti-Shia and known 
to support the Bangash tribe.183 Long-standing sectarian 
clashes and violence have seriously impeded the agency’s 
development, with almost no industrial base and limited 
economic opportunities. Nonetheless, Kurram follows 
closely behind Khyber with a 20 per cent literacy rate, 
which is above the FATA average of 17 per cent.184 Kurram 
borders three districts of Nangarhar province in Afghani-
stan, namely Sherzad, Khogiani and Pachir Wa Agam. 
While the majority of drugs produced in these areas are 
likely to join more substantial trade flows through Khyber 
Agency, some drugs are also smuggled through Kurram. 
Orakzai Agency
Orakzai Agency is populated almost entirely by the Orakzai 
tribe, with a total population estimated at 285,073.185 
Importantly, Orakzai is the only agency in FATA not bor-
dering Afghanistan. Despite being tribally homogenous, 
the Orakzai tribe is plagued by sectarian clashes between 
Shia and Sunni followers. Ongoing sectarian clashes have 
diminished the influence and power of the Orakzai tribe 
and allowed extremist groups to gain influence over the 
agency. Several extremist organizations are based in Orakzai, 
including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and elements of TTP.186 
Orakzai is economically underdeveloped, with minimal 
agricultural production outputs, the highest level of pri-
mary school dropouts – at 66 per cent – and the lowest 
levels of literacy within FATA.187 The agency’s small indus-
trial efforts and investment are not sufficient to support 
economic development. Given the poor economic situation 
and the agency’s position bordering Khyber and Kurram 
Agencies, it is not surprising that drugs are readily available 
and major drug markets have emerged. 
183 The Nation, August 24, 2009.
184 FATA Census, 1998.
185 Bureau of Statistics, 2009, FATA Cell, Peshawar.
186 Fishman, April 2010, The Battle for Pakistan, New America Foundation.
187 Directorate of Education (FATA), NWFP, Peshawar.
Type of institution
Number of educational institutions      Enrolment   
Total Male Female Total Male Female
All primary schools 4,187 2,402 1,785 354,717 207,745 146,972
Middle schools 403 274 129 71,540 52,554 18,986
High schools 232 196 36 88,413 74,679 13,734
Higher secondary schools 13 8 5 8,072 5,900 2,172
Degree colleges 35 23 12 11,107 9,576 1,531
Govt: technical institutes 11 11 0 584 584 0
Govt: colleges of manage-
ment sciences 5 5 0 1,576 1,576 0
Source: Bureau of Statistics, 2009, FATA Cell, Peshawar, Pakistan.
Table 19: Educational institutions and enrolment in FATA, 2008-2009
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North Waziristan
North and South Waziristan are the most isolated and 
remote agencies within FATA. The population of North 
Waziristan is estimated at 470,048,188 although violence has 
displaced many people and exact population estimates are 
unavailable. Geographically, North Waziristan is the second 
largest agency of FATA and is dominated by the Utmanzai 
Wazir tribe. Other tribal groups include the Daurs, mainly 
in the mountains, and the Gurbuz. Cross-border tribal con-
nections are strong, with the Wazirs linked to the Paktika 
province in Afghanistan and the Gurbuz linked to Khost. 
North Waziristan hosts the second official FATA border 
crossing with Afghanistan at Ghulam Khan, although 
ongoing conflict and the presence of extremist groups has 
significantly reduced licit trade and traffic. The agency’s 
industrial base is almost non-existent and agricultural pro-
ductivity is low, maize being the most productive crop. In 
2009, North Waziristan produced 9,700 tons of maize, 
equivalent to 15 per cent of the total maize production of 
FATA.189 Given the lack of employment opportunities, the 
population of North Waziristan is vulnerable to the eco-
nomic incentives offered by extremist groups. Extremist 
groups are well established in North Waziristan. In fact, 
many of the Afghan Taliban operations in southern Afghan-
istan have been organized from the town of Miram Shah. 
Foreign fighters are also present in the agency, along with 
Al-Qaida, Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) and the 
Haqqani Network. Factors such as the size of the agency, its 
inaccessibility and its connections to Afghanistan make it a 
favourable operating environment for militants and other 
criminal networks. Despite the lack of law enforcement 
reach in the area, tribal connections and proximity to 
Afghan heroin production labs, the unstable security situa-
tion and lack of trade flows prevents the establishment of 
significant drug trafficking routes through North Waziristan.
South Waziristan
South Waziristan is geographically the largest FATA agency 
with a population estimated at 529,871.190 The Mehsud 
and Ahmadzai Wazir tribes dominate South Waziristan, 
with the Wazirs having close tribal connections across the 
border. The Mehsud tribe has long been involved in con-
flicts and has a reputation for being fierce fighters. They are 
especially well represented among the ranks of the TTP. 
Insecurity and military offensives in South Waziristan have 
seriously hindered economic growth; industry is almost 
non-existent and agricultural production has dramatically 
declined. While data shows that in 2008-2009 South 
Waziristan produced 71 per cent of the total production of 
fruit in FATA, a spike in military offensives since 2009 is 
likely to have significantly reduced agricultural outputs 
across the agency. North and South Waziristan are home to 
188 Bureau of Statistics, 2009, FATA Cell, Peshawar.
189 Directorate of Agriculture (FATA), NWFP, Peshawar.
190 Bureau of Statistics, 2009, FATA Cell, Peshawar.
the largest number of local and foreign jihadists. This phe-
nomenon is likely to have originated with the major Paki-
stani military operations in South Waziristan in late 2009 
and early 2010. In fact, during the military offensive many 
extremist groups moved into North Waziristan, giving rise 
to tribal clashes and social unrest.
Law enforcement agencies in FATA
Few federal law enforcement agencies operate in FATA. The 
ones that do are largely based along the border at official 
crossings rather than within the tribal areas. Although the 
responsibilities of the military, Frontier Corp (FC) and 
Frontier Constabulary are clearly delineated, the ongoing 
insurgency in FATA has blurred these responsibilities. With 
the effective absence of the State from FATA, the military 
is leading the counter-insurgency effort to re-establish State 
authority.
In addition to the national forces (FC, Anti Narcotics 
Force, Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and Customs), 
tribal law enforcement mechanism are also in place. In 
FATA, policing is mainly conducted by irregular forces 
operating under the Political Agent (PA), including Levies 
and Khassadars. FATA does not have a formal police force 
and is governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 
(FCR), which provides for local systems of governance and 
justice. In accordance with FCR, disputes are largely 
resolved through a community-based dispute resolution 
mechanism known as a Jirga on the basis of customary or 
Islamic law. Depending on the location of the Jirga, these 
decisions are enforced by Levies and Khassadars or Lashkars.
Levies are the most formal police force found in FATA, 
numbering approximately 6,779. They are financed, 
equipped and administratively attached to the Ministry of 
Interior. They are recruited on merit from the tribes and 
appointed by the PA, who is their commanding officer. 
Although responsible for policing in tribal areas where the 
provincial police do not have a presence, Levies are not 
equipped or trained to effectively fulfill this role. For exam-
ple, most levy forces are required to provide their own 
weapons and ammunition and often receive little or no 
training. Tribal levies earn less than a quarter of the Taliban 
stipend.191 In addition to being poorly trained, these forces 
are disorganized and lack authority. The expanded role of 
Khassadars and Levies to deal with the insurgency in the 
area has raised concerns among FATA communities that 
these groups are simply another actor in search of power 
rather than a formal security institution. With no formal 
police in FATA, accurate crime statistics are difficult to 
obtain, as much of the criminal activity is dealt with at the 
tribal level, or by militant groups. PAs have some insight 
through their overview of Levies and Khassadars opera-
tions, but this data is likely to represent only a small frac-
tion of total crime and justice incidents that occur in FATA.
191 World Bank, 2010, Pakistan Crisis Analysis Framework: KP and FATA.
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Khassadars were established in 1921 by the British Govern-
ment to reduce its military commitment by formalizing 
tribal and territorial responsibility. Locally recruited, tribal 
Levies and Khassadars together number around 23,500. In 
a given agency, each tribe raises a Khassadar force according 
to a quota system. Khassadars are nominated by the local 
Malik and their salary is paid by the federal government 
that also provides them with a uniform and a pair of shoes 
every year. Khassadars are required to supply their own 
weapons. Salaries are low and Khassadars are not provided 
a pension, training or service structure. Khassadars have 
become a hereditary office. Although formally reporting to 
the PA, it has been pointed out that the Khassadar owes his 
allegiance to the Malik who offered him employment and 
also to the tribe.192
Lashkars are a traditional tribal militia, often formed on an 
ad hoc basis for the accomplishment of a specific purpose. 
They are typically assembled for the resolution of a particu-
lar tribal issue, such as hunting down an outlaw or address-
ing a family feud that has grown out of control, and after 
that they are disbanded. Each tribal Lashkar is required to 
provide his own weapon, food and supplies. Generally, the 
Government does not assist Lashkars either financially or 
logistically, but in recent years they have been provided 
limited supplies in order to counter the Taliban in the tribal 
areas. Ultimately, Lashkars are tribal militias, fiercely inde-
pendent and answerable only to their tribal elders. Reliance 
on and support of this untrained, tribal militia is likely to 
inflame the militant situation of FATA rather than assist in 
resolving it.
Border control in FATA
The border between FATA and Afghanistan is virtually 
impossible to monitor and police. There are two official 
border crossings with Afghanistan, namely Torkham and 
Ghulam Khan. Aside from these official crossings, most 
people are unaware of the exact border line location. 
Numerous people live and work in both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, regularly crossing the border without any identi-
fication documents. Limited law enforcement capacity, the 
porous nature of the border and corruption make move-
ments of drugs, precursors and other contraband items 
relatively easy.
Torkham border crossing receives the majority of trade and 
human traffic entering FATA from Afghanistan, mainly due 
to its geographic position linking Kabul to Islamabad and 
onto the national trade corridor of Pakistan. As a result, 
Torkham is also staffed by more law enforcement personnel 
and was selected as the pilot border crossing for the estab-
lishment of a Border Liaison Office. Despite some seizure 
successes, law enforcement agencies in Torkham are gener-
ally overwhelmed by the large volume of trade and traffic 
192 http://waziristanhills.com/FATA/FATAAdministration/LawEnforcement-
Forces/tabid/127/1.
and are unable to thoroughly monitor these flows.
Customs, the FC and the FIA all operate in Torkham. 
Although the most effective of these bodies, the Frontier 
Corp does not search goods transiting the border, but 
rather checks for irregularities in paperwork. Customs offi-
cials are responsible for confirming the contents of the 
containers. Across the board, equipment among the agen-
cies is insufficient; for example, customs does not possess 
scanners. The border crossing process at Torkham requires 
pedestrians regularly crossing the border for work or family 
reasons to show their national identification card. These 
persons do not undergo an immigration control nor is their 
passport stamped. In theory, travellers from further afield 
are required to undergo an immigration control, but this is 
not always the case as the two are difficult to distinguish. In 
some cases, pedestrians are able to cross the border with no 
identification at all.
It is important to note that the ANF does not operate at the 
border crossing point itself, but rather operates from mobile 
posts situated about 8 km from the border. Major roads 
leading to and from the border are monitored by ANF 
mobile posts, although these could be easily bypassed by 
donkey carts and other agile means of transport. Technical 
limitations aside, the entrenched and ongoing corruption 
among border law enforcement officers enables Torkham to 
be used for movement of contraband items. Jobs at border 
crossings are highly valued and equally competitive, as 
money earned from corruption significantly supplements 
and even exceeds actual salary. These posts are commonly 
awarded along familial, tribal or friendship lines. As a result 
of corruption and inefficiency on both sides of the border, 
drug traffickers consider law enforcement at Torkham 
border crossing ineffective and subsequently not threaten-
ing to their movements.193
The border crossing at Ghulam Khan is less used than other 
FATA crossings; it is staffed by fewer law enforcement offi-
cers and has been excluded from the Border Liaison Offices 
plan.194 Ongoing military operations in North Waziristan 
Agency have reduced bilateral trade through Ghulam Khan 
to a near standstill, while local trade has continued, albeit 
at a lower volume. Drug traffickers in FATA have reported 
that Khassadars based at both Torkham and Ghulam Khan 
crossings often accept bribes to let drug shipments through; 
this said, the security situation has reduced drug trafficking 
and shifted routes through Khyber Agency instead.
A number of cross-border initiatives have been instigated to 
improve border control, of which the most comprehensive 
is the Triangular Initiative (TI). Pakistan, Islamic Republic 
of Iran and Afghanistan formed the TI to increase cross-
193 Drug trafficker interviews, Peshawar, August 2010.
194 BLOs have been planned at three locations in Pakistan: Torkham and Cha-
man on the Afghan border and at Taftan on the Iranian border. In August 
2010, the first BLO was opened at Torkham. The two remaining BLOs in 
Balochistan are scheduled to be opened in 2011. 
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border information sharing, conduct joint operations and 
develop real-time communications. It is considered that 
cooperation will be facilitated by the establishment of 
Border Liaison Offices (BLOs) and the development of a 
communications network between the three countries. 
Implementation has been slow, but the first BLO is now 
operational. Border management is particularly important 
in FATA as the Government has little or no capacity to 
police inside the tribal areas.
Opiate trafﬁcking to/from FATA
FATA is a key opiate trafficking route linking Afghan pro-
duction with consumption markets in China, India and 
other international destinations via sea and air. Large inter-
national shipments are more easily transported through 
Baluchistan to the Makran coast. However, the permissive 
security situation of FATA and its direct links to the Paki-
stani national trade corridor network ensure that shipments 
will continue to transit through the tribal areas. Although 
all types of heroin are available in FATA, white heroin is the 
most common form trafficked through the area and brown 
heroin is the most commonly abused.  
Drugs trafficked from Afghanistan into FATA mainly enter 
through Khyber, Mohmand or Bajaur Agencies,195 with 
Khyber as the most dominant route by far. Drugs are mostly 
trafficked via the numerous unofficial mountain passes that 
puncture the border, although the official Khyber Agency 
crossing at Torkham is also used. Drugs smuggled through 
Torkham and onto main roads use trucks, donkey carts or 
other vehicles, while those utilizing unofficial crossings 
necessitate the use of mules and camels. Smaller quantities 
smuggled across mountain passes are often consolidated 
once in Pakistan, before onward movement. The ongoing 
development of arterial roads to remote villages, which aims 
to increase the rural population’s access to trade centres may 
also reduce travel time for traffickers utilizing unofficial 
crossings.
Moreover, drug trafficking networks in FATA maintain a 
number of opiate stockpiles, primarily in Khyber Agency. 
Known locations of stockpiles include Bara Tehsil, Jamrud 
Bazaar, Tedi Bazaar of Jamrud Tehsil, Landi Kotal, Ali 
Masjid and the Shakas and Wazir Dand areas behind 
Karkhano market. Stockpiles are kept in FATA for two 
main reasons; firstly, as a safe storage location before onward 
sale and secondly for financial reasons. In most cases, opium 
is stored in shopping bags, known locally as Khaltay. Tem-
porary drug stockpiles are reportedly located in the Chaghi 
district of Baluchistan, specifically in Girdi jungle, Brab 
Chah and Rabt, as well as Dalbandin, Shahr Khar Bakhsh 
and Gulistan. These stocks are only temporarily held until 
they can be transported through Baluchistan to their final 
destinations. Some trafficking groups also stockpile excess 
drugs, which are not produced to fill a specific order, but 
195 Interview with CNPA and ABP intelligence heads May, 2010.
rather to wait for optimal sale prices. These stockpiles are 
temporary, only held for weeks or months rather than years 
until drug prices increase.
Most drug traders receive orders for opiates over the tele-
phone, almost entirely utilizing mobile communication, or 
via direct contact on both sides of the border, although 
there is rarely any hand-over at the border itself. The traf-
ficker generally smuggles the drug himself or by giving it to 
the local freight carriers, which charge approximately $24 
to smuggle 1 kg of heroin into FATA.196 According to 
sources in Khyber Agency, Afghan drug traffickers can 
bring the drugs across the border, store them in their safe-
houses in Khyber Agency and sell them from there.197 
Alternatively, Pakistani traffickers can travel into Afghani-
stan and collect the drugs personally. Ease of crossing the 
border makes both of these delivery methods viable and 
eliminates the need to exchange drugs and make payments 
at the border itself.
Border controls between Afghanistan and FATA are over-
stretched and insufficiently equipped, thus allowing drug 
traffickers to easily pass through unofficial crossings and 
enter FATA undetected and unsearched. In fact, it is virtu-
ally impossible to police the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, 
especially the border with FATA. Once in FATA, drug traf-
ficking networks often stockpile the drugs before onward 
shipment to China, India or onto the trade corridor net-
work of Pakistan.  
The Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) also works in 
the reverse direction, from Afghanistan through to Karachi 
for onward export. Drugs can be brought into Pakistan 
from Afghanistan in containers under the ATTA. Accord-
ing to the interviews, many containers are fitted with 
hidden compartments that can be opened from the outside 
without unsealing or opening the whole container.198 This 
way, a container might be used as a mule often without the 
knowledge of the owner. 
Afghan opiates destined for the Chinese border are traf-
ficked through FATA and then Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, both 
directly onto the road network and through the north-
western areas of Gilgit-Baltistan. Aside from the Karakoram 
Highway (KKH), there are no official roads puncturing the 
Pakistan-China border and the terrain is extremely rugged. 
The Pakistan-China border trade route is particularly dif-
ficult for the trucking industry and currently more expen-
sive than using ocean transport. Trucking services to the 
border are very expensive due to the poor conditions of the 
roads and high costs of vehicle maintenance. Taxes and 
duties, both official and unofficial, are also high. The 
upgrade of sections of the KKH route will help to reduce 
travel times, triple transport capacity and reduce mainte-
196 Interview in Peshawer, March, 2010.
197 Interviews in Peshawar, October 2010.
198 Interviews in Peshawar, August 2010.
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Map 37: Heroin seizures in Northern Pakistan, 2000-2009
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. 
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nance costs for freight trucks. These improvements will 
likely also shift an increasing proportion of opiate exports 
and precursor imports onto the KKH. 
The majority of drugs trafficked to China from Pakistan 
likely enter the border through irregular pathways in order 
to avoid any interaction with authorities. However, if the 
KKH upgrade were to triple the volume of traffic, diminish 
the reach of customs and reduce travel time, then criminal 
groups may consider using the KKH as a cost-effective 
alternative route into China. Trafficking across the border 
occurs in passenger buses, trucks and private vehicles. Alter-
natively, drug consignments can also be hidden in the 
border zone and later taken across the border in smaller 
quantities.199
Drug trafficking from FATA to India is reduced compared 
to China or Karachi’s international routes, entering India 
mainly via Sialkot and across the Pakistan-India border at 
the Wagha border crossing in Punjab. Drugs can be smug-
gled into India utilizing train, bus or car connections via 
Wagha, but any of these options are limited to small pas-
senger consignments. Cargo trucks transporting goods 
199 “Enhancing Border Management: An Assessment of the Pakistan-China 
Frontier”, UNODC, 2009.
from Pakistan into India are required to be fully unloaded 
and re-loaded onto Indian trucks and the same applies to 
Indian goods entering Pakistan. As such, traffickers are at a 
greater risk of detection than at the Afghan border, for 
example, where trucks can directly cross the border. 
In recent years, opiate seizures along the Pakistan-India 
border have been small with just nine seizures at the Wagha 
border crossing between 2008 and 2010, all of which were 
passenger consignments. Although the lack of drug and 
precursor detection equipment clearly impacts seizures, the 
fact that no large cargo seizures have been made suggests 
that the border area is most likely only used by small play-
ers, with larger shipments arriving by air or sea.
The national trade corridor of Pakistan, stretching from 
Torkham to the Makran coast, makes the international 
shipment of drugs through FATA a viable transport option. 
The numerous proposals to upgrade this corridor are likely 
to consolidate the use of this route and reduce transport 
time for traffickers. According to interviews in Khyber 
Agency, drugs are shipped from FATA to the coast by dif-
ferent means depending on the type of drug transported. 
Heroin is reportedly transported in concealed compart-
ments in small vehicles, such as jeeps or cars, while hash is 
more likely to be transported in large trucks or oil and 
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water tankers. These vehicles are driven from the safehouse 
in FATA to the destination by a courier who has no knowl-
edge of the wider network. Often the drivers are requested 
to abandon the vehicle at a specified location and do not 
even meet the recipients. The vehicles are then collected by 
drug traffickers and the drugs are transported to safehouses 
in Karachi or along the Makran coast to prepare for export. 
Based on the destination of the shipment, drugs are gener-
ally concealed according to the most common trade between 
Pakistan and that particular country.
Infrastructure development along the national trade corri-
dor from Torkham to Karachi will increase the freight, 
traffic and trade capacity of border crossings and other 
entry points. It is unlikely that the capacity of border con-
trol posts and customs will develop as quickly as trade 
flows, considering that this capacity is already stretched. An 
increase in volume of trade coming into, and transiting 
through, FATA without simultaneous boosting of customs 
and border control units will reduce the traffickers’ chances 
of being detected.
Aside from established ports, a significant volume of drugs 
is also trafficked by sea from various unofficial points along 
the Makran Coast. In addition to seaports and coast, the 
dry seaports of Afghanistan are likely to be used for heroin 
trafficking as the capacity in these ports is limited. Pakistani 
officials have drawn the attention of UNODC to the insuf-
ficient capacity to check every container entering or exiting 
key dry ports. Traffickers likely exploit these inland export 
points, particularly in Lahore and Multan. Many heroin 
seizures occur near these cities. 
Opiate trafficking networks in FATA are closely linked to 
tribal and familial ties in Afghanistan. Overall, these net-
works are less established and less professional than those in 
Baluchistan and many smaller players are likely to have 
entered the trade. Despite perceptions of ties to militants, 
the drug trafficking networks in FATA are more criminal 
than militant in nature, although the requisition of taxes for 
protection is common.
Drug trafficking groups from both Afghanistan and Paki-
stan operate in FATA. The main groups involved are Afghan 
tribesmen from the Kochi, Shinwari, Khugiani and Mohm-
and tribes, or FATA drug traffickers from the Afridi, Shin-
wari and Mohmand tribes.200 In particular, the Afridi and 
Shinwari tribes, which span both sides of the border, are the 
most powerful, influential and heavily involved. Despite 
being officially Afghani, many of the Afghan opiate traf-
fickers maintain permanent residences in FATA and are 
active on both sides of the border. Many of these drug traf-
fickers are also based in Peshawar, in the KP province.
200 Interview with Nangarhar CNPA head, December, 2010.
1.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Stopping the operations of the deadly and globalizing 
Afghan opiate market that has exploded over the last 20 
years, will require further efforts to gradually eliminate 
production of, demand for and trafficking in Afghan opium 
and heroin. Increasing the effectiveness of interventions in 
these three inter-related areas requires guidance from accu-
rate information and assessments of the problem and of the 
ways in which the performance of counter-measures can be 
increased.
There is a strong link between insecurity and opium poppy 
cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan. Anti-govern-
ment elements are partly funding their operations from the 
opiate trade. In most of the Afghan provinces where secu-
rity is better, there is either no or very limited opium poppy 
cultivation. Conversely, the main poppy cultivation areas of 
the country are found in the insecure southern provinces. 
Further improving security in Afghanistan appears there-
fore as a critical precondition for controlling opium poppy 
cultivation in the country. 
Heroin trafficking occurs mainly through Afghan border 
provinces with weak law enforcement and border control. 
Although considerable improvements have been brought to 
a number of border control points, there are still many areas 
along Afghanistan’s borders that are not well protected or 
monitored, such as the borders between the southern prov-
inces of Afghanistan (Hilmand, Kandahar and Nimroz) 
and the Baluchistan province of Pakistan. Drug traffickers 
take advantage of this situation and heavily use these bor-
ders for trafficking opium, heroin and acetic anhydride 
from one country to the other.  The capacity to control 
these border crossings should be further increased. 
In addition to land borders, the sea- and airports of Afghan-
istan’s immediate neighbors have become increasingly used 
for heroin and acetic anhydride trafficking. Maritime trans-
portation, in particular, appears to have gained in impor-
tance for traffickers, be it for exporting heroin to the 
re-emerging African route, or for importing acetic anhy-
dride destined to heroin processing labs in Afghanistan. 
Consequently, interdiction capacity at vulnerable seaports, 
including dry ports, should be improved, notably in Paki-
stan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, but also in other 
transit and destination countries. 
Only some 2 per cent of the millions of containers shipped 
every year across the globe can be physically searched. 
More generally, the further drugs move away from their 
source, the more fragmented, diverse and widespread drug 
shipments become, making it extremely difficult for law 
enforcement agencies to detect and intercept them in the 
legitimate and ever growing flows of goods and people. 
Particular attention needs to be paid, therefore, to stepping 
up interdiction efforts and capacity as close as possible to 
the Afghan opiate source, as well as to increasing intelli-
gence sharing among concerned law enforcement agencies.
In addition to increased law enforcement capacity, social 
and economic conditions need to be improved in Afghani-
stan and the poorest areas in the region. Although there is 
no direct causal link between poverty and drug production 
and trafficking, where security and the rule of law is weak, 
drug traffickers and anti-government elements find in dis-
advantaged areas a more fertile ground to promote illicit 
drug production and to recruit young males in the ranks of 
armed and drug trafficking groups. 
The vast majority of heroin produced in Afghanistan is 
consumed outside of Afghanistan and its immediate region. 
Although heroin demand has stabilized worldwide, there 
are no signs of a decrease at present. Afghanistan and its 
neighbors cannot bear alone the burden of stopping the 
operation of the global opiate market.  In line with the 
principles of shared responsibility and a balanced approach 
to reducing supply and demand, consuming countries, 
particularly in the regions that create the strongest demand 
pull, need to strengthen their own efforts to reduce opiate 
consumption within their borders and the outflow of drug 
money it generates. Strategic considerations, public health 
needs and humanitarian concerns all point to the need to 
increase, in line with international standards and guide-
lines, treatment efforts directed at core opiate users, who are 
both consuming the bulk of illicit opiates and suffering the 
most severe health and social consequences as a result of 
their use.
Increases in Afghanistan’s opiate production and trafficking 
in recent years have also caused an increase in opiate addic-
tion in Afghanistan and its neighbors. Sadly, facilities to 
provide treatment for drug addicts in the region are far 
from sufficient. As drug abuse, and its associated health 
impact (such as HIV/AIDS among injecting drug users) 
worsens in the region, the development of local treatment 
capacities needs to be given greater priority. 
Key information gaps 
Effective opiate trade interventions require an accurate 
picture of global supply, demand, trafficking routes and 
beneficiaries. Many information gaps remain. With further 
study, data collection and analysis, the international com-
munity can better combat the global opiate trade. 
Key information gaps that have emerged during the prepa-
ration of this report include:
• Reliable opiate consumption per user per year
• Detailed seizure data – including origin, destination 
and purity
• Morphine content of Afghan opium
• Volume and methods of drug trafficking via maritime 
transport 
• Drug trafficking through East Africa, routes and 
beneficiaries
Key interdiction gaps:
• Forensic capacity in Afghanistan remains insufficient 
• Many global customs offices have insufficient acetic 
anhydride test kits
• Maritime transport – only minimal numbers of con-
tainers are scanned
Local research and data collection capacity in opiate pro-
ducing and transit countries is essential. For that purpose, 
the Afghan Opiate Trade Project is working very closely 
with the Member States who request assistance to increase 
their capacity. Currently, the Programme is working with 
the relevant ministries and institutions in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to establish and enhance their research, data col-
lection and processing capacity on drug related topics. In 
due course, this assistance is planned to be extended to 
other countries along the main transit routes of Afghan 
opiates, depending on availability of resources.  
With accurate information, strong commitment and greater 
international cooperation, the impacts of the Afghan opiate 
trade can be effectively targeted and mitigated – both 
within Afghanistan and across the globe.
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2.1 THE CURRENT STATE OF THE 
ILLICIT ACETIC ANHYDRIDE MARKET
Heroin is derived from chemically processed opium as 
almost all illicit drugs require chemical intervention for 
production. These chemicals are generally referred to as 
precursor chemicals or simply “precursors”.203 Although 
various solvents, acids and bases can be used in heroin 
processing, the precursor acetic anhydride is of crucial 
importance for the synthesis of opium into diacetylmor-
phine, or heroin. The entire illicit heroin industry,204 mainly 
confined to Afghanistan, Myanmar and Latin America, 
relies heavily on the availability of the substance, particu-
larly Afghanistan which is currently the base for nearly 85 
per cent of global heroin. UNODC estimates that approxi-
mately 475 tons of acetic anhydride may be required each 
year for manufacturing Afghan heroin. 
Acetic anhydride has numerous legitimate industrial appli-
cations and is manufactured legally worldwide in Asia, 
Europe and the Americas and traded internationally. Most 
of this trade is tightly monitored and international diver-
sion is prevented through the international precursor con-
trol system. An increasing number of manufacturing, 
exporting, importing and trans-shipment countries are 
taking necessary actions to prevent the diversion of acetic 
anhydride from licit international trade into illicit traffic. 
Specifically, Governments are now systematically checking 
203 For the purpose of this report, the term precursor (or precursor chemical) 
may be used as a short-hand expression for all the substances listed in Table I 
and Table II of the 1988 Convention.   
204 It should be emphasized that “industry” is used in this report as a value-
neutral economic term which describes a range of activities related to opiates 
from the production of raw materials, to processing, distribution through 
wholesale and retail markets, consumption and export.
the legitimacy of individual transactions, involving precur-
sor chemicals like acetic anhydride. 
As a result of tightened systematic checks and tracking of 
individual shipments in international trade, there are indi-
cations that traffickers are being forced to turn more often 
to domestic distribution channels to obtain the chemicals 
they require. However, domestic regulatory controls have 
limitations, as, unlike monitoring shipments in interna-
tional trade it is often not feasible to monitor every single 
sale of controlled chemicals which may be taking place 
widely in a country.  Indeed, organized crime groups are 
still able to divert and smuggle hundreds of tons of acetic 
anhydride annually. Once diverted, the substance is smug-
gled through various routes to final destinations where 
illicit heroin manufacture takes place. Often, this involves 
blending with licit trade flows, making detection a costly 
and difficult process. The organized crime groups manag-
ing this trade are fluid networks of diverse nationalities 
opportunistically joined together for profit. 
Diverted acetic anhydride reaches laboratories in Afghani-
stan through numerous smuggling routes; some overlap-
ping exists with well-worn corridors trafficking heroin out 
of Afghanistan. It is perhaps more accurate to speak of a 
convergence of routes into countries bordering Afghani-
stan, namely Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, two 
states with vast coastlines. In licit trade, acetic anhydride 
costs no more than US$1 per litre; however, in Afghanistan 
the same litre costs on average $350 for a retail market of 
$165 million annually. With such mark-ups, the incentives 
for criminal groups are obvious, but there are also disturb-
ing signs of armed anti-government groups entering the 
acetic anhydride supply chain in Afghanistan. 
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The capital, crime and drugs associated with the illicit traf-
ficking of acetic anhydride indicate that it contributes 
directly to organized criminality; as a constituent to the 
drug trade, it is also linked to numerous national and 
regional security issues arising from drug trading. Despite 
this, significant gaps remain in the understanding of the 
acetic anhydride issue and the criminal networks that ani-
mate the heroin chemical trade. In turn, there is little 
dedicated research to address these critical knowledge gaps. 
In order to better understand the importance of precursor 
chemicals in the illicit drug supply chain, the 2009 action 
plan of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) recom-
mended to conduct further research on precursors to 
understand emerging trends and share the results of such 
research.205 A more comprehensive understanding of acetic 
anhydride trafficking may help to identify vulnerabilities in 
the heroin industry. Moreover, preventing heroin chemical 
supply would have the benefit of affecting the drug trade at 
a stage prior to heroin processing. In line with the recom-
mendations of the CND, this chapter seeks to contribute 
to a more informed approach to targeting illicit heroin 
precursor trafficking towards Afghanistan. 
Acetic anhydride is not only used in heroin manufacture; it 
can also be illegally employed in the manufacture of 
amphetamine, methaqualone and in some areas as a reagent 
to produce coca paste and cocaine. In general, however, the 
size of the illicit acetic anhydride market is primarily driven 
by the demand for heroin. In 2009, between 460-480 tons 
of pure heroin were trafficked worldwide.206 Afghanistan 
provides enough opium to manufacture approximately 380 
tons of heroin annually, while Myanmar and Latin America 
(primarily Mexico and Colombia) are second-tier suppliers 
with a combined annual estimated production of 60-65 
tons of heroin. India comes next with approximately 15 
tons. While a focus on Afghanistan is justified by its domi-
nance of the illicit acetic anhydride market, the caveat is 
that small niches and eddies of illicit acetic anhydride 
around the world may be influenced by the corner of the 
market that services production in Mexico, Colombia, 
India and Myanmar. 
The heroin manufacturing process
Heroin is the final, finished product that depends on two 
primary input chains: opium and acetic anhydride. In most 
processing regions, the basic process is generally the same, 
involving morphine being extracted from opium and chem-
ically converted to morphine base and then mixed with 
acetic anhydride and other chemicals to make heroin. The 
two most commonly produced heroin varieties in the world 
are brown heroin base (also known as No. 3 heroin, or 
smoking heroin), and white heroin hydrochloride (also 
known as No. 4 heroin, or injectable heroin). 
205  Political Declaration, par. 2, March 2009.  
206 This estimate was made while also taking into account average global seizures 
and other losses incurred en route, which totaled approximately 90 tons.
Before delving deeper into the illicit supply chain, it is 
useful to explain the basic steps in the heroin manufactur-
ing process. In Afghanistan, UNODC generally uses a 7:1 
conversion rate for dried opium to morphine extraction, 
which yields approximately the same amount of brown 
heroin base. More opium is required if heroin hydrochlo-
ride (white heroin) is the final product. UNODC previ-
ously used a rough estimate of 2 litres of acetic anhydride 
to heroin hydrochloride, but less is needed to produce 
brown heroin (1 litre). In addition to acetic anhydride, a 
range of chemicals is also required to extract the morphine 
from opium and to purify the intermediate and final prod-
uct. The quantity needed for these chemicals is sometimes 
much more substantial than acetic anhydride and measure-
ments can vary considerably. Moreover, many chemicals 
can easily be substituted with analogues to produce the 
same effect. 
At the onset, it is important to note that the following 
description of heroin processing is a simplified, generic ver-
sion of the one used in Afghanistan, It should therefore be 
viewed as notional and not as providing detailed documen-
tation of the process in other regions. That said, the typical 
heroin manufacturing process involves diluting opium in 
water and adding a base, such as calcium oxide, to the solu-
tion. Ammonium chloride is then used to extract the mor-
phine from the solution. The result is morphine base and 
acetone, or another organic solvent, is sometimes used to 
further purify the product. 
The next step involves boiling the morphine base with 
acetic anhydride, which bonds with it to form a crude 
heroin base. An alkaline material –usually sodium carbon-
ate– precipitates the heroin base, which is filtered, dried 
and packaged. The product at this point is brown heroin of 
50-70 per cent purity. As for morphine base, in some cases 
heroin base can undergo additional processing to enhance 
its purity with a solvent (such as acetone, methanol, chlo-
roform and ethanol) that removes further impurities con-
sisting of other alkaloids and processing by-products.207 An 
acid, such as hydrochloric acid, produces a salt, heroin 
hydrochloride (white heroin), which has reported purity 
levels of up to 90 per cent.208 At this point, or at the heroin 
base stage, some processors may also cut their product with 
adulterants209 to increase profits, consequently reducing 
purity levels. 
Some adulterants, such as caffeine, cause heroin to vaporize 
207 Including monoacetylmorphines, morphine, codeine, acetylcodeine, papav-
erine, noscapine, thebain meconine, thebaol, acetylthebaol, norlaudanosine, 
reticuline, and codamine. By way of comparison, pharmaceutical grade 
heroin produced in controlled conditions has a purity greater than 99.5 per 
cent.  
208  SOCA, 2009 annual report, p. 24.
209  Adulterants include quinine, mannitol, lactose,caffeine, inositol, lidocaine, 
starches, methapyrilene, sucrose, acetylprocaine and dextrose. In addition to 
these, other substances are used to adulterate or enhance the appearance of 
the heroin. In a minority of cases, these substances are added to enhance the 
effect of the drug (a local anesthetic for example).
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at a lower temperature210 and are used to enhance the bio-
availability of heroin produced for smoking, thus making 
for a ‘better mix’;211 another common adulterant is crushed 
paracetamol. These substances are usually cheap and readily 
available on the licit market; in many cases, they also resem-
ble heroin in appearance and can easily blend in or in some 
cases provide the coveted white color wrongfully synony-
mous with high quality heroin.212
Indeed, the practice of grading heroin according to color 
and appearance is not a definitive measure of purity or a 
reliable indicator of origin.213 For example, so-called white 
heroin may have a beige or even brown appearance while 
brown heroin may have a lighter tone, depending on the 
chemicals used in the process and the adulterants used to 
cut the substance. Considering the process previously 
described, brown heroin base is easier and cheaper to pro-
duce. Apart from this, the main difference between Afghan 
white heroin hydrochloride (HCL) and Afghan brown 
heroin appears to be solubility (lower for brown heroin)214 
and to a lesser extent the related mode of administration 
(heroin HCL is usually injected, while brown heroin is 
smoked).215 
In areas of Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation, a 
form of heroin known under various local names such as 
210 UNODC World Drug Report 2009.
211 David Macdonal, Drugs in Afghanistan: opium, outlaws and scorpion tales, 
Pluto press, London, 2007, p.100.
212 Kind Saud University, Qualitative and quantitative analysis of heroine and 
other adulterants, http://faculty.ksu.edu.sa/18856/454/Detection%20of%20
Heroine.pdf.
213 Australian Crime Commission, Illicit Drug Data Report, 2007-08, www.
crimecommission.gov.au/publications/iddr/_files/2007_08/04heroin200708.
pdf.
214 “The political economy of heroin: regional markets, practices and conse-
quences, International Journal of Drug Policy 16 (2005), 289–290.
215 Injecting brown heroin requires the addition of an acid to improve water 
solubility, turning it into a salt.
kompot or Chernioshka is produced by directly acetylating 
poppy straw or opium. The end product, which is injected 
and requires heating to put into solution, contains more 
impurities (such as contaminants and plant by-products) 
than Asian heroin. Given that processing skips chemical 
treatment and filtering steps, acetylated opium is cheaper, 
quicker and easier to manufacture than heroin manufac-
tured in Myanmar or Afghanistan.216 A form of acetylated 
opium is produced in Mexico and is appropriately named 
black tar heroin on account of its appearance. The texture 
ranges from unmanageable, black-brown, sticky goo, to a 
light brown powder, which comes from cutting it with 
lactose. Elsewhere in Latin America, Colombian heroin is a 
high-purity powdered substance, light to medium brown 
and easily soluble in water.
It is commonly thought that white heroin is of higher 
purity than brown heroin, but this can be deceptive since 
216 United States of America Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence 
Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, February 2010.
Fig. 23: Opium to heroin processing in Afghanistan
Source: UNODC.
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Source: UNODC.
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there are innumerable variations in the quality and purity 
of heroin produced around the world. Therefore, it can be 
confusing to distinguish between types such as brown 
heroin base and white heroin hydrochloride (HCL) on the 
basis of purity alone. This study is based on the 2010 World 
Drug Report, which reported that typical purities found in 
seized heroin base in Afghanistan range from 50 to 80 per 
cent. This is in line with previous results reported by the 
German Federal Criminal Police (Bundeskriminalamt or 
BKA) from Afghanistan and is consistent with UNODC 
accounts from key informants in Afghanistan, reporting an 
average heroin purity range of 50-90 per cent. 
As suggested by the United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) tests in Afghanistan,217 the market is 
complex, but for the purposes of this study a reasonable 
working assumption made is that the output from Afghan 
facilities prior to dry cutting is heroin of approximately 70 
per cent purity (given the uncertainty of measurements, a 
range of 50-90 per cent is used with a midpoint of 70 per 
cent). 
217  In Afghanistan, although heroin HCL is reported as having the highest 
purity, DEA tests of the substance in 2007-2008 showed average purities of 
37 per cent and 32 per cent.  Drawing conclusions from the DEA tests is dif-
ficult, however, since they are based on seizures in Afghanistan and purities in 
major destination markets such as Europe are consistently higher - around 35 
per cent for heroin HCL and 22 per cent for heroin base (brown heroin). Ac-
cording to EMCDDA data, based on limited country data, the average purity 
of white heroin (HCL) in 2007 ranged between 31 per cent (Denmark) and 
42 per cent (France). For brown heroin the range is lower with an average 
EU purity at the street level between 15 per cent and 30 per cent; See: www.
emcdda.europa.eu/publications/drug-profiles/heroin.
Global heroin production
Heroin processing is not static – chemical availability and 
the quality of opium used can vary considerably; for exam-
ple, the opium volumes required may differ based on each 
region’s level of morphine content per kilogram of opium.218 
Some stages of the process may also change over time or be 
completely omitted in some processing regions. Addition-
ally, even within Afghanistan, the written recipes that have 
been examined show widely varying ingredients, quantities 
and instructions. It bears repeating that collecting informa-
tion on heroin processing in the field means a lack of con-
trolled conditions especially in Afghanistan, where the 
dangerous environment contributes to the difficulty of col-
lecting reliable data. 
Faced with the diversity of recipes, this analysis begins by 
privileging a 2005 study conducted by the German Federal 
Police (BKA) in Afghanistan, which was performed with 
the most strongly verified quantities (see table 1). However, 
that process focused on heroin HCL and requires some 
calibration against 2010 UNODC sources, which estimate 
that at least 1 litre of acetic anhydride is required for 1 kg 
of brown heroin. Additionally, a breakdown of volumes 
based on the observations of the BKA also shows that 
brown heroin requires approximately 1 litre of acetic anhy-
dride. 
Based on regular reporting of the products emerging from 
Afghan facilities, our first reasonable assumption is that the 
bulk of production is heroin base (so-called brown 
heroin).219 There is certainly a proportion of heroin hydro-
chloride (white heroin) being manufactured in Afghanistan 
and other regions, but the market for this product appears 
to be smaller.220 Taking into account this assumption along 
with the inherent uncertainty of the measurements, for the 
purposes of this report it is assumed that producers use 
1-1.5 litres of acetic anhydride for every kilogram of Afghan 
heroin. Finally, in line with the 2010 World Drug Report, 
the assumptions that 7 kg of opium are needed to produce 
1 kg of morphine and that 1 kg of morphine base is equal 
to 1 kg of brown heroin base will remain fixed.221 
218 Much of the following description of heroin processing relies on observations 
made in Afghanistan during fieldwork and, to a lesser extent, open source 
reports on similar processes in Myanmar and South-East Asia. See: United 
States Drug Enforcement Administration, Opium poppy cultivation and heroin 
processing in Southeast Asia, 2001.
219 UNODC field research in 2009-2010 indicates that heroin for the local mar-
ket (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Tajikistan) is mostly at 
50 per cent purity, while heroin destined for western countries (including the 
Russian Federation) has a purity of 70-90 per cent. 
220 As explained by lab owners in Hilmand province, the availability of solvents 
and reagents may also influence processors to forego the additional steps to pu-
rification; Interview with Hilmand lab owner, Kabul, Afghanistan, June 2010.
221 UNODC, World Drug Report 2010: Methodology, p.11.
The heroin value added chain
Heroin purity is linked to a number of overlapping fac-
tors such as chemical availability and processing know-
how, but essentially depends on two key variables. The 
first is the profit margin decision of traffickers and 
processors. While purity decreases during processing 
and with distance from the source, prices increase as 
traffickers use adulterants and diluents to cut or bulk 
up shipments.  By the time heroin reaches the intended 
consumer it could have lost 50-95 per cent of its purity, 
as retailers mix wholesale supply with at least an equal 
amount of adulterants (such as lactose or powdered 
sugar). Other important factors to consider are distance 
and risk, which add to prices to the point that buyers 
are willing to pay more along a route even though the 
purity is declining. The inverse relationship between 
price and purity along the trafficking route is striking: 
as purity goes down, price goes up, pointing to the high 
risk involved and the fragmentation of the trafficking 
chain. As an example, one gram of heroin (40-45 per 
cent purity) in the United Kingdom costs around 
US$100 while one gram of similar purity costs US$2 
in Afghanistan.
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Recipe  I.  BKA observations 2005
Original recipe 
(BKA  
observations 
2005)
 Volumes per 
kg of opium
Volumes per 
kg of heroin 
base (brown 
heroin)
Volumes per kg 
of heroin  
hydrochloride 
(white heroin)
Opium volumes 70 kg 1kg 8.97 kg 17.50 kg
Quick Lime 7 kg 0.1 0.90 kg 1.75 kg
Ammonium chloride 20 kg 0.29 2.56 kg 5 kg
Acetic anhydride 8 litres 0.11 1.03 litres 2 litres
Sodium carbonate 20 kg 0.29 2.56 kg 5kg
Heroin base (brown heroin) 
output 7.80 kg 1 kg 1.95 kg
Activated carbon (charcoal) 6 kg 0.09 1.50kg
Ammonia 1 litres 0.01 0.25 litres
Acetone 0.15 litres 0.002 0.04 litres
Hydrochloric acid 1.5 litres 0.02 0.38 litres
Heroin HCL  (white heroin) 4 kg 1 kg
Source: Adapted from BKA observations (Documentation of heroin manufacturing process in Afghanistan, 2005, pp. 28-30).
Table 20: Chemical and opium volumes used to manufacture 1 kg of brown heroin base and 1 kg of white 
heroin hydrochloride from 112 kg of raw opium (in kg and litres as appropriate)
Table 21: Chemical and opium volumes used to manufacture 1 kg of brown heroin/white heroin hydrochlo-
ride from 112 kg of raw opium (in kg and litres as appropriate)
Recipe II.  UNODC/ICMP observations 2010
Original recipe 
(UNODC/ICMP 
observations) 
Volumes per  
kg of opium
Volumes  per 
kg of heroin 
base (brown 
heroin)
Volumes per kg 
of heroin  
hydrochloride 
(white heroin)
Opium volumes 112 kg 1 6 9.5
Lime 28 kg 0.25 kg 15 2.5
Ammonium chloride 24 kg 0.21 kg 1.3 2
Acetic anhydride 20 litres 0.18 litres 1.05 1.7
Sodium carbonate 16 kg 0.14 kg 0.85 1.3
Heroin base (brown heroin) 
output 19 kg 1 kg 1.58 kg
Carbon powder 5 kg 0.04 0.4
Ammonia 2 litres 0.02 0.17
Acetone N/A N/A N/A
Hydrochloric acid 5 litres 0.04 0.4
Heroin HCL (white heroin) output 12 kg 1 kg
Source: Adapted from “Opium processing and general information about the heroin labs and drugs trafficking in the eastern zone of Afghanistan”, 2010 
(UNODC/ICMP)  
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Afghanistan
Acetic anhydride has no legal uses in Afghanistan and its 
importation is prohibited; the substance needs to be smug-
gled into the country. In 2009, Afghanistan produced 
6,900 tons of opium, of which it is estimated that approxi-
mately 2,700 tons were transformed into about 380 tons of 
heroin, in line with estimated global demand. According to 
the above estimates, heroin processors required between 
380 and 570 tons of acetic anhydride to be smuggled into 
the country in 2009.  For the purposes of this study, a mid-
point of 475 tons will be assumed. Given that Afghanistan 
has been a processing centre for over a decade, thousands of 
tons of acetic anhydride have been smuggled and used in 
Afghanistan during that period.
Myanmar 
Myanmar does not manufacture acetic anhydride and only 
imports very small amounts for licit purposes.222 In 2009, 
an estimated 25 tons of brown heroin were manufactured223 
in Myanmar, requiring an estimated 25-40 tons of acetic 
anhydride; approximately 5 per cent of global heroin 
requirements. Similarly to Afghanistan, most of the heroin 
produced in Myanmar is brown heroin; however, the mor-
222 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, p.22, www.
incb.org/pdf/e/tr/pre/2002/precursors_2002_3b_2.pdf.
223 For Afghan opium, a conversion ratio of 7:1 is used, while for Myanmar and 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the ratio increases to 10:1.
phine content of Myanmar opium is reportedly lower, 
translating into higher opium volume requirements for 
Myanmar processors.224 Laboratories refining Myanmar 
opium, therefore, face somewhat higher processing costs in 
the initial phases of heroin manufacture.
Latin America (primarily Mexico and Colombia)
Latin America has the capacity to produce up to 40 tons of 
heroin annually; most of this heroin originates in Mexico. 
However, the amount of acetic anhydride used in the man-
ufacturing process remains unclear since the conversion 
process has not been documented. In the absence of direct 
evidence and for the purposes of this report, a working 
assumption is that an acetic anhydride to opium ratio 
roughly similar to that of Afghan brown heroin is used in 
processing. Approximately 40 tons of Mexican heroin were 
manufactured in 2009, which would require around 40 
tons of acetic anhydride. In 2009-2010, there were several 
seizures of acetic anhydride destined for heroin processing 
in Mexico. It is unclear however how much of this was 
linked to heroin production since other acetic anhydride 
seizures were also linked to methamphetamine produc-
tion.225 Unlike Myanmar and Afghanistan, Mexico is both 
a producer and legitimate user of acetic anhydride which 
may increase the risk of diversion within the country. 
Elsewhere in Latin America, approximately 1 ton of high 
quality heroin was manufactured in Colombia in 2009, 
requiring only 1-1.5 tons of acetic anhydride to be smug-
gled, or imported and then diverted, to the country.226 
Other countries 
Some illicit heroin manufacturing has been reported in 
India, an acetic anhydride manufacturer, consisting mostly 
of low purity brown heroin, the production of which is 
estimated at 15 tons for 2009. In Eastern Europe (particu-
larly Ukraine, Poland and the Republic of Moldova) and 
the Russian Federation, some addicts boil poppy straw with 
organic solvents and acetylate with acetic anhydride.227 This 
is also reflected in the number of interdicted small ‘kitchen 
labs’ dedicated to acetylating opium. For example, the Rus-
sian Federation interdicted 347 of these laboratories in 
2007 while the Republic of Moldova reported a total of 473 
‘acetylated opium’ labs destroyed in 2004-2005.228 
The acetic anhydride pipeline
Heroin is manufactured illicitly in relatively concentrated 
areas, while acetic anhydride industrial production is spread 
throughout the world (see map 1). The largest global man-
224  Approximately 10 kg of opium for each kg of heroin processed.
225 UNODC, Global SMART update Volume 4, www.unodc.org/documents/
scientific/GSU4_FINAL_Web.pdf.
226 A DEA study on heroin laboratory efficiency in Colombia estimated that 8 
kg of oven-dry opium were needed to manufacture 1 kg of 100 per cent pure 
heroin HCl; World Drug Report 2010, p. 138.
227  UNODC World Drug Report, 2009.
228  UNODC World Drug Report, 2010.
Fig. 24: Heroin production in Afghanistan, 2009
Source: UNODC.
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ufacturers appear to be the United States of America and 
China. Many countries (including producing countries) 
import such chemicals for their own manufacturing and 
other industries. At the onset, it is important to note that 
acetic anhydride licit manufacturers or acetic anhydride 
distributors do not function as suppliers to the illicit market 
per se; rather it is the traffickers who perform the service of 
siphoning a fraction from the licit market and making it 
available on the illicit market. 
Upwards of 2 million tons of acetic anhydride are estimated 
produced annually...229 Estimating that illicit acetic anhy-
dride demand in Afghanistan is 380-570 tons per annum, 
only a tiny percentage (0.02%) of global production would 
need to be diverted and trafficked to heroin laboratories. 
These figures, while useful to illustrate the challenges of 
precursor control, can be narrowed further for more accu-
rate risk analysis, since as much as two thirds of global 
acetic anhydride production is utilized for domestic indus-
229 In 2009, SRI consulting estimated that 1,645 million metric tons of acetic 
anhydride were produced globally but most observers put the average produc-
tion at two million tons per year; see “Acetic anhydride”, CEH Marketing 
Research Report, SRI Consulting, January 2010.
trial use.230 It is the remainder, (estimated at 320,000 tons 
in 2009),231 which is traded internationally and presents a 
potential target for diversion by traffickers.  However, this 
is also not representative of the amount of acetic anhydride 
potentially vulnerable to diversion, since traffickers target 
only a limited number of countries/distributors and gener-
ally divert the substance from domestic distribution chan-
nels. Additionally, traffickers do not operate strictly based 
on demand and may organize for one or multiple large 
orders of the substance in anticipation of some shipments 
being intercepted.232 Whatever the exact volumes, it remains 
that only a fraction of global acetic anhydride production is 
required to meet demand in the illicit heroin processing 
230 Once produced, many chemicals including acetic anhydride are used 
uniquely for the production of other chemicals and thus, are never really sold 
or traded.
231  “Trends and prospects in international trade of Acetic Anhydride”, Business 
Analytic Center (BAC), 2010.
232 For example, in 2001 the Russian Federation stopped the export of 1,000 
tons of acetic anhydride (a quantity well above Afghan or even global illicit 
demand) to Ukraine, when Ukrainian authorities determined that the compa-
ny allegedly placing the order did not exist and that the acetic anhydride was 
in fact destined for Afghanistan; Information provided by the security services 
of Ukraine, 22 March 2010.
Fig. 25: The heroin supply chain
Source: UNODC.
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sector. Traffickers therefore have flexibility to seek that frac-
tion from the least-protected corners of the market, increas-
ingly by diverting from domestic distribution channels. 
The point of diversion to illicit trade may come at any step 
of the licit supply chain. At the manufacture stage, methods 
can range from inaccurate reporting of over-consumption 
to outright siphoning by unscrupulous employees. Some 
companies may order greater quantities of acetic anhydride 
than required for their related outputs.233 Most basically, 
this involves dividing a shipment within the factory, using 
a proportion for genuine production needs and diverting 
the rest.234 It can also include tampering with recipes – such 
as for pharmaceuticals – in order to reduce the total 
required. For a thorough operation, these methods then 
require adjustments to production reporting in order to 
balance the books.235 Another procurement strategy could 
involve the establishment of a front company236 that would 
report acetic anhydride as a requirement to carry out its 
normal business activity (for example, textile or leather 
manufacture).237 In principle, these should be easy to detect 
by systematic checks on importing facilities. In practice 
233 “Precursor trafficking and diversion: March 2010” UNODC Country Office 
Pakistan, March 2010.
234 These are not front companies since they have a  genuine commercial purpose 
and concerns that are derivative of this.  
235 Information provided by UNODC Country Office Pakistan; see also 
“Precursor trafficking and diversion: March 2010” UNODC Country Office 
Pakistan, March 2010.
236 In some cases, legitimate forms of trade are carried out by front entities, 
sometimes related to the chemical trade.  
237 NCIS, United Kingdom Threat Assessment report, 2002. 
however it can be difficult to find the resources to follow up 
and seek information from licensees. Diversion can also 
occur during the storage or transportation stage, in the 
form of theft and pilferage. 
Preventing the diversion of acetic anhydride and other pre-
cursor chemicals from legitimate trade is one of the key 
goals of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the 
1998 Convention). Article 12 of the Convention relates to 
precursors and requires parties to monitor their manufac-
ture and distribution. The Convention also identifies those 
precursors most crucial to the illicit manufacture of drugs 
and places them under a special control regime. These are 
listed in Table-I and Table-II of the 1988 convention (see 
Annex 1). The international rescheduling of acetic anhy-
dride from a Table-II to a Table-I substance in 2001 further 
tightened international control on the substance. Member 
States are now obliged to supply, upon request to the Sec-
retary-General by the interested Party, pre-export notifica-
tions from the competent authorities of the exporting 
country when the chemical is traded. There is a working 
mechanism, which the International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB) facilitates, for governments to share infor-
mation on suspicious cases, particularly on stopped ship-
ments, in order to prevent traffickers from going elsewhere 
to obtain the necessary chemicals. Also, various interna-
tional co-operations efforts assisted by INCB, such as 
Project Cohesion,238 may have raised awareness in the com-
238 A global initiative led by INCB aimed at assisting countries in addressing 
Map 38: Countries licitly manufacturing acetic anhydride, 2009
Sources: UNODC Country reports, reports of the International Narcotics Control Board on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Con-
vention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-2009).
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mercial sector, reducing the readiness of companies to pro-
vide huge quantities of acetic anhydride to unknown and 
suspicious customers.239 Such initiatives have also led to a 
significant increase in the identification and prevention of 
diversion from international trade. As a result of this kind 
of collective action, precursor chemicals like acetic anhy-
dride are now increasingly diverted from domestic distribu-
tion channels of the countries which manufacture, or 
import, such chemicals. Nonetheless, while the system to 
prevent diversion from international trade is functioning, 
vigilance is still needed and there are still attempt at divert-
ing the substance internationally.
In most recent domestic diversion cases linked to Afghan 
heroin production, intermediaries or brokers240 are 
approached by front companies posing as distributors for 
other front companies in neighboring countries posing as 
end users. Once the chemical is procured, it may be placed 
in a warehouse or stored for an extended period before 
smuggling. This is effective since traffickers know that law 
enforcement resources are limited. 
Once diverted, acetic anhydride is smuggled through vari-
ous routes to final destinations where illicit drug manufac-
ture takes place. This involves a variety of methods, 
including misdeclaration or mislabeling of consignments 
and the removal of goods during or after loading. Criminal 
groups may take advantage of free trade zones,241 which also 
provide the ideal setting for repackaging and relabeling 
shipments. The use of circuitous routes is also noted, with 
chemicals routed through numerous destinations listing an 
intermediate port as the end destination.242 A container 
arriving at port may thus be re-routed to a port in a second 
country en route to a final destination in a third country. 
Container ports in Europe and Asia are particularly tar-
geted, due to high trade volumes, which make detection 
more difficult. Countries with light monitoring systems 
that double as major trade hubs offer optimal circum-
stances for traffickers. Intelligence-led investigations and 
checks are thus crucial if law enforcement is to detect illicit 
shipments without hindering the free flow of legitimate 
trade. 
In and of itself, the illicit supply chain is made of a vast and 
complex network of networks providing access to acetic 
anhydride through multiple sales transactions, front com-
the diversion of acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate by providing 
a platform from which time-bound regional operations can be launched, 
investigations into seizures and stopped shipments can be coordinated and 
licit trade monitored.
239  UNODC World Drug Report, 2008.
240 Those acting as intermediaries are not necessarily chemical brokers per se, as 
non-specialized commodity brokers can and have also been targeted.
241 The title ‘free trade zones’ encompasses the broader category of special eco-
nomic zones, including free ports, export processing zones, special economic 
zones et cetera.
242 This means that once the ship arrives at this location, the illicit cargo is 
transferred surreptitiously to another ship for transport to a third country, for 
which it has not been approved.  
panies and intermediaries which serves to insulate the crim-
inal groups managing the trade. Traffickers also thrive on 
weak controls and easily exploited loopholes in transit or 
domestic trade. This is combined with the underhand 
methods of the smugglers, such as mislabeling and misde-
claring acetic anhydride and smuggling the substance 
through multiple countries. All these and other methods 
reduce the risk of detection while collusion by government 
officials provides an added security buffer along the traf-
ficking chain. 
Interdiction
Seizures are a commonly used indicator of trends in illicit 
markets but interpreting acetic anhydride seizure data is 
challenging since, in any given year, seizures are such a 
small percentage of what is estimated to be traded.  Small 
variations in the number of seizures – for example, from 2 
to 6 seizures – can yield seemingly large swings in the 
amount of seizure activity. For instance, one relatively large 
seizure can have quite a marked effect on data series. At the 
same time, such seizures are not expected to significantly 
impact the supply of illicit acetic anhydride, for example 
when compared to heroin seizures and their impact on the 
opiate trade. In fact, despite major seizures in some years 
and the lack of seizures in others, the availability of acetic 
anhydride appears to have remained constant in Afghani-
stan.
Between 1999 and 2008, a total of around 1.03 million 
tons of acetic anhydride were seized worldwide. Of this 
amount, 95 per cent, (975,000 tons) was seized in a total 
of 14 countries. Turkey seized the highest volumes of acetic 
anhydride followed by China, Slovenia and the Russian 
Federation. Turkey is a transit country for acetic anhydride 
diverted mainly in European internal trade and trafficked 
to Afghanistan. According to the limited individual seizure 
statistics, acetic anhydride enters Turkey via its land borders 
with Bulgaria and to a lesser extent Greece. The smuggled 
chemical exits Turkey via its borders with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and continues onward. A comparison of 
volumes of acetic anhydride seized by Turkish authorities 
with the volumes seized by regional neighbors appears to 
indicate the need for increased regional cooperation. 
From 2000 to 2010, an annual average of approximately 
110 tons of acetic anhydride were seized worldwide. 
Although global seizures fluctuated between 1999 and 
2003, overall they remained stable, with the exception of a 
sizeable increase in 2001  partly on account of large con-
fiscations in the United Kingdom and Turkey. A slight 
decline was noted in 2004, which was followed by a sharp 
drop to historical lows. There is a wide range of hypotheses 
regarding this lapse in seizures, including the use of unsu-
pervised routes or a change in modus operandi by traffick-
ing networks.243 During that period, China, the Russian 
243  A partial explanation can be found in recent investigations that revealed that 
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Pakistan. Therefore, it is striking that, despite the increased 
concentration of processing activity in Afghanistan, little 
acetic anhydride was seized in countries neighbouring 
Afghanistan (excluding China) during the 2002-2007 
period. It bears repeating that there is no evidence of diver-
sion of licit production of acetic anhydride in Uzbekistan 
or in the Islamic Republic of Iran, two of the three produc-
ers bordering Afghanistan. Such a prolonged region-wide 
absence likely denotes operational adjustments by traffick-
ers, which may also include corrupting officials. 
The lack of major seizures of acetic anhydride in and 
around Afghanistan since 2001 prompted UNODC to 
Federation and Turkey accounted for more than 70 per cent 
of all global seizures. In analyzing acetic anhydride traffick-
ing trends, stopped shipments – shipments in licit trade 
that were not allowed to be exported either from the source 
countries or transit points because of suspicion – can also 
provide important pieces of information.244 It is notewor-
thy for example that during the seizure lapse period of 
2005-2007, a very low number of stopped shipments were 
reported.245 
A slight increase was noted in global seizures in 2007, fol-
lowed by a 250 per cent increase in 2008, mostly thanks to 
the strength of seizures in Slovenia and Hungary. The more 
than 220 tons of acetic anhydride seized in 2008 would 
have been enough to produce nearly half of world’s heroin 
output. Based on the preliminary data shown below, global 
seizures in 2009-2010 are back down to levels observed 
earlier in the decade.
Early in the decade most acetic anhydride was seized in 
Europe and Asia. Seizures shifted slightly to the Russian 
Federation in 2004-2007. Over the last few years, global 
seizures are once again dominated by Asia and Europe. 
Afghanistan obtains acetic anhydride from multiple sources 
and, unless shipped by air, precursors must transit the 
neighbouring countries in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajik-
istan and Turkmenistan), the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
hundreds of tons of acetic anhydride had been successfully smuggled out of 
Central Europe (and to a lesser extent the Republic of Korea) during that 
period.
244  A shipment is stopped in case of doubts about the licit purposes of the trans-
action.
245  According to the INCB, “between November 2006 and October 2007, only 
one shipment of the substance (4.3 tons), which was to be sent from the 
United Kingdom to India and it was suspended for administrative reasons”; 
see Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2007 on the 
Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, p.15.
Country Acetic anhydride seizures (Litres) Cumulative percentage
Turkey 187,675 18%
China 139,956 32%
Slovenia 117,899 43%
Russian Federation 104,482 53%
Turkmenistan 96,946 63%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 73,000 70%
Hungary 63,000 76%
Romania 48,323 81%
Islamic Republic of Iran 41,118 85%
Afghanistan 31,507 88%
Myanmar 27,049 90%
India 20,156 92%
Bulgaria 20,156 94%
Pakistan 15,704 96%
Republic of Korea 14,800 97%
Rest of the world 29,049 100%
Total 1,030,820
Table 22: Reported global acetic anhydride seizures, by country, 1999-2008
Fig. 26: Reported global acetic anhydride seizures, 
1999-2010*
Source: Collated from UNODC Country reports, reports of the Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Board on the Implementation of Article 12 of the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-2009). 
*Figures are preliminary and may be revised when updated information 
becomes available.
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2. Acetic anhydride trafficking
Fig. 28: Acetic anhydride seizures in Afghanistan 
and neighbouring countries (excluding 
China), 1995-2010 (litres)
Source: UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia; UNODC Office in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran; UNODC Country Office Pakistan; UNODC 
TARCET reports.   
Fig. 27: Reported global acetic anhydride seizures, 
by region, 1999-2010 (litres)
Source: Collated from UNODC Country reports, reports of the Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Board on the Implementation of Article 12 of the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-2009). 
launch Operation TARCET,246 in conjunction with Paris 
Pact Partners in 2008. A primary goal of the operation is to 
promote regional action and cooperation against precursor 
trafficking into Afghanistan and as a result of the anti-
trafficking operational activities, successes have been 
achieved both in Afghanistan and its neighbouring coun-
tries. In total, during the first phase of Operation TARCET 
246 TARCET is an acronym for Targeted, Anti-trafficking, Regional, Communi-
cation, Expertise and Training. TARCET addresses the issue of smuggling in 
precursors used in heroin manufacture en route to Afghanistan. TARCET is a 
regional operation coordinated by the UNODC; the objectives of Operation 
TARCET are twofold: (a) to educate key law enforcement officers on methods 
used to identify and intercept smuggled consignments of chemicals; (b) to in-
tercept consignments of smuggled chemicals using modern methodologies. 
(2008), 44 tons of acetic anhydride and nearly 30 tons of 
other chemicals were seized in Afghanistan, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Similarly, during the second phase of the oper-
ation (2009-10), 22 tons of acetic anhydride and over 430 
tons of other chemicals were seized in Afghanistan, Paki-
stan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. A third phase is currently 
underway. In the main destination market of Afghanistan, 
seizures of acetic anhydride in 2003-2010 average almost 
13 tons, approximately 3 per cent or less of the country’s 
estimated illicit requirements of the substance (475 tons). 
High seizures in 2009-2010, reflecting both increased local 
capacity and ISAF assistance, brought up the average con-
siderably from 5 tons per annum in 2008.
Alongside the resurging presence of acetic anhydride in 
2008-2009, seizures of chemicals closely related to acetic 
anhydride  namely acetic acid and acetyl chloride  were 
also reported in at least three countries neighbouring 
Afghanistan. During the 2008-2010 period, acetyl chloride 
alone made up over 40 per cent of all seized chemicals 
destined for Afghanistan. The reasons for these seizures are 
unclear. Acetic anhydride is thought to be virtually 
irreplaceable, because it is the safest and most effective 
agent for acetylation. Nevertheless, the above seizures may 
indicate the use or attempted use of substitutes in heroin 
manufacture in the region. There is however no evidence of 
any substitute chemical being used in Afghanistan.
After 2002, a decrease in annual acetic anhydride seizures 
was observed in China, perhaps due to lower demand from 
neighbouring Myanmar and the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic. At the same time, acetic anhydride seizure cases 
in Pakistan pointing to Chinese diversions continued to be 
reported between 2000 and 2010. In recent years, some of 
the acetic anhydride seizure cases identified in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan were also linked to trafficking from India. 
Although India is a licit producer of acetic anhydride, it is 
unclear if the seized acetic anhydride had been diverted 
from domestic production. In 2008-2009, the Republic of 
Korea has detected and seized multiple shipments of acetic 
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diversion. As precursor chemical smuggling attempts often 
involve routes through third countries, such investigations 
necessitate joint investigations beyond borders, and possi-
bly different law enforcement authorities.  In other cases, 
where feasible, “controlled deliveries” may be warranted, 
which again involve joint cross-border operations. In order 
to use either of these advanced investigative techniques, it 
is essential that necessary working mechanisms and stan-
dard operating procedures are established between the 
countries concerned.
Fig. 30: Share of Afghan-bound chemical seizures 
in countries neighbouring Afghanistan, by 
type, 2008-2010
Source: UNODC TARCET reports. 
anhydride destined for Afghanistan mainly via the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. In all cases, the chemical had been diverted 
from domestic distribution channels. 
The Russian Federation has seized around 104 tons of 
acetic anhydride between 2000 and 2008. Some of these 
seizures were attempts to traffic the substance into Central 
Asia and there is recent evidence of attempted acetic anhy-
dride trafficking from this country to Afghanistan via Cen-
tral Asia.   
In 2008, some 156 tons of acetic anhydride were seized in 
one year by Slovenia and its neighbour Hungary, account-
ing for approximately 75 per cent of global seizures in 
2008. Seizures, or interceptions, of precursor chemicals are 
not the end of law enforcement action. They enable ‘back-
tracking’ investigations to identify the original sources of 
Map 39: Global acetic anhydride seizures by country, 1999-2010 (100 litres or more)
Source: Collated from UNODC Country reports, reports of the International Narcotics Control Board on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-2009).  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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Fig. 31: Seizures of acetic anhydride in 2008  
(over 100 litres), disaggregated by country 
Source: Collated from UNODC Country reports, reports of the Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Board on the Implementation of Article 12 of the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-2009).    
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2.2 ACETIC ANHYDRIDE TRAFFICKING 
TO AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan is the primary market for illicit acetic anhy-
dride and thus the final destination of most global acetic 
anhydride routes. Acetic anhydride trafficking for Afghan 
heroin production is multi-directional and multi-modal. 
The chemical is diverted mainly in Europe and Asia and 
trafficked to Afghanistan via its neighbours, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian countries 
of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. 
Based on seizure data, Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran receive the bulk of trafficked acetic anhydride by land 
and sea transportation. However, because illicit shipments 
of acetic anhydride can be re-routed - often via indirect 
routes - before reaching final destinations, it is difficult to 
speak of routes in the sense commonly used for opiates or 
other drugs. Moreover, acetic anhydride routes are not 
static and can change rapidly. 
Three major routes
Acetic anhydride trafficking routes to Afghanistan appear 
to roughly operate along major Afghan opiate routes – in 
the reverse direction. Thus the Balkan, Northern and 
Southern routes out of Afghanistan which move hundreds 
of tons of heroin to Western and Asian markets are used in 
the reverse direction to smuggle hundreds of tons acetic 
anhydride. However, unlike with opiates, the number and 
size of acetic anhydride seizures reported in many countries 
along the Balkan, Northern and Southern routes have gen-
erally remained low. In most cases, seizures are erratic and 
during some periods non-existent. 
Along the Balkan route, the newest European Union 
member states and the former Soviet states in Eastern 
Europe continue to be targeted, but effective international 
cooperation has also responded efficiently. Slovenia and 
Hungary play a key role owed to their key geographic loca-
tion as the Schengen zone’s external borders. This is reflected 
in seizures of 156 tons of acetic anhydride in 2008 destined 
for movement through south-eastern Europe. Further 
downstream, acetic anhydride is smuggled into Turkey and 
continues to the Islamic Republic of Iran before reaching 
Afghanistan. Turkey is the only country on the Balkan 
route where there are reasonably consistent acetic anhy-
dride seizures. By contrast, in all other countries along this 
route, the pattern of seizures is mostly erratic such as in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran which had no seizures between 
2002 and 2007. There were several seizures in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran after 2008 but these originated in Asia and 
were affected at seaports. This may be an indication that 
acetic anhydride traffickers have successfully exploited vul-
nerabilities on the Islamic Republic of Iran border with 
Turkey.  There also appears to be additional routes into the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, with acetic anhydride trafficked 
from northern Iraq intermingling with sea-borne AA flows 
from Asia.  
There are however alternatives to trafficking large acetic 
anhydride loads overland from Europe into Turkey and 
through the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, although 
illicit shipments of acetic anhydride can be smuggled into 
Afghanistan from nearly all directions, the eastern and 
southern borders with Pakistan appear to be subjected to a 
higher degree of risk due to a concentration of laboratories 
and the comparative lack of government presence in the 
area. Thus, the Southern route through Pakistan appears to 
be the other primary route into Afghanistan. Seizure data 
aside, there was a consensus among all sources interviewed 
that flows through southern provinces of Afghanistan 
(Kandahar, Hilmand) were quantifiably more important 
than those that travel via the country’s western (or eastern) 
border. Most of this trafficking appears to source AA from 
Fig. 32: Top ten ports by annual container volumes in twenty-foot equivalents units (TEUs), 2008 
Source: American Associate of Port Authorities.   
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Asia and involves the use of seaports; although small over-
land (or aerial) ventures from India or China cannot be 
discounted. 
In Afghanistan’s region, the main trade and transportation 
hub is the United Arab Emirates. In the past, several sei-
zures indicated that the United Arab Emirates was being 
used as a transit for smuggling towards Afghanistan.247 
Since 2008, many acetic anhydride seizures in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Pakistan have transited Dubai ports, 
which now reportedly handle in excess of 11 million con-
tainers per year (five times as much as in 2000).248 In July 
2010, as a result of intelligence sharing, 14.6 tons of misla-
beled acetic anhydride diverted in China and destined for 
Pakistan were seized in Dubai. This is only illustrative, as 
there are other large seaports in the region used as a cover 
for acetic anhydride trafficking. As a result, authorities in 
Dubai and other major ports in the region face huge diffi-
culties detecting illicit shipment among the thousands of 
containers that are processed daily. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that increased international focus on Kara-
chi seaport (Pakistan) and Bandar Abbas (Islamic Republic 
of Iran) may influence traffickers to use alternate ports of 
entry such as Gwadar in Baluchistan (Pakistan) or Cha-
247 Early examples include seizures of 10 tons of acetic anhydride in Turkmeni-
stan in 1997, 10 tons in Pakistan in 1998 as well as 9 tons in Dubai smuggled 
from India in 1999.
248 NAVLINK, March 2003, Putting e-business in Dubai Ports at work, www.
navlink.com/march-03.html.
habar in Sistan-Baluchistan (Islamic Republic of Iran). 
Such efforts should, therefore, be complemented by intel-
ligence sharing and regional cooperation.
Although a major thoroughfare for acetic anhydride traf-
ficking in the 1990s, the use of the Northern route through 
Central Asia for trafficking acetic anhydride now appears 
secondary compared to the Balkan and Southern routes. 
UNODC research in Afghanistan indicate that flows from 
Central Asia are minor and irregular and this is likely to 
remain unchanged as long as heroin laboratories in prov-
inces bordering Central Asia continue to rely on the South-
ern route supply line out of Pakistan. This said, there 
continues to be attempts at diverting acetic anhydride in 
the Russian Federation for smuggling through Central Asia. 
There is also fragmentary evidence that a China-Kyr-
gyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan route is developing. It seems 
unlikely, however, that significantly larger volumes of acetic 
anhydride are being trafficked than those reflected in the 
limited seizure data. This is also in part the result of logisti-
cal disadvantages: sea-borne shipping249 to Pakistan and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran gives traffickers a logistical edge in 
supplying precursors to Afghanistan. In that regard, trade 
between Central Asia and Afghanistan is far below its 
249 The closest equivalent is the Caspian Sea, which borders Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, but UNODC has no information on its use for precursor 
movements.
Map 40: Acetic anhydride seizures in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries (except China), 2008-2010
Source: UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations.
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potential250 and may continue to present fewer opportuni-
ties for precursor smugglers than the eastern or southern 
borders, which see far larger trade volumes. Another shift in 
trafficking routes is not out of the question however, par-
ticularly taking into account the new customs agreement 
between Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Belarus.251 
As controls in one area develop, alternative routes with 
fewer controls are sought by acetic anhydride traffickers. 
Although not discussed in-depth in this report, there are 
other regions that can be targeted by traffickers seeking the 
path of least resistance to Afghanistan. Iraq appears to be 
vulnerable; in particular, northern Iraq appears to be emerg-
ing as a transit zone for acetic anhydride shipments des-
tined for Afghanistan through the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Additionally, the number of identified diversion attempts 
involving countries neighboring Iraq is increasing. In 2008-
2009, the Governments of Spain, Germany and the United 
States of America stopped suspicious shipments of nearly 
95 tons of acetic anhydride, at the request of Iraqi authori-
ties. Africa also appears vulnerable on account of weak 
controls and low law enforcement capacity. According to 
the 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
(INCSR) issued by the United States of America State 
Department, Africa is increasingly targeted by traffickers 
for possible smuggling to Afghanistan. For example, several 
stopped shipments over the last few years could be indica-
tions that traffickers have redirected some of the trade 
through the East Africa region. This includes two ship-
ments from India and the Islamic Republic of Iran that 
were intercepted by Djibouti authorities in 2009; these 
totaled 36 tons of acetic anhydride and were requested by a 
company in Djibouti.252 Other African regions may have 
been targeted as well, as suggested by a stopped shipment 
of 15 tons of acetic anhydride from Italy to Egypt in 
December 2008. The acetic anhydride route through Africa 
appears to be a new phenomenon and more time is needed 
to monitor and analyse its potential dynamics.
Finally, some acetic anhydride may not be destined for 
Afghanistan at all. Based on significant increases in mor-
phine seizures in countries bordering Afghanistan, the 2008 
World Drug Report concluded that important amounts of 
heroin are produced outside Afghanistan, as morphine does 
not have a large user base. The possibility of processing 
occurring outside Afghanistan may also partially account 
for long-standing seizure gaps along key routes and would 
correlate with intermittent but unconfirmed reports of 
refining activity elsewhere in the wider region.
250 Asian Development Bank, Afghanistan Trade with CAREC Neighbours: 
Evidence from Surveys of Border Crossing Points in Hairatan and Sher Khan 
Bandar, October 29, 2008. 
251 Under this agreement, once cargo enters any of these countries, customs of-
ficials consider it to be domestic cargo not subject to inspections while sealed, 
potentially presenting opportunities for traffickers.
252 The shipments were intercepted after authorities detected that the import 
permits were forged.
Groups involved
Based on arrests resulting from seizures, it appears that 
nationals of Afghanistan and Pakistan play an important 
role in diverting acetic anhydride internationally, even in 
distant producing and importing countries where there is 
not a large diaspora (Republic of Korea, Japan). Groups of 
Afghan and Pakistani nationals manage trafficking through 
the seaports of both Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Considering that few Afghans are generally arrested 
on drug charges outside Afghanistan, it is notable that 
Afghan nationals are by contrast quite present in acetic 
anhydride related arrests. 
This international mobility is facilitated by the acquisition 
of multiple citizenships, which provides an added degree of 
protection against law enforcement. This has proved help-
ful in internationalizing groups beyond the region, as evi-
denced by the reported involvement of Afghans in acetic 
anhydride procurement in India, the Russian Federation, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, which all involved this 
form of modus operandi.
On the Balkan route, acetic anhydride distribution is han-
dled by a diversity of criminal groups, which does not 
include Pakistani and Afghan nationals. It is unclear if Ira-
nian traffickers are involved as middlemen on the Balkan 
route since detailed arrest figures are not available. For the 
most part, groups operating on the Balkan route do not 
have a strong social or ethnic identity. At the same time, 
there is a consensus among law enforcement that groups on 
this route are becoming more organized and more sophisti-
cated in diverting and smuggling operations.
The following section of the chapter summarizes the main 
acetic anhydride trafficking trends over the last ten years, 
including a more detailed description of acetic anhydride 
routes into Afghanistan, the criminal groups that ply them 
and region-specific risk factors identified throughout the 
course of the research. The main indicator of trafficking 
activity is seizure data, bearing in mind the equivocal nature 
of such figures; for example, rising seizures in one country 
may simply reflect changes in the actions of law-enforce-
ment agencies rather than changes in trafficking routes. 
The seizure data presented below is therefore supplemented 
by contextual information and expert opinion, for instance 
from law enforcement agencies in seizing countries and 
UNODC officials. 
The Southern Route
The southern route is not a route in the conventional sense. 
Rather, it consists of a series of chains that converge on the 
borders between Pakistan and southern and eastern Afghan-
istan, most of which originate in Asia. Sea routes are privi-
leged, but some road transportation from neighbouring 
China and to a lesser extent India may also occur. 
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China
Bordering Pakistan in the south-west, China is a major 
global producer and importer of precursor chemicals, 
including acetic anhydride. Despite tight controls on pro-
duction and distribution, some domestic diversion occurs; 
a portion of which is likely then smuggled into Myanmar’s 
laboratories, which in turn process opiates for the Chinese 
market. In 2008, China reported various large seizures of 
precursor chemicals, including 5.6 tons of acetic anhydride; 
however, earlier in the decade China was seizing six times 
this amount. It may be surmised that the drop in volumes 
is linked to the declining heroin manufacture in Myanmar, 
but this is largely speculative, as Chinese statistics on sei-
zures made available to UNODC do not usually include 
disaggregated data on place of apprehension and, crucially, 
destination. 
The limited data available appears to indicate attempts by 
traffickers at establishing an acetic anhydride route from 
Western China’s Xinjiang province to Afghan labs since the 
1990s. For example, in 1999-2000, Chinese law enforce-
ment noted several attempts to traffic the substance to 
Afghanistan from western China (Xinjiang province) via 
Pakistan.253 Referring to a seizure of 5.7 tons in April 2000, 
the annual drug control report for China states that ‘on 7 
April an Afghan businessman, a Pakistani businessman and 
some illegitimate persons inside China collaboratively 
attempted to smuggle acetic anhydride hidden in a trunk of 
carpets directed to Afghanistan, which were seized by the 
Urumqi (Xinjiang) customs’.254 In all, Chinese authorities 
reportedly seized more than 66 metric tons of acetic anhy-
dride that traffickers were attempting to smuggle out of 
Xinjiang between 1991 and 2004.255 
253  Annual Report on Drug Control in China, 2000, http://www.fjncc.org/en/
showinfo.asp?infoid=7948.
254  Annual Report on Drug Control in China, 2000, http://www.fjncc.org/en/
showinfo.asp?infoid=7948.
255  Dr. Murray Scot Tanner, “China Confronts Afghan Drugs: Law Enforce-
Apart from anecdotal reports of air trafficking,256 since then 
the last major case of attempted acetic anhydride smuggling 
from western China’s Xinjiang province made known to 
UNODC resulted in arrests on September 2007. The case 
related to 1.07 tons of acetic anhydride seized in a chemi-
cals market in Urumqi. Chinese state media reported that 
this was under the control of a smuggling group that had 
been trafficking to Pakistan. Although the exact route to 
Pakistan was not specified, the only overland route from 
China to Pakistan is through the Khunjerab pass, where in 
the past China has made very large seizures of acetic anhy-
dride.257 
The Khunjerab crossing currently accounts for a small pro-
portion of bilateral trade, although this is likely to grow and 
traffic regulation of this crossing is difficult.258 A source 
from the Afridi tribe in the border areas of Pakistan indi-
cated that acetic anhydride enters Pakistan from China in 
small quantities and mislabeled as other chemicals.259 
Another source noted that illicit trade along this route has 
diminished as a result of Chinese interdiction and that sea 
routes are utilized instead.260 There is some recent evidence 
to substantiate this last claim in the form of three large 
seizures:
• A May 2010 seizure of 15.6 tons of acetic anhydride in 
port Qasim, Pakistan, which was reportedly diverted in 
China. 
• A July 2010 seizure of 14.6 tons of acetic anhydride in 
Dubai, destined for Pakistan and reportedly diverted in 
China.
ment Views of “The Golden Crescent”, CNA China Studies, March 2011, 
p.15.
256  In 2009, law enforcement sources in Afghanistan reported another route, by 
air, from Xinjiang to Islamabad and further along the same corridor, but no 
seizures have been reported.
257  Ningbo Customs district’s people republic of china website. ningbo.customs.
gov.cn/Default.aspx?tabid=7775.
258  UNODC Country Office Pakistan ,“Precursor trafficking and diversion: 
March 2010”, March 2010
259  Drug trafficker interviews, Peshawar, August 2010.
260  Drug trafficker interviews, Peshawar, August 2010.
Fig. 33: Seizures of acetic anhydride in China, 
1999-2009 
Sources:  UNODC Country reports, reports of the International Narcotics 
Control Board on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances of 1988 (1999-2009).
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• 30 tons of AA seized in China in August 2010 and 
linked to the previous seizures. No further details are 
available.
All the aforementioned seizures were reportedly diverted 
within China, an indication that traffickers are targeting 
domestic distribution channels in response to tight export 
controls. 
Although not a seizure, in 2007 China stopped a shipment 
of 80 tons of acetic anhydride destined for Afghanistan, 
which has no licit requirements for the substance.261 China 
has a short (76 km), isolated border with Afghanistan, but 
acetic anhydride trafficking across this border is unlikely 
due to terrain and climate and to the existence of easier 
trafficking alternatives, including potential along the Cen-
tral Asia-Chinese border. 
The last seizure in Afghanistan purportedly linked to China 
occurred in 2003 in Nangarhar province, but no recent 
Afghan seizures were attributed to diversions in China. 
Although data is preliminary as of the time of this writing, 
a 2010 seizure of acetic anhydride in Central Asia 
(Tajikistan) seems to indicate a route originating in Xin-
jiang province. It should be noted that the end user country 
has not been confirmed to be Afghanistan.
The volumes of acetic anhydride potentially arriving over-
land from China are likely to be small compared to the 
quantities received via other routes into Pakistan. Indeed, 
the use of sea routes could be an indication of Chinese suc-
cess at curtailing smuggling across its land borders. At the 
same time, the increased trade with Pakistan262 mostly by 
sea mitigates this as it reduces the ability to monitor cargoes 
unless further steps are taken to improve information flows 
and risk-based targeting among customs and law enforce-
ment authorities. 
India 
Like China, India produces acetic anhydride. In 2008, 
production in India alone reportedly reached 42,000 tons 
from about seven manufacturers,263 with northern India 
(particularly the state of Uttar Pradesh), accounting for a 
major percentage of this turnover.264 Important acetic anhy-
dride seizures have also occurred in this area. As an exam-
ple, 85 per cent of the total 2,665 litres of acetic anhydride 
seized in 2004 was apprehended in a single seizure by 
261  Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2007 on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, p.15.
262  In 2006, bilateral trade between China and Pakistan surpassed that between 
the United States of America and Pakistan, and in 2009, China became 
second largest trading partner of Pakistan. Source: IMF Direction of Trade 
Statistics.
263  UNODC, South Asia Regional Profile, 2008, p.86.
264  A.P. Kala, “Problem of diversion of precursor and their use in illicit produc-
tion of drugs in Indian context”, UNODC Precursor Control laws: Chal-
lenges And Response; www.unodc.org/pdf/india/publications/precursor_con-
trol_laws/10_mrkalapresentation.pdf.
Indian law enforcement in Uttar Pradesh.265 This state also 
doubles as a licit growing area for opium poppy and, despite 
strict controls,266 domestic diversion remains a concern, 
particularly given a fairly vibrant illicit heroin manufactur-
ing in India. Of note, India is among the few countries with 
both licit acetic anhydride and licit domestic opium pro-
duction.267
India seizes an annual average 2.2 tons of acetic anhydride. 
This does not solely reflect the acetic anhydride demand in 
Afghanistan, as some of these seizures are linked to local 
heroin manufacturing;268 this amount was perhaps as much 
as 15 tons of heroin base in 2009. 269  
In the past, acetic anhydride from India was smuggled 
across the border into Myanmar’s laboratories,270 but this 
route appears to have fallen out of use particularly with the 
concentration of processing in Afghanistan. With acetic 
anhydride diverted from Indian domestic production or 
trade, India was also initially an important source of labo-
ratories in Pakistan (and later Afghanistan). Between 1991 
and 2000, 79 consignments of acetic anhydride totaling 34 
tons were detected along the India–Pakistan border. Many 
265  More recently, in January 2008 Indian authorities made two simultaneous 
seizures of 1,500 litres in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.
266  Acetic anhydride is subject to a special customs regime, according to which 
its storage and transportation within 100 km of the India-Myanmar border 
and 50 km of the India - Pakistan border are subject to special controls.
267  This production is confined to certain provinces and carefully monitored.
268  Low-grade heroin, known locally as ‘brown sugar’, is mostly manufactured; 
information provided by UNODC India Office, 2009.
269  Heroin aside, an unknown portion of diverted acetic anhydride could also 
be intended for mandrax production in South Africa, but data on individual 
seizures is limited. Mandrax is a blend of the pharmaceutical drugs methaqua-
lone and antihistamine. It was originally used legally as a sleeping tablet.  The 
term “mandrax” refers to the common street name for a drug containing sig-
nificant quantities of methaqualone; UNODC South Africa Country Profile, 
2002, p.7, www.unodc.org/pdf/southafrica/country_profile_southafrica.pdf.
270  United States of America Department of State, International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report, 2001.
Fig. 34: Seizures of acetic anhydride in India, 
1999-2009 
Source: Regional Office for South Asia, Narcotics Control Bureau of India, 
published reports of the International Narcotics Control Board on the 
Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-
2009).
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Map 41: Acetic anhydride seizures in India (2008-2009) and reported transnational trafﬁcking routes 
(1999-2009)
Source: UNODC Regional Office for South Asia; Narcotics Control Bureau of India.  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
of these were mid-sized loads (16-200 litres) and the trans-
porters were mostly Indian nationals.271 Although the 
Indian border is heavily militarized and by all accounts 
smuggling has generally declined,272 Pakistan law enforce-
ment believes that some small acetic anhydride consign-
ments are still trafficked into Pakistan overland from 
India.273 This said, no precursors have been seized at the 
Wagha crossing on the Indian border in years and any 
smuggling ventures are likely to be small amounts.274 More-
over, the small number of cargo trucks transporting goods 
from India into Pakistan are required to be fully unloaded 
and re-loaded onto trucks in Pakistan and the same applies 
to goods entering India from Pakistan. As such, traffickers 
are at a greater risk of detection than at the Afghan border, 
for example, where trucks can directly cross the border. 
Most of the trade between India and Pakistan takes place 
primarily by sea and is often re-routed through a third port, 
such as Dubai.275 This offers obvious possibilities for acetic 
anhydride traffickers as reflected in a march 2008 seizure of 
271  UNODC Regional Office for South Asia, “Significance of South Asia in 
Afghanistan-specific drug control strategy”, 2009. 
272  UNODC, 2005, South Asia Regional Profile – India,  www.unodc.org/pdf/
india/publications/south_Asia_Regional_Profile_Sept_2005/10_india.pdf.
273  Information provided by UNODC office in Pakistan, 2010; Interview with 
ANF, Islamabad, May 2010.
274  Customs, Wagha Border, October 2010.
275  “Quantifying informal trade between Pakistan and India”, Sustainable Policy 
Development Institute for the World Bank, June 28 2005.
1,224 litres of acetic anhydride in Quetta. The shipment 
appears to have been sent from India via Dubai, concealed 
in drums. A shipment seized in Dubai itself offers an exam-
ple of pilferage, an alternative illicit procurement method. 
In this particular case dating back to 1999, fully 9 tons of 
acetic anhydride had been pilfered over time from acetic 
anhydride-carrying tankers in India during licit transport. 
More recently reported cases continue to highlight the risk 
of pilferage, with one case involving hundreds of litres of 
acetic anhydride destined for Afghanistan.276 
India has direct air links to Afghanistan, notably through 
Kabul and Kandahar..277 It is perhaps because most other 
trade avenues are limited that India is the only country to 
record several instances of acetic anhydride trafficking by 
air. An early example of usage of this route occurred in 
2000, when 2 tons of acetic anhydride were seized en route 
to Kabul. More modest amounts, such as a shipment of 200 
litres by air reported in 2008, highlight the continued use 
of air routes from India into Afghanistan..278 In this par-
ticular case, the transporters smuggled the chemical to 
Kabul by air, 20 litres at a time, likely indicating that 
smaller loads are now privileged. This is also reflected in a 
276  UNODC Regional Office for South Asia, “Significance of South Asia in 
Afghanistan-specific drug control strategy”, 2009. 
277  Kandahar has an international airport with direct flight to India (and the 
U.A.E.) and there are daily flights from Delhi to Kabul. 
278  Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) of India.
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May 2009 seizure of reportedly 137 kg of acetic anhydride 
of Indian origin in Karachi. Although most shipments are 
small, in the aggregate these can amount to significant 
quantities with higher profit margins. 
The combination of hostile terrain, low trade flows and 
heavily militarized border control means that the greater 
volumes of acetic anhydride coming from India are likely to 
be shipped by boat rather than by air or by risking direct 
overland movement across the border.
Republic of Korea 
In 2008 Republic of Korea customs detected two cases 
totalling about 83 tons of outbound acetic anhydride,279 
most of which had been diverted from domestic distribu-
tion channels. According to reports, between April 2007 
and March 2008, the criminal group involved had already 
managed to send a full 50 tons of acetic anhydride from the 
Republic of Korea to Nimroz and Kandahar provinces in 
southern Afghanistan.280 This involved four different ship-
ments disguised as disinfectant.281 Of that total, 14 tons 
had been seized in Karachi port in 2008. That 14-ton sei-
zure is not only important by virtue of breaking a seizure 
279 “Combat against Drug Smuggling in Korea 2009” Narcotics Investigation 
Division, June 2009.
280 Korea used by Taliban heroin ring, article.joins.com/article/article.
asp?ctg=12&Total_ID=3214030. July 7 2008.
281 CARICC information bulletin 29, August 4, 2008.
lapse in the region, but it also led to numerous other sei-
zures in the Republic of Korea. Most of these were destined 
to transit the Islamic Republic of Iran, but in July 2009 
Korean police reportedly found 3.5 tons of acetic anhydride 
stored in a warehouse outside Seoul destined to reach 
Afghanistan via Pakistan. 
Map 42: Trajectory of the 2008 14-ton seizure of acetic anhydride in Karachi, Pakistan
Source: ANF Pakistan; UNODC TARCET. 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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Acetic anhydride shipments smuggled from 
 the Republic of Korea to Afghanistan  
Year Amount (tons) Date
2007 0.5 tons April
0.5 tons July
13 tons October
2008 13 tons January
Total  27 tons 
 
Source: ANF Pakistan. 
*Figures are preliminary and may be revised when updated information 
becomes available.
Table 23: Reported acetic anhydride shipments  
(including seizures) linked to the seizure 
of 14 tons in Karachi in 2008*
110
THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE: A  Threat Assessment 
challenge for controls is that smugglers can take advantage 
of the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) to avoid 
regular cargo inspections. 
Afghan Transit Trade Agreement
The 1965 ATTA signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan allows 
goods for import and export on the three land border 
routes linking Afghanistan with Pakistan (Torkham, 
Ghulam Khan and Chaman/Spin Boldak) to transit 
through the port of Karachi (Pakistan) exempt from duties 
or customs tariffs and screening. The transit trade flowing 
through Pakistan constitutes a major portion of Afghan 
total trade – 38 per cent of imports and 52 per cent of 
exports284 but it also poses an enormous challenge to the 
prevention of trafficking in precursor chemicals, weapons 
284  Rapid Logistics Review: Transit of Afghan Goods through the Pakistan-
Afghanistan Border Crossings and the Implications of Transit Trade on the 
Economies – DRAFT, World Bank, 2009.
Pakistan
Pakistan ceased licit domestic manufacturing of acetic 
anhydride in 1995, but it retains a legitimate demand for 
the chemical in a number of industries, particularly textile, 
pharmaceutical and paint making. Pakistan is the last line 
of defense against chemical smuggling into southern and 
eastern Afghanistan. The country’s relatively developed port 
and highway infrastructure, which links with neighbouring 
Afghanistan, make Pakistan attractive as a transit country 
for both licit and illicit trade. Pakistan has seven official 
border entry and exit points, in addition to eight interna-
tional airports and seaports.282 Karachi and Qasim ports 
currently handle 95 per cent of external trade and contain-
ers are held in the port for at least seven days –three times 
the standard timeframe of developed countries.283 An added 
282  UNODC country office Pakistan, “Illicit drug trends in Pakistan” April 
2008, p. 28.
283  Akram Malik, Pakistan Planning Commission, NTCIP.
Chaman and 
Ghulam Khan Torkham Total
Commercial Non-Comm Total Commercial
Non-
Comm Total Commercial
Non-
Comm Total
MMTon 0.59 - 0.59 2.71 1.08 3.79 3.3 1.08 4.38
US$ m 255 - 255 1 804 - 2 059 - 2 059
Source: Railway Headquarters, Karachi , quoted in Rapid Logistics Review: Transit of Afghan Goods through the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Crossings and 
the Implications of Transit Trade on the Economies; World Bank, 2009.
Table 24: Afghan import transit trade through Pakistan, 2008-2009
From 
Port to 
Border 
Crossing
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008
Wagons Containers
Total  
Tonnage
Wagons Containers
Total 
 Tonnage
Wagons Containers
Total  
Tonnage
Karachi 
- Chaman 5,310 1,927 147,160 3,308 1,587 98,828 2,313 1,565 77,526
Port 
Qasim – 
Chaman
1,576 11 33,300 544 20 11,794 433 16 9,389
Sub-total 
(for 
Chaman):
6,886 1,938 180,459 3,852 1,607 110,622 2,746 1,581 86,915
Karachi/ 
Peshawar 10,446 7,770 363,111 8,322 8,105 324,705 6,409 8,799 297,371
Port 
Qasim – 
Peshawar
4,138 879 103,160 1,645 302 40,132 865 255 22,883
Sub-total 
(for Pesha-
war):
14,584 8,649 466,271 9,967 8,407 364,837 7,274 9,054 320,253
National 
Total: 21,470 10,587 646,730 13,819 10,014 475,458 10,020 10,635 407,168
Source:  Railway Headquarters, Karachi , quoted in Rapid Logistics Review: Transit of Afghan Goods through the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Crossings 
and the Implications of Transit Trade on the Economies; World Bank, 2009.
Table 25: ATTA commercial cargo via Pakistan railways to Chaman and Peshawar
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and other contraband. Goods imported under ATTA are 
sometimes subsequently smuggled back into Pakistan for 
local consumption without having paid any import tariffs. 
The volume of clandestine business (smuggling or re-rout-
ing of ATTA goods) between the two countries is estimated 
at several billion dollars, a lifeline for many residents in the 
border regions. As of the time of writing, under ATTA, 
sealed containers are not checked (unless strong intelligence 
requires it) and can only be opened upon reaching their 
destination in Afghanistan. Scanning each load at Karachi 
is obviously unworkable, given the large size of trade vol-
umes. The possibilities for abuse are obvious and should 
inform strategies that support the cooperation between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
Seizures in Pakistan
Despite bordering what was fast becoming the number one 
processing centre in the world, acetic anhydride seizures in 
Pakistan were negligible near the turn of the century. This 
state of affairs lasted until 2008. This seizure lapse, particu-
larly in Baluchistan and FATA, can no doubt be partly 
linked to general insecurity brought on by cross-border 
insurgents and the related obstacles to government control. 
However, such a prolonged countrywide absence also likely 
denotes an adjustment in trafficking operations.
Between 2008 and 2010, Pakistan made several relatively 
large heroin chemical interdictions, mainly in Karachi and 
near the border with Afghanistan. The larger seizures appear 
to have been diverted in the Republic of Korea, China and 
to a lesser extent India. The last evidence of European-
sourced shipments was reported in Rawalpindi in 1998 
with a seizure of 10 tons of acetic anhydride reportedly 
diverted in Germany and trafficked through southeastern 
Europe.285 
According to seizure data, the sea routes into Pakistan 
appear to be particularly targeted by traffickers with many 
shipments being concealed aboard maritime sea vessels. 
The most recent and largest AA seizure (15.6 tons) was 
misdeclared as water soluble paint when it was intercepted 
and seized at Port Qasim in March 2010.
Further along the sea coast, Pakistan law enforcement and 
Baluchistan locals point out that irregular and unmoni-
tored landing of various boats is not unusual along the coast 
of Baluchistan. UNODC is not aware of any precursor 
seizures that have been traced back to such a landing, but 
this remains a possible entry into trafficking routes through 
Baluchistan. 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border 
Pakistan shares a 2,538 km border with Afghanistan, 
stretching from the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas 
(FATA) to Baluchistan province.286 The major legal border 
crossing points along the border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan are: Torkham (Nangarhar Province-Khyber 
Agency), Ghulam Khan (Khost Province–Kurram Agency) 
and Chaman (Kandahar province-Baluchistan). Afghani-
stan imports goods primarily from Pakistan, which is 
reflected in the predominance of the Pakistan rupee in 
285 Presentation on precursors used in heroin manufacturing, ANF, Round Table 
on precursors, Vienna, May 2007.
286 The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is the area of Pakistan out-
side the four provinces, comprising a region of some 27,220 km².  It consists 
of seven semi-autonomous agencies or administrative districts Bajaur, Khyber, 
Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, South Waziristan and North Waziristan. 
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Fig. 35: Seizures of acetic anhydride in Pakistan 
(litres), 1999-2010  
 
 
Source UNODC Country Office Pakistan; Pakistan Anti Narcotics Force 
(ANF).
Date Location Seizure description
Mar-08 Quetta 1,224 L of acetic anhydride.arriving from India via Lahore
23-Mar-08 Karachi 14,000 kg of acetic anhydride, arriving from South Korea.
29-Aug-08 Karachi 46.5 L of acetic anhydride coming from India.
16-Jan-09 Karachi 5,000 kg of acetyl chloride.
27-May-09 Karachi 137 kg of acetic anhydride coming from India.
29-Jul-09 Chagi, Baluchistan 4,989 kg of acetic anhydride and 3,600 L of ammonia.
Mar-10 Karachi 15.6 tons of acetic anhydride arriving from China
Source: Pakistan Anti Narcotics Force (ANF).
Table 26: Chemical seizures in Pakistan, 2008-2010
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almost all Afghan districts bordering Pakistan. Sporadic 
seizures and law enforcement assessments suggest that the 
main route for acetic anhydride is through Karachi port. 
Mislabeling appears to be the most common method for 
smuggling acetic anhydride into the port city. Karachi is 
linked by road and rail to two major trade corridors: firstly, 
the Karachi-Peshawar-Jalalabad-Kabul corridor and sec-
ondly, the Karachi-Chaman-Kandahar-Hirat corridor. 
Acetic anhydride smuggling takes place along the border 
with Afghanistan and both legal and illegal crossing points 
are used. All manners of conveyances are utilized, including 
large trucks, small pick-up trucks, pack mules or camels 
and crossings on foot.  
Karachi-Chaman (Spin Boldak)
The largest flows of smuggled acetic anhydride occur pri-
marily along the border with the southern Afghan prov-
inces of Nimroz, Hilmand and Kandahar. An enduring hub 
in this area appears to be the Baramcha bazaar287 (southern 
Hilmand/Chagai district of Baluchistan), a village that 
straddles the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Elsewhere in the 
287  Phone interview with Nimroz border official, September 2008.
Fig. 36: Share of acetic anhydride seizures in  
Pakistan by country of diversion,  
2008-2010  
 
 
Source UNODC 
Fig. 37: Share of acetic anhydride seizures in  
Pakistan by mode of transportation,  
2008-2010  
 
 
Source UNODC 
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Map 43: Acetic anhydride seizures in Pakistan and trafﬁcking routes into southern and eastern 
Afghanistan, 2008-2010
Source: UNODC  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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Chagai district of Baluchistan, the Girdi Jangle refugee 
camp continues to be a consolidation and repackaging 
point for southern laboratories, although nowhere near the 
importance it held in 2007-2008.288 
Using ATTA and other covers, large consignment are trans-
ported along the main onward route through Baluchistan 
province and enter Afghanistan at Chaman (Spin Boldak), 
the only official crossing point in the region. Unofficial 
crossings may be used in the case of smaller consignments, 
as one recent seizure suggests. In August 2009, Pakistani 
ANF seized 4,989 kg of acetic anhydride in Chaghai dis-
trict. According to the information provided by the ANF, 
the chemicals were being smuggled into Afghanistan in 
small quantities packed in 30-litre cans transported on 
jeeps.289 Trafficking in small quantities may also be related 
to higher risk and prices, which means that even small ship-
ments are now financially viable. The increasing sale of 
smaller volumes is likely to impact precursor trafficking 
logistics and result in the use of minor routes through the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which will likely make inter-
diction more difficult.
This said, there is a possible alternative route into Balu-
chistan province. A significant proportion of opiates trans-
iting Baluchistan enter into the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and these smuggling paths appear to be used in reverse to 
also traffic precursor chemicals.290 This route may gain in 
importance as counter narcotics operations intensify in 
southern Afghanistan. Law enforcement sources in Afghan-
istan expect an increased concentration further west around 
Zaranj, Robat-e-Jali and other remote areas in Nimroz 
province.
Karachi-Torkham/Ghulam Khan
From Karachi, another route runs through FATA and into 
south-eastern Afghanistan. Paktya province in Afghanistan 
has experienced a few sizeable seizures in recent years, with 
chemicals apparently smuggled through the Ghulam Khan 
crossing in North Waziristan Agency. However, in this 
region the major crossing for acetic anhydride is at Torkham 
in Khyber agency (FATA), which borders eastern Afghani-
stan. Once across the border, acetic anhydride is shipped to 
the many laboratories in border districts or continues to the 
north-east and Badakhshan province. 
Acetic anhydride seizures occur mainly in Karachi or near 
the border with Afghanistan but few precursors are seized 
within Baluchistan and none in FATA. This may be indica-
tive of both the lack of law enforcement capacity and traf-
fickers’ reliance on the ATTA. There was a consensus 
among sources interviewed that the routes through Balu-
chistan were quantifiably more important than those run-
288  UNODC Mission to Afghanistan Mazar-Sharif and Hairatan March 2008).
289  Information provided by ANF Pakistan, August 2009.
290 Interviews with drug traffickers, Peshawar, October 2010.
ning through FATA. The main reason for this is the 
concentration of laboratories in southern Afghanistan, but 
also on account of the Chaman border links with the main 
transportation corridors in Afghanistan and its status under 
ATTA. There are serious allegations that a large opiate net-
work controls the Chaman crossing; if true, this would also 
facilitate acetic anhydride smuggling.291 
Groups involved 
Arrests in the Republic of Korea and Japan seem to show 
that nationals of Pakistan and Afghanistan dominate the 
acetic anhydride illicit trade along this route. Afghans and 
Pakistanis appear to cooperate seamlessly and, based on the 
limited data available, this appears to be a long-term 
trend.292 In fact, one could make the case that some Afghan 
and Pakistan precursor networks are fully integrated, but 
with the caveat that the term ‘multi-national’ loses some of 
its meaning in the Afghan context. In fact, many Afghans 
by virtue of conflict and other reasons have dual nationality 
of Pakistan and Afghanistan; at times, this is triple national-
ity, as they are also citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Such networks are active internationally, perhaps more so 
than opiate-specific networks who are often confined to 
their respective countries. In recent cases, the groups 
involved in trafficking AA out of Asia are also involved in 
international trafficking of opiates and hashish.293 The lim-
ited seizure data indicates that acetic anhydride networks 
have often established bases in the targeted source or transit 
countries when attempting to organize shipments; this 
includes countries where there is not a large Afghan 
diaspora. In such countries, acetic anhydride networks usu-
ally operate with the help of several local associates consti-
tuting fluid networks of buyers, sellers and middlemen who 
are opportunistically linked together across regions and 
ethnic groups. In the case of the cooperation between the 
Republic of Korea and Pakistan, examples of such networks 
stretch back a decade, but several arrests since 2000 illus-
trate that networks also cooperate with Chinese and Japa-
nese operatives to traffic acetic anhydride through both 
Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some of these are 
unwitting participants, while others are knowingly involved. 
In September 2009, prosecutors of the Republic of Korea 
arrested a Korean suspect who allegedly attempted to smug-
gle 11.6 tons of acetic anhydride to Afghanistan.294 The 
suspect was involved in the dyeing business and had con-
tacted two members of groups in Pakistan acting as inter-
291  Mathieu Aikins, “The Master of Spin Boldak”, Harper’s Magazine, December 
2009, pp.59-62.
292   As an example, one group linked to a 1998 shipment of ten tons of acetic 
anhydride from Germany to Pakistan was composed of three Afghans and 
four Pakistani nationals, Presentation “on precursors used in heroin manufac-
turing”, ANF, Round Table on precursors, Vienna, May 2007.
293 Information provided by Directorate General Anti Narcotics Force Rawal-
pindi, January 2011.
294  “South Korean police bust ‘Taliban-linked’ drug ring”, AFP, July 3, 2008.
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mediaries.295 Some Pakistani or Afghan acetic anhydride 
traffickers are dual nationals of target countries. For exam-
ple, acetic anhydride seizures in the Republic of Korea led 
to the arrest of a Pakistani man who had become a natural-
ized Korean in 2005.296  
The volumes and logistics involved in the Republic of 
Korea seizures suggest that these are rather well-organized 
international ventures. In the region of study, smaller play-
ers appear to operate mostly out of India, but there may be 
larger, more sophisticated networks sending larger ship-
ments by sea. Although seizure data from India indicates 
that most persons arrested on acetic anhydride trafficking 
charges are Indian nationals,297 some recent arrestees have 
familial or ethnic links with Afghanistan.298 In a 2008 case 
of acetic anhydride trafficking by air (200 litres) from Delhi 
to Kabul, the Afghan organizer based in southern Afghani-
stan had recruited two fellow Afghans based in Delhi.299 
However, as many as a dozen other players (organizers, 
financiers, facilitators, transporters) were involved, oppor-
tunistically linked for even this small acetic anhydride ven-
ture.
According to the available data, the hawala (also referred to 
as hundi) money transfer system is the most widely used 
method of financing for acetic anhydride procurement in 
the region.300 The aforementioned air trafficking case to 
India is one example; the investigation in the 2008 seizure 
made in the Republic of Korea also uncovered financing 
centered around a network of Pakistani hawala or hundi 
operators in that country.301 These networks manage trans-
fers of monetary value, but can also be important in con-
necting different nodes in logistics networks. 
Hundi agents who considered themselves to be 
legitimate businessmen claimed that other 
agents who are willing to move criminal funds 
will serve more than one criminal network and/
or industry. These agents can occasionally take 
an important role as a match-maker between 
networks. One reported example was an agent 
who facilitated connections between a client 
who ran an importing company and a client 
involved in precursor chemical trafficking 
through Pakistan to southern Afghanistan.302
295 Korean businessman arrested for exporting raw materials for heroin produc-
tion 14/09/2009 http://vestnik.kr/law/3770.html.
296 Korea times, July 7.
297 Seizure data for the 2007-2009 period provided by UNODC India Country 
Office.
298 The following is based solely on local media account.
299 Sahil Makkar, “200 Litres of Acetic Anhydride Seized by Delhi Police”, India 
E-news, 2 March 2008.
300 CARICC Information Bulletin n. 29.
301 Korea Times, 2008, Illegal currency trading ring caught,  www.koreatimes.
co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/06/113_33987.html.
302 “Precursor trafficking and diversion: March 2010” UNODC Country Office 
Pakistan, March 2010.
There also appears to be evidence of extremist involvement 
in acetic anhydride procurement. The planned recipient of 
the 14 ton-seizure made in Pakistan in 2008 was based in 
Peshawar and, according to ANF sources had links to Al-
Qaida and the Taliban. Moreover, according to reports, an 
Afghan man linked to acetic anhydride seizures in 2008 had 
admitted procuring the chemicals for members of the Tali-
ban movement,303 who had sent $50,000 through hawala to 
purchase the 12 tons.304 If confirmed, these reports may 
indicate that elements of the Afghan insurgency are 
involved, directly or indirectly, in acetic anhydride distribu-
tion in Afghanistan. This is perhaps not surprising given 
that Afghan insurgents are involved in many other aspects 
of the Afghan opiate trade, since the opiate economy is a 
central rather than marginal phenomenon in Afghanistan.
The Balkan route 
The traditional Balkan route is the largest opiate conduit in 
the world with long established criminal networks smug-
gling significant amounts of heroin annually from Afghan-
istan through the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey 
towards the European market. In a reverse course, acetic 
anhydride is diverted in  or trans-shipped through  West-
ern and Central Europe and trafficked through South-
Eastern Europe, towards Afghanistan.  
Western and Central Europe
Several countries within Western Europe can act as trans-
shipment points for international acetic anhydride traffick-
ing. Countries such as Belgium305 and the Netherlands are 
huge trans-shipment and brokerage hubs that have been 
targeted by trafficking networks in the past. More recently, 
central Europe has been used as a sourcing hub for acetic 
anhydride diverted from domestic distribution. 
Apart from a brief spike in 2001 and again in 2008, com-
paratively few acetic anhydride seizures are reported in 
Western and Central European countries between 1999-
2008; producing highly volatile series. A recurring theme is 
that almost all seizures were destined for transit through the 
Balkan region and further to Turkey. This was the case for 
a rare seizure of nearly 70 tons made in 2001 in the United 
Kingdom.306 Other notable seizures during the 2000-2001 
303 Korea Times, “Police Round Up Drug Ring Linked to Taliban”, July 4 2008.
304 Financial Action Task Force, Mutual Evaluation Report - Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Republic of Korea, 26 
June 2009, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/43439553.pdf.
305 According to the 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report “Al-
though Belgium is not a major producer of precursor chemicals used in the 
illicit manufacture of drugs, it is an important transshipment point for these 
chemicals coming from China to Europe. Precursor chemicals that transit 
Belgium include: acetic anhydride (AA) used in the production of heroin; 
see United States of America Department of State, International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report, 2006. www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol1/
html/62111.htm.
306 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, P. 21, www.
incb.org/pdf/e/tr/pre/2002/precursors_2002_3b_2.pdf.
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period took place in Germany and Slovenia. Almost no 
seizures were reported in the following five years even if 
some seizures made downstream in Bulgaria were linked 
back to trans-shipment through Central Europe.307  
The first seizure to break the pattern occurred in March 
2007, when Slovenia reported a seizure of 6,472 litres of 
acetic anhydride. That seizure alone accounted for almost 
100 per cent of European seizures that year. Slovenian law 
enforcement reported that this was part of a larger 20-ton 
shipment, which continued on to Turkey through Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria (later seized). The backtracking 
investigations into the origin of the acetic anhydride later 
determined that the substance was diverted in the Czech 
Republic and then smuggled through Austria before its 
storage in Slovenia awaiting delivery. Although impressive, 
the 2007 seizure is dwarfed by the interdiction of a stagger-
ing 93 tons in Slovenia during three separate operations in 
early 2008. This amount of acetic anhydride would have 
been sufficient to produce up to 90 tons of heroin (approx-
imately the total heroin demand for Western and Central 
Europe) worth billions of dollars on the European market. 
The investigation into this last seizure led to the arrest of 
several individuals, all Slovene citizens.308 Two additional 
elements stand out: firstly, this illicit shipment reportedly 
involved the same diversion point,309 route and groups as 
307 This was the case in 2004 when an investigation into a 7-ton seizure in 
Bulgaria revealed that the shipment (originating in South-East Asia) had been 
transshipped through Slovenia, where it had been re-packaged and concealed 
in industrial air conditioners.  Report of the International Narcotics Control 
Board for 2005 on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances of 1988, p.12; www.incb.org/pdf/e/tr/pre/2005/precursors_2005.pdf.
308 Interview with Criminal Police Directorate of Slovenia, Ljubljana, November 
2010.
309 Annual report on the work of the police, 2008, Republic of Slovenia, 
Ministry of the Interior, p.7, www.policija.si/portal_en/statistika/lp/pdf/
report2008.pdf; see also Results of the Slovenian Presidency of the European 
previous  seizures in 2007 and possibly earlier.310Secondly, 
according to Slovenian law enforcement, one of the crimi-
nal groups involved had already managed to similarly divert 
-and successfully traffic through the Balkans- almost 366 
tons of acetic anhydride from 2006-2008;311 evidence of 
extensive use of the Balkan route during that period.312 
The same year that Slovenia seized its record haul, its north-
eastern neighbour Hungary seized a total of 63 tons of 
acetic anhydride – its only seizures during the entire 1999-
2008 period. Although the group involved reportedly dif-
fered, the initial diversion had also occurred in the Czech 
Republic313 with the shipment sent to Slovakia before stop-
ping in Hungary. As in Slovenia, the interdicted shipment 
had been stored in Hungary awaiting shipment, indicating 
perhaps that these two countries were used as a storage or 
repackaging point prior to downstream distribution along 
the Balkan Route. Altogether, both countries accounted for 
approximately 75 per cent of global seizures in 2008.
In what appears to be linked to the aforementioned inter-
dictions, in May 2009 a seizure of 800 litres was made in 
Slovakia, originating in the Czech Republic. According to 
official reports, four Slovakian nationals were arrested and 
Slovakian authorities prevented the diversion of further 
large amounts of the substance in the region.314 Given the 
Union in the field of drugs, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 
July 23 2008, p.5, www.parlement.com/9353000/1/j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j9v-
vhy5i95k8zxl/vi7jgt96razw.
310 Annual report on the work of the police, 2008, Republic of Slovenia, Minis-
try of the Interior, www.policija.si/portal_en/statistika/lp/pdf/report2008.pdf; 
Report on the drug situation in Slovenia 2009.
311 Annual Report of Czech Republic Police Headquarter 2008; p.22, www.
policie.cz/SCRIPT/ViewFile.aspx?docid=21219340; Interview with Criminal 
Police Directorate of Slovenia, Ljubljana, November 2010.
312  Interview with Criminal Police Directorate of Slovenia, November 2010.
313 Interview with officials of the Hungarian National Bureau of Investigation, 
Budapest, November 2010. 
314  National Drug Headquarters Annual Report 2009 Czech republic, p.14.
Fig. 38: Acetic anhydride seizures in Central and 
Western Europe (litres), 1999-2009  
 
 
Sources: UNODC Country reports, EU law enforcement agencies, reports 
of the International Narcotics Control Board on the Implementation of Arti-
cle 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-2009).
Fig. 39: Acetic anhydride seizures in Slovenia 
(litres), 2000-2010  
 
 
Source: Slovenian Ministry of Interior.
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number and volumes of seizures and increased attention 
paid to the region, trafficking groups may elect to start 
moving smaller quantities of acetic anhydride to reduce 
detection and losses. It is also possible that they may simply 
reorganize their supply routes in the future and avoid this 
leg of the Balkan route altogether.
Seizure and other data seem to indicate that traffickers may 
be exploiting the advantages of a single market, diverting 
trade internally from the weakest-controlled distributors to 
the weakest-controlled exit points. The term ‘control’ needs 
to be qualified here since domestic trade implies that orders 
of acetic anhydride are not subject to the established pre-
export notification system. 
With regard to this, many law enforcement officials believe 
that traffickers are taking advantage of insufficient interna-
tional judicial cooperation and inadequate legislation. 
Regarding the latter, law enforcement officials in Central 
Europe stressed that a significant roadblock to more effec-
tive control of acetic anhydride was the fact that in Euro-
pean Union legislation (Regulation (EC) No 273/2004), 
end users of acetic anhydride (a Category 2 substance 
according to this legislation), who do not place on the 
market the substance, are neither required to register nor to 
report the quantities they buy for their own end-use. It was 
felt that this did not allow adequate control and investiga-
tion by authorities in countries of the European Union. 
Three years following the implementation of the European 
precursor legislation, the European Union carried out an 
evaluation of the functioning of its legislation which con-
cluded that even though the legislation was overall func-
tioning well, it also showed some weaknesses, notably with 
regard to the effectiveness of preventing the diversion of 
acetic anhydride. The EU is in the process of assessing dif-
ferent options to address the identified weaknesses.315 
Through the Balkans
The Balkan region is the obligatory stopover for overland 
shipments destined for Turkey. Relative to seizures upstream, 
seizures in the Balkans occurred with slightly more regular-
ity over the period of study.316 Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
an early and recurring target of acetic anhydride traffickers, 
perhaps due to perceptions of weak law enforcement struc-
tures and national controls.317 In 2001, Bosnia and Herze-
govina reported seizing 5 tons of acetic anhydride.318 The 
following year, Slovakian and Czech authorities reported 
stopping exports amounting to 20 tons and 500 tons, 
respectively, to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia 
(now Serbia and Montenegro). This was followed by com-
bined seizures totaling 76 tons in 2003, the largest volumes 
ever seized in the Balkan region.  
315 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
(pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 and to Article 32 
of Regulation (EC) No 111/2005) on the implementation and functioning 
of the Community legislation on monitoring and control of trade in drug 
precursors , COM 709(2009), Brussels 7 January 2010; Council conclusions 
on the functioning and implementation of the EU drug precursor legislation, 
3016th Competitiveness Council meeting, Brussels 25 May 2010.
316 For the purposes of the report, the Balkans comprises the nine nations of the 
Stability Pact: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, 
Romania and Serbia.
317 Interview with Bosnian law enforcement officials (SIPA), Sarajevo, December 
2010.
318 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, p. 21.
Location Amount (tons)
Percentage of 
global seizures
As a percentage of  
estimated Afghanistan 
illicit requirement 
Potential retail value 
in Afghanistan in $ 
(rounded)
Slovenia 93 42% 20% 30 000 000 
Hungary 63 28% 14% 22 000 000
Sub-total 156 70% 34% 52 Million
Total global seizures 
in 2008
224 tons 
(rounded) 100%
Table 27: Seizures of acetic anhydride 2008: Slovenia and Hungary
The cost of interdiction
The aforementioned seizure successes in the region also 
place a heavy burden on seizing countries, a reality that 
complicates law enforcement responses. As an example, 
Hungarian law enforcement agencies informed 
UNODC that it cost almost €1,000 a day to observe an 
acetic anhydride storage site, a process which can last 
months.  Traffickers will store acetic anhydride for long 
periods knowing full well that law enforcement 
resources of authorities are limited and observation of a 
consignment cannot be continued indefinitely. Costs 
then multiply at the time of interdiction, Slovenian 
authorities informed UNODC that the 93 tons of 
acetic anhydride seized in 2008 cost their government 
€250,000 in storage alone and that destruction of the 
substance had brought additional difficulties. In both 
cases, law enforcement officials felt their countries had 
borne a disproportionate share of the interdiction 
burden.
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The first of these - 22,800 litres of acetic anhydride - was 
seized in early 2003.  The shipment had been imported 
from the Netherlands then moved through Germany, Aus-
tria, Slovenia and Croatia before crossing into Bosnia.319 In 
this particular case, the name of a legitimate company was 
used without the knowledge of the company concerned. In 
November 2003, an additional 19,872 litres of acetic anhy-
dride were seized, once again sourced in the Netherlands. 
The next seizure occurred in late 2003, consisting of 33,600 
litres split in two separate shipments. While also purport-
edly transshipped through the Netherlands, the acetic 
anhydride had reportedly been diverted in Mexico. Half of 
the shipment had reportedly arrived at the seaport of Ploce, 
Croatia and was transported from there via truck to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and320 was reportedly destined to be sold 
in Serbia.321
In Serbia itself, only one seizure of AA has been reported 
since 2000, it consists of 20 tons of AA seized at the border 
crossing with Hungary. The intercepted truck was report-
edly on its way to Montenegro (at the time Serbia and 
Montenegro were in a state union). Although no other 
acetic anhydride seizures were reported in Serbia,322 the 
direct overland road from Hungary through Serbia toward 
Bulgaria was nevertheless active during the period of study. 
This is attested by multi-ton seizures in both Bulgaria 
(2010) and Turkey (2008) that transited Serbian 
territory.323 
In this particular area of the western Balkans, border man-
agement remains a challenge as some crossings are poorly 
maintained and often easily bypassed. This applies espe-
cially to Kosovo324, whose borders “are still not fully 
secured”.325 Only one seizure has been reported having links 
to Kosovo326 however; in 2004 Montenegro police at the 
Klobuk border crossing between Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Montenegro reportedly confiscated 3,000 litres of 
acetic anhydride.327 According to police information, the 
substance was ordered by a company in Austria on behalf 
of a corporate customer in Kosovo. 328  
319 Interview with Bosnian law enforcement officials (SIPA), Sarajevo, December 
2010.
320 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, March 2004.
321 Authorities in Bosnia advanced that the acetic anhydride was destined for 
processing amphetamines, but this was not confirmed by Serbian authorities.
322 Ministry of Interior of Serbia: Analysis of the results in the fight against 
narcotics smuggling in Serbia from 2004 to 2006; 2006.
323  nterview, Bulgaria Ministry of Interior, Bulgaria, February 2011.
324 All references to Kosovo in this report should be understood to be in the 
context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
325 “Kosovo 2010 progress report”, European Commission, Brussels, 9 Novem-
ber 2010.
326 All references to Kosovo in this report should be understood to be in the 
context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
327 “Networking sites - Criminal group expands across the Balkans”, Jane’s Intel-
ligence Review, December 2009. 
328 All references to Kosovo in this report should be understood to be in the 
context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
Smaller seizures in this area also include 370 litres of acetic 
anhydride (2003) seized by the authorities of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - the country’s only sei-
zure during the period of study. The substance had been 
smuggled through Albania and was destined for Greece and 
eventually Turkey. This seizure is also the only indication 
that the territory of Albania has been used to traffic acetic 
anhydride in the last decade. 
Another important acetic anhydride route passes through 
the eastern Balkans, through Hungary into Romania, Bul-
garia, Turkey and further to Afghanistan. The first Balkan 
country on this route, Romania, has had steady, yet small 
seizures since 2000. Its last large seizure was a 43.5-ton 
confiscation in 1999. Romania continues to be a major 
transit point; for instance, the route through Romania 
(Slovenia-Hungary-Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey) was used in 
April 2007 when 12,970 litres were seized in Turkey as part 
of a controlled delivery.329 That same year, Romanian law 
enforcement seized an additional 1,206 litres of acetic 
anhydride stored in and around Bucharest. More recently, 
13 tons seized in neighbouring Bulgaria in September 2010 
had also transited Romania.  
South of Romania, Bulgaria is the last stop before Turkey. 
Its border crossing of Kapitan Andreevo is the only truck 
crossing into Turkey and thus acts as a natural target for 
traffickers. One important seizure occurred at that crossing 
in October 2004, when Bulgarian customs officials seized 
barrels totaling 7 tons of acetic anhydride hidden between 
329 The operation involved the United States of America DEA as well as Turkish 
and Romanian authorities. It ended in Turkey with the arrest of 4 perpetra-
tors and the seizure of the entire quantity; see National Report on Drug Situ-
ation, 2008 Romania: “New Development, Trends and In-depth Information 
Selected Issues”, p. 96.
Fig. 40: Acetic anhydride seizures in Romania, 
1999-2008
 
Sources: UNODC Country reports, reports of the International Narcotics 
Control Board on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances of 1988 (1999-2009).
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Republic of Macedonia) has been used to transit signifi-
cantly larger amounts. In 2002, for example, Turkish police 
reportedly seized more than 12 tons of acetic anhydride at 
Ipsala customs gate at the border between Greece and 
Turkey; the chemical was found in a truck driven by a 
Macedonian national and had last transited the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.334 
334 Anadolu Agency, “Police seize 12 tons of acid anhydrite, highest amount so 
far found in Turkey”, 23 August 2002.
textile machines in a truck.330 The truck was en route from 
Slovenia-Hungary-Romania.331 In September 2010, a very 
large 13-ton shipment using a nearly identical route was 
seized at the crossing.332 Due to its geographical location, 
Bulgaria also receives smuggled shipments from the western 
section of the Balkans particularly through its border with 
Serbia. As an example, in April 2010, 8 tons of acetic anhy-
dride trafficked from Serbia were seized while in storage in 
a village near Sofia, Bulgaria’s capital. 333    
Greece, neighbouring Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Repub-
lic of Macedonia and Albania, also shares a border with 
Turkey. The country seized only 167 litres of acetic anhy-
dride between 1999 and 2009, with its last and only size-
able interdiction dating back to the year 2000.  In 2003, an 
investigation into a seizure of 370 litres of acetic anhydride 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia revealed that 
Greek territory was to be used to traffic the substance into 
Turkey. While the above concerns relatively small amounts, 
it should be noted that some seizures reported downstream 
indicate that in the past Greece (and the former Yugoslav 
330  Crime in the Balkans, UNODC, p. 64, 2008.
331 “Bulgarian Police Arrest Turkish National in Seizure of 8.5 Tones of Heroin 
Precursor”, Bulgaria News Network, 31 October 2004.
332  “Bulgaria: 2 arrests in chemical smuggling case” The Associated Press, Sep-
tember 13, 2010. 
333 Corruption, Trafficking and institutional reform,  Prevention of Trans-Border 
Crime in Bulgaria, Centre for the study of democracy, unpan1.un.org/intra-
doc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan017006.pdf.
Map 44: Acetic anhydride seizures in the Balkans and Central Europe, 1999-2010
Source: UNODC country reports, various Balkan law enforcement agencies, reports of the International Narcotics Control Board on the Implementation of 
Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-2009).  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
111
860
48,323
6,500
370
41,406
78,154
65,000
3,000
114,899
Serbia
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Greece
Hungary
the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia
Montenegro
Bosnia
&
Herzegovina
Acetic anhydride seizure
(kg)
Legend
Fig. 41: Acetic anhydride seizures in Bulgaria, 
1999-2010
 
Sources: UNODC Country Reports, UNODC Regional Office for South 
Eastern Europe.
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Fig. 42: Acetic anhydride seizures in Ukraine,  
1999-2009
 
Sources:  UNODC Country Reports, Security service of Ukraine, UNODC 
Ukraine project office.
Outside the traditional Balkan routes, erratic and mostly 
small-sized seizures are noted in Eastern Europe, including 
Ukraine and Poland. These are often linked to local pro-
duction of acetylated opium or, exceptionally, heroin man-
ufacture, as suggested by a 2007 interdiction of a heroin 
laboratory in Ukraine.335 Early in the decade, the few larger 
seizures reported in Ukraine were destined for Turkey-
336and reportedly sourced in the Russian Federation.337 
However, in 2008 a portion of Ukrainian acetic anhydride 
seized purportedly originated in the European Union.338 
Given that trafficking routes can change rapidly, continued 
vigilance of this region should be encouraged.
Into Turkey
Traffickers exploit the Turkey-Bulgaria border in two direc-
tions, trafficking drugs into south-eastern Europe and 
smuggling acetic anhydride into Turkey using overland 
routes. According to Turkish authorities, most acetic anhy-
dride seizures in 2008-2010 in Turkey originated in the 
European Union339 and the main gateway appears to be the 
Kapikule border crossing the country shares with Bulgaria. 
The most commonly used route to bring AA to Turkey 
involves trafficking through the eastern Balkans (Romania-
335 The laboratory was reportedly controlled by a mixed Turkish-Ukrainian 
group in the Ukraine. 125 kg of heroin were also seized at the site; Official 
correspondence, security service of the Ukraine, 22 March 2010. 
336 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 on the Im-
plementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, p. 23, www.
incb.org/pdf/e/tr/pre/2002/precursors_2002_3b_3.pdf.
337  In 2001, Russia stopped the export of 1,000 tons of acetic anhydride to 
Ukraine, when Ukrainian authorities determined that the company allegedly 
placing the order did not exist. In 2003, a precursor route running from 
the Russian Federation to Turkey was also noted; www.incb.org/pdf/e/tr/
pre/2005/precursors_2005.pdf.
338 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2009 on the Im-
plementation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, p.16, incb.
org/pdf/precursors-report/2009/English/Precursors_Report_09_english.pdf.
339  Information provided by Turkish Ministry of Interior, March 2010.
Bulgaria-Turkey route) as attested by several large seizures 
over the last decade. The most recent Turkish seizure of 10 
tons of the substance in December 2010 indicates that this 
trend is solidly in place.340 Although less used, an alternate 
route involves transiting through the Western Balkans. 
Serbia is intermittently used as a transit country as attested 
by Bulgarian seizures in 2010 and a Turkish seizure of 
3,520 litres of acetic anhydride in August 2008.341 
There are, however, alternate routes into the country, spe-
cifically sea routes. In 2002, some 10,700 litres of AA were 
seized in a warehouse in Bursa (northwestern Turkey).342 
The investigation revealed that the substance had been 
trans-shipped in Izmir port (on the Aegean sea) from the 
Balkans and was to be smuggled onward.343 Another corri-
dor, the Black sea route, which carries opiates from Turkey 
to Eastern Europe, was used in the reverse direction to 
smuggle acetic anhydride into Samsun and Zonguldak sea-
ports in Turkey. During the 2003-2004 period it was 
reported that acetic anhydride was transshipped from 
Ukraine to Turkey via the Russian Federation, or shipped 
directly from the Russian Federation to Turkey.344
• In 2001, Turkey seized 6,718 litres in its Black sea ports 
coming from Ukraine in a TIR truck.
• In 2002, nearly 4 tons of acetic anhydride was seized 
while being transported across the Black sea; the 
chemical had been sourced in the Russian Federation 
and was transported through Ukraine and into Turkey’s 
port Samsun.345 
• In 2002, 1,850 litres of acetic anhydride were seized in 
Istanbul concealed in a tractor-trailer. The investigation 
revealed that the substance had been smuggled into 
Turkey through Zonguldak port.
• In 2006 Turkey seized several tons of acetic anhydride 
arriving from Ukraine. No further details are available
As shown above, most seizures using seaborne routes 
occurred during the first half of the decade. According to 
Turkish records, at the time there was an efficient territorial 
division whereby the “European-originated” acetic anhy-
dride entered Turkey through the Kapikule border gate and 
“Russian-originated” acetic anhydride entered at Samsun 
port.346 An important diversion point during that period, 
340  Presentation by the Turkish National Police, The Paris Pact Initiative Expert 
Working Group on Precursors, Paris, 8-9 November 2010.
341  Information provided by the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, February 2011.
342  Economic Cooperation Organisation, 2002, Draft Country Profile – Turkey, 
www.ecodccu.org/English/coutry_profiles/turkey/Turkey_DCP_2002.htm.
343 This seaborne route through the Aegean Sea and into Izmir was again 
reported by Turkish authorities in 2010, but no other details were available; 
Presentation by the Turkish National Police, The Paris Pact Initiative Expert 
Working Group on Precursors, Paris,  8-9 November 2010.
344  US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
(INSCR), 2004.
345  Economic Cooperation Organisation, 2002, Draft Country Profile – Turkey 
www.ecodccu.org/English/coutry_profiles/turkey/Turkey_DCP_2002.htm.
346  “Border security control”, Turkish general staff,  partnership for peace train-
ing center, Ankara-Turkey, 2003 www.gnews.gr/Reportage/file/Border_Secu-
rity_Control.pdf?m=download.
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Map 45: Reported acetic anhydride seizures and routes in Central Europe, the Balkans and Turkey,  
1999-2010 
Source UNODC Country reports, reports of the International Narcotics Control Board on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-2009).  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
the Russian Federation currently has strict controls over its 
acetic anhydride manufacturing and cooperates closely with 
Turkish and other national authorities in the region. It 
appears that most acetic anhydride currently trafficked into 
Turkey is shipped via overland routes. Seizures occur mostly 
at the extreme ends of the country. Istanbul, which seized 
the largest volumes in 2008-2010 has often served as a stor-
age/consolidation347 site and is the natural choke point for 
most acetic anhydride trafficked into Turkey. In eastern 
Turkey, the Van and Hakkari districts bordering the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (and Iraq in the case of Hakkari) consist-
ently report higher acetic anhydride seizures than most 
other districts.348 This is logical since the Islamic Republic 
of Iran is the last leg of the Balkan route carrying acetic 
anhydride into Afghanistan. This can be seen in a Septem-
ber 2009 seizure of  2,400 litres of acetic anhydride (in Van 
province),349 concealed in brick-carrying trucks reportedly 
headed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.350 However, unlike 
seizures on the Bulgaria-Turkey border, there are no recent 
seizures at actual border crossings between the Islamic 
347 For example. in July 2006, law enforcement seized 3 tons of acid anhydride 
(along with 381 kg of morphine and 26 kg of heroin) in a private ware-
house in Istanbul; Turkishpress, 7-10-2006, www.turkishpress.com/news.
asp?id=132855.
348 See “Turkish report on drugs and organized crime”2003, 2006.
349 Presentation by the Turkish National Police, The Paris Pact Initiative. Expert 
Working Group on Precursors, Paris,  8-9 November 2010.
350  “Narcotics police seize huge quantity of drugs in eastern turkey”, www.mia.
com.mk,  September 2009. 
Republic of Iran and Turkey.    
It is also possible that some acetic anhydride shipments are 
smuggled through the Iraqi border, as one 125-litre seizure 
in Hakkari district (south-east of Turkey bordering Iraq) in 
2006 seems to suggest. It is unclear, however, if the ship-
ment was destined for processing inside northern Iraq, for 
111 201,000
860
48,323
6,500
370
41,406
78,154
65,000
3,000
114,899
ROMANIA
CZECH REPUBLIC
BELARUS
GREECE
MOLDOVA
GEORGIA
BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA
AZERBAIJAN
IRAN
SLOVENIA
SERBIA
Izmir
Samsun
Zonguldak
#
Ipsala
Kapikule
#
#
#
#
TURKEY
UKRAINE
POLANDGERMANY
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
HUNGARY
SLOVAKIA
MONTENEGRO
FYR
 MACEDONIA
#
Border point/Entry port #
 Acetic anhydride seizure (kg)
400km1000 200
Legend
Reported routes 
Autonomous
province boundary 
Fig. 43: Seizures in Western, Central, South-East-
ern Europe and Turkey, 1999-2009
 
Sources: Ministry of Interior of Turkey, UNODC Country reports, reports of 
the International Narcotics Control Board on the Implementation of Article 
12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-2009).
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Li
tr
es
Seizures in Turkey
Seizures in the Balkans
Seizures in Central and Western Europe
121
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Map 46: Reported acetic anhydride seizures in Turkey by district, 2007-2010
Source: Turkey Ministry of Interior. Turkish national Police Department of Anti-smuggling and Organized Crime. 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Afghanistan through the Islamic Republic of Iran or yet 
another destination. A more recent 2008 seizure in Istanbul 
reportedly involved 3 tons of acetic anhydride destined for 
the Hakkari district. Here again, the final destination of the 
shipment is unclear although the arrest of an Iraqi citizen 
hints at a cross-border connection in Iraq. These assump-
tions however cannot be verified without additional data, 
particularly as it pertains to individual seizures made in 
Turkey.
Turkey is the only country in the region to have consis-
tently reported acetic anhydride seizures every year between 
1999 and 2010. Turkey’s smallest seizures were in 2004 
with 1.5 tons but that aside, it averages nearly 20 tons of 
acetic anhydride seized annually. This consistency is partly 
explained by the fact that the country acts as a bottleneck 
for many illicit shipments transiting the Balkans eastward 
by land. At the same time, the fact that seizures in all other 
countries upstream are irregular and in some cases simply 
non-existent indicates that responses to acetic anhydride 
trafficking in the Balkans need to be more effective. Increas-
ing joint regional action and cooperation between the EU, 
Western Balkan countries and Turkey is crucial. Practically 
speaking, this should include increased support for the 
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) centre 
which provides an operational platform for coordination 
and cooperation in South-East Europe.351
351 The SECI Centre is a regional organization that brings together police and 
The Islamic Republic of Iran
To reach processors in Afghanistan, the last stopover on the 
Balkan route is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Western Euro-
pean countries aside, the Islamic Republic of Iran is the 
only other licit producer of acetic anhydride352 before the 
Balkan route reaches Afghanistan, but controls appear strict 
and there is no evidence of diversion according to the Drug 
Control Headquarters (DCHQ) of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. 
When tracking seizures along the Balkan route, the lack of 
data in the western part of the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
striking. Indeed, before 2009, there was little hard evidence 
of seizures that could be sourced back to Turkey.353 That 
year, the Islamic Republic of Iran reported its largest acetic 
anhydride seizure in eight years, consisting of 7 tons traf-
customs representatives from 13 member states in direct cooperation, coordi-
nating joint investigations and facilitating information exchange against orga-
nized crime and trafficking in South East Europe.  The organization includes 
member states such as: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Greece, Hungary, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of 
Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey. 
352 Interview with DCHQ official, Islamic Republic of Iran, December 2010,; 
see also International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) Report: 2007, p.91.
353 One possible exception concerns an intercepted shipment of two large acetic 
acid consignments (respectively 17,700 kg and 16,173 kg) at Bazargan 
customs on the Islamic Republic of Iran-Turkey border in July 2005. The 
substance was transiting the Islamic Republic of Iran toward Uzbekistan using 
TIR Carnet and was initially reported as acetic anhydride, but no additional 
information was made available except the fact that the shipment was turned 
back and not seized.
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ficked from Turkey. This was followed in October 2010 by 
a controlled delivery of 1.5 ton of acetic anhydride travel-
ling from Turkey into Mashhad city354 in the north-east of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.355 These recent successes are 
impressive and better reflect the geographical location of 
the country, bordering the global center of heroin produc-
tion in Afghanistan. 
Although the core Balkan route passes through Turkey, 
northern Iraq356 has recently emerged as a possible transit 
point for acetic anhydride. In 2009-2010, Iranian authori-
ties seized five shipments, totalling some 1,139 litres, which 
had crossed from northern Iraq into West Azarbaijan prov-
ince (bordering Turkey). In the past, this same province has 
been the site of small-scale processing, such as a 2007 lab 
interdiction that seized morphine along with 20 kg of ‘spe-
cial acid used in changing morphine to heroin’.357 
Another possibility for acetic anhydride trafficking into the 
Islamic Republic of Iran is through the Caucasus. The 2007 
report on organized crime issued by Turkey noted a route 
354 Presentation by Iranian DCHQ official, The Paris Pact Initiative Expert 
Working Group on Precursors, Paris,  8-9 November 2010.
355 Mashhad is a town in northeastern Iran in that straddles a major road artery 
and lies close to the border with Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.
356 The region is also a suspected transit zone for heroin.
357 “Iran: Police seize 100 kg of morphine in West Azarbayjan”, BBC monitoring 
09-10-2007; West Azarbayjan Provincial TV, Orumiyeh, in Azari 1715 gmt 9 
Oct 07.
through the region involving licit trade to Armenia. and 
subsequent diversion and smuggling to the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran (and other countries).358 Armenia has not con-
firmed this information and for its part generally only seizes 
small amounts of acetic anhydride linked to the consump-
tion of local acetylated opium, locally known as chern-
yashka. It should be noted, that in 2008, German 
authorities stopped a 10-ton shipment to Armenia in what 
is believed to be an attempt to divert the substance.359 
Beyond this limited data, nearly all large hauls in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in the last decade have not involved an 
overland route, but rather concern the use of sea routes, 
converging in the commercial port of Bandar Abbas.360 For 
example, in 2000-2001, two shipments of acetic anhydride 
totaling 37 tons, concealed in textile shipments, were seized 
at Bandar Abbas coming from Busan seaport in the Repub-
lic of Korea. Bandar Abbas is a key strategic transport node 
for the Islamic Republic of Iran and has become its major 
port reportedly handling approximately 15 million tons of 
cargo and more than three quarters of its ports’ transit traf-
358 Turkish report on organized crime; 2007. Ministry of Interior of Turkey, 
Turkish national Police Department of Anti-smuggling and Organized 
Crime.
359 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2009 on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the  United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffc in Narcotic Drugs and  Psychotropic Substances of 1988, p.17, incb.
org/pdf/precursors-report/2009/English/Precursors_Report_09_english.pdf.
360 The port itself is 20 km to the west of Bandar Abbas, a city of 350,000 people 
on the Persian Gulf in the vicinity of the Sea of Oman. It is 1,050 km from 
Tehran and 1,100 km from the Caspian Sea port of Neka.
Map 47: Acetic anhydride seizures and reported routes into western and southern Afghanistan via the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000-2010
Source: Turkey Ministry of Interior. 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
AFGHANISTAN
Armenia
Syr
ia
Nakhchivan
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF IRAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAQ
TURKEY
PAKISTAN
BAHRAIN
QATAR
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
UNITED ARAB
 EMIRATES OMAN
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
   Major road
216 kg
0 100 20050
km
Legend
 Acetic anhydride seizure (kg) 
 
    
  
! Cities
Major road 0 200100 km
Rasht
Ashgabat
Tehran
Qom
Van
Ahwaz
Shiraz
Zaranj
Kerman
Baghdad
Esfahan
Zahedan
Dalbandin
Kermanshah
Dubai
Reported routes 
Salmas
111 
216 
602 
216 
7,086 
1,500 
41,440 
123
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fic. The port is linked by ferry to Dubai. As with other 
major seaports worldwide, the sheer size and volume of 
trade through Bandar Abbas seaport provides significant 
concealment opportunities for prospective smugglers. 
Opiate traffickers also exploit the port for outgoing deliver-
ies to various destinations worldwide. 
From 2001 to 2007, no seizures of acetic anhydride were 
reported, but a seizure of a non-controlled chemical was 
made in November 2007, when Iranian customs seized 
nearly 16 tons of acetyl chloride at Bandar Abbas port. The 
acetyl chloride, a chemical that can potentially be used in 
heroin production, was destined for Afghanistan.361 Another 
16-ton seizure of the substance made at the port in May 
2010 might be viewed as an indication of a trend, particu-
larly when taking into account a large seizure of the same 
substance in Pakistan (also destined for Afghanistan) in 
2009. It should be noted however that there is no evidence 
that acetyl chloride is used in heroin production in 
Afghanistan.
In April 2008, the regional Operation TARCET at Bandar 
Abbas revealed that the Busan-Bandar Abbas acetic anhy-
dride corridor was still active. The operation uncovered a 
shipment of 5 tons of acetic anhydride that had transited 
through Dubai, reportedly originating in the Republic of 
Korea. The shipment was destined for Afghanistan through 
Hirat province.362 The seizure was the result of intelligence 
sharing and cooperation between the authorities of the 
Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Based 
solely on seizure volumes, the sea route appears to be privi-
leged by traffickers as Bandar Abbas alone accounts for 80 
per cent of total acetic anhydride seizures in the Islamic 
361 Presentation on precursor control in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Thirty-
second Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies  
(HONLEA), Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 10-13 February 2009.
362 Information provided by the UNODC Office in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
July 2008.
Fig. 44: Heroin chemical seizures (acetic anhydride 
and acetyl chloride) in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 2000-2010
 
Source: UNODC Office in the Islamic Republic of Iran, UNODC 
TARCET seizure database, Islamic Republic of Iran DCHQ.
Republic of Iran. However, given the purported trajectory 
of detected shipments in Europe, this breakdown is unlikely 
to accurately reflect international distribution structures or 
the actual breakdown of acetic anhydride flows into the 
country. Rather, this is likely a case of increased capacity at 
Iranian customs363 and effective cooperation between the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Korea. The 
lack of acetic anhydride seizures at border crossings with 
Turkey also suggests that particular attention should be 
paid to monitoring the relatively short (499 km) Islamic 
Republic of Iran -Turkey border.
363 This is noted in the annual drug control report (2009) issued by e Islamic 
Republic of Iran: “Moreover,  the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Customs Admin-
istration has become quite sensitive towards the smuggling of chemical sub-
stances and precursors so much so that great amount of acetic anhydride were 
seized in 2009”; “Drug Control in 2009”, DCHQ of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 2009, p.38.
Fig. 45: Share of acetic anhydride seizures in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran by mode of  
smuggling, 2000-2010
 
Source: UNODC Office in the Islamic Republic of Iran, UNODC 
TARCET, Islamic Republic of Iran DCHQ.
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Fig. 46: Share of acetic anhydride seizure in the  
Islamic Republic of Iran by country of  
departure, 2000-2010
 
Source: Collated from UNODC Office in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
UNODC TARCET, Islamic Republic of Iran DCHQ.
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At the same time, continued monitoring not only of the 
seaport of Bandar Abbas, but also that Chabahar port is 
warranted. The latter may also be vulnerable to acetic anhy-
dride trafficking due to its proximity to the Afghan bor-
der.364 Upstream of this route, another seaport which bears 
monitoring is Busan port in the Republic of Korea, which 
appears to continue to be targeted by traffickers intent on 
transiting through seaports in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and Pakistan.
364  A Trade and Transit Agreement was entered into with the Chabahar Free 
Zone Authority, allowing goods destined for import to and export from 
Afghanistan through this port to receive a 90 per cent discount on Iranian 
customs duties or tariffs and allowing 20 per cent of warehouse space to be 
allocated for goods transiting to Afghanistan.
Sea routes into the Islamic Republic of Iran
Republic of Korea- Islamic Republic of Iran -Afghani-
stan
The Republic of Korea has been targeted by trafficking 
networks since the mid-1990s when multi-ton seizures of 
acetic anhydride in Central Asia were found to have been 
diverted there. This continued in 2000-2001 with acetic 
anhydride seizures of 37 tons in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran reportedly smuggled out of the Republic of Korea.  
In March 2008, the actions taken by authorities of the 
Republic of Korea led to the seizure of 2.8 tons of acetic 
Date Substance Amount        Trafﬁcked 
from
Seizure loca-
tion
Remarks
2000 Acetic anhydride 16 tons Korea (Rep. of) Bandar Abbas  
2001 Acetic anhydride 20.440 tons Korea (Rep. of) Bandar Abbas  
Nov. 2007 Acetyl chloride 16 tons China Bandar Abbas 
Transiting Dubai 
– destined for 
Afghanistan
Jul. 2008 Acetic anhydride 5 tons Korea (Rep. of) Bandar Abbas 
Transiting Dubai- 
destined for 
Afghanistan
Sept. 2009 Acetic Anhydride 79.5 litres Northern Iraq Salmas (West Azarbaijan)
Transported in a 
vehicle – destined 
for Afghanistan
Sept. 2009 Acetic Anhydride 7  tons Turkey Salmaz district (West Azarbaijan)
18 Nov. 2009 Acetic Anhydride 200 litres Northern Iraq Qom
Transported in a 
vehicle – destined 
for Afghanistan
24 May 10 Acetic Anhydride 103 litres Northern Iraq Piranshahr (West Azarbaijan)
Seized in a private 
residence – des-
tined for  
Afghanistan
May 10 Acetyl Chloride 16 tons Hong Kong,  China Bandar Abbas  
Intelligence-led in 
cooperation with 
Dubai authorities. 
Load consisted of 
80,200-litre barrels 
Apr. 2010 Acetic Anhydride 200 litres Northern Iraq Dougharoon  (Islam Qala)  
Sept. 2010 Acetic Anhydride 556 litres Northern Iraq Border with north-ern Iraq  
Oct. 2010 Acetic Anhydride 1.5 ton Turkey Mashad city  
Source: UNODC Office in the Islamic Republic of Iran, UNODC TARCET reports, Islamic Republic of Iran DCHQ. 
*Figures are preliminary and may be revised when updated information becomes available.
Table 28: Reported chemical seizures in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000-2010
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anhydride destined for Afghanistan through the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.365 In July 2008, the continuing investiga-
tion led to the arrest of several individuals in a chemical 
engineering factory in the Seoul suburb of Ansan366 and a 
seizure of an additional 12 tons of acetic anhydride.  In 
another case linked to the Republic of Korea in July 2009, 
four tons of acetic anhydride were seized in Dubai bound 
for Afghanistan via the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
In September 2009, the Supreme Prosecutors Office of the 
Republic of Korea arrested a Korean suspect,367 who alleg-
edly attempted to smuggle 11.6 tons of acetic anhydride to 
Afghanistan through Pakistani agents. Overall, the group is 
suspected of having successfully shipped 6.6 tons of acetic 
anhydride to Afghanistan in February 2009.368 
Japan-Islamic Republic of Iran-Afghanistan
Japan has a well-developed and controlled chemical indus-
try and had never reported a seizure of acetic anhydride 
before 2009.369 In February of that year, Japanese authori-
ties seized a total of 8.4 tons of acetic anhydride at two 
separate seaports, Yokohama and Nagoya. The first seizure, 
consisting of 1.4 tons of acetic anhydride concealed inside 
365 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2009, E/
INCB/2009/1, p.89.
366  TARCET Debriefing 2010.
367 Korean businessman arrested for exporting raw materials for heroin produc-
tion, 14/09/2009 http://vestnik.kr/law/3770.html.
368 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2010, www.state.
gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2010/vol1/137193.htm.
369  International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2010, www.state.
gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2010/vol1/137193.htm.
metal tanks,370 occurred at Nagoya port in February. A 
Pakistani national was arrested that same month. In a likely 
related incident, which also occurred in February, a further 
0.9 tons of acetic anhydride, concealed in a vehicle, were 
seized at the port, also involving a Pakistani national.371 
Both arrestees were used car dealers and, in both cases, the 
shipments were destined for Kandahar in Afghanistan.
Also in February, in Yokohama port, more than 6 tons of 
acetic anhydride destined for Afghanistan were seized on 
two separate occasions. Nearly 4 tons were found in freight 
containers bound for the United Arab Emirates, leading to 
the arrest of a Pakistani used car salesman.372 A further 2.5 
tons were seized in February on the way to Afghanistan, for 
which an Afghan used car salesman was arrested in July 
2009. According to official information, the networks of 
Afghan and Pakistani nationals373 had acquired the chemi-
cals through Japanese brokers.374 
These seizures, a first in Japan, support the assertion that 
traffickers are looking for new points of diversion and more 
evidence that Afghan and Pakistani traffickers are becoming 
increasingly international. Moreover, the involvement of 
traffickers in the used vehicles trade might not be a coinci-
dence, since there are established trade routes for this com-
modity.375 Japanese cars, which dominate the vehicle market 
370  “Criminal groups shifting operations to East Asia after crackdowns else-
where”, (Mainichi Japan) November 24, 2009, mdn.mainichi.jp/features/
archive/news/2009/11/20091124p2a00m0na003000c.html.
371  Asia and Pacific Amphetamine-type stimulant Information Centre, www.
apaic.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=133&Item
id=141.
372 “Afghan held over drug-linked substance found at Yokohama port”, Japan 
Today, 16 August 2009.
373 Yomiuri online, July 25 2009.
374 Presentation: “attempted smuggling cases of acetic anhydride”, National 
Police Agency Japan; “Afghan held over drug-linked substance found at 
Yokohama port”, www.japantoday.com 16 August 2009.
375 According to AREU research quoting Japanese sources “around half of Japan’s 
Year Amount 
(tons)
Date Destination
2008 12 Jul-08 Afghanistan via Islamic Republic of Iran 
2.8 Mar-08 Afghanistan via Islamic Republic of Iran
2009 4 Jul-09 Afghanistan via Dubai  Islamic Republic of Iran
 3.15 Jul-09 Afghanistan via Dubai Pakistan 
11.6 Aug-09 Afghanistan via Islamic Republic of Iran
Total  33.5 tons 
Source: Country reports, UNODC TARCET, media reports, Report of the 
International Narcotics Control Board for 2008 on the Implementation of 
Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.  
*Figures are preliminary and may be revised when updated information 
becomes available.
Table 29: Reported acetic anhydride seizures and 
stopped shipments in the Republic of  
Korea, 2008-2009
Table 30: Reported acetic anhydride seizures in 
Japan, 2009
Year Amount (tons) Date Destination
2009 1.4 Feb-09
Kandahar, Afghani-
stan through Iran 
(Bandar Abbas) 
0.9 Feb-09
Kandahar, Afghani-
stan through Iran 
(Bandar Abbas)
2.6 Feb-09
Jalalabad, Afghani-
stan through Iran 
(Bandar Abbas)
3.6 Feb-09 Sharjah (UAE)
Total  
seized  8 tons
Source: National Police Agency Japan, media reports.
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in Afghanistan, are supplied largely via second-hand car 
markets in Dubai; from here they are shipped to Bandar 
Abbas in the Islamic Republic of Iran and driven overland 
to Hirat (Islam Qala) or Nimroz province (Zaranj). The 
same routes through Dubai are used for vehicle spare part 
imports, a market which Japan also dominates.376
Islamic Republic of Iran-Afghanistan border
Once inside the Islamic Republic of Iran, acetic anhydride 
flows east toward the 949-km Afghan border, which com-
prises the Afghan provinces of Hirat, Farah and Nimroz. 
The border is mainly mountainous in the north bordering 
Hirat province and gradually grows into harsh desert in the 
south bordering Nimroz. Afghanistan operates three major 
border crossings on the Afghan-Iran border: firstly, Islam 
Qala in Hirat province (Dogharun in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran); secondly, Zaranj (Zaranj district in Nimroz prov-
ince) connected to Milak on the Iranian side and thirdly, 
Mile 73 in Farah province. The Islamic Republic of Iran-
Afghanistan border also has some 60 semi-official crossing 
points with reportedly a law enforcement presence on the 
Afghan side, contrasting with over 200 checkpoints on the 
Iranian side.377 On the surface, the border appears well 
protected on the Iranian side and Afghan officials inter-
viewed have confidence in the protective measures in place 
on the Iranian side of the border.378 In attempting to stem 
the flow of opiates, the Islamic Republic of Iran has spent 
hundreds of millions in the last few years to dig ditches, 
build barriers and install barbed wire along its borders with 
Afghanistan. 
used vehicle exporters are non-Japanese and most are from Pakistan”; Anna 
Paterson, “Understanding markets in Afghanistan: a study of the market of 
second hand cars”, AREU, October 2005, p.18.
376 Anna Paterson, “Understanding markets in Afghanistan: a study of the mar-
ket of second hand cars”, AREU, October 2005.
377 Interview, UNAMA, Kabul, October 2008.
378 Interview with Customs in Hirat (November 2008); Interview with ABP in 
Hirat (November 2008); Interview CNPA Hirat (November 2008); Interview 
UNAMA in Hirat (November 2008); Interview with Customs in Kabul 
(October 2008).
Both Bandar Abbas and Chabahar seaports are connected 
by road with the official Afghan border crossings of Zaranj 
(Nimroz province) and Islam Qala (Hirat province). Offic-
ers of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) 
based in Nimroz reported acetic anhydride trafficking 
through Zaranj,379 but no seizure of acetic anhydride was 
reported at the crossing until 2010.380 Reportedly, a spur of 
the Balkan route may flow across the 976 km border 
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan into 
Baluchistan province, before turning north towards south-
ern Afghanistan but evidence in the form of seizures on 
either side is also lacking here.
The road through Hirat appears to be favored by traffickers 
over the more direct route through Sistan-Baluchistan to 
reach Nimroz province; perhaps because of the harsher ter-
rain in south eastern Iran. Furthermore, according to 
UNODC sources in Afghanistan, the town of Mashad in 
the north-east of the Islamic Republic of Iran appears to be 
a consolidation and forwarding point for some acetic anhy-
dride destined for Afghanistan.381 According to the same 
sources, acetic anhydride shipments tend to be transported 
into Hirat inside commercial containers/cargo, which sug-
gests that some loads are carried through the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran in bulk to Afghanistan. This is supported by the 
limited seizure data available, which indicates that the 2008 
acetic anhydride shipment of 5 tons seized at Bandar Abbas 
seaport was to be smuggled into Afghanistan through the 
Dougharoun-Islam Qala border crossing.382 A previously 
mentioned controlled delivery of 1.5 ton of acetic anhy-
dride from Turkey into Mashhad city383 also supports bulk 
movements. At the same time there appears to be a mixture 
of approaches, since there are also suggestions that ship-
ments are split into smaller loads for onward transporta-
tion. It is unclear however if this occurs in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran or upstream. A 2010 seizure of 200 litres 
at Islam Qala had reportedly originated in northern Iraq. 
Smaller amounts (100 litres or less) are also reportedly traf-
ficked through this crossing using public buses.384 
Groups involved 
Some of the groups discussed and cases presented below are 
more than a decade old, but the insights they provide are 
still relevant today because often the groups or group types, 
and sometimes the methods of illicit trafficking, have not 
changed fundamentally in the intervening period. As an 
379 The same sources reported that acetic anhydride was being smuggled as 
antifreeze liquid and engine oil; Interview, Nimroz CNPA, ABP March 2010.
380 In December 2010, Zaranj customs reported seizing 3,457 Kg of acetic 
anhydride. No further details are available.
381 Multiple interviews with Afghan acetic anhydride traffickers in Hirat, Farah 
and Nimroz, 2009-2010.
382 Information provided by UNODC Country Office of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, September 2009.
383 Presentation by Iranian DCHQ official, The Paris Pact Initiative Expert 
Working Group on Precursors, Paris, 8-9 November 2010.
384 Multiple interviews with Afghan acetic anhydride traffickers in Hirat, Farah 
and Nimroz, 2009-2010. 
Wall section on the Islamic Republic of Iran-
Afghanistan border
Source: Iran Drug Control Headquarters.
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example, one of the criminal organizations linked to recent 
seizures of acetic anhydride in Central Europe has been 
reportedly active in the same region since the beginning of 
the decade.385 Another long-standing feature is the apparent 
multi-crime approach of many organized crime groups, 
including in trafficking weapons, human beings and hero-
in.386 Approximately 10 criminal organizations are esti-
mated to control most illicit trafficking in the region,387 
which might be taken as a proxy for the upper limit to the 
number of groups trafficking acetic anhydride. In Slovenia 
alone, two separate groups were involved in trafficking the 
acetic anhydride seized in 2008.388 Whatever the number, 
the sheer size and value of recent seizures in Slovenia and 
Hungary indicate significant working capital and logistical 
organization.389
According to Slovenian and Hungarian law enforcement 
officials, group membership is fluid and generally ranges 
from 10 to 20 members. Such groups often straddle several 
borders, benefiting from representation in multiple coun-
tries of the region. Organizers often hold multiple citizen-
ships which they exploit to avoid law enforcement and 
extradition efforts. Some groups operating in Central 
Europe and the Balkans seem to have adopted a cell-like 
structure based on the principle of compartmentalization. 
Each link in the chain has a specific role and responsibil-
ity390 (transport, bribes, storage) and has limited contact 
with other cells in the organization.391 At the same time, a 
minority of organizations active in acetic anhydride traf-
ficking seem to have retained features of older organiza-
tional types, including hierarchal command structures. In 
terms of composition, many organizations trafficking acetic 
anhydride (or indeed heroin) along the Balkan route include 
members of almost every regional ethnic group.392 This is 
apparent when looking at the breakdown of nationalities 
arrested in Turkey on acetic anhydride trafficking charges.
The relationships between Turkish, Balkan, Central Euro-
385 Interview with Criminal Police Directorate of Slovenia, Ljubljana, November 
2010.
386 Interior Ministry of Turkey, “2009 National Report on Counteracting Ad-
dictive Substances and Substance Addiction”; EMCDDA 2009 ANNUAL 
REPORT; EUROPOL, “Drug crime: a general overview”, Presentation in 
Sofia, Bulgaria, 14-16 April 2010.
387 Multiple interviews with law enforcement agencies in Slovenia, Hungary, Ro-
mania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, September-December 
2010; see also Iris Kempe (Ed.) A 2004/6844. Prospects and Risks beyond EU 
Enlargement. Eastern Europe: Challenges of a Pan-European Policy. Leske and 
Budrich, Opladen 2003, p. 126.
388  Interview with Criminal Police Directorate of Slovenia, Ljubljana, November 
2010.
389 Interview with Slovenia Ministry of Interior, November 2010.
390 Interview with the BiH State Investigation Protection Agency (SIPA), Sara-
jevo, BiH, December 2010.
391  Multiple interviews with law enforcement agencies in Slovenia, Hungary, 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, November-December 2010.
392  As an example. in October 2009 Turkish police seized 5 tons of acetic 
anhydride in Istanbul. The Balkan-based group arrested was composed of 
Turks, Macedonian and Slovenian nationals; see “Turkish police break Balkan 
narcotics ring”, MIA Bulletin 1148, Macedonia Information Agency, October 
20 2009, www.mia.com.mk.   
pean and other criminals appear fluid, with the different 
ethnic groups working together seamlessly.393 In truth, the 
relevance of ethnicity or nationality has declined in recent 
years and most organizations now outsource activities to 
other specialists and networks irrespective of ethnic links. 
For example, a group involved in trafficking acetic anhy-
dride through the Balkan route is reportedly composed of 
a Slovenian organizer, Turkish financiers, Croatian trans-
porters with facilitators in the Czech Republic and procur-
ing agents in Slovakia.394 Similarly, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a venture for smuggling acetic anhydride was 
reportedly composed of Serb, Bosnian and Albanian traf-
fickers from separate groups.395 With some notable 
exceptions,396 most groups should be viewed more as loose 
multi-national networks than rigid mono-ethnic mafia-
style organizations. This integration is most obvious when 
two illicit commodities, in this case heroin and acetic anhy-
dride, are exchanged. This type of exchange generally 
appears to take place in Turkey397 or Bulgaria398 and has 
been reported at least since 2003.399 This practice continues 
393 “Situation report on organized and economic crime in southeastern Europe”, 
CARPO regional project, Council of the European Union, September 2006, 
p.29.
394 Multiple interviews with law enforcement agencies in Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 
2010- February 2011.
395  Interview with the Bosnia and Herzegovina State Investigation Protection 
Agency (SIPA), Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 2010.
396 There are some indications of territorial divisions in some parts of the route, 
particularly the apparent dominance of Serbian groups in controlling all 
aspects of the trade from Hungary through Serbia and toward other Balkan 
countries; United States of America Department of State, INCSR report 
2010, www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2010/vol1/137197.htm.
397 Turkey’s official report on drugs and organized crime (2007) asserted that 
acetic anhydride traffickers are paid with heroin and they deliver heroin to 
European countries; see “Turkish Report on Drugs and Organized crime 
2007”, Ministry of Interior Turkish National Police, 2007, p.23.
398 According to official reports of the Serbian Ministry of Interior, during the 
2006-2008 period, Serb groups would usually sell acetic anhydride or trade 
it for heroin in Bulgaria where local groups would then take over; see Serbia 
Ministry of Interior, “Analysis of the results in the fight against narcotics 
smuggling in Serbia”, 2004-2006. 
399 Heroin for acetic anhydride exchanges were reported in 2003 involving 370 
Fig. 47: Distribution of arrestees for acetic anhy-
dride trafﬁcking in Turkey (by nationality), 
2007-2009
 
Source: Turkey Ministry of Interior.
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today. A group involved in trafficking 13 tons of AA into 
Turkey was planning on exchanging at the rate of one ton 
of acetic anhydride for 16-20 kg of heroin (in Turkey).
The Black sea acetic anhydride route into Turkey offers a 
rare example of PKK (Kurdistan Workers` Party) involve-
ment in acetic anhydride procurement. In 2002, a joint 
Turkish-Russian-United States of America investigation 
codenamed ‘Matruska’ conducted a controlled delivery 
operation from the Russian Federation to Elazig province 
in Turkey. The operation led to the arrest of several indi-
viduals with links to the PKK in the Russian Federation.400 
The involvement of the PKK in drug networks had already 
been documented but this was a rare occasion where its 
dual links with acetic anhydride procurement and heroin 
production were noted by another country.401 However, it 
should be noted that this kind of fund-raising appears to be 
traditionally linked to the logistical networks of the PKK 
and not the guerilla directly implicated in the armed strug-
gle.402 
There is little data available on the groups involved in traf-
ficking acetic anhydride from Turkey into the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. In the Islamic Republic of Iran itself, the 
limited data available on arrests does not allow to extract a 
profile of traffickers plying this route. The annual drug and 
crime reports issued by Turkey for 2006-2007 indicate the 
arrests of Iranians apparently linked to acetic anhydride 
seizures, but no other information is provided. In Romania, 
a dismantled trafficking group (composed of Turks, Irani-
ans and Romanians) led by an Iranian citizen provides a 
rare example of Iranian nationals trafficking the chemical 
upstream.403 Other routes into the Islamic Republic of Iran 
do provide indication that the groups involved in traffick-
ing acetic anhydride by sea appear to be dominated by 
Pakistani nationals. This seems to be a long-standing fea-
ture of this route as demonstrated by Iranian and Korean 
seaport seizures in 2001, 2008 and 2009 which, in all cases, 
led to the arrest of Pakistani (and Korean) nationals in the 
Republic of Korea.404 
litres of acetic anhydride (seized in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia), which were to be exchanged for heroin in Turkey. UNODC “Addiction, 
crime and insurgency: the transnational threat of Afghan opiates”, 2009, p. 
75.
400 “Turkey country profile 2002”, Economic Cooperation Organization. 
Drug Control Coordination Unit (DCCU) , www.ecodccu.org/English/
coutry_profiles/turkey/Turkey_DCP_2002.htm; see also A. Pek and B. Ekici, 
“Narco-terrorism in Turkey: the financing of PKK Kongra gel”, Understand-
ing and responding to the terrorism phenomenon: a multi-dimensional 
perspective, Band 2006, p.148.
401 Turkey for its part had already noted a link as far back as 1997 when cross-
border military operations in northern Iraq reportedly uncovered missiles, 
guns and acetic anhydride; see Nur Bilge Criss and Yavuz Turan Çetiner, 
“Terrorism and the Issue of International Cooperation”, etc.hil.unb.ca/ojs/
index.php/JCS/article/viewFile/4337/4977.
402 « Le PKK, terrorisme et guerrilla au Coeur de la zone des tempetes », 
Assemble Nationale 20 Novembre 1995, Centre de Recherches des Menaces 
Criminelles Contemporaines, 1995.
403 Romania National Report on the drug situation, 2008, p. 96.
404 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, p.22.
The Northern Route 
To the north, Afghanistan borders the Central Asian coun-
tries of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, over a 
length of 2,600 km. Before 1991, the borders between the 
then-Soviet Union and Afghanistan were effectively sealed 
to large scale trafficking. The dissolution of the Soviet 
Union resulted in the creation of a new outlet for Afghan 
opiates almost overnight. Progressively, a portion of opiates 
that were transiting the Islamic Republic of Iran (Balkan 
route) and Pakistan (Southern route) began to be shipped 
through the former Soviet states towards Europe, creating 
new markets along the way, notably in the Russian Federa-
tion. 
Central Asia
The fall of the Soviet Union also enabled the re-activation 
of dormant cross-border trade and migration. Ethnic popu-
lations spill over the borders of countries throughout the 
region all the way to the Afghan border. This has facilitated 
various forms of trafficking including in the reverse direc-
tion, with a route dedicated to precursors soon developing. 
From 1995 to 2000, more than 120 tons of acetic anhy-
dride were seized in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan alone. 
During the 1995-2000 period, these two countries seized 
on average 40 tons per annum. Most of the acetic anhy-
dride seized during the period originated in China, the 
Republic of Korea, Ukraine405 and the Russian Federation, 
but at least one case of domestic diversion was reported 
within the region. In 2000, Central Asian seizures alone 
were sufficient to process some 40 tons of heroin– nearly 
10 per cent of the potential heroin manufacture capacity of 
Afghanistan that year. Trafficking during the 1995-2000 
period was partly due to an increase in the number of 
processing laboratories in the south and west of Afghani-
stan and their aggregation over the next several years, shift-
ing part of the route burden. Additionally, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran had closed its border with Afghanistan in 
September 1998 (then reopened it in late 1999), forcing 
traffickers to rely more on Central Asian routes. After the 
year 2000, a lapse in seizures occurred and there was little 
intelligence of large acetic anhydride shipments transiting 
the region. Whether this was due to tighter border controls 
or a shift in trafficking strategies is unclear since, to a lesser 
degree, a similar phenomenon occurred in all countries 
bordering Afghanistan.406 
Indeed, after seizing huge seizures of acetic anhydride 
between 1995 and 1998, Uzbekistan has since reported 
only two chemical seizures, which were not involving acetic 
anhydride. A 2002 seizure of 200 litres of unidentified 
precursors at Hairatan port was followed six years later by a 
405  “Money Laundering and Related Issues in Uzbekistan”, GPML Central Asia 
Briefing No.2, 24, May 2002.
406 By contrast, opiates continued to move through Central Asia as seizure data 
can attest.
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Map 48: Acetic anhydride seizures (in tons) in Central Asia, 1995-2010
Source: UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia. 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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Fig. 48: Acetic anhydride seizures (in litres) in Central Asia, 1995-2010
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seizure of 1,600 litres of acetic acid in May 2008 at the 
same port.407 Uzbekistan is an important trade partner for 
Afghanistan,408 which imports 10,000 tons of fuel daily 
(3.4 million tons annually) in addition to other commodi-
ties, most of it through the Hairatan river port.409 While the 
trend towards larger trade flows is a key point in assessing 
the risk of acetic anhydride trafficking, the country’s short 
border with Afghanistan appears to be generally avoided by 
acetic anhydride traffickers. Uzbekistan is also the only 
Central Asian producer of acetic anhydride and controls are 
reported as strict. 410
407 Acetic acid is a non-controlled chemical which is increasingly suspected of 
being used in heroin production.
408  “Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and ADB Sign Memorandum of Understanding 
for Railway Transport Cooperation”, ADB, 20 November 2008, www.adb.
org/media/Articles/2008/12719-railway-transport-cooperation/.
409  The major exports from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan are fuels, glass, cement, 
and molten-soft bars of iron; Asian Development Bank, 2008, Afghani-
stan’s Trade with CAREC Neighbors, http://www.adb.org/Documents/
Events/2008/9th-Trade-Policy-CAREC/9th-TPCC-AFG-Trade-Study-paper.
pdf.
410 The plant is located in Ferghana city.
Turkmenistan was the last Central Asian country to seize 
large amounts of acetic anhydride, 83 tons in the year 
2000. Since then, no seizures have been reported but 
research carried out by UNODC in Afghanistan indicates 
that small amounts of acetic anhydride may be trafficked 
through the Turkmen border into Faryab province to be 
used by local laboratories.411 After 2000, Tajikistan was the 
site of the last reported acetic anhydride confiscations in the 
region, purportedly destined for Afghanistan. In February 
2001, the Russian Federal Border Service (then deployed in 
Tajikistan) seized 28 litres of acetic anhydride in the border 
areas near Khorog in the Gorno Badakhshan autonomous 
region bordering Afghanistan.412 Nearly a decade later, 404 
litres of acetic anhydride, was apprehended by customs in 
northern Tajikistan, travelling from Kyrgyzstan. The source 
was not specified. 
411  “Opiate and precursor seizures in Afghanistan 2008”, 2009, UNODC, p. 
21.
412 It is important to note that Khorog is the last step of a drug route that runs 
through Murghab (a city on the border between Tajikistan and China) and 
crosses the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border towards Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan 
and ultimately to Bishkek in northern Kyrgyzstan.
Date Location Substance Amount Remarks
1995 Uzbekistan Acetic anhydride 15 tons Originated from Uzbekistan, exported to Kyr-gyzstan, and re-exported to Uzbekistan.
1995 Turkmenistan Acetic anhydride 25 tons Originated from the Russian Federation, exported without export authorization.
1996 Uzbekistan Acetic anhydride 7.2 tons Smuggled in railway cargo.Originated from Republic of Korea.
1996 Uzbekistan Acetic anhydride 17.4 tons From the Russian Federation smuggled as cargo with engine oil in truck.
1996 Uzbekistan Acetic anhydride 32 tons Transported on railway.  Originating in China
1997 Turkmenistan Acetic anhydride 10.2 tons
Two shipments originated from China.  
Shipped via UAE and Iran to 
Turkmenistan. Transported on truck,  
mislabeled as corn oil.
1998 Uzbekistan Acetic anhydride 16 tons Smuggled in railway cargo.Originated from China.
1998 Turkmenistan Acetic anhydride 45.6 tons
1999 Turkmenistan Acetic anhydride 12.07 tons
2000 Turkmenistan Acetic anhydride 40.29 tons
Seized at Serkhetabad State Customs 
 (total 2 cases).
Originated from Singapore
2000 Turkmenistan Acetic anhydride 42.47 tons Seized at Mary State Customs (total 2 cases).Originated from Republic of Korea.
2001 Khorog Tajikistan Acetic anhydride 25 kg
2008 Termiz, Uzbekistan Acetic Acid 1600 kg Containers from Korea concealed among com-modities transported to Afghanistan.
2008 Dushanbe, Tajikistan Acetic acid 156 kg
2009 Osh Kygyzstan Acetic acid 1547 kg Reportedly sourced in China
2010 Tajik-Kyrgyz border Acetic anhydride 404 kg The shipment was crossing into Tajikistan from Kyrgyzstan
Source: UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia.
Table 31: Chemical seizures in Central Asia, 1995-2010
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Acetic anhydride aside, other chemicals including heroin 
processing chemicals have been seized in Central Asia. 
Three chemicals have been consistently reported  in the 
region since 2001: sulphuric acid413 and to a lesser extent 
acetic acid and hydrochloric acid.414 As an example, the 
report issued by Tajikistan’s Drug Control Agency in 2009 
notes that two cases of chemical trafficking occurred that 
year, including a sizeable 7,500 kg of hydrochloric acid at 
the customs post Nijniy Pianj, which is the country’s main 
border point with Afghanistan. In June of the previous year, 
a seizure of 156 litres of acetic acid was reported in the 
capital Dushanbe.415 In neighboring Kyrgyzstan, 1,670 
litres of acetic acid sourced in China were seized in Osh, in 
November 2009. 416 This said, it is important to note that 
these seizures are not reported in relation to heroin process-
ing. Furthermore, UNODC research in Afghanistan does 
not indicate that chemicals like acetic acid or sulphuric acid 
are smuggled from Central Asia417 or used in heroin process-
ing within the country. 418
Seizures - or the lack thereof - are not the only indicators of 
transit potential. In Central Asia, both Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan display a number of vulnerabilities, which are 
exploited by criminal groups that traffic all forms of illicit 
goods. Firstly, most of the 90 tons of heroin that cross from 
Afghanistan annually are transported through both coun-
tries; this also provides opportunities for other forms of 
smuggling. In Kyrgyzstan, continuing instability combined 
with high levels of corruption at all levels of public and 
private life can only be attractive to transnational criminals. 
Similar conditions are observed in the southern neighbour 
of Kyrgyzstan - Tajikistan - which is also the only Central 
Asian country to directly border a major heroin-manufac-
turing area in Badakhshan province. UNODC research in 
413 In July 2006, during the international operation transshipment, Kazakh 
mobile teams seized approximately 3 tons of hydrochloric acid in Eastern 
Kazakhstan near the Kazakhistan-Russian Federation border.
414 Negligible amounts (4 litres of acetic anhydride) were also seized in Kazakh-
stan in 2006.
415 In addition, in August 2008, the head of the engineering research depart-
ment at the Yovon chemical plant in Tajikistan was arrested and five litres 
of acetic anhydride seized; see Avaz Yuldoshev, “Alleged precursor trafficker 
has been detained in Dushanbe”, Asia-Plus, 18.08.2008; asiaplus.tj/en/
news/47/37105.html.   
416 The only acetic anhydride seizure in Kyrgyzstan was effected in Bishkek in 
December 2007 and consisted of ten litres of acetic anhydride and 4 litres of 
acetone leading some observers to suggest the existence of small processing 
ventures in the country; see www.for.kg/ru/news/51825/.   
417 Moreover, Afghanistan has reported few confiscations of sulphuric acid, the 
last dating back to the 1999 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
which reported “the Taliban destroyed 34 heroin narcotics laboratories in 
Nangarhar province in a series of well-publicized raids in February 1999. 
The Taliban authorities claimed to have seized in the same raids 500 kg of 
opium, 70 kg of mixed heroin, 1,200 litres of acetic anhydride, 500 litres of 
hydrochloric acid (HCl), 800 kg of ammonium chloride, 900 kg of charcoal, 
1200 litres of sulfuric acid, 700 litres of ammonium hydroxide, and 380 litres 
of ethyl alcohol”; US Department of State, INCSR, 1999; CNPA seizure data 
shows only 2 small seizures of sulphuric acid between 2003-2008. 
418  One law enforcement source in Central Asia  surmised that seizures of 
acetic acid, may indicate a lack of sophistication on the part of groups; that 
is, they likely ordered acetic anhydride and were duped with acetic acid, or 
they themselves do not know that acetic acid is not a heroin precursor. This 
remains largely speculative and additional research is needed on the theme of 
acetic anhydride substitutes.  
Badakhshan and other north-eastern provinces indicates 
that local laboratories receive most of their heroin precur-
sors from eastern Afghanistan through the Pakistan border 
but that small shipments of AA do intermittently come in, 
primarily through Tajikistan. From 2008-2010, the highest 
risk acetic anhydride smuggling point identified was the 
bridge at Nijniy Pianj connecting Tajikistan’s Khatlon prov-
ince with Afghanistan’s Takhar province,419 as well  the 
bridges of Tem, Ishkashim and Darvuz on the border with 
Badakhshan.420 In addition to being the only Central Asian 
country since 2000 to seize acetic anhydride, Tajikistan ter-
ritory has also been targeted in at least two attempts to 
smuggle large amounts of acetic anhydride diverted in the 
Russian Federation. 
The Russian Federation – Central Asia
The lapse of seizures in Central Asia after the year 2000 
needs to be qualified. There were in fact some attempts 
outside the region in which Central Asian countries were 
the purported destination. Most of these attempts were 
foiled by authorities in the Russian Federation;421 this was 
the case in 2001, when Russian law enforcement disman-
tled a network that was planning to smuggle acetic anhy-
dride to an unspecified Central Asian country for onward 
smuggling into Afghanistan. Authorities seized 1.5 tons of 
the substance and arrested six individuals.422 The following 
year, 6 tons of acetic anhydride was seized in the Russian 
Federation. The investigation determined that the ship-
ment had been smuggled from the United States of Amer-
ica through the Netherlands and into the Russian 
Federation. In that particular case, the end user was report-
edly in Kazakhstan.423 
The only acetic anhydride producing plant remaining in 
the Russian Federation is located in Dzerjinsk city 
(Nijegorodskaya Oblast). The Russian Federation has since 
2007 reduced acetic anhydride exports to zero and controls 
are strict but traffickers have nevertheless made some 
attempts at diversion. In 2007, the Russian Federation 
confirmed a 10-ton seizure in Moscow destined for Afghan-
istan through Tajikistan. The seizure was an attempted 
diversion of licit production from the Russian Federation 
through a legitimate company. More recently, 800 kg of 
acetic anhydride were seized by Russian authorities in April 
2011. 
419 In 2008, respondents in a UNODC drug flow survey in Afghanistan reported 
that the sole source of precursors from Central Asia was the bridge at Nijny 
Pianj, see UNODC Drug flow survey 2007, p.11.
420 UNODC Field mission to Badakhshan, Kunduz and Takhar, April 2010, 
October 2010.
421 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2004 on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, s133, p.21.
422 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, p.21.
423 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2004 on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, s133, p.21.
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Once again, it appears that the substance was to be traf-
ficked through Tajikistan.424
Background information on individual cases in the Russian 
Federation is limited, making it difficult to determine 
routes or destinations. During the general lapse in global 
seizures between 2004 and 2007, the Russian Federation 
led the world in acetic anhydride seizures, accounting for 
approximately 50 per cent of reported global seizures. With 
seizures declining in most countries, the reasons for this 
increase are unclear. Although individual seizure data is 
unavailable, a portion of confiscations in the Russian Fed-
424 http://www.fskn.gov.ru/includes/periodics/news_all/2011/0425/004712332/
detail.shtml.
eration appears to be linked to the local production of 
acetylated opium. An example of this is the seizure of 1,500 
litres of acetic anhydride in Voronezh in February 2005, 
which the dealers were selling for almost US$300 per 
litre.425 It was also reported that 10 tons of acetic anhydride 
were stolen in 2004 and since then, no reports of similar 
incidents have been made known to UNODC.426 As previ-
ously mentioned, early in the decade the Russian Federa-
tion had also been a source for acetic anhydride destined to 
Turkey.427
Groups involved 
Given the limited data made available to UNODC and the 
relatively secondary role of the Northern route in acetic 
anhydride trafficking, little information exists on the nature 
of chemical trafficking groups in this region. A first point 
is that unlike Balkan networks, which have had time to 
build trafficking capacity to Afghanistan, the Northern 
route is comparatively more recent, with less entrenched 
trafficking groups. Second, there was a consensus among 
interviewed law enforcement agencies in Central Asia that 
those involved have tended towards specialization and were 
not involved in processing activities for example. Third, 
unlike traffickers plying the Balkan and Southern routes, 
local groups do not appear to be able to access acetic anhy-
dride markets outside their region. Available information 
on the 2007 10-ton seizure in the Russian Federation indi-
cates a multinational group, which included one natural-
ized Russian citizen of Afghan descent and several Russian 
criminal associates.428 In addition to the 10 tons the group 
had secured, it had reportedly planned to dispatch an addi-
tional 300 tons of the substance.429 Such volumes and 
logistical capacity point to well-organized groups with 
access to important revenue streams.430 The limited infor-
mation on the more recent  2011 seizure appears to indicate 
the involvement of Tajik citizens which is consistent with 
the targeting of Tajikistan as the transit country to reach 
Afghanistan. Finally, the 2010 seizure made in Tajikistan of 
a consignment of the chemical from Kyrgyzstan indicates 
regional links however, the volumes suggest the involve-
ment of smaller entrepreneurs.431 
425 “Police seize large stockpile of drug components in central Russia”, BBC 
monitoring, 8 February 2005.
426 	
 March 2004, www.kuzbassinvest.ru/news.
shtml?id=1078981798_2.
427 For example, a seizure of 3 tons of acetic anhydride by Russian authorities 
made in April 2003 was reportedly linked to this route; International Narcot-
ics Control Strategy Report, 2003; Russian Country Report, March 2004, 
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
428 “Russian police seize large batch of heroin precursor destined for Afghani-
stan”, ITAR-TASS news agency, November 7 2007.
429 Dublin group, Regional Report for Central Asia, June 18 2008, /register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st10/st10843.en08.pdf. 
430 In an anecdotal reference to this case, a high-ranking CNPA official evoked 
a method whereby Afghan businessmen would claim to be involved in the 
leather business to purchase acetic anhydride in the Russian Federation; 
Interview with CNPA officials, Kabul, May 08 2008.
431 	, MCH online, www.msn.kg/ru/
news/30314/.
Fig. 49: Seizures of acetic anhydride in the Russian 
Federation, 1999-2009
 
Sources: Reports of the International Narcotics Control Board on the Imple-
mentation of Article 12 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1999-
2009).
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Sources: UNODC Country reports, reports of the International Narcotics 
Control Board on the Implementation of Article 12 of the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
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2.3 GETTING TO MARKET IN  
AFGHANISTAN
In general terms, major opiate and acetic anhydride routes 
use the same infrastructure across the borders of Afghani-
stan. However, the level of inspection of shipments entering 
Afghanistan is not as thorough as that headed in the other 
direction. Passive or active connivance on the part of border 
officials also facilitates acetic anhydride movements. 
Much of the recent data from countries neighbouring 
Afghanistan indicates that acetic anhydride trafficking into 
Afghanistan takes place with the use of container trucks and 
the wide usage of mislabeling. The main methods reported 
to UNODC during the study are outlined below:
• Acetic anhydride mislabeled/disguised as battery acid 
(western Afghanistan)
• Acetic anhydride mislabeled/disguised as innocuous 
chemicals or liquids (reported at all borders)
• Acetic anhydride mislabeled/disguised as motor/engine 
oil (southern and eastern Afghanistan)
• Acetic anhydride mislabeled/disguised as disinfectant 
(southern and western Afghanistan)
• Acetic anhydride mislabeled/disguised as mineral water 
(southern Afghanistan)Acetic anhydride disguises as ed-
ible oil (eastern Afghanistan)
• Acetic anhydride concealed in car parts, used vehi-
cles, household appliances (southern and western 
Afghanistan)
• Acetic anhydride concealed inside oil tankers (western 
Afghanistan)
A combination of field432 and seizure433 data over the past 
three years shows that one of the most commonly used 
stratagems to traffic the substance is to disguise the sub-
stance as engine oil. Reconstruction or general construction 
in Afghanistan also necessitates huge quantities of chemi-
cals, thus creating opportunities for traffickers. Finally, the 
used car business can and has provided cover for illicit traf-
ficking, particularly through Dubai, but also potentially 
along the traditional Balkan route.434 The importation of 
car parts also provides an attractive means of importing 
acetic anhydride, given that both new and second-hand 
spare parts are delivered in containers purchased on order 
by large importers.435 
432 Drug flows in Afghanistan, UNODC, 2007, p.11.
433 “South Korean police arrest Taliban-linked drug ring”, Taipei 
Times, July 5 2008, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/ar-
chives/2008/07/05/2003416563.
434  Another often mentioned route for the use of the vehicle trade involves 
importations from Germany through Turkey and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and into Afghanistan;  see Anna Paterson, “Understanding markets in 
Afghanistan: a study of the market in second-hand cars”,  AREU, October 
2005.
435 Anna Paterson, “Understanding markets in Afghanistan: a study of the mar-
ket in second-hand cars”,  AREU, October 2005, p.20.
Until they reach Afghanistan, consignments of acetic anhy-
dride generally have to follow established transport routes 
and are therefore more likely to come into contact with 
border controls. At the border with Afghanistan, trafficking 
can easily occur using pack mules and even individuals 
crossing over unguarded borders on foot. Much like opi-
ates, some precursor shipments may get divided into smaller 
consignments to facilitate transport and minimize losses in 
case of detection.436 Smaller networks may also opt to 
import small amounts at a time using other means of trans-
portation. In some cases, these dealers may make use of 
professional tribal smugglers to bring their shipments into 
Afghanistan. Other methods include the use of shipment or 
transportation companies and individual bus or truck 
drivers,437 knowingly or unknowingly importing the sub-
stance. Generally, the transporters do not strictly form part 
of a criminal group and they carry considerably smaller 
volumes than what is handled by the larger, better-con-
nected smugglers who can afford to pay the bribes required 
along the main highways.
Smuggling routes into and through 
Afghanistan
The following section presents a summary assessment of the 
border provinces in order to illustrate aspects of processing 
and cross-border interactions in the context of precursor 
trafficking flows. The provincial assessment contained 
therein is therefore not exhaustive and does not include an 
in-depth analysis of inland provinces with seizure histories. 
Eastern and south-eastern regions
Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, three decades of 
conflict have resulted in a closely-knit network of contacts 
that facilitates trafficking in weapons, timber and drugs or 
chemicals. Trafficking on the eastern border of Afghanistan 
is controlled by tribal networks dominated by Pashtuns 
(mostly criminal elements of the Shinwari and Afridi 
436  Interview DEA Kabul, 2010.
437  This appeared to be the case in November 2009 when Afghan police in Hirat 
province seized 100 litres of acetic anhydride in a local transport bus coming 
from the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Torkham border crossing
Source: Asian Development Bank.
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tribes). Nangarhar is the keystone province for acetic anhy-
dride trafficking in the eastern region and no precursor 
trafficking has been reported in the north, in Kunar or 
Nuristan.438 In the south-eastern region, Paktya province is 
another major precursor crossing point and Khost may be 
emerging as an acetic anhydride route into Afghanistan. 
Further south, Paktika has never reported a chemical sei-
zure of any kind.
Nangarhar
Nangarhar boasts the largest border crossing point in the 
country -the Torkham border post- which alone accounts 
for 20 per cent of the customs revenue and 10 per cent of 
Afghan tax revenue. It is also one of two border points 
through which ATTA-authorized traffic can cross into 
Afghanistan. The border is immensely porous and nearly 
half of the travellers at Torkham have property and/or 
family links across the border.439 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)-Nan-
garhar
The main acetic anhydride route into eastern and south-
eastern Afghanistan is through FATA. There is reportedly 
438  There were anecdotal reports of scatted heroin labs in 2006 in Dokalam 
(Nuristan), which were fed through Chitral.
439  UNHCR Research Study on cross-border population movement between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, June 2009.
some acetic anhydride coming from western Afghanistan to 
Nangarhar, but no seizure data is available to confirm this. 
In addition to being processing centres, Nangarhar districts 
directly bordering Pakistan, such as Dur Baba and Aichin, 
have been major smuggling routes for decades. In fact, one 
of the main sources of income for residents on both sides of 
the border is derived from cross-border smuggling,. includ-
ing in opiates.440 Across the border, Khyber agency in FATA 
acts as a consolidation and forwarding point for precursors. 
There are at least three drug/precursor markets in the 
Khyber agency: Landi Kotal (Lwargah), approximately 10 
km from the border with Afghanistan, is the most famous 
precursor/opiate market in the agency; Ali Masjid, which is 
also located 10-15 km from the Afghan border and lastly 
Karkhano Market, located between the Jamrud and Pesha-
war border on the Khyber Pass road. Some traffickers 
reportedly travel outside the region (Lahore, Islamabad, 
Faisalabad, Karachi) to purchase chemicals that they then 
traffic into the Khyber Agency for forward shipment.
Nangarhar has at least 20 unofficial crossing points with 
FATA, through which precursors and a multitude of other 
goods (arms, but also timber and gems in the reverse direc-
tion) are smuggled into Nangarhar. Across these mountain 
passes, local smugglers use mules and in some instances 
simply pack the acetic anhydride on their back and walk it 
440  Interview with CNPA Nangarhar, October 2008; Interview with local infor-
mants, October 2008.
Map 49: Afghanistan border crossing points
Source: UNODC. 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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into Afghanistan.441 Some of these crossings have a govern-
ment presence, but this has not necessarily curbed smug-
gling since some officials receive payments or have familial 
links with traffickers. The price of precursors depends on 
the transportation cost as well as distance of transport. 
Small-scale smugglers plying this route charge a flat rate of 
$25-30 per litre442 for transportation to border districts 
from Khyber. Some are also provided with money to cover 
bribes for officials on either side of the border. Most of the 
chemicals are brought directly to buyers, that is labs on the 
border, while a portion is reloaded onto vehicles and sent 
onward to buyers elsewhere. Most freight carriers transport 
acetic anhydride from Ali Masjid to Achin or Dur Baba 
district (Nangarhar), a widely used route.
CNPA seizure data and UNODC field research indicate 
that heroin processing chemicals not destined for process-
ing in the border districts of Nangarhar are transported 
toward Kabul. Some acetic anhydride consignments are 
veered off into Laghman province for processing, but most 
are headed towards the capital city, which essentially acts as 
a storage and consolidation point for further shipping. 
Although no labs were dismantled in Kabul in 2008, the 
city reported the fourth largest amount of chemicals seized 
441  Interview with UNODC officials, Nangarhar, October 2008.
442  Interview with ABP intelligence head, January 2010. 
in 2008,443 including a 380-litre incident in Kabul gate in 
February. From Kabul, acetic anhydride and other precur-
sors generally follow the ring road and travel northward 
through the Parwan and Baghlan provinces towards Takhar 
and Kunduz, where some chemicals feed the few local labo-
ratories. The final destination of most acetic anhydride 
trafficked along this route are laboratories in Badakhshan. 
Transporting acetic anhydride across Afghanistan is not 
cheap; specialized freight carriers charge approximately 
US$100 for transportation from eastern Afghanistan (Nan-
garhar) to north-eastern Afghanistan (Badakhshan). This 
appears to be a steady and regular supply that increases 
443  “Opiate and precursor seizures in Afghanistan 2008”, UNODC, 2009
Fig. 51: Acetic anhydride route 1
Fig. 52: Acetic anhydride route 2
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Map 50: Acetic anhydride smuggling routes into eastern Afghanistan
Source: UNODC. 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Nangarhar
Bara
Jamrud
Torkham
Dur Baba
Jalalabad
Ali Masjid
Landi Kotal
Tirah
Achin
Kurram
Mohmand
Orakzai
Nowshe
Adam Khel
Peshawar
Khyber
Charsadda
Malakand
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
  
 
Legend
Transit and
destination points
Main roads
Trafficking routes
136
THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE: A  Threat Assessment 
Map 51: Acetic anhydride smuggling routes in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan 
Source: UNODC.  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
slightly during the summer due to the later harvest in Bada-
khshan. Over the years, several seizures testify to the use of 
the east to north-east corridor. 
• In 2004, a routine search of a truck entering Kabul 
revealed 375 litres of acetic anhydride travelling from 
Jalalabad. 
•  In January 2006, over 400 litres of acetic anhydride 
were seized on the route from Kabul to Baghlan head-
ing to Kunduz and further to supply laboratories in 
Badakhshan.444 Later that month, 925 kg of unspeci-
fied precursor chemicals sourced in Shinwar district of 
Nangarhar were seized in Baghlan (Doshi district), also 
headed for Kunduz.
• In May 2008, over 3 tons of chemicals (2,230 kg of 
ammonium chloride, 737 kg of sodium carbonate and 
124 kg of activated carbon) were seized in Kabul. The 
truck had allegedly crossed into Nangarhar and was 
headed to Kunduz.
• In July 2008, 480 litres of acetic anhydride mislabeled 
as hydrogen peroxide ‘made in Pakistan’ were seized 
in Kabul; no further details on this seizure were made 
available.
• In September 2010, 840 litres of acetic anhydride were 
seized in Badakhshan province. The shipment had 
been sent from Kabul concealed in cement and was be-
444  CNPA seizure database.
ing transported to the Baharak district of Badakhshan 
when it was seized in the provincial capital. 
There are no reports or seizures of acetic anhydride being 
transported southward from Nangarhar, a route, which 
would add significant costs and complications for southern 
processors.
Southeast: Paktya, Khost, Paktika, Ghazni
South of Nangarhar, Paktya province also appears to be a 
major trafficking point for heroin precursors, seizing over 
50 tons of different precursors in 2006-2007. In 2008 
Gardez, the capital of Paktya, was the scene of a 2.3-ton 
seizure of acetic anhydride. That seizure followed similarly 
large confiscations of acetic anhydride in 2006 and 2007, 
apparently crossing from Pakistan by truck.445 The topogra-
phy of the border region would seem to make large-scale 
precursor trafficking challenging; yet, Paktya appears to be 
an established branch of the trunk route in Pakistan that 
feeds Nangarhar.  
No laboratories were dismantled in Paktya in 2008; how-
ever, based on law enforcement feedback and seizure data, 
445 Of particular interest is a 2007 seizure of 26 tons of acetic anhydride in the 
provincial capital Gardez. CNPA reports this seizure as 26 tons of ‘unidenti-
fied chemicals and acids’ although the customs mobile units who carried 
out the seizures repeatedly confirmed they had positively identified acetic 
anhydride before handing the case over to CNPA.
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2. Acetic anhydride trafficking
it appears that a portion of precursors entering Paktya is 
directed northward to Nangarhar, while the bulk joins 
flows heading for the northeast. Regarding the latter route, 
shipments are linked with the main ring road (or adjacent 
secondary roads) in the provincial capital Gardez, before 
continuing to Logar or Ghazni to Kabul and further to 
laboratories located in the north-eastern provinces. A 
number of major seizures in Paktya supported this premise, 
including a 2.3-ton confiscation of acetic anhydride in 
2006. The acetic anhydride shipment, which included 
other precursor chemicals,446 was seized in a truck that had 
crossed from the neighbouring Kurram Agency447 and was 
being transported to Badakhshan through Takhar prov-
ince.448 Other seizures from the past two years indicate the 
continued importance of Paktya and its capital Gardez as a 
transit point for onward trafficking of acetic anhydride:
• In May 2006, 20 tons of unidentified chemicals and 
6,670 kg of unknown acid were seized in Gardez.
• In January 2008, 4 tons of chemicals (2,310 litres of 
acetic anhydride and 1,960 kg of ammonium chloride) 
were seized in Gardez. 
Paktya borders Ghazni province, whose significance to traf-
ficking between south-eastern and northern/eastern 
Afghanistan is a result of the ring road crossing the prov-
ince. Some precursors seized in neighbouring Paktya prov-
ince were likely intended to transit Ghazni, although 
Ghazni’s role in processing remains unknown.449 Some 
chemicals crossing into Paktya are reportedly destined for 
other provinces (Wardak, Uruzgan and Zabul), but most 
quantitative and qualitative information seems to testify to 
the importance of north-eastern shipments. There may also 
be minor flows from Paktya to the south, although there is 
no seizure data to substantiates this. 
UNODC information suggests that direct entry to Paktya 
province continues to be the preferred route in this part of 
Afghanistan. At the same time, the province of Khost 
located south of Paktya is also punctured by dozens of 
passes and trails and it is possible that acetic anhydride 
moving through Paktya first transited Khost. On one occa-
sion, a multi-ton shipment was carried across the south-
eastern border by pack animals, then loaded onto a truck in 
446 The seizure consisted of 900 kg of ammonium chloride, 2320 litres of acetic 
anhydride and 165 kg of carbon.
447  The Kurram Agency borders Nangarhar province of Afghanistan in the 
north- west and the Khost and Paktia provinces of Afghanistan in the south-
west.
448  Pajwok News Agency, May 2006.
449  “Opiate and precursors seizures in Afghanistan 2008”, UNODC, 2009, 
p.27.
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Afghanistan. Khost has a comparatively developed infra-
structure including an official truck crossing at the Ghulam 
Khan border point. Only one seizure of acetic anhydride 
was recorded in Khost, in May 2010, but it was a very sig-
nificant incident involving 6.5 tons of the substance.450 
Additionally, a massive 10,000-litre seizure in northern 
Balkh province in August 2009 was reported as having 
crossed from Khost province,451 indicating perhaps the 
emergence of a new acetic anhydride sub-route into 
Afghanistan and again confirming the importance of the 
east to north-east precursor route. Further south, Paktika 
has not reported precursor seizures since CNPA record 
keeping began. Although Paktika also has numerous unof-
ficial crossings handling dozens of vehicles a day, UNODC 
information suggests that Paktika is not a significant acetic 
anhydride crossing point.
Nangarhar seems to dominate the central, south-east and 
eastern regions in processing activity, with Laghman prov-
ince a distant second. In Nangarhar, this takes place par-
ticularly in the remote border areas of Achin, Nazyan, Door 
Baba, Lal Pura, Khogyani, Sherzad and Gohsta districts.452 
It is there that law enforcement control is weakest, while 
government presence is virtually non-existent across the 
border in FATA. Laboratories in this region do not function 
year round -although there are certain periods of height-
ened activity around harvest time- and usually produce 
based on demand and specific orders from traffickers. Over 
the past few years, interdiction fears have forced processors 
into mobile underground facilities, which could be as 
simple as the courtyard of a private home. Laboratory 
owners usually purchase acetic anhydride in small amounts, 
based on their daily or weekly needs and no stockpiling has 
been reported.453 Laboratories in the region typically manu-
facture morphine and several grades of heroin, including 
white heroin hydrochloride. 
North, north-western and north-eastern 
Afghanistan
The north-western and north-eastern regions of Afghani-
stan border the Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and a large section of Turkmenistan, with the 
nature of the border zone varying from country to country. 
The Uzbek and Tajik borders are marked by the Amu 
Darya river, while the area around the Turkmen border is 
mainly desert. There are more than eight official crossings 
with Central Asia including two river ports: 
• Hayraton (Balkh province of Afghanistan - Sukhanraya 
province of Uzbekistan) 
• Sher Khan Bandar (Kunduz province of Afghanistan - 
Khatlon province of Tajikistan).   
450  TARCET database.
451  Information provided by CNPA Balkh, November 2010.
452  Interview CNPA Nangarhar 2010; UNODC drug flow survey (2007).
453  Interview CNPA Nangahar; Interview with Nangahari lab owners, January 
2010.
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These two ports are the primary crossing points in terms of 
trade volumes and infrastructure. They are also potentially 
the most important gateways for landlocked Central Asia, 
providing connections to the seaports of Karachi and 
Bandar Abbas, among others. The range of products 
exported from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is 
limited, mainly consisting of raisins, potatoes and cement. 
Imports seem to consist mostly of oil and oil products. 
Although this section of the Afghan border enjoys strong 
ethnic and cultural ties with Central Asia, with regard to 
heroin chemicals, the most important relationship appears 
to be with Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan. As mentioned 
previously, most chemicals in the north and north-east 
appear to be smuggled from FATA into Nangarhar before 
heading to Kabul towards Balkh, Kunduz, Takhar and 
ending in the laboratories of Badakhshan. There are also 
occasional small inflows from Chitral (Pakistan)454 in the 
summer months, often using pack animals. Interestingly, 
according to interviews with law enforcement officials in 
Badakhshan, during the 1990s most acetic anhydride was 
also transiting Chitral and not, as perhaps expected, Cen-
tral Asia. CNPA officials in north-eastern Afghanistan alsoo 
note that a limited amount of acetic anhydride comes from 
southern Afghanistan and is transported through Kabul 
and into the Kunduz-Takhar-Badakhshan corridor.455 Simi-
larly to the eastern region, laboratories in the north, north-
west and north-east are usually not permanent fixtures. 
Most laboratories operate in Badakhshan province with the 
remainder scattered in Takhar, Kunduz, Balkh, Faryab and 
Baghlan.  
North and north-west – selected provinces: Faryab, 
Balkh 
The Balkh transportation network is excellent by Afghan 
standards and includes the best road link between Kabul 
454  This rarely-used route runs through the Shah Salim corridor in Zebak district 
which doubles as a small opiate route to Garma Chishma of Pakistan.  
455  Interview, Badakhshan, April, 2010.
and Central Asia. Three seizures were reported to CNPA in 
Balkh between 2006 and 2007, including a 1.6-ton confis-
cation of unknown acids and other chemicals in Mazar-I-
Sharif in April 2007; the source of those seizures was not 
identified. In August 2009, a huge 10,000-litre seizure of 
acetic anhydride was reported in Balkh. According to 
CNPA information, it was transported through Khost 
province into Kabul towards Balkh. Its final destination was 
reportedly the north-east (Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan 
provinces).456
According to field information, there was limited labora-
tory activity in Balkh in 2009. Balkh receives acetic anhy-
dride from the east and a smaller inflow from the south, 
most of which is forwarded on to Kunduz and further to 
Badakhshan. There are no reports of acetic anhydride being 
smuggled from Central Asia and the Uzbek side of the 
official Hainatan crossing is relatively well run. Conversely, 
precursor networks may find it convenient to use the bet-
ter-developed infrastructure of Hainatan, as perhaps sug-
gested by a seizure of acetic acid in Uzbekistan during 
Operation TARCET in 2008.
Faryab has a road crossing with Turkmenistan at Akina/
Imam-Nazar. This was previously in poor repair, but in 
recent years the Turkmen Government has invested heavily 
in this infrastructure and licit traffic flows are increasing. 
Irregular crossings in and out of Faryab have always 
occurred, facilitated by ethnic links into eastern Turkmeni-
stan. In 2008, some precursors were reportedly transported 
across this border into Faryab.457 UNODC sources indicate 
that up to 8 labs were active in 2009-2010, all in the 
Kohistan district. Criminal groups in this district have close 
ties with networks in Hilmand province and, as in Balkh, 
Faryab is reported to receive a portion of its acetic anhy-
dride from southern Afghanistan. Finally, the province has 
become increasingly insecure, with predictable effects on 
law enforcement.458
North-east – selected provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, 
Badakhshan, Baghlan
Baghlan sits on a transportation fork, with the well-devel-
oped Balkh-Kabul road heading north-west and direct links 
to Takhar and Kunduz going north-east. Many precursor 
shipments are transported along this route through the 
province, but few seizures were reported in 2008, apart 
from 2,281 litres of unknown chemicals in a single incident 
in the provincial capital; UNODC has no data by which to 
assess the significance of this incidence. Heroin-processing 
labs were located in Tala wa Barfak district in 2007 and 
UNODC has reports of limited laboratory activity in Bagh-
lan in 2009, including one in Tala wa Barfak.  
456  Interview CNPA Balkh, December 2010.
457  “Opiates and precursors in Afghanistan 2008”, 2009, p. 22, UNODC.
458  In early 2009, the Governor of Faryab decided that no eradication effort 
would be made, citing security concerns.
Fig. 54: Daily border crossing volumes by means 
of transportation (Hairatan and Sher Khan 
Bandar), 2008
Source: Asian Development Bank.
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Further north, Kunduz province borders Tajikistan in three 
districts (Qala-e-Zal, Imam Sahib and Archi) and hosts the 
Sher Khan Bandar crossing over the Pianj river. Although a 
reported route for opiates, the port had also previously been 
mentioned as the only Central Asian conduit for heroin 
chemicals in the UNODC 2007 drug flow study.459 While 
no evidence of seizures has emerged, the bridge’s forecasted 
capacity of several hundred vehicles per day and direct con-
nection to Kunduz city and the ring road could potentially 
be misused for chemical movements. In 2009, little labora-
tory activity was identified in Kunduz; UNAMA460 sources 
reported some limited processing in the Imam Sahib dis-
trict and provincial CNPA reports only 100 litres of acetic 
anhydride seized with no laboratory destructions.461
Moving eastward along the border, Takhar province is also 
a transit point for the eastward acetic anhydride flows to 
Badakhshan. Additionally, according to 2010 field research 
there is a possibility that Takhar intermittently receives 
some precursors from Tajikistan as well.462 According to 
2009-2010 UNODC field research, there is some limited 
heroin manufacturing in Takhar.463 As in Kunduz, these are 
small mobile facilities, manufacturing at most 5 kg per day. 
The seizure of small quantities of ammonium chloride and 
acetic anhydride in 2008 could be taken as a sign of process-
ing activity, but it seems equally likely that these were in 
transit to Badakhshan. In 2009, Takhar was the only north-
eastern province to seize acetic anhydride, with 480 litres 
seized in January.
Traditionally a heroin manufacturing area, Badakhshan is 
the longest gateway to Tajikistan. Nine districts of Bada-
khshan have a border with Tajikistan464 and there are three 
official border crossing points or bridges with Tajikistan in 
Badakshan province: Nusay, Shegnan and Eshkashem. In 
2007, there were reportedly as many as 100 heroin labora-
tories in Badakhshan,465 but most were destroyed during 
operations. In 2008 CNPA reported the destruction of 15 
heroin labs and the following year 12 lab destructions were 
reported.466    
CNPA officers, UNAMA sources and UNODC field 
research consistently report that Badakhshan laboratories 
seem to specialize in manufacturing white heroin, necessi-
459 “Monitoring of drug flow in Afghanistan”, UNODC, 2007, p.11.
460 United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan.
461 CNPA report, March 2009- March, 2010.
462 Multiple interviews with drug traffickers, lab owners and CNPA; Badakhshan 
province, April 2010.
463 These were reportedly operating in the districts of Rustaaq, Dashti Qala, 
Yangi Qala, Khwaja Ghar and perhaps Samti. Although there were no reports 
of processing in Takhar the previous year; UNODC, “Opiate and precursor 
seizures in Afghanistan”, 2008, p.20.
464 Wakhan, Eshkashem, Shegnan, Mahimai, Nusai, Shekai, Kofab and Shahr-e-
Buzarg.
465 Interview, CNPA Badakhshan, April 2010.
466 Labs were reportedly active in the districts of Kishem, Warduj, Argo, Da-
rayem, Tishkan, Baharak, Jerm, Khash, Ragh, Faizabad city.
tating large volumes of hydrochloric acid, or an analogue.467 
This seems to square with consistent reporting that north-
eastern opiates are considered to be of high quality and are 
used to cut lower-quality products. This is not, however, 
reflected in the province’s seizure data, which does not 
document a single case of hydrochloric acid seizure. Indeed, 
despite sustained processing in the province since the 
1990s, most seizures have been small in volume and have 
consisted of unidentified chemicals or non-controlled pre-
cursors.468 Since CNPA record keeping began in 2003, 
Badakhshan has reported exactly two seizures of acetic 
anhydride: 40 litres in September 2008 and 840 litres in 
September 2010. Such low seizures, despite continuous 
processing activity and comparatively good security, high-
light deficiencies in counter-narcotics law enforcement.
Western region 
The western region is characterized by rising insecurity in 
Hirat and Baghdis and low Government presence in the key 
provinces of Farah and Nimroz. It also straddles the largest 
drug route out of Afghanistan, along the Balkan route to 
Europe. Most acetic anhydride in this region transits the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and, in some instances, continues 
towards southern Afghanistan. 
Baghdis
There is consistent reporting that opium from Badghis usu-
ally has low morphine content and is therefore rarely used 
to manufacture heroin. However, there have also been sug-
gestions that laboratories may be operating in the districts 
of Murghab and/or Jawan, respectively situated on western 
and eastern borders of Badghis. Security in Badghis deterio-
rated in 2008-2009 and the government’s influence has 
become increasingly constrained. No chemical seizures 
were ever officially reported in the province, but UNODC 
information from Badghis suggests that small-scale precur-
sor smuggling from Turkmenistan occurs using pack ani-
mals. Noting the higher prices of precursor chemicals in 
recent times, this method has likely become more profita-
ble, although it is still likely dwarfed by mislabeled and 
hidden chemicals that arrive via legal crossings in Faryab 
(north-west region) and especially Hirat. 
Hirat
Hirat province borders both the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and Turkmenistan. The Iranian border crossing point is 
Islam Qala. According to 2009 data, Islam Qala reportedly 
processes on average 335 vehicles a day,469 of which approx-
imately 98 per cent are trucks.470 On average 170 vehicles 
cross the border from Afghanistan toward the Islamic 
467 UNODC Field mission to Badakhshan, April 2010, October 2010.
468 CNPA database.
469 Data provided by Afghanistan Customs Directorate; 2009.
470 Information provided by international Mentors based in Islam Qala, October, 
2009.
140
THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE: A  Threat Assessment 
Republic of Iran and 165 vehicles travel from the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to Afghanistan. According to a 2008 study 
conducted by the World Bank in cooperation with 
UNCTAD, 85 per cent of trucks entering through this 
crossing are Iranian, 70 per cent of which arrive from the 
Bandar Abbas seaport in the southern part of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Traditionally, strong cross-border relations 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran were further reinforced by 
the back and forth movement of refugees across the bor-
der.471
As well as the Iranian crossing point of Islam Qala, Hirat 
has a rail and road link with Turkmenistan through Torg-
hundi. In the past, this was the location of large acetic 
anhydride seizures, which have not occurred now for nearly 
a decade. According to sources, small amounts of precur-
sors, originating in the Islamic Republic of Iran, are traf-
ficked through this border, although this account also 
remains anecdotal. Torghundi is also of lesser commercial 
importance than Islam Qala, processing 10-30 vehicles on 
any given day.472
Considering the amount of acetic anhydride purported to 
be crossing into Hirat, there were negligible seizures in 
Hirat in 2008, with only 16 kg of unidentified precursor 
chemicals seized. The largest seizure in the past five years 
involves 369 litres of hydrochloric acid in Hirat city in 
October 2007. Before 2009, the sole example of an acetic 
anhydride sighting concerns a 2004 seizure reported in the 
media, involving 100 litres of the substance seized in a 
private house in Hirat; this said, the seizure does not figure 
in CNPA databases.473 Significantly, drug traders and labo-
ratory operators interviewed in Hirat note no lack of acetic 
anhydride availability.474
As of 2009, laboratory activity was reported in the prov-
ince, including in Hirat city and the Kushk Kohna, Gho-
ryan and Kohsan districts. Heroin processors have also been 
reported using Shindand district, a contested area that bor-
ders Farah and is subject to insurgent influence.475 How-
ever, like most laboratories in western Afghanistan, these 
are mobile, small facilities that typically produce no more 
than 10 kg of heroin per day.476 The only laboratory dis-
mantled in 2008 was a small-scale facility in Hirat city and 
UNODC sources have observed the importation of equip-
ment for ‘at-home’ heroin processing.477 Another indication 
of small-scale processing is that most acetic anhydride 
471 “Local Governance and Cross Border Relations in Afghanistan”, Center for 
Development Research, Universität Bonn, 19 September 2006.
472 Interview with international consultant, Hirat, November 2008; Data pro-
vided by Afghan customs.
473 “Afghan security forces seize drugs in western city”, BBC monitoring, 28 
December 2008.
474 Interview drug trader; Interview with lab operator; Hirat city, November 
2009.
475 “Opiate and precursor seizures in Afghanistan”, UNODC, 2009, p.23.
476 Interview CNPA Hirat; Interview with lab operator; Hirat, November 2009.
477 “Opiate and precursor seizures in Afghanistan 2008”, UNODC, 2009, p.23.
coming into Hirat does not appear to remain in-province, 
but continues southward to Kandahar and Hilmand prov-
ince.478 As an example, in November 2009 a local transport 
bus coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Hirat was 
stopped with 100 litres of acetic anhydride. The investiga-
tion revealed that the chemical was to be shipped by local 
transport to a businessman in Kandahar province. Accord-
ing to UNODC research, smugglers charge US$40-70 for 
west to south transportation inside Afghanistan.
Farah
Moving south along the western border, the rise in insur-
gent control in Farah has created an environment condu-
cive to opium poppy cultivation, processing and trafficking. 
Farah is an entry point for acetic anhydride transported 
through the Islamic Republic of Iran and, in a perhaps 
related trend, in recent years it has become a host for heroin 
processing. The usage of trucks and fuel tankers seems to be 
the preferred modus operandi for precursor trafficking and 
the Mil-78 (Qala Kah district) crossing appears to be a 
major thoroughfare.479 Sources in Farah described a smug-
gling method involving 25-litre jerry cans hidden inside 
hollowed fuel tankers that were then filled with water (and 
some fuel) and smuggled into the province. Visits by 
UNODC staff to crossing points on the Afghan side of the 
border in 2008 and 2010 confirm that commercial truck 
traffic from the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to be 
heavy both at legal and illegal border crossings. In that 
regard, UNODC witnessed a number of large fuel smug-
gling operations in remote southern Farah, including one 
involving a very large truck stop in full sight and with the 
apparent complicity of provincial authorities.480  
Heroin production in Farah and Hirat provinces peaks 
immediately after harvest time, when opium prices are 
lowest. UNODC has identified lab activity in Farah centre, 
Bakawa, Qala Kah and Bala Bluk districts. Most labs appear 
to be concentrated in Bakawa district481 and some are under 
the control of networks from adjacent Nimroz province.482 
All this activity translates into very few heroin chemical 
seizures reported with the exception of two confiscations in 
October 2007 in Farah city (the capital) consisting of 
unknown chemicals and 1,250 kg of ammonium chlo-
ride.483 
Nimroz
Nimroz is located in south-western Afghanistan and bor-
ders both the Iranian province of Sistani-Baluchistan (222 
km) and the province of Baluchistan (223 km) in Pakistan. 
478  Interview, Ghoryan Chief of Police, Ghoryan district (Hirat), November 
2009.
479  Information provided by the Afghanistan Customs Directorate, June 2008.
480  Information provided by international officials, June 2008.
481  Interview CNPA Farah. 
482  Interview, UNAMA analyst, June 2010.
483  CNPA seizure database.
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Milak-Zaranj bridge in Nimroz province
Source: UNODC
mined number of other unofficial crossing points on the 
Nimroz section of the Iranian border.491
One commonly reported smuggling route is a river port 
named Korki (Kang district), which is reportedly used 
extensively when the river dries up. This port is also used 
for legitimate trade, particularly imports of liquefied gas.492 
Nimroz traders interviewed for this research underscored 
the complete lack of police presence in the area of Korki 
and the heavy smuggling taking place there. In many areas 
along this border, smuggling has been a way of life for cen-
turies. As one Nimroz trader put it, “where we have houses 
or small villages near the border we have smuggling for 
sure”.493 Iranian authorities have reportedly finalized con-
struction of a wall along the border with the Kang district 
in Nimroz province, ostensibly to prevent drug smugglers 
from slipping into the Islamic Republic of Iran.494
In terms of trade, Nimroz is most closely linked to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and is dependent on Iranian cur-
rency, locally called Toman. The continued development of 
trade links with the Islamic Republic of Iran may provide 
further opportunities for precursor traffickers to blend in 
with licit traders; furthermore, the numerous smuggling 
routes on the Iranian border (particularly in Farah and 
Nimroz) also have a strong potential to be used by acetic 
anhydride traffickers. Border control remains a tremendous 
challenge and would benefit greatly from strong trilateral 
cooperation. 495
491 Including Bazaar Mushtarak, Godar Samad, Gudar Khoaja, lakari in the 
Zaranj district;  Haji Jan, Neshkoshi, Sharshila, Talaie and darvishok in the 
Kang district and and Khujah Ali in the Charburjak district; see Institute for 
Afghan Studies, Afghanistan’s International Trade Relations with Neighboring 
Countries, 2001,  www.institute-for-afghan studies.org/Afghan%20Recon-
struction/Economy/intltrade.pdf; personal communication with traders in 
Nimroz, June 2008.
492  “Nimroz custom revenue up”, www.onlinenews.com.pk/details.
php?id=133522.
493 Interview, June 2008.
494 Amin Tarzi, “Kabul mulls relations with Iran”, Radio Free Europe, March 16 
2007. 
495  “Opiate and precursors seizures in Afghanistan 2008”, UNODC, 2009.
The border with the Islamic Republic of Iran is formed by 
the Hilmand river, which dries out completely in the 
summer months. Nimroz also borders two major poppy 
growing and processing provinces (Hilmand and Farah) 
and is itself a major processing centre, as evidenced by the 
destruction of numerous laboratories in 2007.484 As of 
2010, UNODC has received reports that heroin is being 
manufactured in the districts of Khashrod, Chahrburjak, 
Delaram, Zaranj (mainly the Deh Maldaran area). Most 
labs in the province appear to be concentrated in Khashrod 
district, which straddles the ring road.485   
As stated above, Nimroz is a major trafficking hub, strad-
dling some of the most important drug routes out of 
Afghanistan and into Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. The border with Pakistan is largely desert and isolated, 
forming one giant illegal crossing point. The Robat area at 
the junction of the borders of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran is also a major drug and precursor 
trafficking route that is under the control of Anti-Govern-
ment Element (AGE) groups.486 The precursor route from 
the Islamic Republic of Iran through Nimroz and into Hel-
mand is well worn and there are reports that the Taliban 
provide protection to some acetic anhydride shipments 
moving through this route. Trafficking from Hirat travels 
south, along the route: Hirat-Farah/Nimroz - Helmand or 
Kandahar).  
There is one official crossing point in Nimroz, the Milak-
Zaranj bridge over the Parian river bordering Sistan-Balu-
chistan province in the Islamic Republic of Iran. On 
average, 90 transit trucks - inbound and outbound - cross 
the bridge on a daily basis.487 This crossing has for years 
been suspected as a major entry point for acetic anhydride, 
but only in 2010 has this been supported by evidence. In 
December, 2010 a shipment of 86 plastic containers total-
ing 3457 kg was seized by Afghan Customs at the cross-
ing.488 However, perhaps the most important smuggling 
point in the province is the unofficial Robat I Jali489 (Chahar 
Burjak district) crossing, located 200 km south-west of 
Zaranj. This isolated crossing sits on the corner of Pakistan 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran and doubles as a major 
smuggling route for narcotics.490 There is also an undeter-
484 UNODC, Afghanistan: Opium poppy free roadmap and provincial 
profiles, June 2008, www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Blue_
Opium%20Poppy%20Roadmap-Work%20in%20Progress_June08.pdf.
485 There may be other drugs being processed in Nimroz labs, military lab inter-
dictions in 2009 found evidence of methamphetamine production.
486 Interview CNPA Kandahar, 17 December 2009; Interview UNAM Kanda-
har, 18 December 2009.
487 Interview, Director of customs, Nimroz, March 2010.
488 Information provided by the UNODC country Office in Afghanistan, May 
2011.
489 Information provided by UNAMA 2008; interview with United Nations 
officials, September 2008. 
490 This route has a long history and was widely used by the Afghan Mujahideen 
during the war against the Soviet Union. It was identified early on by Alain 
Labrousse in his work “La drogue, l’argent et les armes”, (Paris: Fayard, 
1991), p.125.
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Southern region
In Afghanistan, opium production and processing are con-
centrated in the southern provinces, such as Hilmand and 
Kandahar, where the insurgency and lack of Government 
control provide the ideal cover for these illicit activities. 
Heroin labs are located in the following districts of Hilmand 
province: Nad e ali, Marja, Musa Qala, Sangin, Garmser 
and Dishu. The southernmost Dishu district, it appears, 
houses the largest concentration of laboratories.496 In Kan-
dahar, heroin labs (mostly mobile) appear to be concen-
trated in Maiwand, Spin Boldak, Ghorak, Panjwayi and 
Nish districts. 
In this region, Pashtun and Baluch networks control both 
the drug and precursor trade. Most bulk shipments of acetic 
anhydride come from the southern border with Baluchistan 
province in Pakistan, but a significant number of small 
shipments are sent from western Afghanistan into Hilmand 
province. The south does not seem to receive acetic anhy-
dride from eastern Afghanistan. This is logical since, from 
the perspective of southern Afghan drug processors, receiv-
ing acetic anhydride through that region has additional 
costs and complications, as the chemicals must then be 
transported through eastern and central Afghanistan back 
down to southern laboratories.
Kandahar
Kandahar has a 450-km border with Baluchistan in the 
south and south-east and borders the Afghan provinces of 
Zabul in the north-east, Oruzgan in the north and Hilmand 
in the west. The province has one official crossing point at 
Spin Boldak, considered the second most important port of 
entry into Afghanistan, after Torkham. In December 2009, 
customs at Spin Boldak estimated that on average 300-350 
vehicles cross the border from Pakistan (almost all com-
mercial trucks) and 20-25 vehicles are directed to Pakistan 
daily.497 
Kandahar city is a main road junction, strategically situated 
along the trade route extending from Karachi in the south 
and from the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkmenistan in 
the west to Kabul. Notably, Spin Boldak district in Kanda-
har was the location of the largest acetic anhydride seizure 
in 2008, with 7,500 litres destined for Hilmand province 
confiscated in a single incident. In 2010, Kandahar was 
again the site of a major acetic anhydride seizure. In May, 
police in Spin Boldak seized 4,590 litres of acetic anhy-
dride, along with 2,100 kg of the explosive precursor 
ammonium nitrate and 1,775 kg of ammonium chloride.498 
The 2008-2010 period contrasts sharply with previous 
years, which saw few precursor seizures in the province 
496 Interview, June 4-6 2010, Kabul, Afghanistan.
497 Interview, Director of Customs, Kandahar, 18 December 2009.
498 CNPA.
particularly from 2003 to 2007.499 Insurgent-linked insecu-
rity likely accounts for such negligible seizure numbers 
between 2004 and 2007, as do limited local data collection 
and reporting capacity. 
Hilmand
Hilmand is at the core of the global trade in Afghan opiates. 
In addition to being a big producer of opium, Hilmand is 
also the location of large, fixed heroin processing facilities, 
such as the ones found in the village of Baramcha, which 
straddles the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
This remote area is a major entry point for precursors and 
one of the most insecure areas in Afghanistan.500 Despite 
having the largest concentration of drug laboratories in 
Afghanistan, until 2008 only one 4-litre seizure of acetic 
anhydride was reported to CNPA. Hilmand, however, 
seized 15.5 tons of ammonium chloride in 2006-2007, 
almost half the total amount seized in Afghanistan.501 A 
more informative case, which does not appear in the CNPA 
database, concerns the apprehension of over 200 litres of 
acetic anhydride in July 2007 in the Nadali district. 502  A 
year later, the same district was the site of the only acetic 
anhydride seizure made in Hilmand in 2008, consisting of 
an 80-litre seizure made in February. It should be noted 
that over 20 tons of various precursor chemicals and 
‘unknown acids’ were also seized in Hilmand during the 
2003-2007 period, but the proportion of acetic anhydride 
remains unclear. Although most precursor seizures are made 
in the vicinity of laboratories in northern Hilmand (Musa 
Qala, Sangin, Lash Karga and Nadali), Afghan law enforce-
ment also reported two seizures in March 2007, following 
lab interdiction operations in Baramcha (Dishu district) 
along the border with Pakistan. Alongside military forces, 
significant law enforcement resources are devoted to 
Hilmand, although they operate in a difficult environment 
that includes not only regular bribery, but also constant 
physical threat. In 2009 and in testament to the particularly 
dangerous conditions in the province, approximately 20 
tons of acetic anhydride were seized in ISAF-assisted opera-
tions in Hilmand - more than the country’s total acetic 
anhydride seizures in 2008 (the highest year since 2003) 503 
and a huge increase over the seizures made in that particular 
province in 2008.
Groups involved
Criminality in Afghanistan spills over into neighbouring 
states with many traffickers having multiple citizenships 
499 The earliest one, only reported in local media, consisted of 170 kg of un-
known chemicals seized in a vehicle in Kandahar city.  Official seizure data 
accounts for 30 kg of unknown chemicals in the Zari district in December 
2004. Only two other seizures were reported before 2008, both in March 
2007 in the capital Kandahar consisting of 670 litres of unknown acid.
500 Phone interview with Nimroz ABP official, 14  September 2008.
501 CNPA database.
502 Along with 2 tons of ammonium chloride; Information provided by 
UNODC Kabul.
503 ISAF seizure database.
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and often not actually residing in Afghanistan itself. In and 
around Afghanistan, criminal activity can be roughly 
divided into two broad and sometimes overlapping catego-
ries: locally operating independent dealers and regional 
drug syndicates, most of which benefit from political con-
nections. The method for transferring the chemicals inside 
Afghanistan depends on the network’s importance and con-
nections.
The largest shipments are brought in directly across major 
crossing points by politically connected opiate networks. 
These are usually the largest and best-established traffickers 
who have integrated their own precursor supply lines and 
are in many cases connected to high-ranking officials. 
Examples of drug syndicates integrating precursor supply 
lines include the recently sentenced Haji Khostel504 and 
Haji Abdullah - both operating along the western border of 
Afghanistan in Nimroz province - and Haji Baghcho, who 
was based in eastern Afghanistan.505 However, in general 
terms, this kind of overlap is less obvious in the east than in 
the south and west of the country.506 In some cases, public 
officials themselves are involved in trafficking; the March 
2010 conviction of a CNPA commander in Balkh province 
for acetic anhydride trafficking is a clear example of this. 
Another example of the latter concerns a network that 
reportedly controls the Spin Boldak crossing in southern 
Afghanistan and allegedly uses it to traffic opiates and 
smuggle shipping containers filled with acetic anhydride 
diverted in China.507 
In Afghanistan, most precursor traffickers are often local 
businessmen or traders who also smuggle other goods into 
Afghanistan (such as oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran), 
with acetic anhydride just acting as another ‘grey market 
commodity’ to tap into. Afghan intelligence officers 
advanced that some traffickers were directly involved in the 
car oil or construction business, which provides a cover for 
importing chemicals and other liquids. Few appear to spe-
cialize solely in precursors trafficking, as 2007 research by 
UNODC seems to also indicate.508  Thus, in Afghanistan 
the precursor trade closely mimics the dynamics apparent 
in licit trade. 
At the retail level, most traders appear to be long estab-
lished; for instance, one lab owner interviewed by UNODC 
had dealt with the same supplier for 15 years. In a similar 
fashion, such suppliers appear to have a fixed long-standing 
504 According to INSCR 2010 “Investigators obtained evidence linking  Khostel 
to the trafficking of more than 1,700 kg of heroin, 4,100 kg of opium and 
2,700  litres of precursor chemicals.”; “directly linked by this evidence to 
1.7 tons of heroin, 4.1 tons of raw opium and 2.7 tons of heroin processing 
chemicals”.
505 Interview CNPA Nangarhar, interview ABP Nangarhar, January 2010.
506 AOTP Interview with a drug trafficker and head of Jalalabad CNPA, 2010; 
Interview with head of Nangarhar CNPA and phone interview with Mazar 
CNPA deputy, May, 2010.
507 Mathieu Aikins, “The Master of Spin Boldak”, Harper’s Magazine, December 
2009, pp.59-62.
508 Drug flows in Afghanistan, UNODC, October 2007, p.15.
circle of buyers that is, lab owners. These locally-operating, 
independent dealers can traffic as little as a few dozen litres 
a week to laboratories across Afghanistan. In some cases, 
their supply comes from the aforementioned larger net-
works in the country. 
According to multiple sources, the higher acetic anhydride 
prices in Afghanistan have provided incentives for more 
players to enter the trade; this may include elements of the 
Afghan insurgency.509 Indeed, with rising prices and the 
long-term concentration of insurgents and processors in a 
few provinces, there are increased opportunities for direct 
insurgent involvement and entry into the supply chain, 
including in acetic anhydride procurement. 
Laboratories, capacity and the price of 
processing
Heroin production is often a simple process, without the 
need for complex technology or technical training. Corre-
spondingly, heroin laboratories are not large industrial 
facilities, but fairly rudimentary constructions that can be 
contained within one or two rooms of any given com-
pound. Equipment generally consists of several large barrels 
or enamel containers, several basins, a pressing machine, a 
heat source (diesel generator, firewood) and the raw mate-
rial - opium. Beyond that, the only prerequisite is access to 
a water source (rivers or wells). Facilities are usually tempo-
rary in nature and many are located near unofficial border 
crossing points for ease of smuggling. 
From opium production to heroin production
The transition to heroin manufacture inside Afghanistan 
occurred incrementally. In the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey 
was a major processor of Afghan morphine. During that 
same period, a number of refining laboratories operated in 
FATA in north-western Pakistan. In 1994, as many as 100 
labs with an estimated heroin production capacity of 70 
tons per year were believed to be operating in that region.510 
The country’s initial refining operations (mostly morphine 
production) were located close by, in eastern Afghanistan, 
near the transport routes to FATA. During the 1990s, these 
spread gradually into other opium-producing areas in the 
south-eastern and north-eastern regions. During this same 
period, opium seizures in countries neighbouring Afghani-
stan decreased and smuggling of acetic anhydride to 
Afghanistan increased, including huge multi-ton shipments 
through Central Asia. The years that followed saw process-
ing become increasingly concentrated in Afghanistan, 
making the entire trade far more lucrative for local traffick-
ers, as refined products are much more profitable. Today, 
taking into account that Afghan opium accounts for up to 
85 per cent of global heroin manufacture, it is reasonable to 
assume that most processing occurs in Afghanistan. In 
509 Interview, Hilmand traffickers and lab owners, Kabul 2009.
510 US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
(INSCR), April 1994.
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Heroin laboratory in Kunduz, north-eastern 
Afghanistan, 2009
Source: UNODC Country Office Afghanistan.
addition to Afghanistan, it should be noted that the only 
confirmed large-scale heroin manufacture takes place in 
Myanmar and Latin America (primarily Mexico). 
Laboratories in Afghanistan
In recent years, the largest laboratories reported by Afghan 
authorities were located in the remote areas of southern 
Afghanistan, particularly the border areas of Hilmand prov-
ince where Government control is weak and instability is 
high.511 Some of these include a few fixed, long-term settle-
ments contrasting with the smaller mobile facilities that can 
be found throughout most of Afghanistan. The south also 
appears to dominate numerically, followed by western 
Afghanistan and the processing centres of Nangarhar and 
Badakhshan.
Lab owners generally purchase the opium from local trad-
ers, although some in Hilmand deal directly with the farm-
ers given the low risk of exposure;512 on the contrary, acetic 
anhydride is usually distributed by acetic anhydride traders 
or brought directly to the laboratories by smugglers. Accord-
ing to field data, laboratories generally employ 4-12 work-
ers (usually drug addicts) and one ‘chemist’ that for the 
most part simply follows set recipes. Only a minority oper-
ating in the country are experienced and knowledgeable 
cooks, which generally include foreigners from Pakistan, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran or Turkey.513 
There are numerous estimates on the number of laborato-
ries in Afghanistan and obvious limitations when attempt-
ing to quantify an activity that is by nature hidden. 
Estimates as to the number of laboratories in Afghanistan 
range from 100 to 500. At the high end of the range, offi-
cials of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service estimated 
that as many as 500 laboratories were active in Afghanistan 
511 In provinces like Hilmand, they are usually near the remaining opium mar-
kets.
512 Interview with Hilmand lab owner, Kabul, June 2010. 
513 Jon Boone, “Afghan drug lords hire foreign chemists,” Financial Times, July 
28 2008.
in 2010.514 In 2008, the UNODC survey on drug flows in 
Afghanistan estimated that at least 97 laboratories operated 
in the country; however, once again numbers are only 
indicative515 due to limited data availability and data collec-
tion errors, such as double counting. On the other hand, 
the accurate number of laboratories destroyed provides a 
picture of the minimum number of laboratories present in 
the area. Afghan authorities reported the destruction of 69 
similar facilities516 in 2008,517 although this represented less 
than a third of lab destructions reported in 2006.518 The 
table below also suggests what may be a worrying trend: 
despite the reported increase in Afghan law enforcement 
capacity since 2004, lab interdictions have in fact declined.
Most surveys and intelligence–based estimates attempting 
to quantify laboratory activity begin with supply side esti-
mates. Another method would be to start from the demand 
side (an estimated 380 tons are produced in Afghanistan to 
meet global demand) and estimate back to the lab level to 
calculate the number of laboratories required to manufac-
ture 380 tons of heroin. There are regional divisions with 
respect to heroin processing and heroin types, but these are 
not absolute. Not unexpectedly, Hilmand and Kandahar 
provinces host some large heroin labs that can manufacture 
20-40 kg of heroin daily, with some reports claiming even 
higher outputs. In certain parts of Hilmand, such labs may 
have as many as 15-20 individuals working at any given 
time, depending on the security situation (for example, 
depending on law enforcement pressure) and the orders 
received from traffickers. It is estimated that the average 
annual production per laboratory is around 1,300 kg in 
both southern provinces. 
514 RIA Novosti, en.rian.ru/russia/20100628/159613460.html.
515 Drug flows in Afghanistan, UNODC, 2007.
516 By way of comparison, Myanmar authorities dismantled 24 heroin labora-
tories over a three year period (2006-2008); UNODC, “Patterns and Trends 
of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants and Other Drugs in East and South-East 
Asia”, November 2009, pp 86-91.
517 UNODC Afghanistan country office, “Analysis of Opiate and Precursor 
Seizures in Afghanistan in 2008”, 2009, p.13; UNODC, 2009 World Drug 
Report, p.37.
518 Already in 2002, 417 labs were reportedly active in Afghanistan; see “Allies’ 
heroin habit a dilemma for the US”, The Associated Press, 15 October 2002; 
see also Roger McDermott, “Border security in Tajikistan”, October 2002. 
Conflict Studies Research Center.
Table 32: Heroin lab destructions in Afghanistan,  
2004-2009
Year Number of reported lab destructions
2004 125
2005 188
2006 263
2007 57
2008 69
2009 48
Source: CNPA/MOI Afghanistan.
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Map 52: Reported heroin lab activity in Afghanistan by province, 2009-2010 
Source: UNODC.  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
In the west, it was estimated that the average annual pro-
duction per laboratory, which was gleaned from survey 
data, stood at approximately 300 kg per year. Like most 
laboratories in Afghanistan, these also function just a third 
of the time, or approximately ten days a month. The over-
whelming majority of laboratories appears to be small and 
consisting of mobile facilities mostly concentrated in inse-
cure areas of Farah or Nimroz and to a less extent Hirat and 
Baghdis. In the eastern region, the average annual produc-
tion capacity is around 1,200 kg per lab. These laboratories, 
mostly concentrated in Nangarhar and to a lesser extent 
Laghman, go largely undetected and can be quickly moved 
in response to law enforcement pressure.519 In some dis-
tricts, such facilities may be shared among five or six fami-
lies. Similar to the eastern region, laboratories in the north, 
northwest and northeast are usually not permanent fixtures. 
Most of them operate in Badakhshan province with the 
remainder scattered in Takhar, Kunduz, Balkh, Faryab and 
Baghlan. The average annual heroin manufacturing capac-
ity is estimated 1,150 kg per laboratory and processing 
appears to mostly occur between late June and late Decem-
ber.520 
519 According to one informant in Aichin, “The lab may be located in one house 
for 2-4 weeks and then be moved to another house to avoid detection”.
520 UNODC Mission to Mazar, interviews with CNPA, UNODC Survey coor-
dinator, CNAT, ABP officials, December 2009.
In order to collect information, a survey of selected lab 
owners in Afghanistan was undertaken.521 The methodol-
ogy used for data collection in this report is a pragmatic 
approach to a first rapid and explorative assessment in a 
521 Approximately 30 lab owners were repeatedly interviewed in Afghanistan in 
2009-2010. Formal semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus group dis-
cussions were conducted over a period of six months. Surveyors supplement-
ed interview data with information gathered through participant observation 
while working in the regions in question.
Region Average annual 
production (kg) per 
laboratory
East 1 200
North, North-East and 
North-West 1 150
West 300
South 1 300
Average annual  heroin 
manufacture per lab  980 kg (rounded) 
Estimated 2009 heroin 
manufacture 380 tons
Estimated number of  
heroin labs 385
Source: UNODC.
Table 33: Average annual heroin production and 
estimated number of heroin laboratories 
in Afghanistan, 2009
Laghman
Logar
Kabul
Paktya
Khost
Nangarhar
Kunar
Nuristan
Kunduz
Samangan
Wardak
Parwan
Jawzjan Takhar
Bamyan
Sari Pul
Baghlan
Paktika
Badghis
Faryab
Zabul
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Ghazni
Uruzgan
Badakhshan
Kandahar
Nimroz
Ghor
Hilmand
Farah
Hirat
Day Kundi
Panjshir
Kapisa
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ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC
OF IRAN
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UZBEKISTAN
Provinces with illicit
laboratories
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High processing activity
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region that includes difficult and insecure areas where 
obtaining information can be dangerous. This is reflected 
in the limited number of lab owners that could be inter-
viewed (30). For present purposes, the figures presented are 
therefore only intended as an indication of the level of 
activity required in this part of the opiate trade and should 
be treated as illustrative rather than authoritative. Moreo-
ver, a similar survey with a larger sample size will be con-
ducted in 2011 and the results will be provided in a 
forthcoming report. 
According to the survey results, the average Afghan annual 
heroin manufacturing per laboratory is 300 kg in the west, 
1,150 kg in the north-east, north and north-west, 1,200 kg 
in the east and 1,300 kg in the south. Thus, it could be 
estimated that a laboratory manufactures on average 980 kg 
a year. In turn, an estimated 385 laboratories would be 
required to manufacture 380 tons annually. Within this 
context, it should be noted that there is a variety of lab sizes 
and daily/weekly outputs, so the estimated number of labo-
ratories and annual production estimates are intended as 
indicators of the level of activity required in this part of the 
opiate trade, rather than actual numbers of laboratories in 
operation on a given day.
The crucial variable or main determinant to reach these 
estimates required information on the average lab produc-
tion in Afghanistan, taking into account geographic varia-
tions. Most laboratories in Afghanistan do not function all 
year round and generally operate based on demand and 
specific orders from traffickers. The typical heroin manu-
facturing period are the months following the harvest 
season, usually June and July in southern and western 
Afghanistan, when opium is cheaper than the rest of the 
year. Research by UNODC seems to indicate that most 
laboratories operate 10 days a month, which equals roughly 
120 workdays per year.  
Market value and prices
Market-size estimates are based on price data; however, 
unlike in the case of legitimate commodity markets, it is 
difficult to obtain accurate illicit acetic anhydride prices.522 
Prices collected informally by UNODC in Afghanistan 
indicated a retail cost of US$350 in 2009 (2009 prices 
ranged from $250 to $450 a litre, with a mid-range point 
of $350). Given that acetic anhydride demand in Afghani-
stan is estimated at 380-570 tons (mid-range point 475 
tons) this would imply a retail market value of approxi-
mately $13-200 million annually (mid-range point of 
$165 million). 
522 The way prices alter at market level is a significant gap in our understanding of 
illegal acetic anhydride markets. There are strong suggestions that international 
precursor controls – though not having a real impact on availability – have, at 
least, an impact on prices. Apart from standard conclusions on more effective 
interdiction or increased demand, there is no strong evidence that individually 
or together these would have resulted in such a sharp and prolonged spike in 
prices. 
Fig. 55: The value chain of acetic anhydride from 
India to Afghanistan
Sources: CNPA; AOTP research in Pakistan and Afghanistan; UNODC 
Regional office for South Asia.
The acetic anhydride supply chain
As would be expected, acetic anhydride prices are highest in 
Afghanistan. It is worth reiterating that no licit demand for 
acetic anhydride exists in Afghanistan, although there have 
been cases of attempted importation in the past.523 UNODC 
currently has limited data on prices outside Afghanistan, 
but one basic observation is that the value added across 
countries is substantial. For example, in 2009 illicit retail 
prices in India were approximately 60 per kg,524 for acetic 
anhydride destined for Afghanistan. Once in Pakistan, the 
same litre of acetic anhydride was sold for US$200, yielding 
a substantial mark-up, while in Afghanistan the cost was 
around $300. The figure below shows the outline of the 
system and includes estimates of the prices and value added 
to the acetic anhydride at each level.
Illicit acetic anhydride prices for Afghanistan, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Pakistan were reported to UNODC 
researchers in the field. All other prices are taken from 
interviews with law enforcement or sources quoting law 
enforcement officials. Thus, the resulting information 
should not be viewed as a reliable guide, but rather as a 
snapshot of the types and prices of acetic anhydride avail-
able in certain locations at a certain point in time.
Acetic anhydride prices for both the Republic of Korea and 
523 The first documented example occurred in May 2007 when the drug regulation 
committee of Afghanistan received an application from a commercial com-
pany in Kandahar province for a license to import 70 tons of acetic anhydride 
(enough to manufacture at least 70 tons of heroin). The company proposed 
importing the substance from a Chinese company for the purposes of ceramic 
tile production. The Ministry of Trade and Commerce, the Ministry of Public 
Health, and the Afghan Investment Support Agency (ISA) all submitted writ-
ten expressions in support of the application to the Committee. The applica-
tion was eventually rejected. A year later, another attempt was reported, again 
from Kandahar province. The company proposed importing 1,000 litres of 
acetic anhydride from the Republic of Korea, transiting via the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran. (source: UNODC Country Office Afghanistan).
524 This ratio is dependent on quality, location and law enforcement pressure; 
information provided by UNODC Country Office India, August 2010 and 
UNODC sources in Afghanistan, June 2010.
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China seem out of place compared to prices in Europe, and 
in countries neighbouring Afghanistan. The Republic of 
Korea figure is based on the wholesale price traffickers alleg-
edly paid for a 12-ton shipment,525 while the second figure 
is from an official 2008 report issued by the Chinese 
National Narcotics Control Commission. Lower prices in 
the Republic of Korea are likely due to perceived lower risk 
and fewer intermediaries. Additionally, if these prices are 
correct, sourcing from Asia would appear to lead to higher 
mark-ups for traffickers in Afghanistan or its neighbours, 
while the greatest price differential would be between 
Europe and Afghanistan. In Europe, price mark-ups appear 
to occur earlier in the trafficking chain, consistent with law 
enforcement risks. Smuggling by sea (Republic of Korea, 
China) may also be less expensive than road transportation 
through the Balkan route. In any case, due to the rapid 
increase in value as precursors approach Afghanistan, most 
of the profit is realized inside Afghanistan or in its neigh-
bouring countries.
In 1998, at a value of US$24 per litre in Afghanistan,526 the 
acetic anhydride trade offered a more modest income to 
retailers. Prices steadily climbed over the following 7-8 
years, but a sharp spike occurred sometime between spring 
2007 (approximately $145 a litre)527 and spring 2008 
525 Financial Action Task Force, “Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism,” Korea, 26 June 2009, 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/43439553.pdf. 
526 1998 prices ranged from $13 to $34, “The opium economy in Afghanistan: an 
international problem”, UNODC, 2003.
527  “Monitoring of Drug Flow in Afghanistan,” UNODC, 2007.
Country Price/L Year reported
India $60 2009-2010
Pakistan $200-300 2009-2010
Republic of Korea  $4-6 2009
China  $12 2007
Islamic Republic of 
Iran $220-250 2009-2010
Slovakia  $25 2010
Bosnia and Herze-
govina  $130 2010
Bulgaria $100 2010
Turkey $200-225 2010
Sources: Afghan Opiate Trade Project; law enforcement agencies of Slovenia; 
law enforcement agencies of Bosnia and Herzegovina; law enforcement 
agencies of Slovakia; UNODC regional office for South Asia; local media 
sources (Republic of Korea, China).
Table 34: Reported illicit acetic anhydride prices 
(wholesale) in selected countries, 
2007-2010
($350).528 Due to insufficient data, there are no conclusive 
answers as to why the price of acetic anhydride has risen so 
sharply and how this resonates internationally. The rise in 
prices does roughly correspond to a 250 per cent rise in 
global seizures from 2007 to 2008, but this does not neces-
sarily indicate causality. Increased law enforcement pressure 
is one variable in most illicit markets, while stricter controls 
in source regions may have raised the risk of diversion and 
consequently costs downstream. 
Although price data is severely limited, there are indications 
of price increases in other regions. For example, according 
to the UNODC Regional Office for South Asia, illicit retail 
prices of acetic anhydride in India were estimated at $20 a 
litre in 2005,529 but reached approximately $45 a litre in 
2009.530 China also reported an increase in illicit acetic 
anhydride prices of nearly 50 per cent between 2004 and 
2007.531 Altogether, these developments suggest that the 
trade in heroin precursors may be experiencing disruptions.
Acetic anhydride prices in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan itself, there is evidence of more efficient law 
enforcement leading to additional risk premiums, particu-
larly with the growing engagement of International Secu-
rity Assistance Forces (ISAF) in counter-narcotics operations 
in the south. As an example, before the recent military 
operations in Hilmand, the average acetic anhydride price 
in the province was $260 per litre. During operations, the 
price jumped to $420 and as of April 2010 had come back 
down to $315.532 
At the national level, acetic anhydride prices range widely, 
reflecting several other potential variables beyond law 
enforcement pressure, such as buyer-seller relationships, 
quantities purchased (retail or bulk), frequency of purchase, 
origin (real or perceived) and transportation costs.  
In 2009, the price of acetic anhydride varied substantially 
between and even within regions and provinces in Afghan-
istan. This was less apparent in the 2007 drug flow survey 
carried out by UNODC, with national prices ranging from 
$140 a litre in southern, western and eastern Afghanistan 
to $150 a litre in the north and north-east.533 When analyz-
ing 2009-2010 price data, the discrepancy between the 
north/north-east and the rest of the country has widened 
considerably. The average cost of a litre of acetic anhydride 
in the northeast ($420) is higher than anywhere else in 
Afghanistan and is most prone to fluctuation. Acetic anhy-
528 “Addiction, crime and insurgency: the transnational threat of Afghan opiates”, 
UNODC, 2009.
529 UNODC, India Country Profile, 2004.
530 Prices ranged from $25 to $65 (median point: $45) per kilogram depending 
on a variety of factors such as quality, location and law enforcement presence. 
Information provided by UNODC Country Office India, August 2010.
531  “Addiction, crime and insurgency: the transnational threat of Afghan opiates”, 
UNODC, 2009, p.68.
532 UNODC Mission to Hilmand province, 21 March - 08 April 2010. 
533 UNODC Drug Flow Survey 2007, p.12.
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UNODC research indicates that Nangarhar is the main 
supplier of acetic anhydride for areas in the north (Balkh) 
and all of the north-east (including Takhar, Kunduz and 
Badakhshan). The links between the two regions are well 
established, particularly between the two processing centres 
of Nangarhar and Badakhshan. For example, many Nan-
garhar heroin laboratories relocated to Badakhshan in 
2001-2002.535 That link is still strong today, with several 
laboratories in Badakhshan reportedly under the control of 
a single network based in Nangarhar536 and many lab work-
ers hailing from that province. Moreover, according to 
UNODC drug flow surveys in 2008, Badakhshan also 
received morphine for processing exclusively from Nan-
garhar. In 2008, some Badakhshan prices in the spring had 
reached $700 a litre, likely due to acetic anhydride 
shortages;537 north-eastern purchasers face occasional supply 
Precursor networks and heroin lab owners reportedly test the purity of acetic 
anhydride through a litmus paper, before striking any deal for purchase of 
acetic anhydride. A good quality acetic anhydride shows its actual colour on 
the litmus paper.  Part of the concerns with purity may also be linked to the 
practice of blending acetic anhydride with other chemicals, a form of ‘cutting’. 
535 Interview, UNAMA analyst, June 16 2008; Interview ABP Nangarhar 2008; 
Interview, UNAMA analyst, March 2009.
536 Interview, UNAMA analyst, June 2010, Kabul. 
537 Badakhshan was also the only province to report acetic anhydride shortages in 
October 2007; “Heroin lab destroyed in Afghan north”, Voice of the Islamic 
dride in the south is sold for approximately $290 a litre and 
appears to vary less between districts and provinces. Whole-
sale-level prices for acetic anhydride in the western prov-
inces were the lowest national prices – reportedly related to 
the perceived low quality of the acetic anhydride availa-
ble.534  
534 Lab owners interviewed in Afghanistan informed UNODC that the purity of 
acetic anhydride is directly proportional to heroin quality, noting that 97-98 
per cent of pure acetic anhydride is required to prepare good quality heroin. 
Region Average price per litre in US$
Eastern region (Nangarhar) 325
Central Region (Kabul) 300
Northern region (Balkh) 385
Northeast region  
(Takhar, Kunduz, Badakhshan) 420
Western region (Farah, Hirat, 
Nimruz, Baghdis) 260
Southern region (Kandahar, Hilmand) 290
Afghanistan average 330
Source: UNODC Afghan Opiate Trade Project.
Table 35: Illicit acetic anhydride prices in  
Afghanistan, 2009-2010 
Map 53: Illicit acetic anhydride prices in Afghanistan (by region) and main acetic anhydride routes,  
(snapshot, May 2009) 
Source: UNODC. 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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problems likely due to reliance on eastern suppliers. Prices 
for other precursor chemicals also seem to be higher in 
Badakhshan.538
The lack of a stable and sufficient acetic anhydride supply 
line from Central Asia (particularly due to the distance 
from the major acetic anhydride pipelines in southern and 
western Afghanistan) likely plays the biggest role in driving 
the overall higher prices found in Badakhshan and the 
north-east. As an example, 1 litre of acetic anhydride in 
FATA costs $200, but once across the border in Nangarhar 
it can be sold for $250. However, if the consignment is 
transported across Afghanistan, the price can go up sub-
stantially as the same litre will generate 60 per cent more 
revenue in north-eastern Afghanistan.539 This is not due 
solely to transportation costs, but also to informal pay-
ments collected by law enforcement agencies, as the chem-
ical is transported across the country. 
At the prices quoted above, it becomes profitable to engage 
in small-scale trafficking - for example to travel to a neigh-
bouring country with 20 kg of opium and return with 20 
litres of acetic anhydride. If even small shipments are finan-
cially viable, there will likely be an impact on precursor 
trafficking logistics by increasing the sale of smaller volumes 
and the subsequent use of minor routes, making interdic-
tion more difficult. 
According to 2009-2010 data, prices in the country are 
Republic of Iran External Service, Mashhad 1 Oct 2007.
538 As an example, ammonium chloride costs $6.38 per kg ($1.67 per kg in Nan-
garhar) while ammonium costs $45 per litre ($1.40 per litre in Nangarhar).
539 Interview CNPA, 2010.
Fig. 56: Acetic anhydride prices in Afghanistan by 
province, 2009-2010
Source: UNODC Afghan Opiate Trade Project.
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generally lower in the fall and winter and increase leading 
up to harvest season. This makes sense, considering that 
processors require acetic anhydride to process the opium 
immediately after it is harvested; this phenomenon is par-
ticularly pronounced in the eastern and north-eastern 
region. The sudden drop in prices in 2010 affected both 
regions and was attributed to increased importation from 
Tajikistan and Pakistan.540 In general, the supply of precur-
sors is not a smooth process and shipments are for the most 
part erratic since Afghans cannot control supply lines, 
unlike in the case of opium. 
The impact of prices on processing 
In most markets, price increases generally lead producers to 
seek alternatives. In the illicit market, the additional risk 
premiums (that is, increased international vigilance and 
seizures) likely add a form of urgency. Since large seizures 
of acetyl chloride and acetic acid were made in countries 
neighbouring Afghanistan between 2008 and 2010, there 
has been speculation that processors are attempting to use 
substitutes.541 However, in Afghanistan there is little evi-
dence (in the form of seizures) that analogues are used, even 
though seizures made outside the country appear to gener-
ally coincide with rising acetic anhydride prices in Afghan-
istan. One lab owner interviewed in eastern Afghanistan 
noted the following: 
A few years ago, when acetic anhydride prices 
became very high, there was new chemical avail-
able for processing morphine to heroin. The 
process with this chemical was sophisticated and 
the result was not good. This kind of heroin cre-
ated a lot of problems between local and inter-
national drug traffickers. So, with time, this new 
chemical disappeared from the heroin indus-
tries. Now, in all heroin labs here in Nangarhar, 
the only chemical used for processing morphine 
to heroin is acetic anhydride. 542
Higher precursor prices do not seem to have impacted 
heroin processing or precursor availability. It is possible that 
the price increase has led some to do more with less, such 
as experimenting with lower volumes of precursor chemi-
cals or mixing acetic anhydride with other analogues. This 
should theoretically compromise quality, but there has been 
little change in the reported purity levels of heroin in 
Afghanistan. 
Although the higher cost of acetic anhydride should logi-
cally increase heroin prices, in some areas these may have 
even been lowered due to declining acetic anhydride avail-
ability; in fact, by limiting the quantities of the product 
540 Interview with opium farmers and lab owners in Nangarhar and Badakhshan, 
July-August 2010.
541 This shift to substitutes seems to have already occurred with cocaine and the 
reported use of non-controlled chemicals in its manufacture.
542 Interview, Nangarhar, January 2010.
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some general price patterns have also been identified. The 
first observation is that the price of acetic anhydride has 
steadily increased over the past ten years. Following the 
opium poppy ban in 2001, it had reached an all-time low 
in early 2002 of $8 per litre544 and by April 2004 it 
amounted to $20-$25. According to intelligence informa-
tion reported by the United Kingdom to UNODC, the 
January 2005 price for acetic anhydride in Nangarhar 
amounted to $60-$65 per litre. The UNODC drug flow 
survey published in October 2007 (findings from July 
2007) showed prices averaging $140 a litre in the east.545 In 
2008 there was a huge jump in the reported price with a 
doubling (and in some regions like Badakhshan tripling) of 
the retail price of acetic anhydride. 
544  Price reported in Ghani Khel district, Nangarhar; Thomas Pietschmann, 
Mission Report “UNODC participation at the BKA meeting on production 
of heroin in Afghanistan”, UNODC, 20-21 January 2005. 
545  UNODC “Drug Flow Survey 2007”, p.12.
Fig. 58: Heroin and acetic anhydride prices in Nan-
garhar province 2005-2010
Source: UNODC.
that can be purchased, higher prices would limit the amount 
of opium (morphine) that can be processed into heroin. In 
such periods, there is likely to be an increase in morphine 
exports. An average of 18.5 tons of morphine was seized in 
Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran between 2003 
and 2006.543 In 2008, Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran seized a combined 16.3 tons of morphine, mostly close 
to the Afghan border and representing 95 per cent of global 
morphine seizures that year. In 2009, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran seized some 16 tons of morphine, 70 per cent of 
global seizures. Base morphine is used to produce heroin 
but the purpose of trafficking morphine to Pakistan and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran remains unclear given the negligi-
ble levels of morphine use in those countries.  
It is important to note that morphine seizures almost always 
concern border areas. In theory, mobile laboratories (con-
sisting of gas fired stoves attached to the back of large 
trucks) should have no hindrance crossing a border. The 
rustic and mobile nature of laboratories combined with the 
porous and unsupervised nature of the Afghan border 
means that a laboratory could easily be operating along the 
border with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan or 
Tajikistan, without authorities on either side being aware 
that a boundary has been crossed. Laboratories have also 
been known to temporarily relocate across the border in 
anticipation of military operations in southern Afghanistan. 
As an example, interdictions in Pakistan during 2006 
involved laboratories operating no more than 800 metres 
from the border, which facilitated the escape of lab employ-
ees into Afghanistan where Pakistan agencies could not 
follow. Given the relative ease of setting up small mobile 
refineries, the absence of law enforcement control along 
certain sections of the Afghan borders and the expertise 
available on both sides of the border, the possibility that a 
portion of opium produced in Afghanistan is processed 
outside the country deserves further investigation. How-
ever, in order to make a real reduction in precursor costs, 
laboratories would have to be moved, or rather set-up, 
closer to the source since that is where the mark-up occurs.
Costs and proﬁt margins
The average price for one litre of acetic anhydride in 
Afghanistan is US$330, which implies between $350-500 
in acetic anhydride costs for each kilogram of heroin. 
Beyond acetic anhydride, there are a number of direct and 
indirect costs associated with the manufacture of heroin, 
which drive up the price of processing and translate into 
more modest profits for heroin processors than otherwise 
expected.  
Various studies of heroin trade dynamics have been con-
ducted in Afghanistan since the 1990s, mainly in Nan-
garhar province. Although primarily focused on heroin, 
543  Turkish seizures of morphine are negligible and the last heroin laboratory 
detected was in 2006.
Fig. 57: Average prices for acetic anhydride in 
Nangarhar province, 2002-2010
Source: UNODC.
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In any manufacturing environment such a jump in prices 
would be reflected in the price of the end product. How-
ever, looking at average heroin prices in Nangarhar, there 
does not seem to be a comparative increase in heroin prices 
relative to acetic anhydride prices; in fact the opposite is 
observed.
At these prices, acetic anhydride makes up a significant 
proportion of the costs of manufacturing heroin. For exam-
ple, in May 2010 in Nangarhar, acetic anhydride cost 
around $416 per litre. A kilogram of dry opium was $167. 
With the understanding that 1 litre of acetic anhydride and 
7 kg of dry opium are required to obtain 1 kg of brown 
heroin, the cost of these inputs is $1,586. In the same 
month, price monitoring by UNODC in Nangarhar reports 
a price of $2,517 per kilogram of heroin.
At face value, that leaves a margin of $917 per kilogram, 
excluding all other input costs, such as labour. This means 
that lab owners must factor in expenses such as rent and 
employee salaries, including the cook.546 Generally the cook 
546  Most cooks in Nangarhar heroin labs are Afghans of the Shinwari Tribe, but 
at times, foreign expertise may be brought in, further raising overheads. In 
is not paid a daily wage, but by production units. According 
to current information, an average cook receives $25 per kg 
of heroin manufactured. In other words, for a typical 10 kg 
heroin processing cycle, a cook can expect to earn $250. 
Yet another cost must be absorbed by processors; in the 
east, there is strong evidence that in Nangarhar province 
(the Khugiani and Sherzad border areas) heroin lab owners 
give financial support - between $600 and $1,200 per 
month for each lab - to anti-government elements.547 This 
insurgent tax is more widespread in the south, with numer-
ous reports suggesting that some laboratories in Hilmand 
offer a portion of their income to insurgent groups in 
exchange for protection. In Badakhshan, some laboratories 
also pay a monthly tax of around $1,000 to police officers, 
local elders or local warlords.548 
2008, UNODC drug flow surveyors identified two types of foreign chemists 
in Nangarhar, Turkish and Pakistani: 1. A Pakistani cook is paid 40,000 rupees 
a day from Pakistan. 2. A Turkish cook is paid 60,000 to 80,000 rupees a day 
(roughly $800).  
547  Aziz Ahmad Tassal, “Hilmand Heroin Menace Grows”, Institute for War & 
Peace Reporting (ARR No. 351, 04-Feb-10).
548  UNODC has not received any reports of insurgent taxation in other north-
eastern provinces where the Taliban presence is more marked, such as Takhar.
Substance
Average 
price in 
 $/kg (May 
2010)
Chemical volumes 
required per kg of 
opium
Chemical volumes 
required per kg of 
brown heroin  
(rounded)
Cost ($) per kg 
of brown heroin 
produced
Calcium oxide 0.24/kg 0.1 1 kg 0.24
Ammonium chlo-
ride 1.67/kg 0.29 2.5 kg 3.34
Acetic anhydride 416 0.11 1 416
Sodium carbonate 1.56/kg 0.29 2.5 3.12
Activated carbon 
(charcoal) 7.14/kg 0.09 1 7.14
Concentrated 
hydrochloric acid 1.40/lit 0.02
Concentrated 
ammonia  
solution
1.40/lit 0.02
Acetone N/A 0.002
Opium 167/kg 7 1170
Total 1600 (rounded)
Price for one kg of brown/white heroin 2517
Estimated profit 917
* This is a snapshot of prices in Nangarhar’s Aichin district in May 2010 combined with the observed quantities used in heroin processing by the BKA in 2005.
Source: Adapted from BKA observations, “Documentation of heroin manufacturing process in Afghanistan”, 2005. 
Table 36: Nangarhar, estimated chemical/opium volumes and cost of processing 1 kg of brown heroin 
base*
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considerably to about 13 tons per annum. Relative to the 
overall size of the Afghan acetic anhydride market, the 2009 
seizures constitute about 8 per cent of national acetic anhy-
dride requirements and are valued at approximately $12 
million on the Afghan retail market. In addition, the 
amount of acetic anhydride seized in 2009 was enough to 
process as much as 40 tons of heroin compared with an 
estimated actual production of 380 tons.
Increased seizures in 2009-2010 seemed to have had little 
impact on acetic anhydride prices, which are comparable to 
2008 prices.549 This does not however indicate that seizures 
are not having an impact on trafficking activities; UNODC 
believes that, as a result, laboratories no longer buy precur-
sors in bulk, but prefer small orders based on daily or 
weekly production. This is supported by acetic anhydride 
seizures themselves, which are generally small, perhaps indi-
cating that large stockpiles may be held away from labora-
tories and that acetic anhydride is simply drip-fed to these 
facilities.550 It must be added that interviewees in southern 
and western Afghanistan were unaware of any heroin chem-
ical stockpiles, at least in Afghanistan. A related trend is 
that laboratories are becoming more mobile and short-
term, partly in response to law enforcement pressure. The 
situation is somewhat different for laboratories in Hilmand 
and Kandahar, since some of these, such as those situated 
in Baramcha, are fixed facilities; lab destructions in these 
provinces still only concern small quantities. 
According to 2008 research, laboratories now tend to keep 
on site only the amount of chemicals needed to prepare a 
particular batch and manufacturing seems to occur increas-
ingly at night, another sign that the environment is less 
permissive.551 This can be seen in documents obtained by 
UNODC, which detail the results of three interdiction 
operations on 26 labs in Nangarhar between January and 
April 2008. The elite United Kingdom-trained Afghan 
Special Narcotics Force (ASNF), that carried out the opera-
tions, seized 7,754 kg of almost every heroin processing 
chemical (ammonium chloride, sodium chloride, hydro-
chloric acid, sodium carbonate, soda power, carbon and 
acetone), but not acetic anhydride. It is more difficult to 
explain why numerous other lab interdictions lead to sei-
zures of every chemical except acetic anhydride. It should 
be noted that there also exists a thriving secondary market 
of on-selling seized acetic anhydride by corrupt law enforce-
ment officials who will substitute it with another chemical 
(such as hydrochloric acid).552
549  “Addiction, crime and insurgency: the transnational threat of Afghan opi-
ates:”, UNODC, 2009, p.68.
550  Some acetic anhydride traders keep acetic anhydride stocks on both sides of 
the border; potential candidates are the border regions of Pakistan and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and perhaps Kabul, which acts a forward shipping 
area for both north-eastern and southern laboratories.  
551 Joanna Wright, “Blood flowers - Afghanistan’s opium industry remains 
robust”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Dec 11, 2008.
552 “Opiate and precursor seizures in Afghanistan 2008”, 2009, UNODC 
Even taking informal payments and labour costs into 
account, refining is still profitable, particularly if we con-
sider the practice of cutting of the heroin, which means that 
1 kg manufactured from the laboratory becomes 1.5 or 
even 2 kg when sold.
Interdiction
Usually, the most direct and obvious indicator of processing 
or trafficking activity is seizure data. While there is clear 
evidence that shipments seized along major routes are des-
tined for Afghanistan, the country only started seizing large 
volumes recently. In 2008, Afghanistan reported its largest 
acetic anhydride seizures to date (totaling 14,234 litres). 
This was a substantial increase over the previous year but 
still constituted only about 3 per cent of estimated require-
ments (475 tons) and Afghanistan averaged about 5 tons 
seized annually. In 2009, seizures increased nearly threefold 
(38 tons), mostly linked to military seizures carried out by 
ISAF and ANA forces in southern Afghanistan. Similar 
figures are reported in 2010 which brought up the average 
Fig. 60: Acetic anhydride seizures in Afghanistan, 
2003-2010*
Source: Collated from data provided by ISAF, CNPA, UNODC Country 
Office Afghanistan. 
* preliminary data for 2010  based on available data as of 31 May 2011.
Fig. 59: Proportion of acetic anhydride to other 
chemicals in the production of one kg of 
brown heroin
Source: Adapted from BKA observations 2005.
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2. Acetic anhydride trafficking
Some of the largest chemical seizures in Afghanistan con-
cern substances that are not under international control and 
are, by extension, much cheaper and easier to procure. As a 
UNODC report notes, these chemicals have licit uses 
within the country and are locally available, thus making 
interdiction efforts more difficult.553 These chemicals are 
used to extract morphine from opium; others are used to 
purify intermediate and final products. They include 
ammonia, sodium carbonate, charcoal, ammonium chlo-
ride and lime; for example, ammonium chloride accounts 
for the largest proportion of all heroin chemical seizures, 
followed by acetic anhydride. It is striking that in seizure 
data, the category named ‘unknown chemicals’ accounts for 
the largest proportion of seizures due to the current limited 
precursor chemical testing capacity in Afghanistan.554 
Some controlled chemicals, such as hydrochloric acid, are 
used almost exclusively to produce white heroin hydrochlo-
553 UNODC, “Targeting precursors used in heroin manufacture”, 2007, p.5.
554 An additional explanation came to light during fieldwork in Nangarhar. The 
researcher found that Afghan law enforcement and locals familiar with heroin 
processing referred to acetic anhydride simply as ‘acid’. It is therefore likely 
that many seizures classified as ‘acid’ or ‘unknown chemicals” actually consist 
of acetic anhydride.
Fig. 61: Disaggregated chemical seizures 
in Afghanistan, 2003-2008
Source: CNPA.
Unlabeled bottles of acetic anhydride hidden in 
wooden fruit boxes
Source: UNODC Jalalabad provincial office.
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ride. Assuming use of the recipe identified by the German 
Federal Police, the 890 litres of hydrochloric acid seized in 
Afghanistan in 2008 would be sufficient to manufacture 
approximately 2.3 tons of heroin hydrochloride.555 As 
shown in the figure below, almost all seizures (94 per cent) 
of identified hydrochloric acid556 occurred in the eastern, 
south-eastern and central areas of Afghanistan. Paktya prov-
ince in south-eastern Afghanistan ranks ahead mostly on 
the strength of one seizure of 3,100 litres made in May 
2006.557 One recorded seizure of 2,110 litres of hydrochlo-
ric acid in Kabul takes second place, with 35 per cent fol-
lowed by Nangarhar (18 per cent) and Hirat (5 per cent). 
The presence of hydrochloric acid is thought to be an indi-
cator that heroin hydrochloride is being manufactured in 
the eastern region.558 Conversely, the limited seizures of 
hydrochloric acid in Hilmand should not be understood as 
an indicator of negligible heroin hydrochloride manufac-
ture in that region.
Nangarhar is the only province where there are reasonably 
consistent seizures of heroin processing chemicals. The 
majority (58 per cent) of all identified acetic anhydride was 
seized in Nangarhar province between 2003 and 2008. 
Notably, Spin Boldak district (Kandahar) was the location 
of the largest acetic anhydride seizure in 2008, with 7,500 
litres (destined for Hilmand province) confiscated in a 
single incident. This seizure placed the province in second 
555 Most heroin hydrochloride was traditionally manufactured in the north-east 
and east of the country, reportedly destined for the Russian Federation. The last 
few years have seen increased reporting of heroin hydrochloride or “chrystal” 
production in the west (Farah, Hirat) and south, mostly Hilmand, which were 
then shipped to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The further trajectory of this 
heroin is unclear given that the use of heroin hydrochloride is not widely used 
in Europe. Low quality heroin (under 10 per cent) is typically used for local 
abuse and/or abuse in neighbouring countries (mostly Pakistan; see Baluch-
istan section).
556 Hydrochloric acid is a notoriously risky and volatile substance, often associated 
with experienced chemists.
557 The substance was reportedly sourced in Pakistan and destined for Nangarhar.
558 Brown heroin (a free base), is the most commonly available form of heroin 
in Europe. White heroin is much less common and likely destined for other 
markets.
Fig. 62: Share of seizures of hydrochloric acid in  
Afghanistan by province, 2003-2008
Source: CNPA.
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place (24 per cent) in 2008, followed by Paktya. Paktya is 
followed by Kabul, a transit point for precursor and drug 
flows in all directions. Negligible amounts of acetic anhy-
dride were seized in Baghlan, Takhar and Badakhshan 
(north-eastern region) respectively. Virtually no seizures of 
acetic anhydride were reported to the Counter Narcotics 
Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) in western Afghanistan 
(Farah, Hirat and Nimroz) from 2004 to 2008. Signifi-
cantly, before 2008, southern seizures were similarly negli-
gible and remained so until 2009 for Hilmand province 
(only 1 per cent from 2003-2008), the hub of the Afghan 
processing industry. 
Seizures in 2009 reflect the growing engagement from 
ISAF, with seizures in Hilmand accounting for the majority 
of seizures. Seizing acetic anhydride for the first time, the 
northern province of Balkh confiscated 10,000 litres of 
acetic anhydride in a single operation in August 2009. In 
the east, Nangarhar remains a high-seizure area, but once 
again acetic anhydride is conspicuous by its absence in the 
west and north-east of Afghanistan. For the west, this state 
of affairs remained largely unchanged in 2009 but 2010 
saw the first seizures of acetic anhydride in Nimroz prov-
ince since CNPA record keeping began in 2003.559 Simi-
larly, in the north-east Badakhshan authorities seized 840 
litres of acetic anhydride in September 2010, a 20-fold 
increase over its only other recorded seizure. In 2010, Kan-
dahar was again the site of major acetic anhydride seizures 
including a seizure in may of 4,590 litres of acetic anhy-
dride along with 1,775 kg of ammonium chloride.560 
It should be noted that each region’s share of seizures 
depends on the extent to which their interdiction is priori-
tized by local law enforcement. As an example, the volumes 
of acetic anhydride seized in the south (2003-2008), par-
ticularly in Hilmand province, clearly do not reflect the 
559 In December 2010, 3,456 kg of acetic anhydride were seized in Nimroz.
560  UNODC Kandahar provincial office, 12 May 2010.
region’s position as the main heroin processing area (as 
made clear from 2009 seizures). Similarly, the relatively few 
seizures in the west and north-east do not negate the pos-
sibility that significant amounts of acetic anhydride may be 
flowing through an area, but rather indicate that little is 
done to stop them, either by design or by necessity. More-
over, data collection is still very weak in Afghanistan and 
available seizure data may not be an accurate reflection of 
all actual seizures in Afghanistan. Seizure data thus needs to 
be supplemented by contextual information; this includes 
qualitative information, data on prices, purity levels and an 
approximation of final indicators, including interdiction. 
Finally, the way prices alter at market level is a significant 
gap in our understanding of illegal acetic anhydride mar-
kets. There are strong suggestions that international precur-
sor controls – though not having a real impact on 
availability – have, at least, an impact on prices in Afghan-
istan. Apart from standard conclusions on more effective 
interdiction or increased demand, there is no strong evi-
dence that individually or together these would have 
resulted in such a sharp and prolonged spike in prices. 
These and several other knowledge gaps will be further 
studied and analysed in the next report from the Afghan 
Opiate Trade Project.
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Fig. 63: Acetic anhydride seizures in Afghanistan 
(shares by province), 2003-2008
Source: ISAF.
Fig. 64: Acetic anhydride seizure volumes in  
Afghanistan by province (litres, 2009
Source: CNPA Database.
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Map 54: Reported seizures of acetic anhydride in Afghanistan, by province, 2003-2010
Source: CNPA, ISAF, UNODC Country Office Afghanistan.  
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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Chapter 1
The findings in this report were calculated by examining a 
range of indicators, such as demand statistics together with 
the opiate seizure databases of the WCO and UNODC, as 
well as the ARQs and individual country reports. During 
the estimation period, experts from specialized global 
organizations such as the WCO were consulted and pro-
vided their input. Similarly, all concerned UNODC field 
offices were consulted regarding the estimations of heroin 
and opium abuse in their respective regions.
Analysis of both opiate abuse and seizure data from 2009 
was carried out to track the pattern and estimate the mag-
nitude of opiate flows throughout the world. The total 
amount of heroin abused was calculated for each country, 
then combined with official seizure data and balanced 
against total manufacture. Manufacture, abuse and seizure 
data were analyzed together. For example, the size of esti-
mated heroin flows from Afghanistan or Pakistan to coun-
try “X”, should be similar to the amount of heroin abused 
and intercepted in country “X” and the destination and 
transit countries receiving heroin via country “X”. First, 
heroin or opium demand in the main destination regions 
or countries was calculated. Then, by drawing on seizure 
statistics from each country, the amounts of heroin or 
opium flowing between the countries were estimated. As 
this report aims to provide global insights as well as orders 
of magnitude, the flows represented on maps should be 
considered broadly indicative rather than definitive flow 
outlines. Flows may deviate to other countries along the 
routes and there are numerous secondary flows that may 
not be represented. Moreover, trends respond rapidly to 
changes in law enforcement and demand. Opiate flow esti-
mations would therefore be revised if demand statistics 
provided in the UNODC World Drug Report were to 
change. The estimates will be updated periodically as new 
drug abuse data is provided by Member States. 
Calculations used in this report are outlined below. Some 
rows do not add up due to rounding, estimates or discrep-
ancies in information. Estimates are unable to be made for 
some countries due to a lack of information.
Country or region
Trafﬁcked 
out  
(rounded
+ Consumption + Seizures - Domesticproduction =
Amount 
trafﬁcked in  
(rounded)
Western and Central 
Europe 0 + 69 + 7.5 - 0 = 77
Northern Europe 0 + 3 + 0.126 - 0 = 3
South-East Europe 59 + 5 + 18 - 0 = 82
Russian Federation and 
Eastern Europe 2 + 73 + 3.1 - 0 = 78
Central Asia 77 + 11 + 3.4 - 0 = 90
Islamic Republic of Iran 91 + 16 + 39 - 0 = 145
Pakistan 138 + 20 + 2 - 0 = 160
Afghanistan 365 + 5 + 2.2 - 380 = 0
Oceania 0 + 3.8 + 0.2 - 0 = 4
East and South-East 
Asia 3 + 80 + 7.8 - 25 = 65
South Asia 15 + 23 + 1.2 - 15 = 25
Americas 0 + 25 + 3.5 - 41 =
Domestic production 
is much higher than 
consumption. 
Africa 9 + 34 + 1.2 - 0 = 44
Source: UNODC, country ARQs, World Customs Organization.
Note: for the purposes of this report all calculations in the table are listed in pure heroin form. Pure heroin originates from Afghanistan and has an esti-
mated 70 per cent purity. Street level heroin is normally around 10 per cent purity before consumption. All consumption figures above have been converted 
to pure heroin value.
Table 38: Heroin trafﬁcking calculations, tons, 2009
ANNEX 1: METHODOLOGY
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Chapter 2
The precursor chapter provides a snapshot analysis of the 
acetic anhydride illict distribution system to Afghanistan. 
Qualitatively, it draws on considerable consultations includ-
ing in-country visits in Central Europe, Afghanistan, Paki-
stan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Central Asia and the 
Balkans. Sources consulted include law enforcement offi-
cials in Central Europe, the Balkans, Turkey, Central Asia 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as acetic anhydride 
traffickers and heroin processors in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan. Much of the quantitative data used was taken from 
several primary sources, namely UNODC field collection, 
UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and seizure data 
provided by Member States. The law enforcement agencies 
of Pakistan, Hungary, Slovenia, India and Turkey to name 
a few, lent their expertise and provided detailed disaggre-
gated statistics on seizures. Data provided by UNODC 
offices in South Asia, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Bulgaria were also utilized. An exten-
sive review of UNODC and International Narcotics Con-
trol Board (INCB) published documentation was 
undertaken, including the World Drug Report, the Afghan-
istan and Myanmar Opium Poppy Surveys and numerous 
publications by the Laboratory and Scientific Section of 
UNODC. 
The information and the derived estimations contained in 
this study are subject to revised conclusions due to the 
inherent difficulty of gathering accurate data on illegal 
enterprises or consumers of illegal commodities. There is no 
simple research practice that could satisfy these concerns, 
but it is hoped that this effort will serve to contribute to a 
stronger evidence base to inform heroin precursor control 
efforts. 
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Table I Table II
Acetic anhydride Acetone
N-acetylanthranilic acid Anthranilic acid
Ephedrine Ethyl ether
Ergometrine Hydrochloric acid
Ergotamine Methyl ethyl ketone
Isosafrole Phenylacetic acid
Lysergic acid Piperidine
3,4-methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone Sulphuric acid
Norephedrine Toluene
1-phenyl-2-propanone
Piperonal
Potassium permanganate
Pseudoephedrine
Safrole
 * The UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
ANNEX 2  Substances controlled 
under the 1988 convention*
